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Nature and End
Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 2
From his file: NATURE AND END.doc.
Read from in 4 classes
- Natural Hearing — 46. Aristotle's Arguments for Nature Acting for an End, and the Objections
- Natural Hearing — 47. Nature Acts for an End: Replies to the Objections and the Infinity of Mind
- De Anima — 20. The Nutritive Soul: Answering Empedocles, Food as Object, Nourishment, Growth and Generation, and the Sacraments
- Prima Pars — 94. Summa I, Q25, Articles 2–4: God's Infinite Power, Omnipotence, and Whether God Can Undo the Past
Aristotle, Book Two of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Five
These things having been determined, one ought to consider about causes, what kinds and how many in number there are. For, since the study is for the sake of knowing, and we do not think that we know each thing before we have grasped the on account of what - this is to grasp the first cause, it is clear that this ought to be done by us about generation and corruption and every natural change, in order that knowing the causes of these, we may try to bring back each thing sought to these causes.
In one way, that from which something comes to be, existing within it, is called a cause; as bronze of the statue and silver of the cup and the genera of these
In another way, the form and the model - this is the account of what was to be and the genera of these; as two towards one of the octave and, in general, number, and the parts in the definition.
Further, whence the first beginning of change or rest; as the advisor is a cause and the father of the child, and in general, the one making of the thing made and the one bringing about the change of the thing changed.
Further, as the end. This is that for the sake of which; as health of walking around. For on account of what does he walk around? We say, “in order that he may be healthy”; and speaking thus, we think that we have rendered the cause. And whatever things, another moving, come to be in the middle for the end; as thinning or purgation or drugs or tools. For all these are for the sake of the end, but they differ from each other as being some deeds and others tools.
The causes, then, are perhaps said in so many ways.
Causes being said in many ways, it happens that there are many causes of the same thing, not by accident; as the sculptor’s art and bronze of the statue, not according to something other but as statue - yet not in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as whence the motion.
Further, some things are causes of each other; as working hard of the good condition of the body and this of working hard - yet not in the same way, but the one as end and the other as the beginning of motion.
Further, the same is the cause of contraries. for what being present is the cause of this, we sometimes give, being absent, as the cause of the contrary; as the absence of the steersman of the overturning of the ship, whose presence was the cause of the safe return.
All the causes just now spoken of fall into four most manifest ways. For undivided sounds of syllables, and the matter of vessels, and fire and such things of bodies, and the parts of the whole, and the premisses of the conclusion are causes as that from which. Some of these are as the underlying subject, such as the parts, while others are as what was to be - the whole and the putting-together and the form. But the seed and the doctor and the advisor and generally the one making are all whence the beginning of change or rest or motion. Further as the end and the good of others. For the that for the sake of which is best and would be the end of others. And it makes no difference to call the same a good or an apparent good. These then and so many in kind are the causes.
Aristotle, Book Two of Natural Hearing (Physics), Reading Thirteen
But it is impossible that it be this way. For these and all things by nature, either come to be always or for the most part, while none of those by luck or chance do so. For neither by luck nor by chance does it seem to rain many times in the winter, but if it happens in the dog-days; nor heat in the dog-days, but if in winter. If then it seems to be either by chance or for the sake of something; and if it is not possible for these to be by chance or luck, they would be for the sake of something. But all things by nature are such, even as those saying these things themselves make clear. Hence, there is that for the sake of which in the things which come to be and are by nature.
Moreover, in whatever things there is an end, for the sake of this is done what comes before and the next in order. Therefore, as it is done, so is it by nature; and as it is by nature, so is each thing done, if something does not hinder it. But it is done for the sake of something. And therefore it is by nature for the sake of something. Just as if a house were among the things that come to be by nature, it would have come to be in the same way as it does now by art. And if the things by nature were to come to be not only by nature, but also by art, they would come to be in the same way as they do naturally. Therefore one of the two is for the sake of the other.
In general, art completes some things which nature is unable to finish while it imitates others. If then the things by art are for the sake of something, it is clear that also the things by nature are for the sake of something. For the things that come after are to the things that come before in the same way, both in the things by art and in those by nature.
