← Library · Logic of the First Act
Last 6 Categories - Chapter 9
Logic of the First Act · Categories
From his file: LAST 6 CATEGORIES C. 9.doc.
LAST 6 CATEGORIES - CHAPTER 9
Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐναντιότητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι· ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἧττον· θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.
<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>
[Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται· εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται.
ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποὺ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ §r˚=Æyh, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποὺ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν §r˚=Æyh.
ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα:
Chapter Nine is very brief and our text may be incomplete.
What Aristotle does first in the text we have is to point out how to act upon and to undergo admit of contraries and more and less. This shows the connection between to act upon and to undergo with quality. Since where and when and to be laid out are connected with place and time which are quantities, we can see one reason why they are placed before to act upon and to undergo. Having or to be outfitted has a likeness to both and is therefore placed rightly in the middle.
Then there is a reference to an earlier text where Aristotle says that the Greek word for to be laid out is said denominatively from position (like if we were to say to be positioned).
Aristotle then exemplifies where, when, and to have or to be outfitted.
Finally, Aristotle says that enough has been said about the genera laid down before (in Chapter Four).
Where is put before when because time is more extrinsic than place. But why is to be laid out, which is the order of parts in place, put after when? Since both where and to be laid out are connected with place (and when, with time), why is to be laid out not put next to where instead of after when. Perhaps the reason given by Thomas why there is no highest genus to when like to be laid out is to where gives us a clue. Since time is the number of the before and after in motion, order is more in the definition of time than in the definition of place. So there is another highest genus for the order of parts in place, but no other highest genus for the order of parts in time since this is already included in the understanding of time. Thus to be laid out is like where in that it is in place and like when insofar as it involves an order of parts. Hence, like in the division of beings in chapter two, where Aristotle enumerated universal substance first and individual accident second and then universal accident (which is like universal substance in being said of another and like individual accident in existing in another), so here he orders to be laid out after the two that it resembles. In a similar order in the book About the Poetic Art, Aristotle defines beginning, and then end, and last middle. (He speaks there as if beginning and end are contrary.) This order of enumeration gives us a more distinct knowledge of what is being enumerated. This order could also be involved in the placing of to act upon and to undergo after where, when, to be laid out, and to outfitted if we follow Thomas’ exposition in the fifth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy that these four are taken from something wholly outside and to act upon and to undergo from something partly inside and partly outside. To act upon and to undergo would then have something like quantity and quality and toward something and something like where and when and to be laid out and to be outfitted.
The last six highest genera do not seem to be accidents in the same way as quantity, quality and toward something. Consider this text of Thomas:
tempus comparatur ad unum tantum motum, sicut accidens ad subiectum; scilicet ad motum primi mobilis, quo mensurantur omnes alii motus.
Ad alios autem motus comparatur sicut mensura ad mensuratum;
sicut ulna comparatur ad virgam ligneam sicut ad subiectum, ad pannum autem qui per eam mensuratur, sicut ad mensuratum tantum;
et ideo non sequitur quod unum accidens sit in multis subiectis.[1]
To be in time is to be measured by time, but is it something in the thing measured by time? Likewise, is to be in this room, something in me? And to be clothed, is that something in me? Consider this text of Thomas:
Ea enim quae habenti aliquam naturam adveniunt nec tamen pertinent ad integritatem naturae illius, vel accidentia esse videntur, ut albedo et musica; vel accidentaliter se habere ad ipsum, sicut anulus, vestimentum, domus, et similia.[2]
Thomas here seems to distinguish between what are accidentia and what accidentaliter se habere. Although both relation and the last six involve something outside of us, the beginning of toward something is in us while the beginning of the last six is outside of us. But to act upon and to undergo seem more to be in the thing. Consider this text of Thomas:
...actio ex hoc quod est actio, consideratur ut ab agente; in quantum vero est accidens, consideratur ut in subjecto agente...subtracta materia, tollitur calefactio, liceat maneat calefactionis causa.[3]
When we say that some quantities are from parts that have position, does position mean the same as when we say that sitting and standing are positions? There is a difference between the order of parts in a whole and the order of parts in place.
If acting upon and undergoing are the same as motion (if the water becoming hot is in some way the same as the water being heated or the heating of the water), then why is not motion the category rather than acting upon and undergoing?
Perhaps motion does not introduce a new mode or way of denominating a thing, especially as far as what there is of motion in act in things. And perhaps what is added by reason is not in things which the Categories is about. Thus what is becoming hot is now warm and this denominates a substance as quality does.
In what category would understanding and loving and sensing be found?
