Natural Hearing Readings
DHB
From his file: NATURAL HEARING READINGS.doc.
Read from in 30 classes
- Natural Hearing — 6. Aristotle Defines Nature: Five Parts, Nature vs. Art, and Experimental Science
- Natural Hearing — 7. Nature vs. Art, Rhetoric, Experimental Science, and Mathematics vs. Natural Science (Physics II, Readings 2–3)
- Natural Hearing — 8. The Central Question of Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, and Whether the Way We Know Is the Way Things Are
- Natural Hearing — 41. The Four Kinds of Causes: Matter, Form, Mover, End
- Natural Hearing — 42. Aristotle's Three Corollaries on Causes and Nature as Form
- Natural Hearing — 48. Natural Hearing III: Why Motion, Place and Time Come First
- Natural Hearing — 50. Motion, the Continuous, and the Discrete: Why the Continuous Dominates Our Naming
- Natural Hearing — 51. Can Motion Be Defined? Why Descartes and Locke Say No, and Aristotle's Approach to Definition
- Natural Hearing — 52. Act and Ability: Being versus Becoming and Aristotle's Definition of Motion
- Natural Hearing — 53. Motion as the Act of the Able, and Place: The First Senses of 'In'
- Natural Hearing — 55. Beginning the Study of Time: Puzzles About the Now
- Natural Hearing — 56. Aristotle's Physics IV: Time Is Not Motion, but Something of Motion
- Natural Hearing — 57. Time as the Number of Motion, and the Problem of the Now
- Natural Hearing — 58. The Now, the Thing in Motion, and the Causes of Before and After
- Natural Hearing — 63. Physics VI: The Continuous Is Not Composed of Indivisibles, and Democritus' Cone
- Natural Hearing — 64. Motion and Indivisible Points: Aristotle's Physics, the Three Senses of "Before," and a Digression on Mill
- Natural Hearing — 65. The Continuous and Its Basic Role: Beginning, End, and the Point Without a Limit
- Natural Hearing — 66. Points Cannot Compose a Line: Aristotle's Arguments in the First Reading
- Natural Hearing — 67. Which Definition Comes First? Circularity in Aristotle's Reasoning
- Natural Hearing — 70. Motion and Time Divisible Forever: Aristotle's Argument from Faster and Slower
- Natural Hearing — 71. False Imagination, Wonder, and Learning from Nature: Student or Judge
- Natural Hearing — 72. Zeno, Parmenides and the Continuous: Why Nothing Continuous Is Indivisible
- Natural Hearing — 73. The Now as Indivisible Limit of Past and Future
- Natural Hearing — 74. No Motion or Rest in the Now, the Divisibility of What Moves, and Boredom and Loneliness
- Natural Hearing — 76. Physics Book VI: The Division of Motion, the Three Roads, and First and Last Philosophy
- Natural Hearing — 77. Physics Book VI: The First in Change, Contradiction, and Relation in the Trinity
- Natural Hearing — 78. Distinction, Order and the Strange Lack of a First in Motion (Physics Readings 7–8)
- Natural Hearing — 79. Moving and Having Moved, Becoming and Contradiction, Eucharist and Idealization in Science
- Natural Hearing — 81. Zeno's Paradoxes, the Socratic Method, and the Four Kinds of Conversation
- Wisdom (2005) — 54. Metaphysics IX, Readings 9–10: Act Is Better Than Ability, the Transcendentals, and the Ability for Contraries
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading One
Since understanding and knowing why in all sciences of which there are beginnings or causes or elements, come to be from knowing these (for then we think we know each thing when we know its first causes and first beginnings and as far as its elements), it is clear that in the science of nature one should first try to determine about the beginnings.
But the road from the more known and more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature is inborn. For the known to us and the known simply are not the same. Wherefore it is necessary to go forward in this way from the more uncertain by nature but more certain to us to what is more certain and more known by nature.
But what is first clear and certain for us is the more confused. Afterwards, by dividing it, the elements and the beginnings come to be known from it.
Hence, one should go forward from the general to the particular.
For the whole is more known by sense. And the general is a kind of whole since the general takes in many things as parts.
Names compared to definitions also undergo the same in some way. for they signify some kind of whole and indistinctly; as circle. But the definition of it divides into particulars.
And children first call all men father, and all women mother, but afterwards separate each of these.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Two
Surely it is necessary that there is one beginning or many.
And if one, surely either immovable, as Parmenides and Melissus say, or movable, as the natural philosophers say, some saying the first beginning is air and others, water.
And if many, either limited or unlimited; and if limited but more than one, either two or three or four or some other number; and if unlimited, either as Democritus, one in kind but differing in figure or form, or also contrary.
Those seeking how many are the things that are also sought in the same way. They sought from what first are the things that are, whether one or many, and if many, limited or unlimited, so that they sought the beginning and element, whether one or many.............
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics),, Reading Eight
But as the natural philosophers speak, the ways are two. For those making one the underlying body, either one of the three or something other, denser than fire but more rare than air, generate other things by condensation and rarefaction, making many things. These are contraries, and in general excess and defect; just as Plato said the large and the small, except that he makes these matter and the form one while they make the underlying matter one and the contraries differences and forms.
But others separate out from the one the contraries existing within it, just as Anaximander says; and whoever says the one and the many are, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras - for these separate out other things from the mixture. They differ from each other in that the former makes a going around in a circle of these while the latter makes the separation once; and the one makes these unlimited, alike in parts and contraries, while the other, only those called the elements.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Ten
All make the beginnings contraries - those saying that the whole is one and not moved, for Parmenides makes the hot and the cold beginnings but calls them fire and earth, and those saying the rare and the dense, and Democritus, the full and the empty, of which he said that one is as being and the other as non-being. Further, by position, figure and order. And these are the genera of contraries: above and below, before and behind of position, angular and with angle, straight and circular of figure. It is clear, then, that all make the beginnings contraries in some way.
And this reasonably. for it is necessary that the beginnings be neither from each other, nor from other things, and all things from them. And these belong to the first contraries. They are not from others by reason of being first. They are not from each other on account of being contraries. But one must consider by reason how this takes place.
One should first grasp that, of all the things that are, nothing is apt either to act upon or undergo any chance thing by any chance thing, nor does anything just come to be from anything, unless someone takes this by happening. For how could white come to be from musical if musical did not happen to belong to not white or to black. But white comes to be from the not white and not from everything thus, but from black or the inbetweens. And musical comes to be from not musical except not from everyone, but form unmusical or if something is between these. Nor is it first corrupted into any chance things; as white not into musical except sometimes by happening, but into the not white, and not into any chance one, but into the black or the inbetween. And likewise the musical into non-,musical and this not into any chance one, but into unmusical or if something is between the same.
This is found likewise in other things since things which are not simple but composed have the same ratio. But because the opposite dispositions are not named, it is hidden that this happens. For necessarily everything harmonized comes to be from the unharmonized and the harmonized is corrupted into disharmony and this not into any chance one but the opposite. It makes no difference to speak of harmony or order or composition. For it is clear that there is the same reason. but house and statue and anything else comes to be in the same way. For house comes to be from these things not being composed, but divided thus; and the statue and each of the shaped things from the shapeless. and of these, some are order and some, composition.
If then this is true, what-comes-to-be comes to be and what-is-corrupted is, either from contraries or into contraries and the things inbetween these. But the things inbetween these are from the contraries, as colors from white and black; so that all things which come to be by nature are contraries or from contraries.
