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Philosophy and the Offshoots
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PHILOSOPHY AND THE OFFSHOOTS
There is a profound likeness between the task of Plato and Aristotle in their own time and the task of their followers in the twentieth century. Both are or were faced with the dominance of what Aristotle call a παραφυες or offshoot [1] that could threaten or does threaten the independence of philosophy or some part of it. To defend the independence of philosophy in this regard does not mean a lack of interest in the dominant παραφυες or offshoot, but it requires a deeper understanding of the latter. The dominant offshoot in the time of Plato and Aristotle was rhetoric, and in our own time, the physical sciences. Understanding the dominant offshoot becomes a principal task of the philosopher, but at the same time it is necessary to defend the independence of his own discipline or disciplines from the dominant offshoot and the reflection on it. The notion of a παραφυες or offshoot becomes central to both tasks. We can begin these by taking up three questions: what is an offshoot?; why it possible?; and why does it have so strong a hold on the minds of men?
A παραφυες or offshoot is the result of bringing together orders that are related to reason in diverse ways. As Aquinas has pointed out in a famous passage, order is related to reason in four ways:
Order, however, is compared to reason in four ways.
There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things.
There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds.
There is, moreover, a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will.
And further, there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is itself the cause, as in a box or house.[2]
It is remarkable that the two central offshoots that we have mentioned, rhetoric and the physical sciences, bring together all four of the orders which Thomas distinguished. Rhetoric brings together the second and third orders in some way while the physical sciences embrace in another way the first and the fourth. But we shall see this better further on. After the above passage, Thomas points out a connection between three of these four orders, taken in separation, and three now traditional parts of philosophy:
And because the consideration of reason is perfected by habit, there is a diverse knowledge corresponding to each of these diverse orders which reason properly considers.
For it belongs to natural philosophy to consider the order of things which human reason considers but does not make; thus that under natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics.
The order however which reason by considering makes in its own act belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of speech to each other and the order of principles to each other and to conclusions.
The order of voluntary actions however belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy.
The order however which reason by considering makes in exterior things put together by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.[3]
Rhetoric is an offshoot of logic (or the dialectical part of it) and moral philosophy (or political philosophy in Plato's and Aristotle's sense). Plato was intent upon showing the independence of logic and especially of political philosophy (including ethics) from rhetoric. But at the same time he contributed to our understanding of the latter as can be seen in he Gorgias, the Phaedrus, etc. Plato's work on the nature of rhetoric was continued and perfected by Aristotle in his book On the Art of Rhetoric which Cicero and the other Roman rhetoricians came to admire. And it is in his On the Art of Rhetoric, that Aristotle points out the character of rhetoric as a παραφυες or offshoot of logic (or dialectic) and ethical or political studies. But right after, or immediately after, he brings out that it is a παραφυες or offshoot, he shows a concern for the independence or distinction of political philosophy from rhetoric. This is an example of the general point or statement made in the beginning, that the notion of an offshoot is central both to an understanding of the offshoot and to the defense of philosophy as an independent discipline or disciplines. After showing the three means of persuasion used by the rhetorician, the first two of which make clear its connection with ethical and political studies, and the third, with dialectic or logic, Aristotle concludes to the character of rhetoric as an offshoot, but adds immediately its distinction from political philosophy:
Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were as offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may reasonably be called Politics. That is why Rhetoric assumes the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same.[4]
As rhetoric is an offshoot of the second and third kind of knowledge distinguished in the above passage from Aquinas, so the physical sciences in modern times are an offshoot of the first and fourth kinds.
When we say that the physical sciences are an offshoot of natural philosophy or science and the mechanical arts, we have in mind first the way each has helped the other in modern times. Heisenberg has put this well:
The connection between natural science and technical science has from the beginning been that of mutual assistance: the progress in technical science, the improvement of the tools, the invention of new technical devices have provided the basis for more, and more accurate, empirical knowledge of nature and finally the mathematical formulation of natural laws have opened the way to new applications of this knowledge in technical science.[5]
But this mutual assistance does not bring out fully that the physical sciences are an offshoot of natural science and the mechanical arts or technical science, distinct in some way from both. An offshoot is, so to speak, the offspring of two other sciences; and like a child who resembles its parents but is nevertheless a distinct individual, the offshoot resembles the sciences it brings together but is nevertheless distinct from both.
