Post-Predicaments — Short Texts

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Post-Predicaments — Short Texts

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From his file: 08c10_11_12_14_15_PostPredicaments_ShortTexts.pdf.

Post-Predicaments — Short Texts Duane H. Berquist

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erhaps Aristotle is killing two birds with one stone in the post-predicaments, just as in I Metaphysics, he narrates the opinions of the philosophers about the causes both to prepare the way for a discussion of their positions and also to confirm the sufficiency of the distinction of the four kinds of cause. Perhaps we must understand why these names are found in the post-predicaments because there is more than one reason for each of them to be there. The Categories is ordered to definition and division. Some texts follow:

Chapters 10 & 11: Four Kinds of Opposites In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XII, n. 922 Primo enim dicit quot modis dicuntur opposita; quia quatuor modis; scilicet contradictoria, contraria, privatio et habitus, et ad aliquid. Aliquid enim contraponitur alteri vel opponitur aut ratione dependentiae, qua dependet ab ipso, et sic sunt opposita relative. Aut ratione remotionis, quia scilicet unum removet alterum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Aut enim totaliter removet nihil relinquens, et sic est negatio. Aut relinquit subiectum solum, et sic est privatio. Aut relinquit subiectum et genus, et sic est contrarium. Nam contraria non sunt solum in eodem subiecto, sed etiam in eodem genere.

First, he gives the various ways in which we speak of opposites; and there are four of these: contradictories, contraries, privation and possession, and relatives. For one thing is contraposed or opposed to another either by reason of dependence, i.e., insofar as one depends on another, and then they are opposed as relatives. Or by reason of removal, i.e., because one removes another. This occurs in three ways. Either one thing removes another entirely and leaves nothing, and then there is negation. Or the subject alone remains, and then there is privation. Or the subject and genus remain, and then there is contrariety. For there are contraries not only in the same subject but also in the same genus.

Quaestio Disputata de Anima, Art. 7, Ad 17 Genus et differentia possunt accipi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum considerationem realem, prout considerantur a metaphysico et naturali et sic oportet quod genus et differentia super diversis naturis fundentur; Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere quod in substantiis spiritualibus non sit genus et differen-

Genus and difference can be regarded in two ways. First, from an existential point of view, so far as they are considered by metaphysics and by natural philosophy. Here it is manifest that genus and difference are based on different natures. Thus nothing prevents us from saying that there is no genus and difference in spiritual sub-

tia, sed sint formae tantum et species simplices. Alio modo secundum considerationem logicam et sic genus et differentia non oportet quod fundentur super diversas naturas, sed supra unam naturam in qua consideratur aliquid proprium, et aliquid commune. Et sic nihil prohibet genus et differentias ponere in substantiis spiritualibus.

stances, but that they are forms in their entirety, and simple species. Genus and difference can also be regarded from the logical point of view. In this case it is not necessary that genus and difference be founded on different natures, but on one and the same nature in which something proper and something common may be distinguished. In this way nothing prevents us from distinguishing genus and difference in spiritual substances.

Quaestio Disputata de Anima, Art. 7, Ad 18 Naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam materia super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariorum formarum. Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis; sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similter est in spiritualibus substantiis.

Speaking of genus and difference from the point of view of the real order, differences must be contraries. For matter, on which the nature of genus is based, is receptive of contrary forms. However, from the point of view of logic, any opposition whatever in differences is sufficient, as is clear in the differences between numbers in which there is no contrariety. It is similar in the case of spiritual substances.

De Potentia, Q. I, Art. 3, corpus Impossibile quod dicitur secundum nullam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsum, dicitur ratione discoherentiae terminorum. Omnis autem discoherentia terminorum est in ratione alicuius oppositionis; in omni autem oppositione includitur affirmatio et negatio, ut probatur X Metaph.; unde in omni tali impossibili implicatur affirmationem et negationem esse simul.

A thing is said to be impossible, not in respect of any power, but in itself, by reason of the mutual exclusion of terms. Now all such mutual exclusion corresponds to some opposition: and every opposition connotes affirmation and negation, as is proved in Metaph. X, 4, so that all impossibilities of this kind imply the mutual exclusion of an affirmation and a negation.

In X Metaphysicorum, Lectio VI, n. 2041 Contradictio includitur in omnibus aliis tamquam prius et simplicus. Opposita secundum quodcumque oppositionis genus impossibile est simul existere. Quod quidem contingit ex hoc, quod alterum oppositorum de sui ratione habet negationem alterius. Sicut de ratione caeci est quod non sit videns. Et de ratione nigri quod non sit album. Et similiter de ratione filii est quod non sit pater eius cuius est filius.

