Logic and Vocal Sounds
Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic
From his file: LOGIC AND VOCAL SOUNDS.doc.
LOGIC AND VOCAL SOUNDS
We order our thinking by ordering our thoughts. This does not mean that we order our thoughts in time before we order our thinking. Rather, when we order our thoughts, we order our thinking at the same time.
If we could order our thoughts without using vocal sounds that signify those thoughts, logic would not be about vocal sounds. But we cannot order our thoughts sufficiently without ordering the vocal sounds that signify those thoughts (and also things in some way).
Vocal sounds can be used to order our thoughts only insofar as they (1) signify things through thoughts (or signify thoughts about things) and (2) are used as such by reason. Hence, logic is not about vocal sounds that do not signify. The teacher clearly uses vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts. But even when a man thinks by himself, he uses vocal sounds even if sometimes only imagined.
Many thinkers, however, hesitate to take the next step which is that logical treatises are about vocal sounds that signify our thoughts about things. This seems to be a degradation of logic, a lowering of the aim of logic from a concern about our thoughts to a concern about vocal sound. Thoughts are clearly better than vocal sounds; they are more important than vocal sounds. Logical treatises, then, would be principally or chiefly about the better or more important - thoughts - and only secondarily about the vocal sounds that signify these thoughts.
Further, it is said that logic is interested in vocal sounds only because they signify our thoughts or are for the sake of our thoughts. But if it is interested in vocal sounds only for the sake of thoughts, then it is chiefly interested in our thoughts. Hence, logical treatises ought to be chiefly about thoughts and only secondarily about vocal sounds that signify (by human agreement) these thoughts.
However, a careful reading of the opening chapters of the Peri Hermeneias of Aristotle (with the commentary of Thomas Aquinas) leaves no doubt in my mind that the treatise is about a vocal sound, not about a thought except insofar as a thought is signified by the vocal sound. If this is so, one can reason that other treatises in logic are about vocal sounds that signify things through thoughts or thoughts about things either by the kind of argument called example (from part to part) or because the subjects of the other parts are (in some way) either composed of statements or parts of statements.
The reason for this is that logic is about tools. But it is difficult, if not impossible, for man to use a tool that is not sensible. But among sensible things (things that can be sensed), vocal sounds that signify by human agreement are the most perfect tools for ordering our thoughts. Hence, logical treatises are about these tools.
Nor does it follow from this that logic is more concerned about vocal sounds than about thoughts. When we learn how to use a tool, we are not more concerned about the tool than its purpose. Even though we are talking about how to use the tool, we want to use the tool for its purpose.
Perhaps a likeness from theology is well-enough known to be useful here. A treatise on sacraments is about seven sensible signs that signify and cause grace (if there is no impediment on the part of the subject etc.). Grace is obviously better and more important than a sensible sign. The sensible signs in this case are for the sake of grace. If man were an angel, God would not use sensible signs to impart grace to man. But it is the nature of man to be led by the sensible. Yet these truths do not prevent the theologian from saying that the treatise is about sacraments and defining sacrament as a sign rather than as a grace even though it signifies and causes that grace. The theologian can of course talk about the grace imparted by the sacrament. Indeed the theologian should talk about this grace. But the reason for talking about grace in a treatise on the sacraments is not that the sacraments are graces, but that they signify and cause grace in some way.
Sacraments are tools that should fit the chief agent (Christ) and the matter they act upon (men). The theologian argues from both that sacraments must be sensible. In like manner, the logician can argue that his tools must be sensible as are vocal sounds.
We are comparing, of course, only this part of theology with logic since theology is not chiefly about tools as is logic