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Moderns on Confused and Distinct
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MODERNS ON CONFUSED AND DISTINCT
Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part II, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, Dover Publications Inc., p. 92:
And as a multiplicity of laws often furnishes excuses for evil-doing, and as a State is hence much better ruled when, having but very few laws, these are most strictly observed; so, instead of a great number of precepts of which Logic is composed, I believed that I should find the four which I shall state quite sufficient, provided that I adhered to a firm and constant resolve never on any single occasion to fail in their observance.
The first of these was to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it.
Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, N.J., 1954, pp. 163-164:
The initiated believe that the result of a scientific experiment is distinguished from ordinary observation by a higher degree of certainty. They are mistaken, for the account of an experiment in physics does not have the immediate certainty, relatively easy to check, that ordinary non-scientific testimony has.
Though less certain than the latter, physical experiment is ahead of it in the number and precision of the details it causes us to know: therein lies its true and essential superiority.
Ordinary testimony, which reports a fact established by the procedures of common sense and not by scientific methods, can be certain only at the expense of not being detailed or minute...With rare exceptions, ordinary testimony offers assurance only to the extent that it is less precise, less analytic, and sticks to the grossest and most obvious considerations.
Quite different is the account of a physical experiment: it is not content with letting us know a gross phenomenon; it claims to analyze it, to inform us about the least detail and the most minute particularity, and to take exact note of the rank and relative importance of each detail and peculiarity...
Therefore, if theoretical interpretation removes from the results of physical experiment the immediate certainty that the data of ordinary observation possess, on the other hand, it is theoretical interpretation which permits scientific experiment to penetrate much further than common sense into the detailed analysis of phenomena, and to give a description of them whose precision exceeds by far the accuracy of current language.
Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, N.J., 1954, pp. 178-179:
The laws that ordinary non-scientific experience allows us to formulate are general judgments whose meaning is immediate. In the presence of one of these judgments we may ask, "is it true?" Often the answer is easy; in any case the answer is a definite yes or no. The law recognized as true is so for all time and for all men; it is fixed and absolute.
Scientific laws based on the experiments of physics are symbolic relations whose meaning would remain unintelligible to anyone who did not know physical theories. Since they are symbolic, they are never true or false; like the experiments on which they rest, they are approximate. The degree of approximation of a law, though sufficient today, will become insufficient in the future through the progress of experimental methods; sufficient for the needs of the physicist, it would not satisfy somebody else, so that a law of physics is always provisional and relative. It is provisional also in that it does not connect realities but symbols, and that is because there are always cases where the symbol no longer corresponds to reality; the laws of physics cannot be maintained except by continual retouching and modification.
The problem of the validity of the laws of physics hence poses itself in an entirely different manner, infinitely more complicated and delicate than the problems of the laws of common sense...A law of physics possesses a certainty much less immediate and much more difficult to estimate than a law of common sense, but it surpasses the latter by the minute and detailed precision of its predictions...The laws of physics can acquire this minuteness of detail only by sacrificing something of the fixed and absolute certainty of common-sense laws.
There is a sort of balance between precision and certainty: one cannot be increased except to the detriment of the other.
Louis de Broglie, The Revolution in Physics, Chapter 2, Noonday Press, 1960, pp. 56-58:
...the principle of the conservation of energy is not enough to build a thermodynamics. It is necessary to add to it the principle of Carnot or of the increase of entropy...Relying on these two fundamental principles, there developed a thermodynamics which permits us to predict a considerable number of phenomena and plays an essential role especially in the theory of gases. It is an abstract science that occupies itself solely with energy stored in bodies and the quantities of heat or work exchanged between them.
It does not try to enter into a detailed description of elementary phenomena, it is interested only in the larger aspects. So it is compatible with any number of different descriptions of the elementary phenomena: it lays down only the conditions which these descriptions must satisfy. Thus classical atomic physics, ignoring quanta, could give pictures of these phenomena in accord with the demands of thermodynamics, but quantum physics, although resting on very different conceptions, furnishes us a picture equally compatible with thermodynamics. From the point of view of the constructive development of contemporary theories, thermodynamics has been able to serve as a guide in limiting the number of acceptable hypotheses, but without indicating in a univocal fashion the way to be followed.
Precisely because thermodynamics pictures only bulk appearances without wishing to enter into the details of the elementary processes, it does not run the risk of the errors which necessarily affect the more audacious theories that pretend to enter into a description of these processes. So a great number of physicists were of the opinion, forty years ago, that it was preferable to be satisfied with these thermodynamic propositions without making an appeal to more precise, but more hazardous conceptions. This prudent method was named energetics.