Almost all the others, then have followed as far as up to this, as we have said before. for all, although laying it down without a reason, nevertheless say that the elements and what are called beginnings by them are contraries - as if being forced by the truth itself.
They differ from each other, however, in that some take those that come before and others those that come after; and some the more known by reason while others the more known by sense. For these lay down hot and cold and those, moist and dry; while others, the odd and the even or hate and love as the causes of generation. and these differ from each other in the aforesaid ways.
Thus they say the same thing in some way and something different from each other. Other just as it seems to many; the same however insofar as proportional. for they take from the same co-ordinated series. For some contraries contain while others are contained. In this way they speak similarly and differently. And worse and better. And some the more known by reason while other, by sense, as has been said before. For the universal is known by reason and the singular by sense. For reason is of the universal but sensation of the particular; as the large and the small by reason, the rare and the dense by sense.
It is clear then that the beginnings should be contraries.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Eleven
The next to be said is whether there are two or three or more beginnings.
For one is not possible because contraries are not one.
Unlimited is not possible because what-is would not be knowable.
And there is one contrariety in every one genus, and substance is one genus.
And because it possible from the limited, it is better from the limited, as Empedocles. For he is thought to explain all things as much as Anaxagoras from the unlimited.
Further, some contraries are before others and others come to be from each other, as sweet and bitter, white and black, while the beginnings ought always to remain.
Hence, it is clear from these things that they are neither one nor unlimited.
Seeing that they are limited, there is some reason for making them not only two. For someone might ask how either density is apt by its nature to make rareness something, or this, density. Likewise in any other contrariety. For love does not bring together hate and make something from the same, nor hate from that; but both, some third thing. Some however take many from which they build the nature of what is.
In addition to these things, someone might have doubts if no one placed another nature under the contraries. For we see that no substance is contrary. but the beginning ought not to be said of any subject for there would be a beginning of the beginning. For the subject is a beginning and seems to be before that which is said of it.
Further, we do not say that substance is contrary to substance. How then would substance be from what is not substance? Or how could non-substance be before substance?
Whence if someone should hold the former reason and this to be true, it is necessary, if both of them are to be saved, that some third thing underlie; as water or fire or something inbetween these. It seems more the inbetween. For fire and earth and air and water are twined together with contrarieties. Hence, those making the underlying other than these, do not act unreasonably; of the others, those saying air - for air has the least sensible differences of the others; next, water.
But all shape this one thing by contraries, by density and rareness, and by the more and the less. These however are, in general, excess and defect, as has been said before. And the same opinion that the one and excess and defect are beginnings of existing things seems to be ancient, except not in the same way. For the ancients say the two act upon and the one undergoes while some of the latter say rather the contrary - the one acts upon and the two undergo.
To say then that the elements are three would seem to have some reason for those considering from these and other such things, as we have said.
But to say more than three would seem no longer to have a reason. For one is enough to undergo. If however four things exist, there will be two contrarieties. and it will be necessary that another inbetween nature will exist separately for each. If, however, being two, they are able to generate from each other, the other one of the contrarieties would be superfluous.
At the same time, it is impossible for there to be many first contrarieties. For substance is one genus of being, so that the beginnings differ from each other only in being before and after, but not in genus. As there is always one contrariety in one genus, all the contraries seem to be led back to one.
It is clear then that the element is neither one nor more than two or three. but which of these, as we have said has great difficulty.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Twelve
Let us speak therefore in this way: first considering about every becoming. For it is according to nature to state first the general and then to consider what is proper about each thing.
We say that one thing comes to be from another, saying either the simple or the composed. I mean this thus: there is man who becomes musical and there is the non-musical which becomes musical or the non-musical man who becomes a musical man. I call simple man and non-musical which come to be something and simple the musical which is coming to be. I call composed, both what is coming to be something and what comes to be, as when we say the non-musical man becomes a musical man.
Of these, this is not only said to become that, but also from this, as musical from non-musical, but this is not said in all. For musical has not come to be from man, but man has become musical.
Of those coming to be something as we say the simple comes to be, the one comes to be remaining, but the other not remaining. For man remains having become musical and is a man, but non-musical and unmusical neither simply nor composed remain.
Having determined these things, one can take this from all the things which come to be, if someone looks at them as we have said, that it is necessary always for something to underlie which comes to be something; and this even if it is one in number, is not of one sort. I mean the same by sort and definition. For it is not the same to be man and to be unmusical.
And the one remains while the other does not remain. the one not opposed remains for the man remains while the non-musical and the unmusical does not remain, nor the composed from both, as the unmusical man.
And something comes to be from something and not this becomes something is said more in those not remaining, as musical comes to be from unmusical, but not from man. But sometimes it is said likewise in those remaining - for we say the statue comes to be from bronze, not the bronze comes to be a statue. But this from the opposite and not remaining is said in both ways: both this comes to be from this, and this comes to be this - both the musical comes to be from the unmusical and the unmusical comes to be musical. Hence likewise in the composed. For it is said both that the musical comes to be from the unmusical man and the unmusical man comes to be musical.
Since coming to be is said in many ways, and of these one is not said to come to be, but to come to be this, while to come to be is said simply of substances only; concerning the others, it is clear that something underlies what comes to be - for how much and how and towards another and when and where come to be with something underlying because only substance is said of no other underlying subject, but all others of substance. That substance and whatever simply is, comes to be from something underlying will become clear to one considering. For there is always something that underlies, from which what comes to be is, as the plants and the animals from seed.
Of the things which come to be, some come to be by changing shape, as the statue; some by addition, as the growing; some by subtraction, as the statue of Hermes from the stone; some by putting together,as the house; some by alteration, as those changed in matter. It is clear that all things thus coming to be, come to be from some underlying subjects.
So it is clear from the aforesaid that everything which comes to be is always composed; and there is something which has come to be and there is something which comes to be it, and this is twofold - either the underlying subject or the opposite. I mean the opposed as the unmusical, the underlying as the man; and the unshaped and the unformed and the disordered the opposed, but the bronze or the stone or the silver the underlying.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading 13
If there are causes and beginnings of the things which are by nature, from which they first are and come to be, not by happening, but by what each is said to be according to its substance, it is manifest then that everything comes to be from the underlying subject and the form. For musical man is put together from man and musical in some way. For you break apart the definition into these thoughts. It is clear then that the things which become, come to be from these.
The underlying subject is one in number, but two in sort. For the man and the gold and generally the matter, can be numbered. The one is more a this something and what becomes does not come to be from it by happening. but the form is one. As the order or the musical art or any one of the other things said in this way.
Whence it is on the one hand that the beginnings ought to be said to be two while on the other hand there are three. And it is that in one way they are contraries, as if one were to say the musical and the unmusical or the hot and the cold or the harmonious and the inharmonious; and in another way it is not - for it is impossible for contraries to be acted upon by each other. But this is untied due to the underlying subject being other - for this is not contrary. Thus the beginnings are neither more than the contraries in a way, but two so as to speak in number, nor again entirely two because to be other belongs to these. For to be a man and to be unmusical are other, and to be unformed and to be bronze are other.
It has been said then how many are the beginnings in the becoming of natural things and in what way how many. And it is clear that something ought to underlie the contraries And that the contraries are two. In a way, the other is not necessary. For it will be enough that one of the contraries make the change by its presence and absence.
The underlying nature is knowable by proportion. For as bronze is toward statue or wood towards bed or the matter and the unformed towards any of the things having form before it receives the form, thus the same has itself toward substance and this something and what is. This then is one beginning, not thus being one or existing as the this something; one of which there is the definition; further the lack, the contrary to this. In what way these are two and in what way more has been said in the above.
