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Parts of a Private Way
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: PARTS OF A PRIVATE WAY.doc.
PARTS OF A PRIVATE WAY
Each reasoned out knowledge has its own tropoß or modus or way which is measured by its matter and how reason is to that matter.
There are two ways in which we can distinguish "all" the parts of a private way. Both involve a distinction of "all" the parts and therefore will to some extent overlap. But something is more naturally (and fully and explicitly) brought out in one division that would come out in a more forced way in the other.
The First Way
In every reasoned out knowledge, we should distinguish between the beginnings of that reasoned out knowledge and what comes after or follows those beginnings.
And proportional to the above, we should distinguish between the way in which the beginnings of that reasoned out knowledge are made known and firm in us and the way in which one goes forward from those beginnings in that reasoned out knowledge.
Aristotle touches upon this in a passage of the Nicomachean Ethics which Thomas lays out in his Exposition of the text. And Thomas follows in particular this division in an article on the modus of sacred doctrine in the Sentences.
The Second Way
A second way to divide the parts of each reasoned out knowledge's own way is to distinguish those parts which belong to it as knowledge and those parts that belong to it as reasoned out.
Since knowledge involves grasping and judging; and in reasoned out knowledge, we must grasp things distinctly by definitions; two parts of the private way of each reasoned out knowledge are its way of defining and its way of judging. These are closely related as can be seen by a reason and by induction and by a sign.
A reason can be given which is that the most potent judgment is made by definition.
An induction can be made to also see they are connected. Natural philosophy defines with sensible matter and its judgments end in the senses. Geometry defines with imaginable matter and its judgments end in the imagination. Logic and metaphysics define without any matter and their judgments end in reason. Theology defines in reference to God and the Trinity and it judges in the divine light.
A sign is that both could be used to distinguish one reasoned out knowledge from another.
When we consider, however, that reasoned out knowledge is not just knowledge, but reasoned out, we naturally think of it being over a road or along a road or following a road. And road means an order. And here we can follow Thomas in his laying out of the first chapter of the first book of Natural Hearing where he distinguishes between the order of determination or consideration and the order of demonstration.
Division of the Parts Made in July, 1997
General distinction according to the difference of looking and practical knowledge: resolutive and compositive modes.
Way of knowing subject in particular Way of defining The way of defining in the three forms of looking knowledge The way of defining the continuous in logic and the wisdom of nature The way of defining the passions in the wisdom of nature and in dialectic The way of defining in the physical sciences The way of defining in theology The way of defining substance, accident, motion and lack Way of demonstrating Demonstration propter quid and quia Demonstration by what causes and how (for example, form in the wisdom of nature and in wisdom) How rigorous are the demonstrations Way of judging The limit or end of judgment Wisdom of nature: sense Mathematics: imagination Wisdom and logic: reason Ethics: experience of human life Way of making known its beginnings* Way of manuductio
Order of knowing: order of determination or consideration Mathematics: simple before composed, equal before unequal Wisdom of nature: general before particular and towards matter Wisdom: towards immaterial and to some extent particular before general (act and ability as found in motion before act and ability in general; material substance before substance in general; one beginning of number before one convertible with being)
__________________________________________________________ * Super Ioannem, Caput XV, Lectio III, n. 2018:
Eiusdem rei potest haberi cognitio perfecta et imperfecta: sicut in scientiis apparet quod qui scit principia omnia unius scientiae dicitur scire scientiam illam, sed imperfecte eam scit. Unde qui docet aliqua principia alicuius scientiae, potest dicere se docuisse scientiam illam, quia omnia quae sunt scientiae illius, sunt in principiis eius virtute; sed illam eamdem scientiam perfectius scit quando conclusiones singulas, quae virtute sunt in principiis, novit.
The above text also seems to indicate that the propria principia of a science are taught and not known (or not known distinctly) by the habit of beginnings.
One connection between the way of defining and the way of judging is that Iudicium autem potissimum de unaquaque re fit secundum eius definitivam rationem. In Boetii De Trinitate, Lectio II, Q. II, Art. 2:
in qualibet cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet principium et terminum. Principium ad apprehensionem pertinet, terminus autem ad judicium; ibi enim cognitio perficitur.
