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Koyre, Benedetti- on Infinite
Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 3
Not Berquist’s writing; a text he kept. By Alexandre Koyre. From his file: KOYRE, BENEDETTI- ON INFINITE.doc.
Alexandre Koyré, "Giambattista Benedetti, critic of Aristotle", translated in the collection Galileo, Man of Science, Basic Books Inc., pp. 98, 108, and 114:
Giambattista Benedetti is certainly the most interesting Italian physicist of the sixteenth century; he is also the one whose historical role was the most important. His influence on the young Galileo, who followed him step by step in his treatise De motu, is undeniable and profound. Benedetti, doubtless, did not break through the boundaries that separated medieval and Renaissance science from modern science; to have done this is the distinctive merit of Galileo. But he pushed the mathematization of science much farther than did Tartaglia, his master and immediate predecessor. Moreover, in conscious opposition to the determinedly empirical and qualitative physics of Aristotle, he tried to build, on the basis of Archimedes' statics, a physics which (in his own phrase) would be a "mathematical philosophy" of nature...Aristotle in no way realized (he asserts) the role of mathematics in the science of physics. He nearly always ended in error; for it is only by building on the "unshakable foundations" of mathematical philosophy - in effect, by beginning from Archimedes and being inspired by Plato - that one can substitute for Aristotle's physics a better physics founded on the truths that the human intellect sees directly...It all comes back to one central defect: Aristotle simply did not understand mathematics. And for Benedetti, the clearest manifestation of this lack of understanding lay in Aristotle's denial of the reality of the infinite:
"He claims (but without proving it and without giving any reason) that the infinite parts of the continuum are not actual in actu, but only in potency. Yet this cannot be conceded to him, because if the entire real continuum is actual, all of its parts must be actual too, because it is stupid to think that things that are not actual could made up of things that exist only in potency. Nor should it be claimed that the continuity of these parts makes them exist only in potency, and not at all in actuality. Suppose for example, we divide a continuous line AU into equal parts at E. There can be no doubt that, before the division, the half AE (even though joined to the other half EU) is as actual as is the whole AU, although it is not distinguished from it by the senses. And I maintain the same is true of a half of AE, i.e., of one fourth of the line, the same of an eighth, of a thousandth, and so on."
The infinite multiplicity is no less real than is the finite. The infinite found in nature is actual and not just potential. And the actual infinite can be understood fully as well as the potential.
The lack of comprehension of mathematics for which Benedetti so often reproaches Aristotle is, therefore, a clue to something far more serious, namely anti-infinitism. This is at the root of all his errors, especially those which concern the structure of thought itself. Conversely, it was Benedetti rejection of finitism that, in the last analysis, led him to oppose the Aristotelian doctrine and tradition, and gave him his place among those who have led mankind from the closed world of the ancients to the infinite universe of the moderns.