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Name Equivocal by Reason
Logic of the First Act
From his file: NAME EQUIVOCAL BY REASON.doc.
Read from in 7 classes
- Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999) — 20. Figurative Naming and Names Equivocal by Reason: Synecdoche, Antonomasia, Metonymy, Metaphor, Irony, and the Kept Name
- Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999) — 21. Names Carried Over: Dropping Meaning and Ratios, Analogy, Metaphor in Scripture and Poetry, and Examples
- De Anima — 40. The Mind as the Place of Species: Universals, Truth and Understanding vs. Reason
- Wisdom (2005) — 29. Substance as the First Meaning of Being, the Philosopher, and Why Wisdom Must Consider the Axioms
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 4. Metaphysics Book Nine, Reading 1: Distinguishing Kinds and Senses, and the Meanings of Ability
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 8. Names Equivocal by Reason: Six Kinds and the Senses of 'Nature'
- Prima Pars — 104. Summa I, Q.28, Art. 3: Why the Divine Relations Are Really Distinct from Each Other (Kinds of Opposition, Names Equivocal by Reason)
NAME EQUIVOCAL BY REASON
It is necessary to understand names equivocal by reason (1) to understand the names said of all or very many for these names are equivocal by reason, (2) to understand fully the first statements which are the beginnings of all reasoning for the names in these statements are also equivocal by reason (3) to avoid the most common mistakes in thinking which comes from mixing up the senses of words equivocal by reason (4) to understand what wisdom and political philosophy are about for the words naming what they are about (being, one, political etc) are equivocal by reason, and (5) to name, talk about and understand to some extent the things that cannot be sensed or imagined (among which are the best things).
This paper is ordered to the universal consideration of name equivocal by reason and its various kinds. A name is a vocal sound signifying by human agreement, no part of which signifies anything by itself. An equivocal name has more than one meaning. A name is equivocal by reason when there is a reason why the name has more than one meaning or when there is a reason why the same name is said of many things even though we do not have the same exact meaning in mind when saying it of each. Thus in a name equivocal by reason, there is a connection or order among the many meanings.
Although many are accustomed to use name equivocal by reason and analogous name to mean the same, this is more ex usu loquentium than from the word analogous itself. For this word means proportional and whether we use that word to mean a likeness of ratios (as Euclid does) or to mean a ratio, it signifies only some kind or kinds of name equivocal by reason. If we want to understand name equivocal by reason universally and in all its kinds, it is necessary to separate the other kinds from those which are based on a proportion or ratio(s).
As the Philosopher says in the Politics, the one who considers something from its origin will understand it better. Hence, it is good to see how a name becomes equivocal by reason. And this should be considered first in just two things.
A name becomes equivocal by reason in two ways: either a name said of two things is kept by one of them as its own (private) name (and a new name is given to the other) or a name placed upon one thing is carried over and placed upon another.
There are two ways or reasons why one thing keeps the common name as its own and the other receives a new name.
The first way is when one adds nothing noteworthy to the meaning of the common name and the other does. The former keeps the common name as its own name and the latter receives a new name. Some examples will help to see this.
Thus property in the sense of speech convertible with a thing is said of both speech convertible with a thing that brings out what it is and speech convertible with a thing that does not bring out what it is. Since the former adds something noteworthy to the common meaning, it gets a new name, which is definition, and the latter keeps the common name. The word property has now become equivocal. For in one sense of the word, we can say that definition is a property; and in another sense, we divide definition against property, saying that a definition is not a property (and vice-versa). But it is equivocal by reason. For there is a reason why one kind of speech convertible with a thing keeps the common name as its own while the other does not.
Likewise, disposition is said of the disposition that is easily lost and the disposition that is firm and not easily lost. Because the latter adds something noteworthy (firmness or stability), it receives a new name, habit, while the other disposition keeps the common name. The word disposition has now become equivocal. For in one sense of the word, we can say that a habit is a disposition; and in another sense, we divide habit against disposition, saying that a habit is not a disposition (and vice-versa). But it is equivocal by reason. For there is a reason why one kind of disposition keeps the common name as its own while the other does not.
