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Philosophy Is Knowledge Over a Road and of the Road to Follow
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: PHIL KNOWLEDGE OVER AND OF A ROAD.doc.
PHILOSOPHY IS KNOWLEDGE OVER A ROAD AND OF THE ROAD TO FOLLOW
Philosophy is both knowledge over a road and knowledge of the road to follow.
The word road here is an interesting example of a word equivocal by reason. The word road was carried over by the first philosophers from the sensible road we walk or drive upon and placed upon the order in our knowledge. They did this by dropping the stone or brick or whatever matter the original road is made of, but keeping the before and after in that road; and by seeing a likeness of ratios in the before and after in the road and that in our knowledge
There are reasons for thinking that philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road.
To some extent all our knowledge is over a road for it must be somewhere along the natural road from the senses into reason because all our knowledge is either in the senses (outward or inward) or in reason.
But because philosophy is in reason and is a work of reason, there is even more reason to think it is over a road. For in every work of reason, there is found order; and a road in our knowledge is nothing other than the order therein.
Again, philosophy is a work of reason as reason although it presupposes what reason naturally understands or comes to understand. Hence, philosophy follows the road of reason as reason.
Moreover, philosophy is a good of reason. And the good of reason is not achieved by luck or chance. For what is by luck or chance is outside the bounds of reason. Hence, philosophy is achieved by following some road.
Again, reason looks for distinction and order everywhere. And hence in its own thinking, it looks for distinction and order.
Moreover, all arts are an ordering of human acts and so the art of logic orders our thinking. But a road in our thinking is an order therein. Hence, philosophy, whose tool is logic, is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road.
Further, no philosopher says or writes all at once what he thinks. And if he followed no order in thinking and saying or writing one thing after another, philosophy would be a disordered heap. Hence, philosophy must follow some road.
A thinker can follow a road or wander in his thinking. And if he follows a road, he can follow the right road or the wrong road. If he wanders, he is apt to fall into error. For wandering is a disordered movement of the reason and a disordered movement is apt to result in error. Hence, the Latin word for error and the Greek word for error both come from the word to wander. If a thinker takes the wrong road, he is also going to end in error, either immediately or through the ignorance of what he would have known by taking the right road. For ignorance is a cause of deception. Thus, it is very necessary for a thinker to find the road or roads to follow.
If philosophy is knowledge over a road, it is also a knowledge of the road to follow. But the latter is for the sake of the former.
It is also a knowledge of the road to follow, but this latter is for the sake of the former.
Does knowledge over a road presuppose knowledge of that road?
The perfection of such knowledge would seem to require a knowledge of that road. It might also be thought that one cannot go forward well (that is orderly, easily and without mistakes) in such knowledge without a knowledge of that road. But if the road is natural or one is accustomed to it or one is following a teacher, it seems possible to go along that road without explicitly knowing it.
In the second book of the Metaphysics (3rd chapter), Aristotle speaks as if a knowledge of the road is presupposed to knowledge over that road. One cannot get both at the same time. One must first learn the road and then afterwards acquire knowledge over that road. And Averroes and Thomas following this line of thought draw the further conclusion that logic must be learned before other forms of reasoned-out knowledge because in logic we learn the common road of reasoned-out knowledge or the common way of going forward in reasoned-out knowledge. So insistent is Thomas upon this order that he even asserts that it must be followed as an exception to the rule that we should consider the easy before the difficult. For "logica habet maximam difficultatem."
Two objections can be made to this order. It seems that the logician must have some experience of reasoned-out knowledge before he could find the common road of reasoned-out knowledge. Thus Socrates discusses the nature of reasoned-out knowledge with Theaetetus who, as a mathematician would have some experience of such knowledge. No one, it seems, would define definition if he had not first defined other things. (This is proportional to naming things and naming names. Hence, the Greek Commentators call the latter the second placing of names.) Likewise, men spoke long before they spoke of nouns and verbs etc. Grammar comes after an experience of speaking. Thus mathematics or some form of reasoned-out knowledge must be learned before logic.
The second objection is based on the fact that logic is itself a form of reasoned-out knowledge. If then logic must be learned before we can acquire any reasoned-out knowledge (because we learn there the common road of reasoned-out knowledge), it would seem that we must know logic before we can learn it, an impossible situation. If we have to know what a definition is, for example, before we can define anything, then we would have to know what a definition is before we defined definition.
But logic is an art that helps nature, and the nature in this case is reason itself.