Individuality of Elementary Particles

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Individuality of Elementary Particles

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 1

Not Berquist’s writing; a text he kept. By Erwin Schrodinger. From his file: INDIVIDUALITY OF ELEM PARTICLES.doc.

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INDIVIDUALITY OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES

Erwin Schrodinger, Nature and the Greeks:

Quantum theory....tells us that what was formerly considered as the most obvious and fundamental property of the corpuscles, so much so that it was hardly ever mentioned, namely their being identifiable individuals, has only a limited significance. Only when a corpuscle is moving with sufficient speed in a region not too crowded with corpuscles of the same kind does its identity remain (nearly) unambiguous. Otherwise it becomes blurred. And by this assertion we do not mean to indicate merely our practical inability to follow the movement of the particle in question; the very notion of absolute identity is believed to be inadmissible...particles of any kind exhibit the character of waves which become the more pronounced the slower they move and the denser they crowd, with the corresponding loss of individuality. (pp. 14-15)

...atomism has proved infinitely fruitful. yet the more one thinks of it, the less one can help wondering to what extent it is at true theory...It behooves us, so I believe, to preserve an extremely open mind towards the palpable proofs of the existence of individual single particles, without detriment to our deep admiration for the genius of those experimenters who have furnished us with this wealth of knowledge. (pp. 86-87)

Erwin Schrodinger, “What is an elementary particle?” in the collection of Schrodinger papers entitled Science,Theory and Man, Dover Publ., N.Y.:

This essay deals with the elementary particles, more particularly with a certain feature that this concept has acquired - or rather lost - in quantum mechanics. I mean this: that the elementary particle is not an individual; it cannot be identified, it lacks ‘sameness’. The fact is known to every physicist, but is rarely given any prominence in surveys readable by non-specialists. In technical language, it is covered by saying that the particles ‘obey’ a new-fangled statistics, either Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics. The implication, far from obvious, is that the unsuspected epithet ‘this’ is not quite properly applicable to say, an electron, except with caution, in a restricted sense, and sometimes not at all.” (p. 194)

The relative permanence of individual pieces of matter is the most momentous feature of both everyday life and scientific experience. If a familiar article, say an earthenware jug, disappears from your room, you are quite sure that somebody must have taken it away. If, after a time, it reappears, you may doubt whether it really is the same one - breakable ones in such circumstances are often not. You may not be able to decide the issue, but you will have no doubt that the doubtful sameness has an indisputable meaning - that there is an unambiguous answer to your query...No doubt the notion of individuality of pieces of mater dates from time immemorial...Science has taken it over as a matter of course. It has refined it so as to safely embrace all cases of apparent disappearance of matter. The idea that a log which burns away first turns into fire, then into ashes and smoke, is not alien to the primitive mind. Science has substantiated it; though the appearance in bulk may change, the ultimate constituents of matter do not. This was (in spite of his occasional scepticism) the teaching of Democritus. Neither he nor Dalton doubted that an atom which was originally present in the block of wood is afterwards either in the ashes or in the smoke.

In the new turn of atomism that began with the papers of Heisenberg and of de Broglie in 1925, such an attitude has to be abandoned. This is the most startling revelation emerging from the ensuing development, and the feature which in the long run is bound to have the most important consequences. If we wish to retain atomism we are forced by observed facts to deny the ultimate constituents of matter the character of identifiable individuals. Up to recently, atomists of all ages, for all I know, had transferred that characteristic from visible and palpable pieces of matter to the atoms, which they could not see or touch or observe singly. Now we observe single particles; we see their tracks in a cloud chamber and in photographic emulsions; we register the practically simultaneous discharges caused by a single swift particle in two or three Geiger counters placed at several yards distance from each other. Yet we must deny the particle the dignity of being an absolutely identifiable individual. (pp. 209-212)