But if prudence is the mother of security, it is on the audacious that fortune smiles. So while the energeticists moved around on a solid but restricted terrain, the partisans of a more detailed description of elementary phenomena discovered new fields by developing atomistic and corpuscular conceptions.
Louis de Broglie, The Revolution in Physics, Chapter 10, Noonday Press, 1960, p. 219:
We also could... examine whether all "idealizations" are not that much less applicable to reality when they become more complete and, although we have little inclination to be paradoxical, we could hold, contrary to Descartes, that nothing is more misleading than a clear and distinct idea.
Niels Bohr, Essays 1958-1962 On Atomic Physics And Human Knowledge, Interscience Publishers, Div. of John Wiley & Sons, p. 1:
Notwithstanding refinements of terminology due to accumulation of experimental evidence and developments of theoretical conceptions, all account of physical experience is, of course, ultimately based on common language, adapted to orientation in our surroundings and to tracing relationships between cause and effect.
From Niels Bohr, His Life and Work As Seen By His Friends and Colleagues, ed. by S. Rozental, Interscience Publishers, Wiley and Sons, N. Y. , p.222:
Bohr's precept never to speak more clearly than one thinks
Max Born, Physics in My Generation, Preface, Pergamon Press, London & N.Y., p. vii:
I now regard my former belief in the superiority of science over other forms of human thought and behaviour as a self-deception due to youthful enthusiasm over the clarity of scientific thinking as compared with the vagueness of metaphysical systems.
Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper & Bros., N.Y., pp. 200-202:
Furthermore, one of the most important features of the development and the analysis of modern physics is the experience that the concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of scientific language, derived as an idealization from only limited groups of phenomena.
This is in fact not surprising since the concepts of natural language are formed by the immediate connection with reality; they represent reality. On the other hand, the scientific concepts are idealizations; they are derived from experience obtained by refined experimental tools, and are precisely defined through axioms and definitions. Only through these precise definitions is it possible to connect the concepts with a mathematical scheme and to derive mathematically the infinite variety of possible phenomena in this field. But through this process of idealization and precise definition the immediate connection with reality is lost. The concepts still correspond very closely to reality in that part of nature which had been the object of reseach. But the correspondence may be lost in other parts containing other groups of phenomena...
Keeping in mind the intrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language in the process of scientific development, one sees that - after the experience of modern physics - our attitude toward concepts like mind or the human soul or life or God will be different from that of the nineteenth century, because these concepts belong to the natural language and have therefore immediate connection with reality.
The general trend of human thinking in the nineteenth century had been toward an increasing confidence in the scientific method and in precise rational terms, and had led to a general scepticism with regard to those concepts of natural language which do not fit into the closed frame of scientific thought - for instance, those of religion. Modern physics has in many ways increased this scepticism; but it has at the same time turned it against the overestimation of precise scientific concepts, against a too-optimistic view on progress in general, and finally against scepticism itself.
The scepticism against precise scientific concepts does not mean that there should be a definite limitation for the application of rational thinking. On the contrary, one may say that the human ability to understand may be in a certain sense unlimited. But the existing scientific concepts cover always only a very limited part of reality, and the other part that has not yet been understood is infinite.
Whenever we proceed from the known to the unknown we may hope to understand, but we may have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the word "understanding." We know that any understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is only there that we can be certain to touch reality, and hence we must be skeptical about any scepticism with regard to this natural language and its essential concepts. Therefore, we may use these concepts as they have been used at all times. In this way modern physics has perhaps opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between the human mind and reality.
Albert Einstein, “The Problem of Space, Ether, and the Field in Physics” in Essays in Physics, Philosophical Library, N.Y., p. 61:
Scientific thought is a development of pre-scientific thought. As the concept of space was already fundamental in the latter, we must begin with the concept of space in pre-scientific thought.
Albert Einstein, “Physics and Reality” in Essays in Physics, Philosophical Library, N.Y., pp. 16-17:
1. General Consideration Concerning the Method of Science.
It has often been said, and certainly not without justification, that the man of science is a poor philosopher. Why then should it not be the right thing for the physicist to let the philosopher do the philosophizing? Such might indeed be the right thing at a time when the physicist believes he has at his disposal a rigid system of fundamental concepts and fundamental laws which are so well established that waves of doubt cannot reach them; but it cannot be right at a time when the very foundations of physics have become problematic as they are now. At a time like the present, when experience forces us to seek a newer and more solid foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to the philosopher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; for, he himself knows best, and feels more surely where the shoe pinches. In looking for a new foundation, he must try to make clear in his own mind just how far the concepts which he uses are justified and are necessities.