Contradiction is included in all the other kinds of opposition as something prior and simpler; for in any kind of opposition it is impossible that opposites should exist simultaneously. This follows from the fact that one of two opposites contains the negation of the other in its notion; for example, the notion of blind contains the fact of its not seeing, and the notion of black, of its not being white. And similarly the notion of son con-

tains his not being the father of him of whom he is the son. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist V, Q. I, Art I, Ad 1 Affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia: in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem: in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam. Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum; et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis; et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori. Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam. Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter [in obj,: essentia non est generans, Pater est generans, ergo they are not the same] immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem, cum quaelibet distinctio, ut dictum est, includat affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam. Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem: et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt; aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem. Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Utrum malum sit quoddam ens positive, Solutio, Ad 1, Ad 2, Ad 3 In malis ergo hoc modo dictis est talis ordo, quod id quod est per se malum, primo dicitur, et omnia alia per relationem ad id; et secundum gradum tenet malum per accidens, quod est subiectum mali quod dicitur malum ex hoc quod privationem quae per se malum est, in se habet; et in tertio gradu est id quod dicitur malum per accidens sicut causa inducens malum; hoc enim non habet in se de necessitate privationem, sed facit aliquid esse privationem habens. Unde primum dicitur absolute malum, et secundum in ordine ad primum, et tertium in ordine ad secundum. Dicendum ergo quod malum nominat non ens. Unde illud quod quod per se malum est non ponit aliquid, sed dicitur esse ut privatio. Malum vero quod est subiectum privationis est aliquid positive, sed non ex eo quod malum est, sicut oculus est aliquid, sed non ex eo quod caecus est: quia caecitas non est in eo nisi ut negatio visionis. Quod autem dicitur malum ut causa mali, in se quidem consideratum, est aliquid; sed in ordine ad effectum, ratione cujus malum dicitur, etiam privative dicitur. Dicitur enim malum ex hoc quod privationem inducit, et sic etiam ratio non entis in ipsum redundat causaliter, sicut et ratio mali. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod genus dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo proprie, prout praedicatur de pluribus in eo quod quid est, et sic neque bonum neque malum sunt genera, sed sunt in transcendentibus quia bonum et ens convertuntur. Alio modo communiter, ut genus dicatur omne id quod sua communitate multa ambit et continet, et sic bonum et malum dicuntur genera omnium contrariorum: quia, ut In I Physic., text. 80, dicitur omnia contraria hoc modo se habent, quod alterum est nobilius et alterum vilius; et ideo illud quod est vilius

post-predicaments — short texts privationem in se includit, sicut nigrum in respectu ad album, et frigidum in respectu ad calidum: propter quod in I De generat. text. 18, dicitur, quod frigus est privatio caloris; et per hunc modum semper alterum contrarium pertinet ad bonum, et reliquum ad malum; unde etiam Pythagoras ponebat duos ordines rerum: unum boni, sub quo colligebat omnia perfecta, ut dextrum, triangulam, aequilaterum et similia; et alterum mali, sub quo ponebat omnia quae imperfectionem implicant, ut sinistrum, feminam et hujusmodi. Ad secundum dicendum, quod si consideretur malum per se sive in abstracto, sic malum opponitur bono ut privatio; si autem consideretur malum per accidens, sicut est in actione vel habitu, sic opponitur bono ut contrarium, ut prodigalitas liberalitati, et timiditas fortitudini. Ad tertium dicendum, quod malum per se vel abstracte sumptum non est differentia specifica; sed malum per accidens vel concrete acceptum; omnia enim moralia ex fine speciem consequuntur. Ex ordine autem ad debitum finem specificatur bona actio et bonus habitus, ratione cujus bonum differentia specifica ponitur habitus et actionis moralis; mala vero actio specificatur ex ordine ad finem indebitum, cui admiscetur privatio finis debiti, ex quo ratio mali incidit. Unde patet quod non sola privatio specificat malum habitum et actionem; sed positio ordinis ad finem quemdam cum privatione debiti finis; et sic patet quod malum, secundum quod differentia, non est malum per se, sed per accidens vel concretive sumptum.

Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXV, Quaest. I, Art. III, Ad 1 & Ad 2 …opposita reducuntur in idem genus in quo vel utrumque est per se, ut patet in contrariis et relativis; vel unum est per se et alterum per reductionem, ut patet in privatione et habitu, et affirmatione et negatione; unde habitum est in XXVIII dist. I libri ab Augustino, quod in eodem genere est genitus et non genitus… …peccatum omissionis non est peccatum originale, sed actuale; nec dicitur actuale quasi in aliquo actu existat, sed quia ad genus actus reducitur cujus negatio est; sicut Augustinus ingenitum in genere relationis ponit, ut habitum est in I libro, dist. XXVIII, et iterum sicut actus est in potestate voluntatis, ita et negatio ejus. Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XL, Quaest. I, Art. 5, Obj. 1 & Ad 1 1. Videtur quod aliqua actio indifferens inveniatur in actibus humanis. Nihil enim potest esse medium inter bonum et malum, nisi indifferens, quod neque bonum neque malum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria mediata, ut in Praedicamentis dicitur. Ergo aliqua actio est indifferens. Ad primum ergo dicendum… quod Philosophus appelat malum non omnem actum inordinatum, sed solum illum qui nocivus est respectu alterius; unde dicit in IV Ethic., cap. XV, quod prodigus, quia causa iactantiae sua inordinate expendit, non est malus sed vanus: et similiter de multis aliis vitiis dicit; et sic patet quod ipse strictius accipit malum quam nos dicentes omnem actum inordinatum esse malum. Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Q. I, Art. 1, Utrum malum sit aliquid, Objs. 19 & 20 and Ad 19 & 20 19. Praeterea, si bonitas non esset aliquid, nihil esset bonum. Ergo similiter si malitia non est aliquid, nihil est malum. Sed constat multa mala esse. Ergo malitia aliquid est.

Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod ens dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod significat naturam decem generum; et sic neque malum neque aliqua privatio est ens neque aliquid. Alio modo secundum quod respondetur ad quaestionem an est; et sic malum est, sicut et caecitas est. Non tamen malum est aliquid; quia esse aliquid non solum significat quod respondetur ad quaestionem an est, sed etiam quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est. 20. Sed dicendum, quod malum non est ens naturae aut moris, sed ens rationis. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Metaph, quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in intellectu. Ergo malum non est ens rationis tantum, sed est aliquid in rebus naturalibus. Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod malum quidem est in rebus, sed ut privatio, non autem ut aliquid reale; sed in ratione est ut aliquid intellectum: et ideo potest dici, quod malum est ens rationis et non rei, quia in intellectu est aliquid, non autem in re; et hoc ipsum quod est esse intellectum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur ens rationis, est bonum; bonum enim est aliquid intelligi.

Chapter 12: The Ordered Senses of Before De Potentia, Q. 3, Art, 13, corpus Fuit autem difficile considerare generationem Filii Patri coaeternam, propter assuefactionem humanae cognitionis in consideratione productionis rerum naturalium, in quibus una res ab alia per motum producitur; res autem producta per motum in esse prius esse incipit in principio quam in termino motus. Cum autem principium motus de necessitate terminum motus duratione praecedat, quod necesse est propter motus successionem, nec possit esse motus principium vel initium sine causa ad producendum movente; necesse est ut causa movens ad aliquid producendum praecedat duratione id quod ab ea producitur.

The difficulty of regarding the begetting of the Son as co-eternal with the Father arose from the fact that in our human observation of nature’s works one thing proceeds from another by movement: and a thing brought into being by movement begins to be at the beginning sooner than at the end of the movement. And since the beginning of a movement must needs in point of time precede the end on account of movement implying succession, and again since movement cannot have a beginning without a moving cause to produce it: it follows that the moving cause in the production of anything must precede in point of duration that which it produces.

Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent., Dist XVIII, Art III, Objs. 1 & 3 & Ad 3 Videtur quod Christus non potuerit mereri in instanti suae conceptionis. 1. Nullus enim meretur nisi agendo. Sed prius est esse rei quam ejus agere. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis, quando Christus primo esse habuit secundum humanam naturam, mereri non potuit…. 3. Praeterea. Quidquid Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, habuit ab alio, non a se. Sed meriti sui ipse ipse causa fuit. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis non meruit. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod esse est prius quam agere natura, non tempore de necessitate.

post-predicaments — short texts Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, scilicet meritum, et ab alio habuit, scilicet inquantum ad meritum exigitur gratia, et a seipso habuit, inquantum meritum procedit ab libero arbitrio. Non enim semper necessarium est ut causa causatum tempore praecedat, sed quandoque sufficit quod pracedat natura.

Chapter 14 — Motion In IV Metaphysicorum, Lectio I, nn. 540–543 Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci. Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid. Secundum quid autem differant negatio et privatio, infra dicetur. Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur. Habent enim aliquid admixtum de privatione et negatione. Nam motus est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur tertio Physicorum.

Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates. Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per existens, sicut sunt substantiae. Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, inquantum removent aliquid trium praedictorum.

It must be noted, however, that the abovementioned modes of being can be reduced to four. For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., negation and privation, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below. There is another mode of being inasmuch as generation and corruption are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the Physics, Book III. The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but in something else, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances. The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself. This is the mode of being which substances have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.

In III Physicorum, Lectio V, n. 324–325 Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit.

For the idea of motion depends not only on that which pertains to motion in reality but also on that which reason apprehends. ⁂

What is to be understood by ratio in the above? I think it should be understood here as in the statement “ratio quam significat nomen est definitio” Hence, below when Thomas explains what is necessary for what is found in rerum natura of motion to have the rationem motus, he brings out the two parts of the definition of motion. De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis. Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est. Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiatur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur.

Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia, non est nisi ab aliqua agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est.