Likewise, the name animal meaning a living body with sensation can be said of the animal with reason (man) and the animal without reason (the beast). But since the former adds something noteworthy in addition to the common meaning of animal, namely reason, it gets a new name man and the other keeps the common name of animal. Thus the name animal has become equivocal for we can say in one sense that man is an animal (without insulting him) and at other times we divide man against the animals. But the name is equivocal by reason for there is a reason why man gets the new name and the beast keeps the common name as its own.
Sometimes we say the hand has five fingers; and at other times we say that it has four fingers and a thumb.
And when the word equivocal is kept for the word equivocal by chance and a new name is given to the word equivocal by reason (such as analogous), the word equivocal becomes a name equivocal by reason in this first way. For an equivocal name is a name with more than one meaning, but in the name equivocal by reason there is something noteworthy in addition, the connection or order of the meanings
Other examples are the words isosceles and equilateral in geometry. For sometimes isosceles means having two sides equal and at other times having only two sides equal. So in one sense the equilateral is isosceles and in the other sense it is not.
In the N. Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes wisdom (sophia sofia) from reasoned out knowledge (episthmh), but in first Philosophy, he calls wisdom (sofia) a reasoned out knowledge (episthmh).
Likewise, people divide person against thing, but in some sense a person is a thing
This kind of name equivocal by reason is the closest to the univocal name.
But when one thing has simpliciter or perfectly what is signified by the common name and the other has only in an imperfect and qualified way the same, the former keeps the common name and the latter is given a new name. Some examples will help to illustrate this kind of name equivocal by reason.
The word dog is said of the mature dog and the immature dog. But sometimes we keep the name dog for the former and give a new name to the latter, puppy. When we distinguish the puppy from the kitten, we might say that the former is a dog and the latter, a cat. But at other times we would distinguish the puppy from the dog and the cat from the kitten. Likewise, we could say that a boy is a man and a girl is a woman, but at other times we would distinguish them.
Again, understanding (or intellect) is said of the angelic understanding and the human understanding. But since the angel is able to understand at once while the human understanding is barely able to understand and usually only that little bit after much thinking or discourse (it is an overshadowed understanding some said), the former keeps the name understanding and the latter is given a new name, reason. The name has become equivocal because in one sense, reason is an understanding, and in another sense, it is not. But the name is equivocal by reason because there is a good reason why one ability to understand keeps the common name and the other is given a new name
Likewise, we sometimes put enthymeme under syllogism and example (the argument) under induction. And at other times, we divide syllogism against enthymeme and induction against example
The other member of our original division (name becoming equivocal by reason of being carried over from one thing to another) can also be subdivided. A name becomes equivocal by reason of being carried over in two ways: either by losing part of its meaning, or by a ratio or ratios.
When the word road was carried over from the stones or bricks or asphalt upon which we walk of drive to our knowledge, the materials were dropped out of its meaning, but the before and after in the road was kept. For a road in our knowledge is the before and after therein.
An example of the first is the word paqoß (in Greek) or passio (in Latin). In speaking of passio, Thomas uses words like proprie and communiter. And sometimes maxime proprie and minus proprie and communiter. The first meaning of the word is receiving something harmful or destructive to the receiver, like our word undergoing. (If one is under the weather, one has been acted upon by the elements in a way that is harmful to oneself.) The word can then be carried over to receiving something which changes the receiver from what it was, but is not harmful. And then it can be carried over to what receives without being changed, but more perfected, as when sensing or understanding are said to be an undergoing.
Perhaps the word mixed-up or confused is like the word passio, its first sense is something bad. It means disordered and perhaps mistaken when first said of reason. As Sartre sees all undergoing as bad, perhaps Descartes and others see the confused or mixed up as always bad.
Likewise, the names of emotions or passions are carried over and placed on acts of the will, but the bodily change in their definitions is dropped. Thus the names love and fear are first placed upon emotions and then carried over to the acts of the will that are formally alike without the bodily transformation of the former.
