Post-predicaments in General

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Post-predicaments in General

Logic of the First Act · Categories

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POST-PREDICAMENTS IN GENERAL

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus:

...hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur: uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.

Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde Philosophus inter postpraedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.

Cajetan, Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis, De Postpraedicamentis, Laval ed. p. 111:

Hic est tertius tractatus huius operis tradens notitiam postpraedicamentorum, id est eorum quae consequuntur diversa praedicamenta. Haec enim superant determinanda hoc in loco secundum veritatem, licet Andronicus, Boetio teste, dixerit Aristotelis non esse doctrinam hanc. Sicut namque ante doctrinam praedicamentorum tradidit eorum notitiam, quae velut principia et fundamenta iacenda erant, et postmodum singula genera cum suis proprietatibus numeravit, sic modo ea quae ad omnia vel multa genera consequuntur, docere consequenter vult.

Sunt autem haec quinque scilicet: oppositio, prius, simul, motus et habere.

Quorum primum, secundum et tertium omnia et singula genera comitantur, quoniam inter omnia genera est oppositio cum sit distinctio, quae super oppositione fundatur, et unum est prius et aliud posterius, et omnia sunt simul tempore: in singulis quoque generibus manifeste haec patent. Differentiae si quidem e converso dividentes genus quodlibet simul natura et oppositae sunt, genera vero priora speciebus sunt.

Motus autem per se quidem quattuor respicit genera, scilicet substantiam, quantitatam, qualitatem et ubi; per accidens autem ad omnia se extendit.

Habere autem substantiam respectu certorum [?] generum comitatur.

Albert the Great, Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis, Tractatus VII, Caput I, Laval ed., ppp. 183-184:

Non enim omnia quocumque modo coordinata reducuntur ad genus unum: ideoque post praedicamenta oportuit sequi tractatum de his quae quidem coordinanda sunt, sed ad unum genus praedicamenti reduci non possunt. Et haec sunt opposita, quae in pluribus inveniuntur, et ea quae sunt prius et posterius, et ea quae sunt simul, et motus, et habitus: haec enim omnia talia sunt cum ipsis nominibus coordinabilitatem habentia, et tamen ad unum aliquod genus praedicamenti reduci non possunt....Et sic completur omnis coordinabilium et praedicabilium coordinatio, quam sequitur actus rationis, qui est praedicabilium rerum de quibus praedicatur compositio.

Accipiuntur autem eorum quinque coordinationes penes quae sunt in pluribus generibus aliquo modo coordinationis unam rationem habentibus: haec enim aut penes omnium generum diversitatem sunt accepta, aut penes ea quae sunt in generibus contenta, aut penes aliorum coordinationem ad substantiam.

Si autem accipiuntur penes omnium generum diversitatem, cum sicut dicit Boetius, opppositio est prima causa diversitatis, tunc est oppositio: quia omnia diversa per divisionem quae est per opposita. exeunt ab uno aliquo, et est oppositio causa diversitatis.

Si autem sumitur ratio coordinationis penes illud quod est in quolibet genere, aut sumitur penes naturam eorum quae sunt ordinata in genere, aut penes ea in quibus stat coordinatio et per quae fit divisio coordinatorum. Et si primo sumitur, tunc cum ordinata in genere non sunt nisi genus et species, inducitur tractatus de eo quod est prius et posterius: quia genus se habet in coordinatione sicut prius, et species sicut posterius, et prius et posterius est ratio coordinationis eorum in genere uno. Si autem sumitur penes ea in quibus stat coordinatio tota, et per quae fit divisio coordinatorum, tunc erit tractatus de simul: quia etiam et individua in quibus stat coordinatio sunt simul natura, et differentiae per quas fit divisio coordinatorum, ex quo sunt oppositae simul exeuntes ex eodem genere, sunt simul natura. Hic ergo de necessitate tractandum est eo quod est simul.

Quia autem in omni natura cujuslibet generis est potentia et actus, et inter haec aliquo modo motus (et ideo motus est in omnibus generibus) ideo necesse fuit etiam de illa ratione coordinationis praedicabilium determinare: et ideo oportuit tractare de motu secundum motus communitatem quam in motibus ponit ratio coordinans praedicabila ad unum commune quod in generibus pluribus invenitur.

Si autem est secundum ordinationem illorum generum ad primum quae est etiam coordinatio quam ratio ponit, sic logico necesse fuit tractare de habere, et in his sufficientia est coordinationis praedicabilium.

Et per ipsam divisionem patet ordo capitulorum istorum: quia prius est id quod sumitur secundum ipsorum generum diversitatem, quam quod sumitur penes ea quae sunt in genere: et sic oppositio est ante omnia alia.

Adhuc prius est quod est in genere secundum substantiam suae coordinationis, quam id quod est in genere secundum reductionem ad ens generis: et sic prius et simul sunt ante reliqua.