Surely not in acting upon as Simplicius seems to put them. Although Aristotle gives as examples here of undergoing to be pleased and to be pained, he may be using here examples from Plato. Could understanding and loving and sensing be placed under disposition as another tropos? In the De Anima and in the seventh book of Natural Hearing, sensing and understanding are distinguished from alteration. And since act and ability are in the same genus, the form by which reason is knowing can exist in full act when one is actually understanding and between full act and ability when possessed habitually. Does Thomas speak of this somewhere?
Scriptum Super Librum II Sententiarum, Dist. 35, Q. 1, Art. 1, Ad 5
Ad quintum dicendum, quod passio potest sumi dupliciter; vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat; et hoc modo non oportet omnem poenam passionem esse; sed quamdam poenam, scilicet poenam sensus: vel quantum ad modum significandi, pro ut grammaticus considerat; et sic illud passive dicitur quod a verbo passivo derivatur; unde privatio qua aliquis privatur aliquo dicitur privatio passiva; et privatio qua aliquis privat, dicitur privatio activa; et hoc modo sumendo passionem, omnis poena est corruptio vel privatio passiva.
Scriptum Super Librum IV Sententiarum, Dist. 38, Q. 2, Art. 3, Qa. 1, Ad 2:
Ad secundum dicendum, quod grammatice loquendo, omnis activa convertitur in passivam; quia grammaticus non considerat substantiam actionis, sed modum significandi. Omne autem verbum activum significat actionem ut in alium transeuntem. Sed considerando substantiam actionis, aliquando actio egreditur ab agente, et non pertingit usque ad patiens, quod habet in sua potestate recipere effectum agentis et non recipere; vel propter aliquod impedimentum interveniens; et ideo, realiter loquendo, in omnibus actionibus quae terminantur ad aliquid extra agentem, activa non convertitur in passivam, sicut est percutere, occidere, scandalizare, et alia hujusmodi. Sed amare et cognoscere sunt actus interiores animae, quae non progrediuntur ad rem extra nisi secundum quod est aliqualiter in ipso agente; et ideo in talibus, etiam realiter loquendo, semper activa in passivam convertitur.
In XI Metaphysicorum, Lectio 9, nn. 23-25:
Quarto ibi, sed est activum probat secundum propositorum: scilicet quod unus motus sit actus motivi et mobilis, hoc modo. Dictum est enim quod motus est actus motivi inquantum facit motum. Est autem mobilis inquantum fit in eo motus: sed motivum facit illum motum qui est in mobili et non alium. Et hoc quod est dicit quod movens est activum mobilis. Unde relinquitur quod unus motus sit actus et moventis et mobilis.
Quinto ibi, quemadmodum eadem manifestat hoc per exempla: et dicit quod una est distantia duorum ad unum et unius ad duo. Sed differt ratione. Propter quod diversimode significatur: scilicet per duplum et dimidium. Similiter una est via ad ascendendum et descendendum, sed differt ratione. Et propter hoc dicuntur hi ascendentes et illi descendentes. Et ita est de movente et moto. Nam unus motus secundum substantiam est actus utriusque, sed differt ratione. Est enim actus moventis ut a quo, mobilis autem ut in quo; et non actus mobilis ut a quo, neque moventis ut in quo. Et ideo actus moventis dicitur actio, mobilis vero passio.
Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sint diversa praedicamenta.
Sed sciendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet.
Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi.
Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subiecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis.
Appendix
Albert the Great, Commentaria in De Praedicamenta Aristotelis, Tractatus VI. Caput I, Laval ed., p. 179:
Ad aliquid autem praedicat id quod est comparatum ad aliquid, qui modus immixtus est omnibus sex praedicamentis, et ideo ut principium ad alia praemitti debuit.
Habita etiam qualitate et qualibus, quae etiam generalem modum praedicandi in quale habent, qui quodamodo inest omnibus aliis.
Propterea etiam praemitti debuit, ut hic substantia praecederet ut omni subjectum, quantitas ut subjectum ad physicum, ad aliquid ut modus aliorum comparatus, quale autem et qualitas ut modum praedicandi dans residuis omnibus.
Restat autem dicere de his quae non habent res absolutas praedicare nec modum praedicandi habent ab illis absolutum: habent enim modum relationis et qualitatis, et addunt aliquid super utrumque per quod efficiuntur specialia praedicamenta.
Propter quod ipsa sex genera causantur ab aliis quatuor, quae praehabita sunt, et non causantur ab ipsis sicut inferiora causantur a superioribus, quia si hoc ita esset, continerentur in eis, sicut in suis generibus, sed causantur ex comparationibus supradictorum generum ad aliud....
----------------------- [1]De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 9, Ad 11 [2] Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV,Capitulum XLI
[3] De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 9, Ad 7