This is especially clear in the other animals which make neither by art, nor investigating, nor taking counsel. Whence some question whether it is by mind or something else that the spiders and the ants and such like build. Proceeding thus little by little, it appears that things useful for an end have also come to be in the plants; as the leaves for the sake of the covering of the fruit. And so, if it is by nature and for the sake of something that the swallow makes a nest and the spider, the cobweb, and the plants, the leaves for the sake of the fruits, and the roots not up but down for the sake of food, it is clear that there is such a cause in the things which come to be and are by nature.
And since nature is twofold, the one as matter and the other as form and this same an end, and the others are for the sake of the end, this same would be a cause for the sake of which.
WHETHER NATURE ACTS FOR AN END
OBJECTIONS TO NATURE ACTING FOR AN END
1. Action for an end requires a mind. but nature does not have a mind. Hence, nature does not act for an end.
Sitting can be a cause of the carpenter making the chair the way he does only because the carpenter has sitting in mind and can figure out by his mind a shape and order that fits that end. But there does not seem to be a mind in the other animals for mind is unlimited. But even the instinct of animals is limited. and even more so would it seem ridiculous to say there is a mind in the tree; as if, for example, the tree thought out the structure of its seeds or their containers so that they would be carried by the wind to some distance.
2. The end and the good are the same. Hence, if nature acted for an end, it would always produce the good. But nature sometimes produces the bad or fails to achieve the good; e.g., defective babies are born, earthquakes etc. Therefore nature does not act for an end.
3. Matter, form and mover or maker with mathematical chance are sufficient to explain the good order found in natural things. But fewer causes are better if they are sufficient (the principle of simplicity). Hence, end or purpose or the good is not among the causes in the natural world.
The sufficiency of the above can be seen from the enormous number of the productions of nature over extremely long periods of time. Nature produces so many combinations that even if most of them are bad, it is bound to hit eventually upon a good one even though it did not intend this or was not directed to it. But the good combinations are able to survive while the bad ones perish. Hence, we see in the natural world today good combinations for the most part since the bad have perished.
NATURE ACTS FOR AN END
We can reason that nature acts for an end or the good in the following ways (after Aristotle):
1. Nature produces the good by chance (as defined in Physics II) or because it is inclined to it. But it does not produce the good by chance. Therefore, nature is inclined towards the good.
Proof of the second premiss: If nature produced the good by chance, it would not produce the good for the most part. But nature does produce the good for the most part. Therefore, nature does not produce the good by chance.
Or to state the proof of the second premiss in another way. If nature produced the good by chance, it would produce it rarely. But nature does not produce the good rarely. Therefore nature does not produce the good by chance.
2. Nature operates in the way that it is apt (like a courageous man operates courageously). but the operation of nature is such as to produce the good. Therefore, nature is apt to produce the good.
Proof of the second premiss: Nature produces the good by going through a determined number of steps such as to produce the good; as does human art (for example, in making a pie). If the production of the good was accidental to what nature does, it would not go through the same ordered steps to produce it.
Nature’s way of producing the good is to go through determined steps, as does human art. But when the good is repeatedly produced by going through the same determined number of steps, the good is a result of those steps as such, not by accident or happening. This can be seen in the arts where the good is produced (not accidentally or by happening) by going through the same number of steps over and over again. An ordered series of steps is found in the arts. Out of this, one obtains a definite result which is good. A recipe would be an example of an ordered series of steps and the cake would be a result. In living things, we find a definite series of steps in the embryo’s development leading to the final result. In this respect there is a likeness between the works of art and of nature; that is, the series of steps tends towards a definite result. Then why not say that the ordered series of steps in nature is for the definite result. There is no defined or determined series of steps in an accidental result. There is, however, in the world of nature and of art. The steps in an accidental result are not for the sake of it, but when a definite ordered series of steps leads to a definite result, they are for the sake of it. Nature goes through very ordered steps to produce a chicken. Hence, one can say that the steps nature takes are such as to lead to a good result. We know that in art we have action for an end. Therefore, nature is such as to produce the good through definite steps, just as art is. Thus we can say that nature is also among the causes that act for an end.
3. Human art clearly acts for an end. But human art cannot act for an end without imitating nature. Therefore, nature acts for an end.
Proof of the second premiss: human art cannot act for an end without making its product out of a matter suitable to its function and without giving it a form suitable for its function. But this is the way nature makes the parts of the animals etc. Hence, if art were to make the products of nature, it would make them in the same way e.g., false teeth.
