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Notes from Dionne's Course on Dispositions of Desire Necessary for Philosophy
Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will
From his file: DIONNE ROLE OF APPETITE IN PHIL.doc.
NOTES FROM DIONNE'S COURSE ON DISPOSITIONS OF DESIRE NECESSARY FOR PHILOSOPHY
(1) Necessity and (2) importance of study of the speculative life.
De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 7 - Opposition between nature and reason. Man distinguished first from other animals by experience - comparison of singulars conserved in memory. Then, man can live by art and reasoning which presuppose the universal gotten by experience.
Nature supplies practical life more than speculative life. Nature gives proximate dispositions for the moral virtues, but only remote dispositions for speculative life. Hence, the general necessity of discovering rules for the speculative life which is least assured by nature.
De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5 - Study of logic presupposes prior mode which is included in second as touch in other senses.
Necessity of considering whatever pertains to man's speculative life. Importance of (1) way of proceeding proper to one science (2) common way of proceeding in the sciences which is logic. (3) way of proceeding of the human intellect.
Last page of Sophistical Refutations: two kinds of discovery (1) not completely original, based on others (2) the first discovery, small in quantity, but much more useful.
The Confessions of St. Augustine in their human and intellectual aspect will be our example or similitude. (1) We begin with Augustine because a singular is more proportioned to us than the universal doctrine. (2) Why singular of fifth century rather than present? To avoid appetite for some present man (3) A unique case, well described.
Texts from the Confessions (ed. Vives)
(1) Book 3, Ch. 3, n. 6 - First desire to be great orator (2) Book 3, Ch. 4 - Pursued this desire in Cicero; mutavit affectum, desire for wisdom (3) Book 3, Ch. 5 - Application to Sacred Scripture, found book impenetrable, unworthy along side of Cicero Ch. 6- Error about creatures as well as about God. n. 11 poetry better than errors (4) Book 3, Ch. 12 - Bishop refused to instruct Augustine because of his lack of docility Book 4, Ch. 1, Ch. 2 - Teaching of rhetoric Book 4, Ch. 3, nn. 4-6 (5) Book 5, Ch. 3, n. 3 Ch. 5 - Errors of Manicheans on astronomy would lead Augustine to doubt their judgment on more difficult matters. Ch. 6 - Ignorance of the liberal arts Ch. 7, n. 13 Ch. 13 - Ambrose's words rather than thoughts pleased Augustine Ch. 14 - Things with words came into soul. Augustine could not separate them, begin to suspect that Manichean difficulties could be solved Book 6, Ch. 5 Book 8, Ch. 12
(1) First impressions are strongest, remain longest. Hence, after Cicero went to Faustus but returned to first - Ambrose.
The first impression of philosophy most persists to end, we love most of all what we first hear. Metaphysics, Liber II, Lectio 5 - Consuetudo vertitur in natura - what we have always heard is stronger than knowledge of truth.
(2) Persuasion: (1) music (2) poetry (3) rhetoric. Persuasion first involves something extraneous to reason. These lead into or precede speculative life.
(3)Stupor is caused in students when teacher speaks above them, followed by despair. These become principle of false judgment. Augustine thought scripture unworthy of being compared to Cicero. Then he was seduced by Manicheans with their gross errors.
(4) Indocilis was Augustine. Something of appetite indocilitas, in will which applies intellect frequenter etc. There is another kind of docility in the proemium to De Anima distinction and order of the treatise which renders the student more apt - purely intellectual. Augustine was indocilis more according to appetite.
(5)Meeting with Faustus - Faustus was ignorant of the liberal arts, and hence Augustine rejected he great teacher of the Manicheans. It was impossible for that man to be right if he ignored the problems of the arts and letters (Very important) Is the skepticism of philosophy what is best??
Two points (a) meeting with Faustus (b) meeting with Ambrosia - Augustine loved him, not insofar as he was a teacher, but insofar he was a man bienveillant: appetite. This incited Augustine to follow the teaching of Ambrose. He defended Augustine against all fears in his heart (?) It is necessary to distinguish between the order of intelligence and the order of the will. There is a certain quia ita est in the Confessions.
Emotions and the speculative life
(1) Distinction of the emotion (2) order
IaIIae, Q. 22: Passio (1) communiter, omnis receptio (2) proprie - receptio cum abjectione (3) mutatio corporalis, transmutatio corporalis.