First then it has been said that only contraries are the beginnings. Later that it is necessary that something underlie and there be three. From the present it is clear what is the difference of the contraries and how the beginnings are to each other, and what is the underlying subject. Whether the form or the underlying subject is substance is not yet clear. But that the beginnings are three and how three and what the way of these is clear. How many then and which are the beginnings can be considered from these things.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Nine
Anaxagoras would seem to have thought the beginnings unlimited in this way because he assumed the common opinion of the naturalists to be true, that nothing comes to be from what is not. For on account of this, they speak thus: all things were together and coming to be such is alteration while others say it is putting together and separating. Further he reasoned from contraries coming to be from each other. Therefore, they exist within.
For if everything that come to be necessarily comes to be either from what is or from what is not, and of these, coming to be from what is not is impossible (for all those treating about nature are of one mind about this), he thought the rest followed necessarily - that coming to be was from what is and exists within, but on account of the smallness of their sizes to be from what is unable to be sensed by us. Hence, he said that everything is mixed with everything because he saw everything coming to be from everything.
They appear different and are called other from each other by that which excels through great number in the mixture of the unlimited things. There is not any whole purely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone, but that of which each thing has the most seems to be the nature of that thing.
If then the unlimited as unlimited is unknown, the unlimited in multitude or magnitude would be unknown as to how much it is and the unlimited in kind would be unknown as to what kind it is. But the beginnings being unlimited both in multitude and in kind, it would be impossible to know the things from them. For we think we know the composed when we know from which, and how many, things it is.
Further, if it is necessary that that whose part can be of any size in largeness and smallness - I mean one of those parts existing within the whole and into which it can be divided - can itself be of any size; and if it is impossible that an animal or a plant be just any size in largeness or smallness; it is clear that neither is any one of the parts. For the whole will be similar. But flesh and bone and such are the parts of animal and fruits of the plants. It is clear then that it is impossible that flesh or bone or something other be just any size in the direction of the larger or the smaller.
Further, if all such things exist within each other and do not come to be, but the within is separated while it is named from the more; and if anything comes to be from anything, as water is separated from flesh And flesh from water while every limited body is taken up and away by a limited body; it is clear that it is not possible for each thing to be within each thing. For taking away flesh from water and again another coming to be from the rest by separation, even if always the separated is smaller, nevertheless it will not go beyond some magnitude in smallness; so that if the separation stops, not all will be in all - for flesh does not exist within the remaining water; if however it does not stop but always there is a taking away, in a limited magnitude there will be equal limited magnitudes unlimited in multitude. This however is impossible.
In addition to these, if every body necessarily becomes less when something is taken away, and the how much of flesh is determined in largeness and smallness, it is clear that from the smallest piece of flesh, no body will be separated. There would be something smaller than the smallest.
Further, in the unlimited bodies, there will exist now unlimited flesh and blood and brain separated from each other, but nevertheless existing and each unlimited. But this is unreasonable.
It is not knowingly said that it will never be entirely separated, but it is correctly said. For the accidents are not separated. If then the colors and the habits are mixed and if they are separated, there will be something white and healthy, not being anything other, nor of a subject. So that the mind seeking the impossible would be absurd if it wants to separate. For to do this is impossible both according to quantity and according to quality: according to quantity because there is not a smallest magnitude and according to quality because the accidents are not separable.
Nor does he rightly take the coming to be of similar things. for it is possible that it be divided as clay into clay; yet it may not be possible. And there is not the same way as bricks from house and house from bricks; thus water and air both are and come to be from each other.
It is better to take fewer and limited beginnings which Empedocles does.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Fifteen
Some others have touched upon the same, but not sufficiently. For they agree that something comes to be simply from what is not, insofar as Parmenides spoke rightly. Then it seems to be the same that, if something is one in number, it is also only one in ability.
But this differs much. For we say matter and lack are other. And one of these is non-being by happening, the matter; but the lack, through itself; and the one is near and a substance in some way, the matter; but the other, in no way.
Some likewise make non-being the large and the small, either together or each apart, so that this kind of triad is wholly other than that. For they got this far, that some nature should underlie, but they make this one. And even if someone makes it a duality, calling it the large and the small, nevertheless he does the same; for he overlooks the other.
The staying under nature is a cause with the form of what comes to be, as a mother. But the other part of the contrariety would seem to be (to one applying his mind) to be harmful to the same and not to be at all. For there being something divine and good and desirable, one of them we say is contrary to this.
The other however is apt to desire and want this according to its nature. But to some it would happen that the contrary desires its own corruption. But surely the form is not such as itself to desire itself because it is not needy; nor the contrary, for contraries corrupt each other; but this is the matter, as if the woman, the man, and the ugly, the beautiful - except not the ugly as such but by happening; nor the woman, but by happening.
It passes away and comes to be in one way; in another way, not. As regards what is in it, it passes away through itself - for it is the lack in it that passes away. However, according to ability, not through itself; but it is necessary for it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. for if it comes to be, it would be necessary for something first to underlie, from which it comes to be existing within, not by happening. If it passed away, it would come to this at last; so it would have passed away before it passed away.
But about the beginning as form, whether it is one or many and what sort it is, it is the work of first philosophy to determine with certitude. But concerning natural and corruptible forms, we will speak in the things to be shown later. Let it be determined thus by us that there are beginnings, and what they are and how many in number. We shall speak again, starting with another beginning.
Aristotle, Second Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading One
Of the things that are, some are by nature while some are by other causes. By nature are the animals and their parts and the plants and the simple bodies such as earth and fire and air and water. We say that these and things like them are by nature. All these seem to differ from the things not put together by nature. For each of these has in itself a cause of motion and rest - some according to place, some according to growth and wasting away, and some according to alteration. But bed and clothing (and any other such genus there may be), insofar as they have each of these said of them and to the extent they are from art, do not have any inborn source of change.
Thus nature is a beginning and cause of motion and rest in that in which it is first as such and not by accident.
I say “not by accident” because someone, being a doctor, might become the cause of health for himself. But nevertheless he does not have the art of medicine according as he is healed, but it happens that the same is a doctor and is healed - on account of which they are sometimes separated from each other. Likewise each of the other things that are made. None of these has the cause of making in itself, but some in others and from without, such as house and each of the other things wrought by the hands, and some in themselves but not as such, whichever become by accident causes for themselves. Nature then is what has been said.
Whatever things have such a cause, have a nature, And all these are substances. for nature is always a certain subject and in a subject.
According to nature are these things and whatever belongs to these as such, as being borne upwards to fire. For this is not a nature, nor does it have a nature, but it is by nature and according to nature.
What nature is then has been said, and what by nature and according to nature.
It would be laughable to try to prove that nature exists for it is obvious that there are many such things among the things that are. To prove the obvious through what is not obvious belongs to one unable to separate what is known through itself and what is not known through itself. That it is possible to undergo this is not unclear. A man blind from birth might syllogize about colors, so as to have reason about names while understanding nothing.
Aristotle, Second Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Three
Since it has been determined in how many ways nature is said, next after this it should be considered by what the mathematician differs from the natural scientist.
For natural bodies have surfaces and solids and lengths and points, about which the mathematician considers.
Further, is astronomy other than or a part of natural science? It would be strange if it belonged to the natural scientist to know what the sun or moon is, but nothing of what happens to these as such; especially seeing that those speaking about nature also speak about the shape of the moon and the sun and besides that also whether the earth and the universe are spherical or not.