Principium igitur cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis est in sensu, quia ex apprehensione sensus oritur apprehensio phantasiae...a qua iterum oritur apprehensio intellectiva in nobis, cum phantasmata sunt intellectivae animae ut objecta...
Sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter. Quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque in solo intellectu.
Quandoque enim proprietates et accidentia rei, quae sensui demonstrantur, sufficienter exprimunt naturam rei, et tunc oportet quod iudicium de rei natura, quod facit intellectus, conformetur his quae sensus demonstrat de re. Et huiusmodi sunt omnes res naturales, quae sunt determinatae ad materiam sensibilem. Et ideo in scientia naturali terminari debet cognitio ad sensum, ut scilicet hoc modo iudicemus de rebus naturalibus, secundum quod sensus ea demonstrat, ut patet in III Caeli et Mundi. [cap.7], et qui sensum negligit in naturalibus, incidit in errorem. Et haec sunt naturalia, quae sunt concreta cum materia sensibili et motu, et secundum esse et secundum considerationem.
Quaedam vero sunt, quorum iudicium non dependet ex his, quae sensu percipiuntur, quia quamvis secundum esse sunt in materia sensibili, tamen secundum definitivam rationem sunt a materia sensibili abstracta. Iudicium autem potissimum de unaquaque re fit secundum eius definitivam rationem.
Both the way of defining and the way of judging could be used to distinguish one reasoned out knowledge from another and specially the looking forms of reasoned out knowledge.
Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist XXXIIII, Q. I, Art. I, Sol. I, nn. 117-21:
Cum unumquodque quod est ad finem determinetur secundum exigentiam finis, potentiae et habitus qui ordinantur ad actus sicut ad ultimam perfectionem oportet quod secundum actus diversos distinguantur, sicut etiam potentiae materiae distinguuntur per relationem ad diversas formas.
Non autem quaelibet diversitas actuum facit differentiam potentiarum et habituum, sed illa tantum quae est ex diversitate objectorum, a quibus actus specificantur, sicut motus a terminis. Solum autem illa differentia terminorum facit diversam speciem motus quae attenditur secundum illam rationem secundum quam terminat motum. Unde quod descensus terminetur ad aquam vel ad terram, non facit diversam speciem motus localis; quia motus localis non erat ad terram vel aquam inquantum huiusmodi, sed inquantum deorsum sunt. Generationes autem differunt secundum speciem quae terminantur ad formas aquae et terrae.
Et similiter objecta diversa non diversificant actus secundum speciem, nisi sit diversitas secundum illam rationem secundum quam est objectum. Videre enim album et nigrum non sunt diversi actus secundum speciem; quia utrumque est objectum visus secundum unam rationem, inquantum sunt colorata visibilia actu per lucem. Et inde contingit quod quanto aliqui habitus vel potentiae sunt immaterialiores, tanto sunt universaliores et minus distinguuntur, quia attendunt universaliorem rationem objecti; sicut quinque sensibus propriis respondet unus sensus communis et una imaginatio.
Sciendum tamen quod cum plures habitus quandoque sunt in una potentia, aliqua diversitas sufficit ad distinguendum habitus quae non sufficit ad distinguendum potentiam; quia potentia alio modo comparatur ad actum quam habitus; unde et secundum alteram rationem objectum utrique respondet. Potentia enim est principium agendi absolute, sed habitus est principium agendi prompte et faciliter; et ideo objectum secundum illam rationem qua se habet ad actum simpliciter respondet potentiae, sed secundum quod se habet ad facilitatem actus respondet habitui. Et ideo diversitas materiae vel objecti in ordine ad ea quae faciunt facilitatem in actu, facit diversitatem habitus et non potentiae
Et inde est quod in speculativis diversitas materiae, secundum quod est determinabilis per diversa media et principia ex quibus est facilitas considerationis, facit diversa scientias, sicut naturalis quae ex effectibus et his quae apparent in sensu demonstrat, a mathematica differt quae circa suam materiam ex eisdem principiis et mediis procedere non potest.