In reality, motion is nothing more than an imperfect act which is a sort of beginning of a perfect act in that which is being moved; thus, in that which is becoming white, some whiteness has begun to be. But in order that what is imperfect have the aspect of motion it is further required that we understand it as a medium between two: the preceding one of them is compared to motion as potency to act (whence motion is called act); the consequent one is compared to motion as the perfect to the imperfect or as act to potency, wherefore motion is called “the act of a being that exists in potency,” as we said above. But anything imperfect, if it is not considered to be tending on to something other as perfect, is called the terminus of motion and one will not have a motion according to which something is being moved; as, for example, if something should start to become white and then the alteration was immediately stopped. Therefore, in regard to what there is of motion in external reality, motion is placed reductively in that genus which terminates the motion, as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as stated above. But in regard to what reason apprehends about motion, namely, that it is midway between two-terms, here the notion of cause and effect are brought in; because for something to be reduced from potency to act an agent cause is required. From this aspect, motion pertains to the predicaments of “action” and “passion”; for these two predicaments are based on the notions of acting cause and of effect, as was said above.

Et quia positum fuit in dubitatione, utrum motus sit actus moventis vel mobilis, et ostensum est quod est actus activi ut ab hoc, et passivi ut in hoc; ad tollendum omnem dubitationem aliquantulum notius dicamus quod motus est actus potentiae activi et passivi.

And because there was a doubt whether motion is an act of the mover or of the mobile and we showed that it is an act of the active as from it and of the passive as in it, then to remove any further doubts we can say somewhat more explicitly that motion is an act of the potency of that which is active and of that which is passive.

In this way is motion like time? Does the above also cast light upon why motion is a post-predicament? Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 13, Art. 1, C. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.

For the notion expressed by the name is the definition.

In IV Physicorum, Lectio XXIII, n. 629 Et dicit quod aut oportet dicere quod tempus non sit, si non est anima; aut oportet hoc dicere verius, quod tempus est utcumque ens sine anima, ut puta si contingit motum esse sine anima. Sicut enim ponitur motus, ita necesse est poni tempus: quia prius et posterius in motu sunt; et haec, scilicet prius et posterius motus, inquantum sunt numerabilia, sunt ipsum tempus. Ad evidentiam autem huius solutionis considerandum est, quod positis rebus numeratis, necesse est ponere numerum. Unde sicut res numeratae dependent a numerante, ita et numerus earum. Esse autem rerum numeratarum non dependet ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquis intellectus qui est causa rerum, sicut est intellectus divinus: non autem dependet ab intellectu animae. Unde nec numerus rerum ab intellectu animae dependet: sed solum ipsa numeratio, quae est actus animae, ab intellectu animae dependet. Sicuti ergo possunt esse sensibilia sensu non existente, et intelligibilia intellectu non existente, ita possunt esse numerabilia et numerus, non existente numerante. Sed forte conditionalis quam primo posuit, est vera, scilicet quod si est impossibile esse aliquem

And he says that it is necessary to say either that time is not, if the soul is not; or to say what is truer, that time is still some sort of being even without the soul’s existing, similar to motion’s existing without the soul’s existing. For as motion is posited, so is it also necessary to posit time, because “before” and “after” exist in motion, and it is these things, namely, the “before” and “after” in motion, insofar as they are numberable, that are time. To make this solution more evident it must be considered that once a series of numbered things is posited, it is necessary to posit number. Hence just as counted things depend on someone’s counting, so also their count [or number]. However, the existence of counted things does not depend on an intellect, unless it be an intellect which is the cause of things, as is the divine intellect, it does not depend on the intellect of the soul. Hence neither does the number of things depend on the intellect in the human soul; only the counting of them, which counting is an act of the soul, depends on the intellect in the soul. Consequently, just as there can be things perceptible to sense even though no sense exists, and intelligible even though no intelligence exists, so there can exist both numberable [countable] things, and number even though no counter exist. But perhaps the conditional he first mentioned is true, namely, that if no counter could

duane h. berquist numerantem, impossibile est esse aliquid numerabile: sicut haec est vera, si impossibile est esse aliquem sentientem, impossibile est esse aliquid sensibile. Si enim est sensibile, potest sentiri, et si potest sentiri, potest esse aliquod sentiens; licet non sequatur quod si est sensibile, quod sit sentiens. Et similiter sequitur quod si est aliquid numerabile, quod possit esse aliquid numerans. Unde si impossibile est esse aliquid numerans, impossibile est esse aliquid numerabile: non tamen sequitur quod si non est numerans, quod non sit numerabile, ut obiectio Philosophi procedebat. Si ergo motus haberet esse fixum in rebus, sicut lapis vel equus, posset absolute dici quod sicut etiam anima non existente est numerus lapidum, ita etiam anima non existente esset numerus motus, qui est tempus. Sed motus non habet esse fixum in rebus, nec aliquid in actu invenitur in rebus de motu, nisi quoddam indivisibile motus, quod est motus divisio: sed totalitas motus accipitur per considerationem animae, comparantis priorem dispositionem mobilis ad posteriorem. Sic igitur et tempus non habet esse extra animam, nisi secundum suum indivisibile: ipsa autem totalitas temporis accipitur per ordinationem animae numerantis prius et posterius in motu, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo signanter dicit Philosophus quod tempus, non existente anima, est utcumque ens, idest imperfecte; sicut et si dicatur quod motum contingit esse sine anima imperfecte. Et per hoc solvantur rationes supra posita ad ostendendum quod tempus non sit, quia componitur ex partibus non existentibus. Patet enim ex praedictis, quod non habet esse perfectum extra animam, sicut nec motus.