The mathematician then also treats of these things, but not insofar as each is the limit of a natural body. Nor does he consider the things that happen insofar as they happen to such existing things.
Wherefore he separates. For they are separated in thought from motion, and it make no difference, nor does a falsehood come to be in those separating.
It escapes those doing this and speaking of Forms. For they separate natural things, which are less separated than mathematical things.
This would become clear if someone tried to say the definitions of each of the two, both of themselves and of what happens to them. For the odd and the even and the straight and the curved, further number and line and shape would be without motion; flesh and bone and man however no longer, but these are said like snub nose, not as the curved.
This is shown also by the more natural of the mathematical sciences, such as optics and harmony and astronomy. For they have themselves in some way the reverse to geometry. for geometry considers the natural line, but not as natural, while optics considers the mathematical line, but not as mathematical, but as natural.
Aristotle, Second Book of Natural Hearing (Physics) Reading Five
These things having been determined, one ought to consider about causes, what kinds and how many in number there are. For, since the study is for the sake of knowing, and we do not think that we know each thing before we have grasped the on account of what - this is to grasp the first cause, it is clear that this ought to be done by us about generation and corruption and every natural change, in order that knowing the causes of these, we may try to bring back each thing sought to these causes.
In one way, that from which something comes to, existing within it, is called a cause; as bronze of the statue and silver of the cup and the genera of these
In another way, the form and the model - this is the account of what was to be and the genera of these; as two towards one of the octave and, in general, number, and the parts in the definition.
Further, whence the first beginning of change or rest; as the advisor is a cause and the father of the child, and in general, the one making of the thing made and the one bringing about the change of the thing changed.
Further, as the end. This is that for the sake of which; as health of walking around. For on account of what does he walk around? We say, “in order that he may be healthy”; and speaking thus, we think that we have rendered the cause. And whatever things, another moving, come to be in the middle for the end; as thinning or purgation or drugs or tools. For all these are for the sake of the end, but they differ from each other as being some deeds and others tools.
The causes, then, are perhaps said in so many ways.
Causes being said in many ways, it happens that there are many causes of the same thing, not by accident; as the sculptor’s art and bronze of the statue, not according to something other but as statue - yet not in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as whence the motion.
Further, some things are causes of each other; as working hard of the good condition of the body and this of working hard - yet not in the same way, but the one as end and the other as the beginning of motion.
Further, the same is the cause of contraries. for what being present is the cause of this, we sometimes give, being absent, as the cause of the contrary; as the absence of the steersman of the overturning of the ship, whose presence was the cause of the safe return.
All the causes just now spoken of fall into four most manifest ways. For undivided sounds of syllables, and the matter of vessels, and fire and such things of bodies, and the parts of the whole, and the premisses of the conclusion are causes as that from which. Some of these are as the underlying subject, such as the parts, while others are as what was to be - the whole and the putting-together and the form. But the seed and the doctor and the advisor and generally the one making are all whence the beginning of change or rest or motion. Further as the end and the good of others. For the that for the sake of which is best and would be the end of others. and it makes no difference to call the same a good or an apparent good. These then and so many in kind are the causes.
Aristotle, Second Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading 13
But it is impossible that it be this way. For these and all things by nature, either come to be always or for the most part, while none of those by luck or chance do so. For neither by luck nor by chance does it seem to rain many times in the winter, but if it happens in the dog-days; nor heat in the dog-days, but if in winter. If then it seems to be either by chance or for the sake of something; and if it is not possible for these to be by chance or luck, they would be for the sake of something. But all things by nature are such, even as those saying these things themselves make clear. Hence, there is that for the sake of which in the things which come to be and are by nature.
Moreover, in whatever things there is an end, for the sake of this is done what comes before and the next in order. Therefore, as it is done, so is it by nature; and as it is by nature, so is each thing done, if something does not hinder it. But it is done for the sake of something. And therefore it is by nature for the sake of something. Just as if a house were among the things that come to be by nature, it would have come to be in the same way as it does now by art. And if the things by nature were to come to be not only by nature, but also by art, they would come to be in the same way as they do naturally. Therefore one of the two is for the sake of the other.
In general, art completes some things which nature is unable to finish while it imitates others. If then the things by art are for the sake of something, it is clear that also the things by nature are for the sake of something. For the things that come after are to the things that come before in the same way, both in the things by art and in those by nature.
This is especially clear in the other animals which make neither by art, nor investigating, nor taking counsel. Whence some question whether it is by mind or something else that the spiders and the ants and such like build. Proceeding thus little by little, it appears that things useful for an end have also come to be in the plants; as the leaves for the sake of the covering of the fruit. And so, if it is by nature and for the sake of something that the swallow makes a nest and the spider, the cobweb, and the plants, the leaves for the sake of the fruits, and the roots not up but down for the sake of food, it is clear that there is such a cause in the things which come to be and are by nature.
And since nature is twofold, the one as matter and the other as form and this same an end, and the others are for the sake of the end, this same would be a cause for the sake of which.
Aristotle, Third Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading One
Since nature is a beginning of motion and change, and the road we are following is about nature, what motion is ought not to be hidden. For this being unknown, necessarily nature is unknown.
Those determining about motion ought to try to go through in the same way the things which follow upon motion. For motion seems to be among the continuous things, and the unlimited first appears in the continuous. Hence, it takes place that those defining the continuous uses many times the notion of the unlimited, as the continuous is what is divisible without limit. In addition to these things, motion is impossible without place and the empty and time. it is clear then that on account of these things and because they are common to all and universal, those taking up these things must consider each of them. For the consideration of the private is after that of the common. And first, as we have said, about motion.
There is something in act and something in ability; and of that in act, one is a this something, another so much, another such and likewise in the other categories of what is. Of towards another, the one is said according to excess and according to defect, and the other according to the one acting upon and the one undergoing, and in general the mover and the moveable. For the mover is the mover of the moveable and the moveable is moveable by the mover.
And motion is not beside things. For the changing always changes either according to substance or according to quantity or according to quality or according to place, but nothing common to these can be taken, As we say, which is neither this nor so much, nor such, nor any other of the categories. Thus there will be neither motion nor change besides the aforesaid, there being nothing besides the aforesaid.
Each belongs in two ways to all: as in this for one is form and the other lack, and according to such for the one is white and the other black, and according to how much for the one is perfect and the other imperfect, and likewise according to change of place, the one up, the other down or the one light and the other heavy. Thus there are as many forms of motion and change as there are of what is.
Aristotle, Third Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Two
Having divided act and ability according to each genus, the act of the able to be as such is motion; such as alteration of the alterable, growing of the growable and decreasing of the decreasable (there is no name common to both), generation of the generable and corruption of the corruptible and motion of the moveable.
That this is motion is clear thus. For when we say the buildable as such is in act, it is being built, and this is being built. Likewise also learning and rolling and growing and ripening and ageing.
Since some things are both in ability and in act although not at once or according to the same but as hot in act and cold in ability, many things act upon and undergo from each other. For all will be at once acting upon and undergoing. Thus the natural mover is moveable for everything such moves being moved itself. It seems to some that every mover is moved, but concerning this it will be clear from other things in what way it is - for there is something that moves and is immoveable. There is motion whenever the able to be, being in act, is actualized, not as such, but as moveable.
I say as such for bronze is able to be a statue, but motion is not the act of the bronze as bronze. For to be bronze and to be in ability are not the same since if they were simply the same by definition, the act of the bronze as bronze would be motion. They are not the same,as has been said.