The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the physicist cannot possibly be restricted to the examination of the concepts of his own specific field. He cannot proceed without considering critically a much more difficult problem, the problem of analyzing the nature of everyday thinking.
Werner Heisenberg, “Language and Reality in Modern Physics”, in his Gifford Lectures, published as Physics and Philosophy, Harper, N.Y., pp. 167-168:
The improved experimental technique of our time brings into the scope of science new aspects of nature which cannot be described in terms of the common concepts. But in what language, then, should they be described?
The first language that emerges from the process of scientific clarification is in theoretical physics usually a mathematical language, the mathematical scheme, which allows one to predict the results of experiments. The physicist may be satisfied when he has the mathematical scheme and knows how to use it for the interpretation of the experiments.
But he has to speak about his results also to nonphysicists who will not be satisfied unless some explanation is given in plain language, understandable to anybody.
Even for the physicist the description in plain language will be a criterion of the degree of understanding that has been reached.
To what extent is such a description at all possible?
SELECTIONS FROM THE COLLECTION OF MAX BORN PAPERS PHYSICS IN MY GENERATION, PERGAMON PRESS, LONDON & NEW YORK:
I now regard my former belief in the superiority of science over other forms of human thought and behaviour as a self-deception due to youthful enthusiasm over the clarity of scientific thinking as compared with the vagueness of metaphysical systems. (Preface, p. vii)
Werner Heisenberg, “The Role of Modern Physics in the Present Development of Human Thinking”, Chapter 11 of Physics and Philosophy, Harper:
...we have now to discuss again those features of modern physics which are essentially different from the previous development of natural science, and we have for this purpose once more to go back to the European history of this development that was brought about by the combination of natural and technical sciences. (p. 194)
...natural science proceeded to get a clearer and wider picture of the material world. In physics this picture was to be described by means of those concepts which we nowadays call the concepts of classical physics. The world consisted of things in space and time, the things consist of matter, and matter can produce and be acted upon by forces. (p. 196)
At the same time the human attitude toward nature changed from a contemplative one to the pragmatic one. One was not so much interested in nature as it is; one rather asked what one could do with it. Therefore, natural science turned into technical science; every advancement of knowledge was connected with the question as to what practical use could be derived from it. (pp. 196-197)
In this way, finally, the nineteenth century developed an extremely rigid frame for natural science which formed not only science but also the general outlook of great masses of people. This frame was supported by the fundamental concepts of classical physics, space, time, matter and causality; the concept of reality applied to the things or events that we could perceive by our senses or that could be observed by means of the refined tools that technical science had provided. Matter was the primary reality. The progress of science was pictured as a crusade of conquest into the material world. Utility was the watchword of the time.
On the other hand, this frame was so narrow and rigid that it was difficult to find a place in it for many concepts of our language that had always belonged to its very substance, for instance, the concepts of mind, of the human soul or of life. (p. 197)
It was especially difficult to find in this framework room for those parts of reality that had been the object of the traditional religion and seemed now more or less only imaginary. (p. 198)
Coming back now to the contributions of modern physics, one may say that the most important change brought about by its results consists in the dissolution of this rigid frame of concepts of the nineteenth century, Of course many attempts had been made before to get away from this rigid frame which seemed obviously too narrow for an understanding of the essential parts of reality. But it has not been possible to see what could be wrong with the fundamental concepts like matter, space, time and causality that had been so extremely successful in the history of science. Only experimental research itself, carried out with all the refined equipment that technical science could offer, and its mathematical interpretation, provided the basis for a critical analysis - or, one may say, enforced the critical analysis - of these concepts, and finally resulted in the dissolution of the rigid frame. (p. 198)
This dissolution took place in two distinct stages. The first was the discovery, through the theory of relativity, that even such fundamental concepts as space and time could be changed and in fact must be changed on account of new experience. This change did not concern the somewhat vague concepts of space and time in natural language; but it did concern their precise formulation in the scientific language of Newtonian mechanics, which had erroneously been accepted as final. The second stage was the discussion of the concept of matter enforced by the experimental results concerning the atomic structure. The idea of the reality of matter had probably been the strongest part in that rigid frame of concepts of the nineteenth century, and this idea had at least to be modified in connection with the new experience. Again the concepts so far as they belonged to the natural language remained untouched. (pp. 198-199)