4. Human art, in helping nature, acts for an end. But we could not act for an end in helping nature if nature had no end. Therefore, nature does have an end.
The medical art acts for a purpose in helping nature by sewing up the body; optics helps the eye in preparing glasses; and logic has a purpose in helping our reason; the farmer in plowing the field etc.
5. The fifth argument is an induction from the many examples of actions for an end in animals and also in the plants. We readily recognize the parts of animals and plants as tools and call them so.
6. Matter is for the sake of form, just as the finished product is for the sake of its uses. Raw materials are to the hammer as the hammer is to hammering. The analogy is one of purpose. But the action of nature is such as to form matter. Therefore, nature acts for an end.
Another wording of the same six arguments
1. Nature produces the good either because its actions are directed towards the good or by chance. But the good is produced by chance rarely while nature produces the good for the most part in animals and plants. Therefore, nature produces the good because its actions are directed toward the good. Hence, nature acts for an end.
2. Nature produces the good by going through an ordered number of steps which are apt to have that result; just as the cook produces an apple pie by going through an ordered number of steps which are apt to have that result. Hence, the production of the good is not accidental to nature's way of acting, but nature's way of acting is such as to have a good result. Therefore, nature does act for the sake of the good.
3. Human art manifestly acts for an end. But human art cannot act for an end without imitating nature's way of acting. Hence, nature must also be acting for an end.
That human art cannot act for an end without imitating nature's way of acting can be seen thus: Nature makes things out of a material suitable for their function and also gives them a form suitable for their function; for teeth and the tongue are made out of materials suitable for their function and the form given them by nature is also suitable for their function. But art cannot make, for example, a saw and a pillow for their respective ends without doing the same.
If human art only sometimes acted like nature, we might be able to say that this likeness is a coincidence and thus try to escape the force of the argument. But when we see that it is impossible for human art to act for an end (which it clearly does), there can be no doubt that nature is itself acting for an end.
4. The arts which help nature (such as the arts of farming, medicine, and logic) are without doubt acting for an end. But one cannot act for an end in helping another if that other is not acting for an end. Therefore, nature must itself be acting for an end.
5. Action for an end is so manifest in the bee, the spider, the ant etc. that some wonder whether they have a mind. And we speak of the body of living things as organic from the Greek word organon meaning tool. The living body is composed of tools. But nothing is more clearly for an end than a tool.
6. Nature acts so as to form matter. But form is the end of matter. Therefore, nature acts for an end.
That form is the end of mater can be seen thus: matter is nothing other than the ability for form. But every ability is for the sake of its act. Therefore matter is for the sake of form.
Hence, we see in human arts that the art which uses the product gives orders to the art which forms the product. And the art which forms the product gives orders to the art which prepares the raw materials. The whole of human art and industry rise up again and again to proclaim this order. Thus, the use of the formed product is to the formed product as the formed product is to the raw materials. But clearly the use is the end of the formed product. Hence, the form is the end of the matter.
REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS
1. The first objection was as follows: Action for an end requires a mind, But nature does not have a mind. Therefore, nature does not act for an end.
Action for an end does require a mind but not necessarily a mind in what acts for an end. The operations of a machine are directed toward an end although the machine does not have a mind. The mind of man has realized something of its art in the machine. This is possible because art, unlike foresight, operates through determined steps. Perhaps some other mind has put something of its art into nature. This is like a habit which we sometimes call a second nature. The habitual driver has realized something of the art of driving a car (like stopping it by putting on the brakes) in his reflexes or habit which accomplish this purpose without a mind (and it is well that it does). When a child runs in front of the car, one does not deliberate what to do, but does so out of habit. Slamming on the brakes is an action done for an end, but it is not deliberated about in the man to whom it has become second nature. Nature is like this. Something of the art of building a tree is in the tree.
If nature is an object for our mind, if it appeals to our mind by its order and simplicity, is it so strange to say that it is a product of mind? If the products of our mind worked out without relation to the natural world have found an application in it, is it strange to say that nature is the product of a mind similar in some way to our own. Moreover like produces like and evolution has resulted in a mind. The products of man’s mind are starting to be a bit like our mind; e.g., computers. Hence some people wonder whether these computers have a mind, just as people wonder whether the bee etc. have intelligence. Of course, it does not belong to natural science to discuss this mind. On the other hand it does not belong to natural science to deny it either. However the evidence points to the existence of such a mind. If one wants to know that mind before admitting its effects, he wants to put the cart before the horse as far as our knowledge is concerned for we usually know effects before causes.