The more the physical sciences proceed, the more they are seen to be no longer a purely natural science. Heisenberg has insisted upon this in his book The Physicist's Conception of Nature :
Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature. The scientific method of analyzing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science alters and refashions the object of investigation.[6]
Weizsacker has also insisted on our making, or our ability to make, as intrinsic to the character of the physical sciences:
But as we try to penetrate to the last foundations of nature in the infinitely small, or to her outermost borders in the infinitely distant, we grow aware that our plain picture of the world was only an aspect of the immediate background.
In those remotest reaches of nature, only that is still comprehensible to us which is of our making or which, at least, could be of our making
It has become clearer than ever before that knowledge and power belong together.[7]
One must admire Kant for having seen this character of the physical sciences at a much earlier stage of their development.[8]
There is a sign of the offshoot character of the physical sciences in the names used in the oldest part of them which was the first to be perfected and is the first in the order of learning. This is that part of physics called mechanics, the word physics coming from the Greek word for nature and the word mechanics recalling the mechanical arts of Thomas' division above.
Once the physical sciences are understood to be an offshoot of the philosophy of nature or a purely natural science and the mechanical arts, the way is also opened to a defense of the independent existence of the philosophy of nature. As Socrates said in the Apology [9], how can one believe in the existence of mules, but deny that there are horses and asses? If the mule is an offspring of the horse and the ass, how can one believe in the former and not in he latter. In a somewhat similar way then, the existence of the physical sciences as an offshoot of the philosophy of nature and the mechanical arts requires us to admit the existence of these parents.
With some understanding now of what an offshoot is, we can turn to the second question of how an offshoot is possible. Here we may emphasize the offshoot that is dominant in our the time: the physical sciences. Why is such an offshoot of natural science or philosophy and the mechanical arts possible? Three basic reasons can be given here.
The first reason is that mathematics abstracts from the difference between nature and art. The four legs of a dog are by nature and the four "legs" of a table are by art, but the number four abstracts from or leaves out this difference between by nature and by art. One reason then why the physical sciences are able to unite in some way natural science and he mechanical arts is their well-known mathematical character. This also brings out a profound difference between the philosophy of nature and the physical sciences. The distinction between nature and human art is fundamental in the philosophy of nature[10] while the physical sciences abstract from this fundamental difference. The equations that govern the paths of the planets are also involved in putting a rocket into orbit.
Something similar to this first reason can be found in the case of the other principal offshoot, rhetoric, which word comes from the Greek word for speech (or speaker). Speech or language is a tool that is not limited to the expression of thought and argument, or to the expressing and arousing of emotion. A good speaker uses language in such a way that it is not clear to the average person, or to the crowd, whether their emotions or reason is being appealed to (or more appealed to). Language enable us to appeal both to someone's reason and to his emotions (and to his imagination). Or to put it more formally, language is apt to be a tool of more than one means of persuasion. We can see this character of speech or language better by a comparison to music without words. Such music is an apt instrument for the expression and arousing of emotion, but one could not use music to persuade by the enthymeme or example (the two kinds of argument used by the rhetorician). But speech is a tool for both.
The second reason why the physical sciences are possible as an offshoot of natural philosophy and the mechanical arts is that art imitates nature. Both art and nature have determined means of reaching a result; they both go through an ordered number of steps to reach a definite goal. There are countless more particular likenesses. We did not, for example, fully understand how birds fly until after we had succeeded in making an airplane that flew.[11] Knowing how computers work may help us to understand something about how our brain works. The horse and the ass would not give rise to a mule unless the former two had a fairly close resemblance to each other. But since human acts lack determined means, we can see why an offshoot of natural science and the mechanical arts is far more likely than between natural science and ethical or political philosophy (let alone with history). The likeness of both nature and art can also be seen in their connection with matter.