These new results had first of all to be considered as a serious warning against the somewhat forced application of scientific concepts where they did not belong. The application of the concepts of classical physics, e.g., in chemistry, had been a mistake. Therefore, one will nowadays be less inclined to assume that the concepts of physics, even those of quantum theory, can certainly be applied everywhere in biology or other sciences. we will, on the contrary, try to keep the doors open for the entrance of new concepts even in those parts of science where the older concepts have been very useful for the understanding of phenomena. (p. 199)
Furthermore, one of the most important features of the development and the analysis of modern physics is the experience that the concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of scientific language, derived as an idealization from only limited groups of phenomena. This is in fact not surprising since the concepts of natural language are formed by the immediate connection with reality; they represent reality. On the other hand, the scientific concepts are idealizations; they are derived from experience obtained by refined experimental tools, and are precisely defined through axioms and definitions. Only through these precise definitions is it possible to connect the concepts with a mathematical scheme and to derive mathematically the infinite variety of possible phenomena in this field. But through this process of idealization and precise definition the immediate connection with reality is lost... (p. 200)
Keeping in mind the intrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language in the process of scientific development, one sees that - after the experience of modern physics - our attitude toward concepts like mind or the human soul or life or God will be different from that of the nineteenth century, because these concepts belong to the natural language and have therefore immediate connection with reality. (pp. 200-201)
Whenever we proceed from the known to the unknown we may hope to understand, but we may have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the word ‘understanding.’ We know that any understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is only thee that we can be certain to touch reality, and hence we must be skeptical about any scepticism with regard to this natural language and its essential concepts. Therefore, we may use these concepts as they have been used at all times. In this way modern physics has perhaps opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between the human mind and reality. (pp. 201-202)
Werner Heisenberg, "Planck's Discovery and the Philosophic Problems of Atomic Physics" in On Modern Physics, Collier Books, N.Y., p. 10:
Modern physics and particularly the quantum theory discovered by Planck...have raised a series of very general questions, which not only concern the narrower problems of physics but also deal with the method of the exact natural sciences and with the nature of matter. These questions have compelled the physicist to reconsider the philosophical problems that seemed to have been definitely answered in the narrow framework of classical physics." ["classical" here means "Newtonian" and "modern", "twentieth century."]
Werner Heisenberg, "Planck's Discovery and the Philosophic Problems of Atomic Physics" in On Modern Physics, Collier Books, N.Y., pp. 27-28:
It seems to me fascinating to think that there is today a struggle in the most diverse countries of the world and with the most powerful means at the disposal of modern technology to solve problems posed two and a half millennia ago by the Greek philosophers...
Werner Heisenberg, in On Modern Physics, Collier Books, N.Y., pp. 41-42:
It is evident that the passage from science to philosophy has given rise to a great many misunderstandings. But I do not believe that it would be useful to try to separate the two fields absolutely and say: Here it is the man of science who is competent, there the philosopher. On the contrary, I believe that it is useful to let the man of science talk philosophy, and the philosopher sometimes science, even at the risk of creating new misunderstandings. The result can be so useful that it is worth running this risk.
Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, N.Y., 1959, p. 133:
This is concerned with my method. My method invariably is to start from something vague but puzzling, something which seems indubitable but which I cannot express with any precision.
I go through a process which is like that of first seeing something with the naked eye and then examining it through a microscope. I find that by fixity of attention divisions and distinctions appear where none at first was visible, just as through a microscope you can see the bacilli in impure water which without the microscope are not discernible.
There are many who decry analysis, but it has seemed to me evident, as in the case of the impure water, that analysis gives new knowledge without destroying any of the previously existing knowledge.
This applies not only to the structure of physical things, but quite as much to concepts. "Knowledge", for example, as commonly used is a very imprecise term covering a number of different things and a number of stages from certainty to slight probability.
It seems to me that philosophical investigation, as far as I have experience of it, starts from that curious and unsatisfactory state of mind in which one feels complete certainty without being able to say what one is certain of.
The process that results from prolonged attention is just like that of watching an object approaching through a thick fog: at first it is only a vague darkness, but as it approaches articulations appear and one discovers that it is a man or a woman, or a horse or a cow or what not. It seems to me that those who object to analysis would wish us to be content with the initial dark blur.
Belief in the above process is my strongest and most unshakable prejudice as regards the methods of philosophical investigation.