It is clear in the contraries. The ability to be healthy and the ability to be sick are other for to be sick and to be healthy would be the same. But the subject able to be healthy and sick,whether moisture or blood, is one and the same. Since they are not the same, just as neither color and the visible are the same, it is clear that the act of the able as able is motion.
Aristotle, Fourth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Fifteen
After the things just said, there remains to go toward time. First it is well to dispute about it through external reasons, whether it is among the things that are or the things that are not, then what is the nature of it.
One might suppose from these things that it either wholly is not or barely and darkly. One part of it has come to be and is not, and the other is going to be and is not yet. The unlimited and always to be met with time is put together from these. And what is put together from non-existing things would seem unable to partake of existence.
Moreover, if what has parts be, all or some of its parts must be when it is. But of time, which has parts, some have come to be, some are going to be, but none are. The now is not a part for the part measures and the whole ought to be put together from the parts - time however does not seem to be put together from nows.
Further it is not easy to see whether the now, which seems to separate the past and the future, remains always one and the same or is other and other.
For if it is always other and other while no part of time is together with another (the one does not contain and the other is contained, as the lesser time by the greater), the now not existing but before existing necessarily has ceased to be sometime and there will not be nows together with each other, the one before necessarily has ceased to be. It cannot cease to be in itself because then it is. And the now before cannot cease to be in another now. For it is impossible that nows be next to each other, as a point to a point. If then it does not cease to be in the next but in another. it will be together with the unlimited nows in between. But this is impossible.
But neither is it possible for the same to remain always. For of no limited divisible thing is there one limit, neither if continuous in one way, nor if in many. But the now is a limit and a limited time can be taken.
Further if to be simultaneous according to time, and neither before nor after, is to be in one and the same now; then if things before and things after are in this now, the things which have come to be a thousand years ago would be simultaneous with the things that have come to be today, and nothing will come to be before or after anything else. Let then these many things be in doubt about what belongs to the same.
Aristotle, Fourth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Sixteen
What time is and what is the nature of it is likewise unclear from the things handed down which we have gone through before. For some say it is the movement of the whole, while others, the sphere itself.
And yet a part of going around in a circle is some time, but not a going around in a circle. For what is taken is a part of going around in a circle, but not a going around in a circle.
Further, if there are many heavens and time was likewise the motion of each of these, then many times will be together.
Because all things are in time and in the sphere of the whole, it seems to some that time is the sphere of the whole. But this statement is too stupid to look into the impossibilities of it.
But since time seems especially to be motion and change, this ought to be looked into. The change and motion of each thing, however, is only in the one changing or where the one moving and changing is, but time is everywhere and among all things
Further change is faster and slower while time is not. The fast and the slow are determined by time - the fast moves much in little time, the slow, little in much. But time is not determined by time - neither as regards how much it is nor as regards how it is. It is clear then that it is not motion. For the present let there be no difference for us to say motion or change.
But neither is it without change. For when we do not change at all in thought or changing is hidden to us, it does not seem to us that time has been; just as not to those sleeping according to the myths in Sardis among the heros when they awake. For they join together the later now and the earlier now, making them one, taking away what is inbetween because of the lack of sensation. Just as if the now was not other but one and the same, time would not be; so since its being other is hidden, there does not seem to be time inbetween. If then it happens to us not to think there is time when we do not distinguish any change, but the soul seems to remain in something one and indivisible; and when we sense and determine, then we say there has been time; it is clear that time is not without motion of change.
It is clear then that time is neither motion nor without motion.
Aristotle, Fourth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading 17
Since we seek what time is, we must begin there to grasp what it is of motion. For we sense motion and time together. For if it was dark and we underwent nothing through he body but some motion was in the soul, right away it would seem that some time had been. But also when there seems to have been some time, at once some motion seems to have been. Thus time is either motion or something of motion. Since it is not motion, it must be something of motion.
Since the moved is moved from something to something and every magnitude is continuous, motion follows the magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, motion is also continuous; and because motion, time. As much as the motion, so much does the time always seem to have been.
The before and after is first in place. There in position. Since there is the before and after in magnitude, necessarily there is a before and after in motion proportional to those there. But also in time there is a before and after because always one of these follows the other.
The before and after in motion as regards that which it is, is motion; but to be that is other and not motion.
But we know time when we divide the motion, separating the before and after. And then we say time has been when we have sensation of the before and after in motion.
For we divide in taking these as other and something other inbetween them. For when we understand the extremities of the middle to be other and the soul says the nows are two, the one before and the other after, then we say this to be time. For what is divided by the now seems to be time and let this be supposed. When then we sense the now as one and not as the before and after in motion or as the same of the before and something after, neither time nor motion seems to have been. When however before and after, then we speak of time. For this is time - the number of motion according to the before and after. Time therefore is not motion, but as motion has a number.
A sign is that we judge more and less by number, but motion more and less by time. Therefore time is some number.
Since number is twofold, for we call number both the numbered and the numberable, and that by which we number, time is the numbered and not that by which we number. For that by which we number and the numbered are other.
Aristotle, Fourth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading 18
And as motion is always other and other, so too is time. What exists at once in the whole time is the same for the now is the same as regards what it is. but being for the same is other - the now determines times insofar as it is before and after.
The now is in one way the same, but in another way not the same. For insofar as it is in other and other, it is different for this was being for the now itself, but as some thing the now is the same.
For as has been said, motion follows upon magnitude and time to this, as we say. And the thing carried along is similar to the point by which we know motion and the before and after in it. This as some thing is the same, for it is a point or a stone or something other of this kind, but in account other; just as the sophists take Coriscus in the Lyceum and Coriscus in the marketplace as other. But this in being in one place and in another is different. But the now follows the thing carried along, as time, the motion - for by the carried along we know the before And after in motion, but insofar as the before and after is able to be numbered it is the now. Thus in these as some thing, the now is the same, for the before and after is in motion, but its being is other. For the now is insofar as the before and after is able to be numbered.
And this is most of all known. And motion through the moved and carrying through the carried. For the thing carried along is a this something, but the motion is not. Thus the now is in one way always the same, in another way not the same, for so also is the carried along.
It is clear that if time be not, the now will not be; and if the now be not, time will not be. The number of the moved and of the motion are together just as the moved and the motion. For time is the number of motion, but the now is as the moved, as the unit of number.
And time is continuous by the now and is divided by the now. And this follows movement and the moved. And motion is one by the moved because it is one and not just anything for it would cease; but in account it distinguishes the before and after in this motion.
And this follows in some way the point. For the point continues and divides the line. For it is the beginning of one and the end of the other. But whenever he thus takes using one as two, necessarily it stands if the same point will be a beginning and end. The now is always other on account of the moved being in motion. Thus time is not as the number of the same point that is a beginning and an end, but rather as the extremities of a line and not as parts on account oa what has been said. It would use the middle point as two so that rest could take place.
And further it is clear that the now is no part of time, nor is the division of motion, as neither the point of the line. Two lines are parts of one. As a limit, the now is not time but happens to it, as it numbers; as it numbers, a number. For limits are only of that of which they are limits, but the number of these horses, ten, is also elsewhere.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading One
If the continuous and the touching and the next are as has been determined before (continuous whose edges are one; touching whose edges are together; next of which there is nothing of the same kind between), it is impossible for anything continuous to be from indivisibles; as a line from points, if the line is continuous and the point indivisible.
For neither are the edges of points one (there is not an edge and some other part of the indivisible), nor are their edges together (for there is no edge of the partless - for the edge and that of which it is an edge are other).