2. The second objection was that nature sometimes fails to produce the good, but produces bad things, as the defects in a baby. How then can one say that nature is directed towards the good?
But human art which is aiming at the good also sometimes fails to produce the good. The cook sometimes overcooks the meat or the doctor makes a mistake. But does this mean that the cook or doctor is not acting for an end. Of course not since this is the rare case. It means the opposite, for there can be failure or mistake only when an end is not realized. If nature also is seen to fail or make a mistake, this is a sign that nature is acting for an end.
3. The third objection was this: Nature could produce the good we think is its end by mathematical chance (e.g., the seeds of a tree) But if the chances are great enough, there is a probability that a good combination will occur. But only good combinations can survive and reproduce themselves. This is why we see good for the most part in the products of nature, not because nature is inclined towards the good rather than to the bad. This would seem to be essentially the argument of Empedocles. This argument also invokes the principle of simplicity or fewness saying that if we can explain the good in natural things by matter, form and mover or maker in the above way, then one should not add a fourth cause that is not necessary, the end or purpose.
The first thing to be recognized here is that mathematical chance (which is expressed in a ratio) is not necessarily a cause outside of intention as is the chance defined in the second book of the Physics as an accidental cause of what happens rarely as a result of an action done for an end. Human art sometimes uses mathematical chance as a means of achieving an end; e.g., the pellets in a hunter’s gun. The production of seeds by a tree may be a means of insuring the reproduction of the tree and maintaining its kind in existence. Nature may use mathematical chance as one means of achieving its ends.
Thus that nature does sometimes achieve the good by mathematical chance is no reason for saying that it is not acting for an end. On the other hand it is not a reason for saying that it does. The problem is whether mathematical chance is a means toward an end, is directed towards an end or is the principal cause of the good in nature.
Mathematical chance left to itself, as a principal cause, is more apt to produce the bad than the good. This is because the good takes place in one way and the bad in many or rather an infinity of ways; so that the chances for the bad are infinitely greater than for the good. There is an infinity of ways to miss the bull’s-eye and only one way to hit it. Hence, if mathematical chance were the first and chief cause of good in the natural world, we would find the good rarely in the works of nature and, in the course of time, the natural world would be getting worse. Since neither of these is so in the natural world, we must conclude that mathematical chance in nature is limited and directed toward the good. Those who deny this are forced to say that the present state of nature where good is found for the most part, is a result of the opposite condition where it would be produced most rarely by a cause that is apt to continue the opposite. One cannot invoke the principle of simplicity or fewness unless the fewer causes are sufficient.
But it can also be pointed out that the principle of simplicity was first adopted in the physical sciences in modern times because it was thought that superfluous principles would serve no purpose in nature. This is to admit that nature acts for an end. This is clearly seen in Newton’s first rule of reasoning in the Principia:
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose, the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain; and more is in vain when less will serve; for nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.
When Newton says “Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve”, he is saying that for nature to have more causes than necessary would serve no purpose. Thus the principle of simplicity is based upon nature acting for an end. Hence, it is absurd to use the principle of simplicity to reject end or purpose in nature if the principle of simplicity is itself based on nature acting for an end. One would be saying that it is not so because it is so.
If someone says that he uses the principle of simplicity, not because of the first reason why it was adopted, but because of its success in modern science, one might argue that this very success is a sign that nature acts for an end. Human art which acts for an end delights in simplicity and is like nature in this respect.
But leaving aside the argument that the principle of simplicity is either based on nature acting for an end or is as sign of it, we can still not reject end in nature on the basis of it. First because the principle of simplicity is not opposed to adding another kind of cause if the others are insufficient. And matter, form and mover are not sufficient to explain the good in nature without end being a cause as can be seen in the reply to objection three. Second the principle of simplicity is not opposed to adding another cause on a higher level when the added cause unifies those already known. But the end does this, being the cause of all the other causes being causes. Newton’s principles did not violate the principle of simplicity when they were added to those of Galileo and Kepler. The former were on a higher level and unified those of Galileo and Kepler.