Passio in appetite which is more passive - trahitur ad rem more through appetite than knowledge. Will or appetite is more active toward exterior because it is more passive - simpliciter loquendo more passive.
Passio more where corporeal transmutation - hence, more in sense appetite. Amor, gaudium etc. attributed to intellectual appetite signify simple act of he will. The word desire applied more to the will than concupiscence.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 23 - Distinction of the emotions - Two sensitive appetites
De Veritate, Q. 25 - Distinction of the emotions - Comparison of sense appetite to natural appetite. Natural appetite tends towards two things: what conserves it and against contraria
congruum alicui naturae concupiscible appetite
Victoriam super contraria Irascible appetite
Sign: animals pursue what is painful.
Irascible fights for concupiscible all passions of irascible begin and end in concupiscible. Hope begins in love or desire and ends in joy or pleasure. Anger begins in sadness and ends in joy.
Bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum is object of concupiscible appetite. Bonum arduum has a certain elevation not easy to overcome. Bonum arduum or difficilis is object of irascible.
Passion is a motion or change and there are two kinds of contrariety in motion (1) to and from the same term - mutatio ad esse and ab esse (2) according to contrariety of term - whiteness and blackness. Both in irascible; second only in concupiscible. Bonum inquantum bonum cannot be object a quo and malum inquantum malum cannot be object ad quem.
Scripture was bonum arduum for Augustine: despair
Q. 25 - Order of passions: In irascible there are passions applying only to movement and not also to rest as in concupiscible. But rest or end is anterior in intention, posterior in execution.
Hope adds to desire elevatio animae> Fear adds to aversion or flight depressio animae.
Hope commands order of irascible; as love, order of concupiscible
Amor desiderium spes audacia gaudium ira odium fuga desperatio timor tristitia
Spes causes audacia easily Timor causes desperatio easily
Order in emotions due to nature - divine wisdom.
Emotions are found in man and brutes, but in man they are apt to be reasonable. De Veritate, Q. 26,Art. 6, Ad 2 Whether we can merit by our passions. Opposite order in knowledge and appetite between intellectual and sensitive.
De Virtutibus in Communi, Art. 8 Whether virtues are in us by nature. Natural dispositions which incline to one virtue incline also towards opposite of another virtue; fear disposes to humility and docility but against fortitude. But man is ordered to a perfect good which involves multiplicity.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars or Prima Secundae (?), Q. 67, At. 5 - Connection between complexio naturalis, passiones et virtutes. Human body must be the most temperate: Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Troilus and Cressida (Ajax) - disorder due to similitude to other animals.
Body disposed first to sense or immediately to sense: Temperatio of body disposes to temperatio of passions which disposes to temperatio virtutum. Other animals can have better other senses, but not touch.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 46, Art. 5, Ad 1 - In the human species there is no passion by nature dominant. Only according to individual dispositions. In other animals, one passion dominates.
Mode of proceeding: (1) As moral science proceeds figuraliter, we shall also proceed figuraliter, and (2) in the light of philosophy. Two different considerations of the speculative life: in the light of philosophy and in the light of theology (sometimes we mix the two)
Very serious to confuse the most fundamental thing as trying to demonstrate the principle of non-contradiction or the existence of nature.
Love, principle of choice in philosophy, is an act of the will. Passio of love has delectabile as object, is first act - first delectabile has very great influence, and can induce custom which has strength of nature (hard to remove). but for the most part these first loves must be removed. What is the object of this love for philosophy?
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Arts 1 & 2 Good is a cause of love; knowledge also is a cause. Objection: things loved more than known as God. But knowledge divides what is joined which the will doe not do. (sicut maxime patet in scientiis quam amant propter aliquam summariam cognitionem.) Young cannot define philosophy, yet they desire it. But this love is placed in some singular man.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 7, Art. 7 Concerning ultimate end in two ways: id in quo and ratio ultimus. All desire happiness but differ in regard to id in quo. Same in those who love philosophy - they all desire it, but where is it found? First teacher may be loved more strongly as id in quo invenitur philosophia.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 3 - Whether similitude is cause of love. Similitude or likeness of two sorts: both in act or one in potency, having inclination towards what other has in act. Perhaps a likeness of temperament which both have in act or which student has in potency and professor in act.