exist, nothing countable could exist, just as the proposition is true that if there could be no one to sense, there could be nothing sensible. For if there is something sensible, it can be sensed, and if it can be sensed, there can be something to sense it— although it does not follow that if there is something sensible, there is something sensing. In like manner, it follows that if there is something countable, there can be someone to count. Consequently, if no one to count could exist, nothing countable could exist. However, it does not follow that if there is no one counting, there is nothing countable, which is the objection raised by the Philosopher. Therefore, if motion had a fixed existence in reality, as a stone or a horse has, one could say unqualifiedly that, just as with no soul existing there exists a number of stones, so also with no soul existing, there would exist a number of motion, which is time. However, motion does not have a fixed existence in reality, nor is anything actual of motion found in things but a certain indivisible of motion which divides motion; indeed, the totality of motion comes to be on account of the mind considering and comparing a previous state of the mobile to a subsequent state. According to this, then, time also has no existence outside the soul except according to its indivisible; while the totality of time is had by an ordering process of the mind enumerating the prior and subsequent in motion [i.e., “before” and “after”], as was said above. And therefore the Philosopher said significantly that with no soul existing time is a being “of a sort,” i.e., imperfectly; this is similar to the statement that motion exists imperfectly without a soul existing. So this answers the arguments mentioned earlier, to show that time does not exist on the ground that it is composed of parts that do not exist. For it is clear from the foregoing that like motion it does not have perfect existence outside the soul.

In V Physicorum, Lectio III, n. 668 Deinde… probat quod non sit motus in genere actionis et passionis.

Then… he proves that motion is not in the genera of action and passion.

Actio enim et passio non differunt subiecto a motu, sed addunt aliquam rationem, ut in tertio dictum est. Unde idem est dicere quod motus sit in agere et pati, et quod motus sit in motu.

For action and passion do not differ really from motion, but they add to it something of reason, as was said. Hence, it is the same thing to say that motion is present in acting and being acted upon as to say that motion is present in motion.

In V Physicorum, Lectio III, n. 661 Concludit ergo ex praemissis, quod cum motus sit de subiecto in subiectum, subiecta autem sunt in aliquo genere praedicamentorum; necesse est quod species motus distinguantur secundum genera praedicamentorum, cum motus denominationem et speciem a termino trahat, ut supra dictum est. Si ergo praedicamenta sunt divisa in decem rerum genera, scilicet in substantiam at qualitatem etc., ut dictum est in libro Praedicamentorum et in V Metaphysicorum; et in tribus illorum inveniatur motus, scilicet motus qui est in genere quantitatis, et motus qui est in genere qualitatis, et motus qui est in genere ubi, qui dicitur secundum locum. Qualiter autem motus sit in istis generibus, et qualiter pertineat motus ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis, in tertio dictum est. Unde nunc breviter dicere sufficat, quod quilibet motus sit in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed per reductionem. Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus, reducatur ad genus actus perfecti. Secundum autem quod motus consideratur ut est in hoc ab alio, vel ab hoc in aliud, sic pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis.

He concludes therefore (487) from the previous lecture that, since motion goes from subject to subject, and subjects are involved in certain genera of the predicaments, the species of motion must be distinguished according to the genera of predicaments, especially since motions derive their nature and name from the terminus, as was said above. Therefore, if the predicaments are divided into ten genera of things; namely, substance, quality, etc. (as is explained in the book of Categories and in V Metaphysics) and motion is found in three of these genera, there must be three species of motion, i.e., in the genus of quantity and in the genus of quality and in the genus of where, which is motion in respect of place. The way in which motion is present in these three genera as well as how it is related to the predicaments of action and passion has been explained in Book III. Hence it is enough to mention briefly that a motion is in the same genus as its terminus, not that the motion itself would be in the genus, for example of quality, but it is placed there by reduction. For just as potency is reduced to the same genus as its act, inasmuch as every genus is divided by potency and act; so it is necessary for motion, which is an imperfect act, to be reduced to the genus of its perfect act. But when motion is regarded as being in something, though originating from something else, or as originating from one thing and being in something else, then it belongs to the predicaments of action and passion.

Since acting upon and undergoing in some way signify motion, but motion is not put in those genera, we have one reason for a chapter on the “species” of motion. That acting upon and undergoing signify motion in some way can be seen from the following two texts.