The word discourse of reason means coming to know or guess a statement through other statements already known or accepted. If we drop out statement from its meaning, but keep the coming to know one thing through knowing other things, defining and calculating could in this second sense also be called a discourse. Finally, we could keep that one thing is known after another without one being known through the other and call this movement also a discourse of reason.
Perhaps property is said in this way. First it means what belongs to only one species, to every member of it and always. In this way, half of four is a property of two. But then we can also call less than ten a property of two because it belongs to every two and always. But it doe not belong only to two. Likewise, we might say that to be a logician is a property of man because only man is a logician, but this seems an even weaker sense since not every man is a logician and even those who are not always so. Again, we might say that one is a property of being although being is not a species or even a genus in the strict sense. Perhaps also the word just when said of the pious or the return of favors.
The word virtue first meant manhood or courage, but it is then carried over to any disposition or habit that is fitting for a man.
The other way a name becomes equivocal by reason in being carried over from one thing to another is by a ratio or ratios. A ratio is the order or relation of one thing to another.
Sometimes a name is carried over from one thing to another because of the ratio of the second to the first. Some examples will be helpful to understand this.
The original word is a vocal sound signifying by human agreement, no part of which signifies by itself. But when man learns to write, he calls a word something that is not a vocal sound, but a sign of that vocal sound. The written word is called a word because it signifies the spoken word. The order or relation of the former to the latter is that of sign. Thus, word is carried over from the spoken word to the written word because of the ratio of the second to the first.
Again, the word being is carried over from substance to quantity because the latter is the measure or size of the former. Likewise, it is carried over from substance to quality because the latter is the disposition of substance.
The word philosophy (in the sense of a knowledge pursued out of wonder) is carried over to logic because the latter is a tool for the acquiring of such knowledge (even though it is not pursued out of wonder).
Sometimes however, a name is carried over from one thing to another because they both have a ratio. There are two ways in which this can happen for a reason: if they have other ratios to the same thing, or if they have like ratios to other things. (The other two possibilities would not give rise to a name equivocal by reason. For if each had the same ratio to the same thing, the name would be univocal. And if they had other ratios to other things, there would be no reason to give them the same name. There is no reason to call a father double of his son or six the father of three.)
An example of a name said equivocally by reason of other ratios to the same thing would be being said of quantity and quality. They have other ratios to the same thing for quantity is the measure of substance and quality is the disposition of substance. Another example is healthy said of one’s diet and one’s complexion for the former causes or preserves the health of the body and the latter is a sign of that health.
The other way in which a name is carried over from one thing to another because of two ratios is when they have like ratios to other things. This way is very common.
The word whole is carried over from the composed whole to the universal whole in this way. For the general is to the particulars something like the whole is to its parts. Hence, the word particular taken from the word part. (And in Greek, the word for general is taken from the word for whole.)
The word beginning in the fifth book of First Philosophy and the word in in the fourth book of Natural Hearing are good examples of words equivocal by reason of like ratios to other things (as can be seen in Thomas’ explanation of them). Thus beginning is said of the foundation of a house and of the definitions, divisions, and statements known through themselves in geometry. For as the foundation is to the house, so are the definitions, divisions and statements known through themselves to geometry. (Here we have a proportion in the sense of Bk. I of Euclid, a likeness of ratios.) The word before in the Categories and the word limit in the fifth book of First Philosophy are also names equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios.
Since we name things as we know them, the order in naming follows the order in knowing. And since we sense before we understand, one might expect to follow this order in all names equivocal by reason. Now in the following words we do proceed in this order: before in Chapter 12 of the Categories (and the word together) beginning in the beginning of book Five of the Metaphysics ; limit also in Book Five of the Metaphysics ; in or being in in Thomas' Commentary on the Fourth Book of Natural Hearing.; and the word see. The first three of these words are very closely related.
Thus, a name is said equivocally of two things by reason of ratios in three ways: by the ratio of one to the other, by other ratios to the same thing, and by like ratios to other things.