Further, it is necessary that the points which make up the continuous be either continuous or touching. There is the same reason in all indivisibles. They will not be continuous on account of the aforesaid reason. In everything touching, either the whole touches the whole; or the part, the part; or the whole, the part. Since the indivisible is without parts, it is necessary that the whole touch the whole. But if the whole touches the whole, it will not be continuous. For the continuous has one part other than another and is divided into different parts separated in place.
But neither is a point next to a point, nor a now to a now, so that length or time could be from these. For those things are next to each other between whom there is nothing of the same kind. But these is always a line between points and time between nows.
Further, if a thing is divided into those things from which it is, it would be divided into indivisibles. But nothing continuous is divided into that which is without parts.
But it is impossible that any other kind of thing be between points and nows. For if there were, it would be clearly divisible or indivisible; and if divisible, either into indivisibles or into what is always divisible. This however is the continuous.
It is clear that everything continuous is divisible into things which are always divisible. For if into indivisibles, the indivisible would be touching the indivisible. For continuous things have one edge and touch.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Two
There is the same reason for composing magnitude, time and motion from indivisibles and dividing them into indivisibles or none of them.
It is clear from these things. For if a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, the motion over it will be from equal indivisible motions; as if the magnitude ABC is from the indivisibles A, B, C, the motion DEF over it, according to which is moved O over ABC, has each part indivisible.
If motion being present, something necessarily moves; and if something is moved, motion is present; to be moved will be from indivisibles. For O has moved on A, having moved by the motion D, and on B by that of E, and on C likewise by F.
And if it is necessary that the thing moved from one place to another, not at once move and have moved to where it is moved; as if someone walks to Thebes, it is impossible at once to walk and to have walked to Thebes.
O is then moved on the partless A as the motion D is present; so that if it has come later than it comes, it will be divisible. For when it came, it neither rested nor had come, but was between. But if the one walking when he walks goes and has gone at once, he will have walked and moved to where he moves. If then something is moved the whole ABC and the motion according to which it moves is DEF, and in the partless A it is not moved but has moved, motion will not be from motions but from having-been-moveds.
And something will have moved without moving; for it will have gone through A without going through it. So that something will have walked without ever walking. It has walked the same without ever walking it.
If then it is necessary that everything move or be at rest, and it rests according to each of A, B, C; so that something continuously resting will at the same time be moved - for it moves the whole ABC and rests in each part and hence in the whole.
And if the indivisibles of DEF are motions, it will happen that, motion being present, something is not moved but at rest. And if they are not motions, motion is not from motions.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Three
Time must be indivisible and composed from indivisible nows in the same way as magnitude and motion.
For if every magnitude is divisible and in less time the equally fast goes less, time will be divisible. And if the time is divisible in which something moves the distance A, A will also be divisible.
Since every magnitude is divisible into magnitudes - it has been shown that it is impossible for something continuous to be from indivisibles, and every magnitude is continuous - the faster moves an equal distance in less time and more distance in less time, as some define the faster.
Let A be faster than B. Since then the faster is what changes before, in the time A has changed from C to D as in time FG, in this B will not be at D but will fall short; so that in an equal time, the faster has gone further.
But also further in less time. In the time A has come to be at D, B will be at E being the slower. Since then A has come to be at D in the whole time FG, it will come to H in less time than this. And let this be in FI. The CH which A has gone through is greater than CE and the time FI less than FG; so that it has gone further in less time.
It is clear from these things also that the faster goes an equal distance in less time.
Since it goes a greater distance in less time than the slower, taken itself by itself, in more time it will go a greater rather than a lesser distance as LM than LX; more will be the time PR in which A itself goes LM than PS in which it goes LX. Whence if time PR is less than PH in which the slower goes LX, so too time PS will be less than PH. For it is less than PR, and what is less than the lesser is itself less. Whence it will be moved through an equal distance in less time.
Further, if everything is moved necessarily in an equal or a lesser or a greater and that in a greater, slower; that in an equal, equally fast; and the faster neither equally fast or slower, the faster would move neither in an equal nor in a greater. It remains,then, in a lesser, so that necessarily the faster goes an equal distance in less time.
Since every motion is in time and in every time it is possible to be moved, and it can happen that everything moved move faster or slower, in all time there will be that which is moved faster or slower.
These things being so, time is necessarily continuous. I call that continuous which is divisible into that which is always divisible. This laid down as the continuous, it is necessary that time be continuous.
Since it has been shown that the faster moves an equal distance in less time, let A be the faster and B the slower; and let the slower be moved the distance CD in FG. It is clear then that the faster will move the same distance in less than this. And let it have been moved in FHG. Again since the faster in FH has gone through the whole CD, the slower in the same time will go a lesser distance. and let this be CK. Since then B the slower in FH has gone though CK, the faster in less time will go through, so that again the time FH will be divided. This having been divided, the distance CK will be divided according to the same reason. If the distance, also the time. And this will be always, taking away the slower from the faster and from the slower the faster and using what has been shown. For the faster will divide the time and the slower the length. if then it is always true to turn around and there always comes to be a division of what is turned about, it is clear that every time will be continuous. At the same time it is clear that every magnitude will be continuous. Both time and magnitude will be divided by the same equal divisions.
Further from the customary reasons, it is clear that it can be said that if time is continuous, distance will be also. For it has gone half in half the time and generally less in a lesser time. For there will be the same divisions of time and distance.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Four
And if either is unlimited, so will be the other. And as the one, so the other - as if time is unlimited in its extremities, so will length in its extremities; if in division, so too length in division; if in both, magnitude in both.
Wherefore the argument of Zeno takes the falsehood that it is impossible to go through unlimited things or to touch unlimited things in a limited time. Both length and time and generally everything continuous are said to be unlimited in two ways: either according to division or in extremities. It is not possible to touch things unlimited in quantity in a limited time but things unlimited in division is possible. For time itself is thus unlimited. Therefore in the unlimited and not in the limited does going through the unlimited take place, and unlimited things are touched in unlimited times, not in limited ones.
It is not possible either to go through the unlimited in a limited time or the limited in an unlimited time. But if the time be unlimited, the magnitude will also be unlimited; if the magnitude, also the time.
Let the limited magnitude be AB, the unlimited time C. Let something limited of the time be taken as CD. In this it goes though something of the magnitude, and let what has been gone through be BE. This either measures AB or falls short or exceeds - it makes no difference. If it always goes through a magnitude equal to BE in equal time, and this measures the whole, the whole time in which it has gone through will be limited, for the magnitude will be divided into equal parts.
Further, if one does not go through every magnitude in an unlimited time, but one happens to go through some in a limited time such as BE, and this measures the whole and it goes through the equal in equal time, then the time will also be limited.
That there is no going through BE in an unlimited time is clear if one should take a limited time over another. If it goes through the part in less, this is necessarily limited, the other limit existing. There is the same demonstration if the length is unlimited and the time is limited.
It is clear from the aforesaid that neither line nor surface nor generally any continuous thing will be indivisible, not only through what has now been said, but also because it will happen that the indivisible be divided.
Since in all time there is the faster and the slower, and the faster goes through more in an equal time, it may happens to go through double and one and a half the length - this may be the ratio of speed. Let then the faster be brought one and a half the distance in the same time and let the magnitudes of the faster be divided into three indivisibles AB, BC, BD and that of the slower in EF, FG. Accordingly the time will be divided into three indivisibles. It goes through an equal distance in an equal time. Let the time then be divided into KL, LM, and MN. Again since the slower has been brought the distance EFG, the time will be divided in two. The indivisible therefore will be divided, and it will go through the partless not in the indivisible, but in more. It is clear then that nothing continuous is without parts.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Five
The now which is not through another, but through itself and first, necessarily is indivisible and exists in all time.
