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Phil follows a road
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: Phil follows a road.docx.
Philosophy is both knowledge over a road and knowledge of the road to follow.
The word road is an important example of a word equivocal by reason. When the word road is carried over from the sensible road we walk or drive upon and placed upon the order in our knowledge, one drops the stone or brick or asphalt or cement or whatever matter the material road is made of, but keep the before and after along that road. But the words before and after are carried over and placed upon the order in our knowledge by a likeness of ratios, as can be seen in the chapter on before in the Categories of Aristotle.
Philosophy is knowledge over a road, knowledge that follows a road. To some extent all our knowledge is over a road for it must be somewhere along the natural road from the senses into reason because all our knowledge is either in the senses or in reason.
Philosophy is a work of reason as reason although it presupposes what reason naturally understands or comes to understand. Hence, philosophy follows the road of reason as reason. This is the road from reasonable guesses toward reasoned out knowledge.
It is also the road from thinking about things to understanding them. We get from thinking about things to understanding them by thinking them out. There are almost as many senses of thinking out as there are of the words out or in. We think out the senses of a word or speech. We think out the parts of some whole, either its quantitative parts or its essential parts. We also think out the definitions of many things. We think out the particular kinds of one general kind of thing. We think out the order of many things. We think out conclusions. There are, at least, seven senses here of thinking out, corresponding to seven senses of in and out. Philosophy is a thought out knowledge in all these senses, but we can call it a reasoned out knowledge from the last kind of thinking out.
It is also the road from understanding what something is to reasoning about it. We do not have to understand fully what something is to reason about it (although the better we understand what it is the better we can reason about it), but we must understand in some way, however imperfectly, what it is before we can reason about it. We go from understanding what something is to reasoning about it through statements about it.
Too Strong for Fantasy, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967, p
Duane Berquist