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Leo Strauss
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
Not Berquist’s writing; a text he kept. By Leo Strauss. From his file: LEO STRAUSS.doc.
Leo Strauss, Excerpt from his lecture The Crisis of our Time
present-day social science admits and even proclaims its inability to validate any value judgments proper...This is, indeed, the core of modern science, of modern social science as it has finally developed in the last two generations: the distinction between facts and values, with the understanding that no distinction between good and bad values is rationally possible...The task with which academic teachers in the social sciences are concerned is primarily to face this issue posed by the fact-value distinction. I believe that one can show that this fundamental premise of the present-day social sciences is untenable, and that one can show it on a variety of grounds. But I am now concerned with a somewhat broader issue.
When we reflect on the fact-value distinction, we see one element of it which is quite striking. The citizen does not make the fact-value distinction. He is as sure that he can reasonably distinguish between good and bad, just and unjust, as he can distinguish between true and false, or as he can judge so-called factual statements. The distinction between facts and values becomes necessary, it seems, only when the citizen's understanding of political things is replaced by the specifically scientific understanding.
The scientific understanding implies, then, a break with pre-scientific understanding. Yet at the same time, it remains dependent on the pre-scientific understanding. I may illustrate this by a most simple example. If someone is sent out by a sociology department to interview people, he is taught all kinds of things; he is given very detailed instructions. But one thing he is not told: address your questions to people, to human beings, and not to dogs, trees, cats, and so on. Furthermore, he is not even told how to tell human beings from dogs. This knowledge is presupposed. It is never changed, never refined, never affected by anything he learns in the social science classes. This is only the most massive example of how much allegedly self-sufficient knowledge presupposes of "a priori" knowledge, of pre-scientific knowledge which is not questioned for one moment in the whole process of science.
Now regardless of whether the superiority of the scientific understanding to the pre-scientific understanding can be demonstrated or not, the scientific understanding is surely secondary or derivative. Hence, social science cannot reach clarity about its doings if it does not dispose of a coherent and comprehensive understanding of what one may call the common sense understanding of political things which precedes all scientific understanding; in other words, if we do not primarily understand political things as they are experienced by the citizen or statesman. Only if it disposes of such a coherent and comprehensive understanding of its basis or matrix can it possibly show the legitimacy and make intelligible the character of that peculiar modification of the primary understanding of political things which is the scientific understanding.
This, I believe, is an evident necessity if social or political science is to be or become a rational enterprise. Being a modification of the primary understanding of political things, it must be understood as such a modification. We must understand the pre-scientific, the common sense understanding, the citizen's understanding of political things before we can truly understand what the modification effected by scientific understanding means.
But how can we get that understanding?...Fortunately for us, this terrific burden, the most basic work which can be done and must be done in order to make political science and, therefore, also the other social sciences truly sciences, rational enterprises, has been done...it has been done by Aristotle in his Politics. That work supplies us with the classic and unforgettable analysis of the primary understanding of political phenomena.
Leo Strauss, The City and Man, Introduction, Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, 1964, pp. 11-12:
One can come to doubt the fundamental premise of present-day social science - the distinction between values and facts - by merely considering the reasons advanced in its support as well as the consequences following from it.
These considerations lead one to see that the issue concerning that distinction is part of a larger issue. The distinction is alien to that understanding of political things which belongs to political life but it seems necessary, it seems, when the citizen's understanding of political things is replaced by the scientific understanding.
The scientific understanding implies then a break with the pre-scientific understanding, yet at the same time it remains dependent on the pre-scientific understanding.
Regardless of whether the superiority of the scientific understanding to the pre-scientific understanding can be demonstrated or not, the scientific understanding is secondary or derivative. Hence social science cannot reach clarity about its doings if it does not possess a coherent and comprehensive understanding of what is frequently called the common sense view of political things, i.e., if it does not primarily understand the political things as they are experienced by the citizen or statesman; only if it possesses such a coherent and comprehensive understanding of its basis or matrix can it possibly show the legitimacy, and make intelligible the character of that peculiar modification of the primary understanding of political things which is their scientific understanding.
We contend that that coherent and comprehensive understanding of political things is available to us in Aristotle's Politics precisely because the Politics contains the original form of political science: that form in which political science is nothing other than the fully conscious form of the common sense understanding of political things. Classical political philosophy is the primary form of political science because the common sense understanding of political things is primary
Leo Strauss, The City and Man, Chapter III, Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, 1964, pp. 239-240:
Most of the speeches and all debates occurring in Thucydides' work deal with foreign politics, with what a given city or group of cities ought to do in regard to another city or group of cities. But the subject of debates is whatever is in the foreground of attention or is primary for the citizen. For the city which is not on the verge of civil war or in it, the most important questions concern its relations with other cities. Not without reason does Thucydides make his Diodotus call freedom (i.e., freedom from foreign domination) and empire "the greatest things" (III 45.6).
Generally speaking, even the lowliest men prefer being subjects to men of their own people rather than to any aliens. If this is so, foreign politics is primary "for us", although it may not be primary "in itself" or "by nature." Thucydides does not rise to the heights of classical political philosophy because he is more concerned than is classical political philosophy with what is "first for us" as distinguished from what is "first by nature."
Philosophy is the ascent from what is first for us to what is first by nature. This ascent requires that what is first for us be understood as adequately as possible in the manner in which it comes to sight prior to the ascent. In other words, political understanding or political science cannot start from seeing the city as the Cave but it must start from seeing the city as a world, as the highest in the world; it must start from seeing man as completely immersed in political life: "the present war is the greatest war." Classical political philosophy presupposes the articulation of this beginning of political understanding but it does not exhibit it as Thucydides does in an unsurpassable, nay, unrivaled manner The quest for that "common sense" understanding of political things which led us first to Aristotle's Politics, leads us eventually to Thucydides' War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.