In XI Metaphysicorum, Lectio XII, nn. 2376–2377 Dicit ergo primo, quod cum praedicamenta dividantur per substantiam, qualitatem, et huiusmodi; et in aliis generibus non possit esse motus; erunt igitur genera entis in quibus potest esse motus: quae sunt qualitas, quantitas et ubi: loco cuius ponit locum, quia nihil aliud significat esse ubi, nisi esse in loco; et moveri secundum locum, nihil est aliud quam moveri secundum ubi. Non enim motus secundum locum attribuitur subiecto loco, in quo est lcous, sed ei quod est in loco.

Attendendum est autem quod praetermittere videtur tria genera, scilicet quando, situm et habere. Cum enim quando significat esse in tempore, tempus autem sit numerus motus, eiusdem rationis est non esse motum in genere quando, et non esse motum in genere actionis et passionis, quae significant aliqualiter ipsum motum.

Positio vero non addit supra ubi nisi ordinem partium determinatum, qui nihil aliud est quam determinata relatio partium adinvicem. Habitus autem importat habitudinem indumenti ad indutum. Et sic eiusdem rationis videtur esse quod non sit motus in situ et habere, et quod non sit in ad aliquid.

He accordingly says, first, that, since the categories are divided into substance, quality and so on, and since there cannot be motion in the other categories, there are therefore three categories of being in which motion can be found; that is, quality, quantity and location, for which he substitutes the term place, because location merely signifies being in a place; and to be moved with respect to place is merely to be moved with respect to one’s location. For motion with respect to place is not attributed to a subject in which place inheres but to the thing in place. Now it should be noted that he seems to omit three categories, namely, temporal situation (quando), posture and accoutrement; for since temporal situation signifies being in time, and time is the measure of motion, the reason why there is no motion in the category of temporal situation or in that of action and of passion, which signify motion itself under special aspects, is the same. And posture adds nothing to location except a definite arrangement of parts, which is nothing else than a definite relationship of parts to each other. And accoutrement implies the relation of one clothed to his clothing. Hence the reason why there does not seem to be motion with respect to posture and to accoutrement and to relation seems to be the same.

In XI Metaphysicorum, Lectio XII, n. 2386 Ostendit, quod neque in agere et pati sit motus: et hoc quatuor rationibus: quarum prima talis est. Agere et pati sunt motus, et significant motum. Si igitur in agere et pati esset motus, sequeretur, quod motus sit alicuius motus, et genrati generatonis, et permutatio permutationis. Sed hoc est impossible; ergo, et hoc quod in agere et pati sit motus.

Here he shows that motion does not occur with respect to either action or passion. He proves this by four arguments, of which the first is as follows: action and passion constitute motion and designate it. If, then, motion were to occur in action and in passion, it would follow that there would be motion of motion and generation of generation and change of change. But this is impossible. Therefore it is also impossible that there should be motion in action and in passion.

post-predicaments — short texts De Potentia, Q. 3, Art. 3, Ad 8

Motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, in quantum proceditur de potentia ad actum: nam in ipso motu terminus motus est in potentia, et potentia et actus reducuntur ad idem genus.

Movement is reduced to the genus of its term, in so far as there is a process from potency to act: since during the movement the term thereof is potential, and potency and act belong to the same genus.

Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio II, Q. I, Art 1, Ad 3 …motus univocatur ad minus in intentione generis

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XV, Quaest. IV, Art. II, Ad 2 …omnes species motus aequaliter conveniunt in ratione communi motus; tamen secundum esse suum proprium, motus localis est prior aliis motibus.

Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXIII, Quaest II, Art. I, Solutio I, Ad 2 …ea quae dividunt aliquod commune univocum, simul sunt quantum ad intentionem generis, quamvis unum possit esse causa alterius quantum ad esse, sicut motus localis est causa aliorum motuum contra quos dividitur. Sed ea quae dividunt aliquod commune analogum se habent secundum prius et posterius, etiam quantum ad intentionem communis quod dividitur, sicut patet de substantia et accidente. Unde ex hoc quod una virtus condividitur alteri, non oportet quod una non sit altera principalior. In XI Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, n. 2291 Et sicut non sit aliquid commune decem praedicamentis quod sit genus eorum, ita non est aliquod genus commune omnium motuum. Et propter hoc motus non est aliquod unum praedicamentum distinctum ab aliis praedicamentis; sed sequitur alia praedicamenta.

And just as the ten categories have nothing in common as their genus, in a similar way there is no genus common to all the kinds of motion. Hence motion is not a category distinct from the others but is a natural concomitant of the other categories.

Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Responsio & Ad 1 …virtus agendi proportionatur agenti. Unde alio modo oportet ponere virtutem agendi in agente principali; alio modo in agente instrumentali. Agens enim principale agit secundum exigentiam suae formae. Et ideo virtus activa in ipso est aliqua forma vel qualitas habens completum esse in natura.

duane h. berquist Instrumentum autem agit ut motum ab alio. Et ideo competit sibi virtus proportionata motui; motus autem non est ens completum sed est via in ens quasi medium quid inter potentiam puram et actum purum, ut dicitur in II Phys. Et ideo virtus instrumenti inquantum hujusmodi, secundum quod agit ad effectum ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, non est ens completum habens esse fixum in naturam, sed quoddam ens incompletum: sicut est virtus immutandi visum in aere, inquantum est instrumentum motum ab exteriori visibili. Et hujusmodi entia consueverunt intentiones nominari et habent aliquid simile cum ente quod est in anima quod est ens diminutum, ut dicitur in VI Meta. Et quia sacramenta non faciunt effectum spiritualem nisi inquantum sunt instrumenta; ideo virtus spiritualis est in eis non quasi ens fixum, sed sicut ens incompletum. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens incompletum quod est in anima, dividitur contra ens distinctum per decem genera, ut patet in VI Meta. (1026a 35). Et ideo talia entia incompleta, per se loquendo, non sunt in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem: sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducitur ad illud genus in quo sunt termini motus, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, quamvis ponatur in praedicamento passionis secundum quod importat ordinationem moventis ad motum, ut dicit Commentator in III Phys. Unde et virtus haec quae est in sacramentis reducitur ad idem genus in quo est virtus completa principalis agentis quae est qualitas, vel in qua esset, si in genere esset; quia virtus increata non est in aliquo genere.

post-predicaments — short texts Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in re corporali non potest esse virtus spiritualis secundum esse completum; potest tamen ibi esse per modum intentionis: sicut in instrumentis motis ab artifice est virtus artis, et sermo audibilis existens causa disciplinae, ut dicitur in lib. de Sensu et Senasato (437a 12) continet intentiones animae; quodammodo etiam in motu est virtus substantiae separatae moventis, secundum Philosophos, et semen agit in virtute animae, ut dicitur in XVI De animal. Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula IV, Responsio …quia omne agens agit sibi simile, ideo effectus agentis oportet quod aliquo modo sit in agente. In quibusdam enim est idem secundum speciem; et ista dicuntur agentia univoca, sicut calor est in igne calefaciente. In quibusdam vero enim est idem secundum proportionem sive analogiam, sicut cum sol calefacit. Est enim in sole aliquid quod ita facit eum calefacientem sicut calor facit ignem calidum et secundum hoc calor dicitur esse in sole aequivoce, ut dicitur in libro de Substantia orbis (cap. 2) Ex quo patet quod illud quod est in effectu ut forma dans esse, est in agente, inquantum hujusmodi, ut virtus activa. Et ideo sicut se habet agens ad virtutem activam, ita se habet ad continendam formam effectus. Et quia agens instrumentale non habet virtutem agendi ut aliquod ens completum, sed per modum intentionis, ut dictum est; et forma introducta continetur in eo per modum intentionis: sicut sunt species colorum in aere, a quibus aer non denominatur coloratus. Et hoc modo gratia est in sacramentis sicut in instrumento, non complete, sed incomplete quantum ad quatuor. Primo, quia in instrumento non est forma effectus secundum completam rationem speciei, sicut est in effectu jam completo et in causa univoca. Secundo, quia est in eo per modum intentionis, et non secundum completum esse in natura: sicut forma effectus est in causa principali non univoca secundum perfectum esse in natura, quamvis non secundum completam rationem illius speciei sive formae quam inducit in effectu, ut calor est in sole. Tertio, quia non est in eo per modum intentionis quiescentis, sicut sunt intentiones rerum in anima, sed per modum intentionis fluentis duplici fluxu: quorum unus est de potentia in actum: sicut etiam in mobili est forma quae est terminus motus, dum movetur ut fluens de potentia in actum; et inter haec cadit medium motus cujus virtute instrumentum agit; alius de agente in patiens, inter quae cadit medium instrumentum, prout unum est movens et alterum motum. Quarto, quia sacramentum etiam instrumentaliter non attingit directe ad ipsam gratiam, ut dictum est, sed dispositive. De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 11, c., & Objection 3 and Ad 3

…sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod re-

…just as a real relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a logical relation is the order of thought to thought; and this may occur in two ways: First, when the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is expressed in a rela-

duane h. berquist lative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est

tive term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and species: for the mind discovers these relations by observing the order between that which is in the mind and that which is outside the mind, or again the order between one idea and another. Secondly, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely when the mind understands one thing in its relation to another, although that relation is not discovered by the intellect but follows by a kind of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which has objective reality. This happens forasmuch as certain things not mutually related are understood in relation to one another, although the mind does not understand them to be related, for in that case it would be in error. Now in order that two things be related they must each have existence, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears a relation to itself ), and be referable to the other. Now the mind sometimes conceives two things as having existence, whereas one or neither of them is a being: as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and considers one in relation to the other by placing one before the other; wherefore such relations are purely logical since they arise from the mode of understanding. And sometimes the mind considers one thing as though it were two, and considers them in the light of a certain relationship: as when a thing is said to be identical with itself, and such a relation is purely logical. Sometimes the mind considers two things as referable to each other, whereas there is no relation between them, in fact one of them is itself essentially a relation: as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject, wherefore such a logical relation has merely a logical relationship to anything else. Again the mind sometimes considers something in relation to another inasmuch as it is the term of the relationship of another thing to it, and yet itself is not related to the other: as when it considers something knowable as terminating the re-

relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationis creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.