There is again something similar in the case of the other principal offshoot, for rhetoric could not exist without a certain likeness between the moving of reason and the moving of the emotions. The emotions can partake of reason as can be seen, for example, in the music of Mozart and Handel. Students are surprised that the Arab philosophers and the Scholastics speak of Aristotle's logical works so broadly as to include even the Poetics, The reason for this broad use of the word logic or rational philosophy is given by Thomas:
All these pertain to rational philosophy for it belongs to reason to lead from one thing into another.[12]
The third reason why an offshoot of natural philosophy and the mechanical arts is possible, is the similarity in the way of judging in natural philosophy and the mechanical arts. This likeness is found first in that both judge by the senses, and second, in their judging principles or beginnings by their results or conclusions. Although there are some very general principles in the beginning of the philosophy of nature where the mind seems to be constrained by the truth itself[13], the particular principles even in Aristotle's time were clearly seen as something to be judged by their consequences. In a magisterial text in the De Caelo, Aristotle criticizes the Pythagoreans for not knowing that there are principles to be judged by their consequences; and in so doing, he compares the way of judging in what we would today call the experimental sciences and the mechanical arts:
It happens that, in speaking about the phenomena, they say things that do not agree with the phenomena. The cause of this is not taking well first principles, but wishing to reduce all things to some determined opinions...For these men, on account of their love of those principles, seem to do the same as those maintaining positions in dialectic. They endure everything that follows as though having true principles; as if there were not some principles which ought to be judged from their results, and especially from the end result. Now the end of a science that makes is the product while of natural science it is always what appears authoritatively according to the senses.[14]
The proof of the pudding is in he eating, the proverb says, but the proof of the recipe is also ultimately in the eating. The recipe is like an hypothesis until something is made according to it and tasted. A recipe or what is proportional to it in the other mechanical arts and an hypothesis in the experimental sciences are both judged ultimately by consequences or results that can be sensed.
What is similar to the above in the case of the other principal offshoot, rhetoric? The rhetorician reasons about the singular in human affairs, and it is also in the singular that emotion and image influence our actions the most. And what holds the place of a principle in human action is the end. Further the connection of passion or emotion with one's immediate end is well known. It is well put by the king in the play within the play in Hamlet :
What to ourselves in passion we propose, The passion ending, doth the purpose lose.[15]
It is not difficult to see then how emotion can come together with enthymeme and example, the two kinds of rhetorical argument, to influence our judgment or guess about the singular in human affairs. When the French King is urging his nobles to prepare carefully for the coming of the English under Henry V, so closely does the argument of example come together with the fear aroused that Shakespeare can make him speak as if fear itself were teaching them out of the example:
It fits us then to be as provident As fear may teach us out of late examples Left by the fatal and neglected English Upon our fields.[16]
It is signficant that anger, the first of the passions considered in the second book On the Art of Rhetoric is the only passion in the Summa Theologiae where Thomas asks whether it is with reason.[17]
We have now seen something of the nature of an offshoot and some of the reasons why it was possible for the two principal offshoots to arise. There remains a third question: why do these offshoots have so much attraction for men?
What is not proportioned to man cannot, in general, have a strong hold upon man. But the two principal offshoots are proportioned to man for three connected reasons.
The first reason is their practical character, the practical being more proportioned to, or connatural to man than the theoretical. The philosophy of nature and logic are entirely theoretical in their character, and even moral and political philosophy are not so immediately practical as rhetoric. Heisenberg in talking about the development of the offshoot called physics in modern times has spoken thus:
At the same time, the human attitude toward nature changed from a contemplative one to the pragmatic one. One was not so much interested in nature as it is; one rather asked what one could do with it. Therefore, natural science turned into technical science; every advancement of knowledge was connected with the question as to what practical use could be derived from it. This was true not only in physics; in chemistry and biology the attitude was essentially the same, and the success of the new methods in medicine or in agriculture contributed essentially to the propagation of the new tendencies.[18]
The practical character of rhetoric is also obvious in its appeal to ambitious young men planning a career in politics or the courtroom and from its matter which is singular human actions and from its end which is persuasion.
A second reason why the offshoots are more proportioned to us than the unmixed forms of philosophic knowledge is that the former are more particular. The universal, in its universality, is not proportioned to the human mind. That is why the teacher must, in Thomas' words, lead the student by the hand from less universal statements which the student is in a better position to judge.[19] And the relatively unlearned man, Aristotle observes, often succeeds better before the crowd than the learned man who goes back to the universal beginnings and loses his audience, who cannot follow him, before he has gotten back to the matter at hand.[20]
A third reason why the offshoots are more proportioned to us than the unmixed philosophical forms of knowledge is that they involve a synthesis which appeals to the body as well as the soul and mind. The physical sciences involve the body in their empirical parts, in experiments etc. and at the same time, they serve the body in their technology (which service was. of course, the original purpose of the mechanical arts). Rhetoric appeals to the imagination and the body's emotions as well as to the mind. Just as poetry or fiction is more pleasingly proportioned to man than purely scientific works aimed simply at the good of reason, so too rhetoric persuades man who is both reason and emotion.
