Locke on Definition of Motion

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Locke on Definition of Motion

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 3

Not Berquist’s writing; a text he kept. By John Locke. From his file: LOCKE ON DEFINITION OF MOTION.doc.

Word doc

JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

The names of simple ideas are not capable of definition; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet observed by anybody what words are, and what are not, capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication by a more general word, and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art, by a genus and difference) when, even after such a definition, made according to rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that the showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions, and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular consideration.

I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable, from that progress in infinitum which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the signification of our words, show why some names can, and others cannot be defined; and which they are.

I think it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but the showing of one word by several other not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is defined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to, in the mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good definition.

This being premised, I say that the names of simple ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined. The reason whereof is this, that the several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can by no means represent an idea which had no composition at all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the the names of simple ideas have no place.

The not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition: - "The act of a being in power, as far forth as in power"; which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of...

Nor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple ideas....The atomists, who define motion to be "a passage from one place to another," what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is passage other than motion?