Adhuc quod est in genere secundum reductionem ad commune quod est hoc genus, vel id, est ante reductionem ad unum quod quod est habens ut subjectum: et sic capitulum de motu est ante capitulum de habere.

Patet igitur sufficientia post-praedicamentorum et ordo eorum ad invicem: quia etiam prius est ante simul: quia in coordinatione prius sunt ipsa coordinata secundum rationem, quam ea in quibus stat coordinatio....

There are five post-predicaments, but they can be divided into three: the first three (opposites, before and together), motion, and to have. Someone might want to put motion and to have together as in some way opposites, but this is not yet clear to me. At any rate they should be distinguished from the first three.

Before and together are almost opposites since together negates before and after (as equal negates more and less). This is also why they should be considered together. Opposites are the basis of formal distinction and distinction is presupposed to before and after since nothing is before or after itself. Before and after also seem to be said toward another. Hence, today can be before tomorrow and after yesterday.

We learn from the first three post-predicaments how names of things are to be distinguished and ordered. In a logical genus, we can distinguish by more than one kind of opposition. And what are distinguished by one pair of opposites should be placed under one of the highest genera before and after each other or together.

But the reason why motion is a post-predicament is more difficult to find.

****************************************************************** Every post-predicament is, as Thomas and the Commentators say, common to diverse genera (commune est ad diversa genera.). The post-predicaments follow upon diverse genera of things (diversa rerum genera consequuntur). But this is not a sufficient explanation of them. Not everything which is common to diverse genera is considered in the post-predicaments (one, for example, or good are not considered there) And being, which is common to diverse genera, is considered before the predicaments or categories. Why then are these and not others considered there? [being is already considered somewhat in chapter four, and good and bad in chapter eleven, and one with opposites and before]

Perhaps Aristotle is killing two birds with one stone in the post-predicaments; just as in I Metaphysics, he narrates the opinions of the philosophers about the causes both to prepare the way for a discussion of their positions and also to confirm the sufficiency of the distinction of the four kinds of cause. Perhaps we must understand why these names are found in the post-predicaments because there is more than one reason for each of them to be there.

And perhaps most of the post-predicaments are ordered to learning how to place species where they belong under the genera of categories or with leading back to a genus what is connected with some species therein. (Some say to have is there to lead back the genera of accidents to their subject, substance.)

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 3:

...in genere continetur aliquid dupliciter:

vel per se et proprie, sicut species, et ea quae recipiunt praedicationem generis;

vel per reductionem, sicut principia generis, ut materia et forma ad substantiam, et unitas et punctus ad quantitatem; quamvis neutrum sit quantitas.

Ita etiam nulla negatio vel privatio est in genere per se: quia non habet aliquam quidditatem nec esse; sed reducitur ad genus affirmationis, secundum quod in non esse intelligitur esse, et in negatione affirmatio, ut dicit Philosophus in II Elench., cap. IV, quia omnis privatio per habitum cognoscitur, et remotio per positionem; et sic etiam non relatio est in genere relationis, quamvis ea de quibus dicitur ista negatio non sint in illo genere.

We want to know how to put or place names, genera and species, (and the things they signify) under the ten genera. But to put names and things under these genera, we must distinguish them by opposites and put them where they belong, some before others and others together. Hence, the first three words in the post-predicaments.

The consideration of the fourth word, motion, is relevant to putting or placing things under the ten genera because, although motions are not species in any of the ten genera, they are something imperfect in a number of the genera and can be placed reductively in four of the genera. And what is wonderful is that these genera are not acting upon or undergoing.

Why is motion not a genus like undergoing or a species like time?

Perhaps like the word act which is not considered in Book Five of the Metaphysics, the words in the post-predicaments cannot be considered sufficiently until after the categories. Perhaps also their equivocation is not simply according to the ten, but they pertain in diverse ways to the categories, like motion which is connected with acting upon and undergoing in one way and in quite another way to substance, quantity, quality and where; and opposites, one of which seem to be a category (toward something) and others useful in distinguishing categories and in the distinction and ordering of species and genera within all or many categories. And one seems to be a property in some.

The reasons for considering the first three post-predicaments are connected for they are connected in themselves and with reason and towards the genera of categories.

The first three post-predicaments are closely connected in themselves. Distinction, which is based on opposites, is almost a part of order which is a before and after. Since nothing is before or after itself, there is always some distinction between what is before and what is after. And formal distinction is caused by some opposition. A sign of the close connection between distinction and order is the word confused. Confused is opposed to both distinct and to order. Both opposites and before are taken up in that same order in Book Five of the Metaphysics under the parts of one. Together or at once seems the opposite of order.

Nothing is more characteristic of reason than to look before and after. And in the ability to look before and after is included the ability to distinguish for it is impossible to see that this is before that if one cannot distinguish between this and that.