The second and third reasons are connected with the first, for the practical is particular, not universal: one cures Socrates, not man; and synthesis, or putting together, is the way of practical knowledge, as analysis or taking apart, is of theoretical or looking knowledge. These connections reinforce the practical character of the offshoots.
It is also important to notice how the two principal offshoots seem to correspond to the division of the practical into doing and making. Rhetoric (and especially its first species, deliberative or political rhetoric) is ordered to doing while the physical sciences, to making.
The two principal offshoots also to some extent correspond with the two ways of moving men to act or the two ways of influencing their acts: persuasion and force. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion and the military art today is very much dependent on the physical sciences. This again brings out the practical character of the two principal offshoots.
Does the above also give a reason for there being two principal offshoots?
Since democratic customs strengthen the practical bent of man, as Alexis de Tocqueville so lucidly shows[21], we should expect the principal offshoots to dominate in our time. Although the physical sciences are the offshoot characteristic of modern times, rhetoric is still very important today in the discussion of moral and political issues and elsewhere. The task then of defending the independence of philosophy from the offshoots becomes particularly difficult for us.
Since Newton's great accomplishment, philosophers have tended, more and more, to see philosophy as something that comes after the development of one of the offshoots. This is clear in many modern philosophers. The philosopher's reflection on the nature of an offshoot (the philosophy of science, for example) surely does come after its development. But does the philosopher have nothing to say that is before the offshoots and in that way independent of them? If we do not see some parts of philosophy as having some kind of independence, we have perhaps not even understood what an offshoot is.
APPENDIX
The philosopher must consider the dominant offshoot of his age and, in general, what an offshoot is; he must distinguish between the offshoot and philosophy; and he must defend the necessity and importance and independence of philosophy from the offshoot.
While the study of philosophy in the middle ages is characterized by its connection with theology, the study of philosophy in ancient time and in modern times is characterized by its relation to the dominant offshoot of the time. It is time then that we began to understand what an offshoot is and to see its distinction from philosophy.
An offshoot should be contrasted with knowledge that has the unity defined in the Posterior Analytics. In an offshoot, there are not first beginnings as such in one knowable genus.
Plato and Aristotle did a better job in regard to the dominant offshoot of their time than we have done in modern times. They understood the nature of rhetoric better than we do the nature of experimental science; they distinguished rhetoric from both logic and political philosophy better than we distinguish experimental science from the philosophy of nature and the mechanical arts; and they defended the necessity and importance of logic and political philosophy as distinguished from rhetoric far better than we defend the necessity and importance of the philosophy of nature as distinct from the experimental sciences. The modern philosophers as a whole have let the experimental sciences replace the philosophy or wisdom of nature. And even among Catholic philosophers, where there is the additional reason for defending the wisdom of nature because of its necessity for theology, the defense of the necessity of the wisdom of nature and even its distinction from the experimental; sciences is weak or non-existent. In other words, we have failed in a task proportional to that in which Plato and Aristotle succeeded.
----------------------- [1]Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 2, 1356a
[2]Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, Lectio I, n. 1
3. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, Lectio I, n. 2
[3]Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 2, 1356a Loeb ed. [4]Physics and Philosophy, Harper & Brothers, 1958, p. 188 [5]Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1958, p. 29 [6]C. F. v. Weizsacker, The History of Nature, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 71
[7]See, for example, Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 1787 [8]Plato, Apology, 27E [9]See, for example, Aristotle, Physics, Book II, Chapter 1 [10]See "Bird Aerodynamics:, by John H. Storer Twentieth Century Bestiary, A Scientific American Book, Simon and Shuster, 1955, p. 117 [11]See Proemium to Posterior Analytics, n. 6 [12]Aristotle, Physics, Book I, Chapter 5, 188b 27-30 [13]Aristotle, On the Heavens (or On the Universe), Book III, Chapter 7, 306a 6-18 [14]Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Sc. 2, lines 197-198 [15]Henry V, Act II, Sc. 4, lines 11-14 [16]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 46, a. 4 [17]Physics and Philosophy, Harper & Brothers, 1958, pp. 196-197 [18]See Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 117, Art. 1, c. [19]Rhetoric, Book II, Chapter 21, 1359b [20]Democracy in America, Vol. II, First Part or Book One, Chapter 10