A love based on human faith, from hearing without any guarantee of truth. Faith is necessary for young - yet argument from faith is weakest of all.
De Trinitate, Q. III, ARt. 1 - Necessity of faith: faith is a voluntary assent. Pia affectio in divine and human faith necessary for docility. This remains for master after science is acquired. De Veritate, Q. 14, Art. 10 - Necessity of faith
Fides ex auditu - Comment il faut ecouter - Plutarch, Chs. 2 & 3 What is heard especially at first forms the student (Ch. 4) Something causes sadness - hence, anger which hears reason imperfectly (N. Ethics, Liber 7, Lectio 6) Mansuetudo especially disposes to speculative life by removing impediments.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 30, Art. 2: Good or end moves differently in being present or absent. good or end insofar as absent is object of desire. Desire caused by love and tends towards pleasure. (Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 1 - Is union an effect of love? Love unio secundum affectum, non secundum rem.
Faith most important in respect to desire. In faith, divine or human, intellect is moved by will even towards specification. John of St. Thomas, q. 1, a. 1 good on pia affectio (nn. 6-7) Will does not add something ex parte veritatis but ex parte convenientiae - non quia visum, sed quia placens. Will renders intellect mobilis ab objecto obscuro quia conveniens vel placens.
Pia affectus at base of faith is foundation of desire; this love as it is more intensified, intensifies desire. Hope also fortifies desire.
Object of desire is an absent good, a distant good. De Anima, III, Lectio 16, n. 37-38 Distinct knowledge required for directly tending to determinate good - likeness of desire in man which can be confused insofar as its good is distant. Even human faith touches obscure object and hence distant and hence object of desire.
De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 10, 10 & Ad 10: Things, thoughts and words inversely related to master and student. Bonum distans, distance from words to things: if will stops with words, it has a concupiscenia confusa which cannot be a principle of a further act of appetite. (De Magistro Knowledge of truth is not in words.)
Cause of love: (1) good, (2) knowledge ,(3) similitude. In philosophy, rare that there be a false orientation with reference to the knowledge, but often in regard to similitude. This similitude may be good or bad between professor and student both in act. Second similitude is also very precarious for student may think professor has in act what he doesn't have.
Absent good requires new movement of appetite - desire. Desire fortifies love - hence, is very important.
Growing progression of movement: these movements of appetite will become clearer and clearer as student progresses in his studies.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 71, Art 2, Ad 3: Plures sequuntur inclinationem sensitivae naturae. More attain beginning than the end. The person who relies only upon love and desire will not reach the end of the speculative life. Intellect has greatest dependence upon the irascible. We cannot have bonas mores intellectuales without rectification of irascible - concupiscible is merely a beginning.
Because object of the concupiscible is bonum absolute, concupiscible is before the irascible. but animal is without defense if without irascible. Irascible is ordered to acquisition of concupiscible by overcoming difficulty - bonum arduum.
Truth must be pursued as a difficult good. Unless evil is seen as most possible, good will not be achieved. Sadness and anger are generated in person who does not have irascible rectified.
Problem in irascible is much more complicated. Now to look at St. Augustine - what is remarkable
Confessions, Liber 5, Chapter 7, 13: Augustine has hope when meeting Faustus. [[How different my first encounter with DeKoninck when he answered my questions]] New element judgment and movement of appetite tending towards an order. Augustine begins to put away the ore elevated doctrine of Faustus because of latter's lack of knowledge of lower arts. Faustus was occasion for most important change in Augustine's appetite. Movement of appetite that is clarified. (How can we cause a love of order in the student?) [[Dionne, even more the DeK, gave us fear of philosopher]]
Liber 5, ch. 11 Objections of Manicheans against Scripture - first acts of appetite become feebler.
Liber 6, Chapters 4, & 5 - Generation of fear, inclination to Catholic Doctrine
Augustine can lave aside earlier affection. Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 97, Art. 2. Ad 1 Human law should not always be changed when a better comes along since it depends upon custom for its efficacy. This is not true of speculative life.
Two conditions for Augustine's attitude: (1) very strong desire for truth and (2) an intelligence excellent enough to see something better.
The first movements of the appetite are obscure - later intelligence directs appetite but not at beginning.