lationship of knowledge to it; and thus it imputes to the thing knowable a certain relation to knowledge, and such a relation is purely logical. In like manner our mind attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the term of the creature’s relation to him: wherefore such relations are purely logical. ⁂

3. Praeterea, hoc nomen Dominus relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est Dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coërcendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum. Et eodem modo apparet quod Dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu.

3. This name Lord signifies a relation since it is a predicamental relative. But Lordship is not merely a logical relation in God. Therefore neither are these relations in God only logical. To the Third Objection it should be said, that just as a man is identical with himself really and not only logically (although such a relation is merely logical) inasmuch as the cause of the relation is real, namely substantial identity, which the mind considers in the light of a relation: even so the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our mind considers it in relation to the subjects on account of the subjects’ relation to God: and thus he is called Lord really, although in him the relation is merely logical. For the same reason it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created mind in existence.

Chapter 15 — To Have Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus …habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde Philosophus inter postpraedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi. …hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur: uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad di-

“To have,” as said in regard to anything that is “had,” is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts “to have” among the “post-predicaments,” so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. …this word “habitus” [habit] is derived from “habere” [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to “have” something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. Concerning the first, we must observe that “to have,” as said in regard to anything that is “had,” is common to the various predicaments. And so

duane h. berquist versa genera. Unde Philosophus inter postpraedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens and id quod habetur: sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio: sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum: unde Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum Habitus: de quod dicit Philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius.

Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est: de quo Philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic… habitus est qualitas.

the Philosopher puts “to have” among the “postpredicaments,” so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the “haver” and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that “a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had”; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of “habit”: of which the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that “there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed.” But if “to have” be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that “habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit.” And in this sense… habit is a quality.

De Rationibus Fidei, Caput 6, n. 987 Contingit autem ab eodem plura haberi secundum diversos modos, in quibus tamen omnibus semper quod est principalius, habere dicitur: quod autem minus principale, haberi. Habet enim totum multas partes, ut homo manus et pedes; non autem dicimus e converso, quod manus vel pedes habeant hominem. Habet etiam unum subiectum multa accidentia, sicut pomum colorem et odorem, et non e converso.

Many things can be had by the same person in different ways, but the principal element is always said to “have”, while the less principal elements are “had”. Thus the whole has many parts, as a man has hands and feet; we do not say the inverse: that hands and feet have a man. Likewise one subject has many accidents, as an apple has colour and smell, but not the inverse.

Habet etiam homo aliqua exteriora sicut possessiones et vestes, non e converso. In solis autem illis quae sunt partes alicuius unius essentiales, aliquando aliquid dicitur habere et haberi ut anima corpus, et corpus animam. Et similiter inquantum vir et uxor in matrimonio coniunguntur, dicitur vir habere uxorem, et uxor virum. Et similiter in his quae quae per relationem uniuntur, sicut dicimus quod pater habet filium et filius patrem.

Man also has exterior things, like possessions and clothing, but not the inverse. Only in the case of essential parts is something said both to have and to be had, as the soul has the body and the body has the soul. And in marriage a man has a wife and a wife has a husband. The same in the case of things united by relationship: thus we say that a father has a son and a son has a father.

De Potentia, Q. 2, Art. 1, Ad 2 …cum recipere terminetur ad habere, sicut ad finem; dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse recipiens, sicut dupliciter est habens. Habet enim uno modo materia formam suam, et subiectum accidens, vel qualitercumque habitum est extra essentiam habentis; …habet autem alio modo suppositum naturam, ut hic homo humanitatem; quae quidem non est extra essentiam habentis, immo est eius essentia. Socrates enim est vere id quod homo est. Genitus ergo in humanis etiam non recipit formam generantis sicut materia formam, vel sicut subiectum accidens, sed sicut suppositum vel hypostasis habet naturam speciei….

While the term and end of receiving is having, there are two ways of receiving and two ways of having. In one way matter has its form, and a subject an accident, or in fact anything that is possessed besides the essence: …in another way the supposit has a nature, for instance, a man has human nature: for the nature is not beside the essence of the haver, indeed it is his essence: thus Socrates is truly that which is a man. Accordingly the begotten one even in mankind receives the form of his begetter, not as matter receives form, or subject accident, but as a supposit or hypostasis has the specific nature….