For there is a furthest extremity of the past beyond which there is nothing of the future and again of the future beyond which there is nothing of the past, which we say is the limit of both. For if it has ben shown that it is such through itself, it will also be clear that it is indivisible.
It is necessary that the same now be the limit of both times.
For if other, one will not be next to the other because the continuous is not from the partless. And if each is separate, there will be a time inbetween. for everything continuous is such that there is something univocal between limits. But if what is inbetween is time, it will be divisible. For it has been shown that every time is divisible. Thus the now will be divisible.
If the now is divisible, there will be something of the past in the future and of the future in the past. For that by which it is divided distinguishes past and future time. At the same time, it will not be the now through itself, but through another. The division will not be through itself. In addition to these things something of the now will be past and something will be future, and the same is never past and future. Nor will the now be the same for time is divisible in many ways. Thus if these things cannot belong, there is necessarily the same now in both.
But if it is the same, it is clear that it is indivisible. For if divisible, the same things as before will happens again. It is clear from what has been said that there is something indivisible in time which we call the now.
That nothing is moved in the now is clear from these things. If it were. something could move faster or slower. Let the now be N and let the faster be moved in it the distance AB. Therefore the slower in the same would be moved less than AB, as the distance AC. Since then the slower has moved the distance AC in the whole now, the faster will be moved in something less than this, so that the now will be divided. But it was indivisible. hence, there is no being moved in the now.
But neither is there rest. For we say that something is at rest which is apt to be moved, that is not moved when and by what and in the way it is apt to. Whence since nothing is apt to be moved in the now, neither will it be at rest. Further, if there is the same now in both times and it could happen in the one to be moved and in the other to rest through he whole; and what moves through the whole, is moved in everything of it as it is apt to be moved, and the resting similarly rests; it would happen that the same rests and is moved. For the now is the same extremity of both times. Further we say that rests which has itself and its parts in the same way now as before. But in the now there is no before;so there is no rest. It is necessary therefore that what is moved be moved in time and that what rests be resting in time.
Everything changing necessarily is divisible. for since every change is from something to something, and when it is in that to which it has been changed, it is no longer changing, and when itself and all its parts have not changed from that from which it changes (for what has itself and its parts in the same way has not changed); necessarily something of the changing is in this and something else in the other. for it is not possible to be in both or in neither. I say that to which it is changed first by the change as from white into grey, not into black. for it is not necessary that the changing be in either of the extremities. It is clear then that everything changing is divisible.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Six
Motion is divisible in two ways: in one way by time; in another according to the movements of the parts of that which is moved, as if the whole AC is moved, both AB and BC will be moved.
Let the motion of the parts be DE of AB and EF of BC. Necessarily then the whole DF is the motion of AC. For it will be moved by this since each of its parts is moved by one of those. Nothing is moved by the motion of another, so that the whole motion is the motion of the whole magnitude.
Further, if the whole motion is of something, the whole motion DF will be neither of either part nor of anything else. For where the whole is of the whole, the parts are of the parts. The parts will be of AB and BC and of nothing other (for there is not one motion of many) and thus the whole motion will be of the magnitude ABC.
Further, if there is another motion of the whole as GH, the motion of each of the parts will be separated from this. But these will be equal to De and EF for there is one motion of one thing. Thus, if the whole motion GH be divided into the motions of the parts, GH will be equal to DF. If something is left over, as IH, this will be the motion of nothing. for it will be neither of the whole nor of the parts on account of there being one motion of one thing, nor of anything other. For a continuous motion is of continuous things. Similarly if it exceeds by division. If this is impossible, it is necessarily the same and equal. This division then is according to the motion of the parts and must be in everything which has parts.
Another division is by time. Since every motion is in time and all time is divisible, the motion will be less in the lesser and necessarily all motion will be divided according to time.
Since everything moved is moved in something and for some time and there is motion of everything moved, necessarily there are the same divisions of time and motion and being moved and of the moved and of that in which there is motion - except not likewise in all thing in which there is motion, but of place through itself and of quality through accident.
Let the time in which it is moved be A and the motion B. If it has been moved the whole in the whole time, in the half it will be moved less, and again, this divided, less than this and always thus. Likewise, if the motion is divisible, the time will also be divisible. For if the whole is in all, the half is in the half, and again the less in the lesser. In the same way, to be moved will be divided. Let to be moved be C - according to half the motion, there will be less than the whole, and again according to half of the half, and always thus. Having placed a being moved to each of the motions, as according to DC and DE, one must say that the whole will be according to the whole. For if other, to be moved will be more according to the same motion, as we have shown that motion is divisible according to the motions of the parts. Taking being moved according to each, the whole will be continuous. Likewise, it has been shown that length is divisible, and in general everything in which there is change, except some things by accident in that the changed is divisible. One being divided, all will be divided. And to be limited or unlimited will be found in the same way in all.
For all to be divided and to be unlimited follows especially from the one changing. the divisible has been shown before, the unlimited will be clear in the things following.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics) Reading Seven
Since everything changing changes from something to something, the changing necessarily is in that to which it has changed when it first has changed.
For the changing leaves behind that from which it changes or it itself fails. And to change and to leave behind are either the same or leaving behind follows change and to have left behind, to have changed for each has itself to the other in a similar way. Since then one of the changes is that according to contradiction, when something has changed from not being to being, it has left behind non-being. It will be therefore in being. For everything necessarily is or is not. It is clear then that in the change according to contradiction, what has changed will be in that to which it has changed. And if in this, also in the others. for as in one, likewise in all.
Further, it is clear to those taking up each one if that which has changed is necessarily somewhere or in something. Since it has left behind that from which it has changed and it is necessarily somewhere, it will be either in this or in another. If then it is in another, as in C, what has changed to B, again changes from C to B. For B is not next, the change being continuous. Thus what has changed, when it has changed, changes to that to which it has changed. But this is impossible. Necessarily then what has changed is in that to which it has changed. It is clear then that what has come to be, when it has come to be, will be and what has ceased to be will not be. In general then every change has been spoken about, and it is especially clear in the one according to contradiction. Therefore, it is clear that what has changed, when it has first changed, is in that.
That in which what has changed has first changed is necessarily indivisible. I call that first which is such not through something other of itself being such. Let AC be divisible, and let it be divided by B. If then it has changed in AB or again BC, it would not have changed first in AC. If it was changing in both (for it is necessary to have changed or to be changing in each), then also in the whole it will be changing. But it was to have changed. There is the same reason if it changes in one and has changed in the other. There would be something before the first. Thus that into which it has changed will not e divisible. It is clear then that what has ceased to be and what has come to be has the one ceased to be in the indivisible and the other has come to be in the indivisible.
That into which something has changed is said in two ways: the one in which first the change is perfected, the other in which it first begins to change. The one called first according to the end of the change is possible and exists for the change can be perfected And there is an end of the change which has been shown to be indivisible because it is the limit. The one according to the beginning is not at all for there is neither a beginning of change, nor a first time in which it was changing.