We distinguish between the genera of categories by opposites and see how one is before the another. And within each genus, species are distinguished by opposites. And within each genus, a genus is before its species, but species of the same genus by the same division are together. All of this is necessary for placing species of things in their proper genus. Further, one kind of opposites is one of the genera (toward something) and one kind of opposites (contraries) were used in the discussion of the properties of the genera. And since contrariety seems the kind of opposition most suitable for distinguishing species, it has appropriately its own chapter in particular. And in addition, because of its multiplicity of meaning.

The division or distinction TWN ONTWN is necessary to understand the distinction of the ten genera of categories, but the distinction of the species of motion is understood through the distinction of the genera of categories. But notice that the division TWN ONTWN is not the same as the distinction in the fifth book of the Metaphysics of being according to the figures of predication. The latter would seem to presuppose the distinction of the ten genera of categories while the former is presupposed to understanding the distinction of the ten genera of categories. Why then does Aristotle give the distinction of the species of motion after the distinction of the ten genera of categories, but not the distinction of being according to the figures of predication? Perhaps the latter is altogether clear from the distinction of the ten genera (as likewise, would be the distinction of one or good according to the ten; and the categories are also not useful for the proper distinctions of these, such as the good into the honorable, the pleasant and the useful), but the distinction of the species of motion does not correspond one to one. In some genera, there is no motion per se. And in some (substance and quantity), he distinguishes two species. Further, there is another difficulty in comparing motion to, and distinguishing it by, the categories because acting upon and undergoing might seem also to pertain to motion. But motion is not reduced to those genera, but to four others. Perhaps, this is enough to see why motion is a post-predicament and not being or one or good. Further, we not only put species under the ten genera, but we also reduce what is not a complete a species. Thus motion and matter and form can be placed in a genus. And in general, every genus is divided by act and ability. But motion is the first since the distinction between matter and form is made through motion and, to some extent, the distinction between act and ability.

To have is also compared to the genera of categories in more than one way. It is the name of one genus. But substance is also said to have a quality or a quantity and, in general, to have accidents. And a whole is said to have parts and likewise, a genus is said to have species. And a species is also said to have a genus. And in the ante-predicaments, a thing is said to have a name or a definition. And sometimes in common and sometimes not with another thing. And some species are said to have a contrary and others do not. Thus, the multiplicity of to have in what has gone before is so great that one wonders that Aristotle does not distinguish more senses than he does. But it would be difficult to distinguish these senses before.

One could also ask why he distinguishes senses of to have rather than senses of in. For accidents are said to be in a subject or in a substance. And likewise, the genus is said to be in the species and the species, in the genus. But in does not a category. Further, we should also note that since whole is to parts as form is to matter and the part is more said to be in the whole than the whole in its parts. But likewise, the whole is more said to have a part than the part, a whole, it is somewhat fitting that in logic, Aristotle distinguishes the senses of to have while in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, he distinguishes the senses of in. The first sense of in is in regard to place which is also proper to the consideration of natural philosophy. When Cajetan explains in what sense an accident is said to be in a subject, he goes back to the senses distinguished in the fourth book of Natural Hearing.

But if it is more proper to the logician to consider to have and to the natural philosopher to be in, why should the logician consider the species of motion? For nothing is more the subject of natural philosophy than motion. And indeed in the fifth book of Natural Hearing, Aristotle distinguishes more perfectly the "species" of motion. Perhaps to show how the imperfect and what is not a perfect species can be reduced to the ten genera and to show why motion is not one of the ten and why motion is not simply reduced to acting upon or undergoing.

We can also see that the order of the post-predicaments corresponds to some extent to the order of the definitions in Chapter One for the first two definitions tell us what can or cannot be placed in direct line under a genus while accidents are said denominatively of substance. Likewise, the first four post-predicaments pertain to placing something in a genus or reducing it to some genus while the first meaning given of to have is that of substance having a quality or a size.

The post-predicaments seem to be chapters distinguishing in order opposite, before, together, motion and to have. However, the language in the chapter on motion seems somewhat different. There he speaks, not of the senses or ways something is said, but of the species of motion

But the kind of order in which the senses are distinguished does not seem to be the same.

The order of the senses of before and together seems the same kind and is like the order of the senses of beginning in the fifth book of the Metaphysics or like the order in which Thomas arranges the senses of in in his commentary on the fourth book of Aristotle's Physics. In these, the word is first placed upon the most sensible and therefore most known meaning. And then it is carried over by likeness to other meanings, going from those more like the first (or previous meaning) to that least like the first meaning.

But the senses of opposite are ordered by their likeness and difference, but not starting with the meaning most sensible (contraries would seem to be most sensible; the senses do not know relation or order) The order is more like that found in the distinction of the four kinds of cause, or even more in the senses of necessary.

The senses or species of motion are distinguished in the order of the ten categories which again does not seem to be from what is more known to us to what is less known to us. The reason for this is that he is not studying motion for its own sake as in the philosophy of nature, but to show how the "species" of motion may be reduced to the genera of categories.