Let AD be the first in which. This is not indivisible for it would come about that nows were next to each other. Further if it rests in the whole time CA (it is given as resting), it will rest in A. Thus if AD is partless, it at once rests and will have changed. It rest in A while in D it has changed. Since it is not without parts, it is necessarily divisible and it has changed in any of this. Dividing AD, if it has changed in neither, it has not changed in the whole; if it changes in both, it also changes in the whole; if it has changed in one of them, it has not changed in the whole first. Thus, it has necessarily changed in each. It is clear then that there is nothing in which it has first changed for the divisions are unlimited.
Neither is there anything first of what has changed that has changed. Let DF be the first of the DE that has changed. Everything that changes has been shown to be divisible. Let HI be the time in which DF has changed. If then DF has changed in the whole, in the half something less and before DF will have changed; and again another before this, another before that, and always thus. Whence there will be nothing first of the changing that has changed. From the things said it is clear that nothing is first, neither of the changing nor of the time in which it changes.
But the thing itself which is changed or according to which it is changes does not have itself likewise. For three things are said to be in change: the changing and that in which and that to which it changes; as the man, time and white. The man and the time are divisible, but there is another account about the white except that all are divisible by accident. For that to which white or a quality happens is divisible. But there will not be a first in whatever things are divisible by themselves and not by accident, as in magnitude. Let the magnitude be AB, and let something be moved from B to C first. If then BC is divisible, there will be something before C into which it has changed; again another before that, and always thus on account of the division never coming to an end. Thus there will not be a first to which it has changed. LIkewise in the change of quantity for this is something continuous. It is clear then that only in the change according to quality can there be the indivisible through itself.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Eight
Since everything changing changes in time, and something is said to change in time as in first and as by another, as in the year because it changes in the day, then necessarily the changing changes in each part of the first time in which it is changing. This is clear from the definition for the first has been spoken of thus, but it is also clear from these things. Let XR be that in which first is moved that which is moved, and let it be divided by K for all time is divisible. Hence, it either is or is not moved in the time XK and again likewise in KR. If then it it is moved in neither, it would rest in the whole for it is impossible that the moved move in none of this. If it moves in either only, it will not move in XR first for the motion is by another. Necessarily then it is moved in each part of XR.
Having shown this, it is clear that everything moving has been moved before. For if it has been moved the magnitude KL in the time XR first, in the half what moves equally fast and starts together will have moved the half. If the equally fast has moved some distance in the same time, the other will necessarily have moved this distance so that what moves will have moved.
Further, if we say that it has been moved in the whole time XR or in general in any time in taking the ultimate now of the same, for this is the determining and time is between nows, so likewise in the others it will be said to have moved. For always together with the division there will be a time determined by the nows. If then every time is divisible, and time is what is between nows, everything changing will have change without limit.
Further, if what continuously changes and neither ceases nor rests from change, necessarily moves or has moved in anything, and one cannot be changing in the now, it necessarily has changed according to each now. Thus if nows are unlimited, everything changing will have changed an infinity of times.
Not only is it necessary that the changing has changed, but also what has changed necessarily was changing before. For everything that has changed from something to something has changed in time. For let it have changed in the now from A to B. It has not changed in the same now in which it is in A for it would be at once in A and in B, and it has been shown before that what has changed when it has changed is not in this. If in another, there will be a time inbetween - for nows are not next to each other.
Since it has changed in time and all time is divisible, in the half it will have changed and in the half of that again and always thus. Thus it will be changing before.
Further, what has been said is most clear in the magnitude because the magnitude over which the changing changes is continuous. Let something have changed from C to D. If then CD is indivisible, the partless would be next to the partless. Since this is impossible, what is inbetween must be a magnitude and divisible without limit. Thus it changes in these before. Necessarily then everything which has changed changes before.
There is the same demonstration in things not continuous, as in contraries and in contradiction. Let us take the time in which it has changed and again we will say the same thing.
Thus what has changed changes and the changing has changed, and to have changed is before changing and to be changing before having changed and the first will never be taken. And the cause of this is that the partless is not next to the partless for the division is unlimited, just as in increasing and decreasing lines.
It is clear then that what has come to be necessarily was coming to be before and what is coming to be has come to be in whatever things are divisible and continuous - not always however what comes to be but another sometime, as something of that, as the foundation of the house. Likewise in the corrupting and what has corrupted. For right away there exists something unlimited in the coming to be and the ceasing to be; and there is neither coming to be without something having come to be, nor having come to be without something coming to be, and likewise in ceasing to be and having ceases to be. For there is always having ceased to be before ceasing to be, and ceasing to be before having ceased to be. It is clear then that what has comes to be necesarily was coming to be before and what is coming to be has come to be. Wherefore there will not be a first in which it will be.
Aristotle, Sixth Book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Eleven
Zeno misreasons. If, he says, everything always either rests or is moving when it is in a place equal to itself, and the thing carried along is always in the now, the arrow carried along is immovable. But this is false. For time is not put together from indivisible nows, just as no other magnitude is.
There are four reasons of Zeno about motion giving difficulty to those untying them. The first is the one about not moving because one must arrive at the half before the end, about which we have distinguished in the aforesaid reasons.
The second is the one called Achilles. This is that the slowest runner will never be overtaken by the swiftest. For it is necessary that the one pursuing go before to where the one fleeing starts off, so that always it is necessary that the one fleeing keep ahead. This however is the same reason as in dividing into two, but it differs in not dividing into two the magnitude which is taken. It follows from this reason that the slowest is not overtaken, but it comes to be from this also by dividing into two. For it happens in both that, the magnitude being divided in some way, one does not arrive ar a limit. But there is added in this, speaking tragically, that the swiftest will not catch the slowest in pursuit. Thus the loosening is the same. Thinking that the one ahead will not be caught up with is false. For when it is ahead, it will not be overtaken; but nevertheless it will be overtaken if one grants that the unlimited can be gone through. These then are two reasons.
The third reason is the one spoken about just now, that the arrow carried along stands still. This results from taking time to be composed of nows. This not being given, there will not be a syllogism.
The fourth is the one about the equal masses in the race-course moved contrarily along side equal ones, some from the end of the race-course and others from the middle, in which he thought it would happen that the half time is equal to the whole.
The misreasoning is in thinking that the equal magnitude and equally fast is moved along sided the moving and the resting in an equal time. But this is false.
Let there be standing magnitudes AA and other BB equal to these in number and magnitude beginning from the middle and others CC, equal to these in number and magnitude and equally fast as the Bs from the extremity. At the same time, it happens that the first B and the first C are at the end moved along side each other. But the C has gone through all the Bs while the B through the half. Thus the time will be half. For each is equal along each. At the same time the first B has gone along side all the Cs. At the same time, the first C and the first B will be in the contrary extremes. For as they say, it will come to be along side each of the Bs as those of the As in an equal time, on account of both coming to be along As in an equal time. This is the reason, but it happens from the falsehood spoken of.
Nor is there anything impossible for us in the change between contradictories; as if something changes from not white to white and is in neither, so that therefore it will be neither white nor not white. For it is not necessary if the whole is not in either, that it cannot be called neither white nor not white, but it may be so in most or the main parts. For it is not the same not to be in this and not to be as a whole in this. Likewise about being and non-being and the other things contradictorily opposed. It will be of necessity in one of the opposed, in neither as a whole not always.
Again about the circle and the sphere and generally the things moved in themselves that it will happen that the same rest. For they and their parts will be in the same place for some time, so that at once they will rest and move. For first the parts are not in the same for any time; then the whole changes always to another. For the revolving taken from A and that from B and from C and for each of the other points are not the same, except as musical man and man, because one happens to the other. Thus the other always changes to another and never rests. It is in the same way with the sphere and the other things moved in themselves.