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Quality - Chapter 8
Logic of the First Act · Categories
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Read from in 4 classes
- Logic (2016) — 23. Relations of Reason in De Potentia, and Aristotle's Chapter on Quality
- Logic (2016) — 24. Relations of Reason and the Four Species of Quality: Dividing by Two or Three, Virtue as the Road to Happiness, and Number in the Trinity
- Logic (2016) — 25. Quality Said in Many Ways: Qualis and 'How', Why Habit Comes First (Prima Secundae), Modus, and the Four Senses of End
- Logic (2016) — 26. Quality in Theology: Powers, Grace, Sacramental Character and Words Taken from the Continuous
QUALITY - CHAPTER 8
Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί tinew λέγονται· ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων.
Ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι· τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως tiw ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή· οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ’ εὐμετάβολον. διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γάρ pvw κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή tiw καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν tiw ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις λέγειν ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα· τοὺς γὰρ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ’ εὐκινήτους ὄντας οὔ fasin ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ pvw κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον. ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερόν τε καὶ δυσκινητότερον. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινταί pvw κατὰ ταύτας, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.
Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ’ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομικοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαί pvw ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν· οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ λέγονται οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί pvw ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.
Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη· ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗται ποιότητές εἰσιν φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ λέγεται κατ’ αὐτάς· οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δεδέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγενῆσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίγνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον· αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ tiw ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε καὶ εἴ tiw φύσει τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν διάθεσις, ὥστε φύσει καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπό tinvn παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται· εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότης λέγεται, ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα, εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα [τὸ aÈtÚ] συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐταὶ λέγονται, ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα. ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί tinew κατὰ ταῦτα· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται. ὅσα τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό tinvn παθῶν γεγένηται ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ’ ἀπό tinvn ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται. ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ καθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενος ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος n, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.
Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν· καθ’ ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον. καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται. τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γάρ tina μᾶλλον φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν· πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων· καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ’ εὐθείας pvw τὰ μόρια κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν. ^
ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν tiw φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ’ οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν.
Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι· οἷον ὁ δρομικὸς ἢ ὁ πυκτικὸς ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ’ οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος παρωνύμως λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καθ’ ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ’ ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ οἱ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται, ^pu-ktikØ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται. ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς· οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ποιὰ οὖν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.
Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς δὲ ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· τῷ γὰρ pur˚=“ µ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν. ἔτι ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ῇ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόζει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρός τι οὔτε πού, οὐδ’ ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναντίων.
Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά· λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει, λευκὸν γὰρ ¯n ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι· οὐ πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα· δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον ἀπορήσειεν ἄν tiw, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων. ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας, ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειάν fasi, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις. ἀλλ’ οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· γραμματικώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ ὑγιεινότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως.
τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ’ ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι εἰσίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ῥηθήσεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτερομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον. ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.
Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ’ ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι κατ’ αὐτήν.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή tiw ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός τι εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδέν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται. τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται· οἷον ἡ γραματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική· ὥστε αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός ti.
λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν, ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά· ὥστε αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα, καθ’ ἅς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι. <. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>
This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle “defines” quality and distinguishes its species. In the second, he considers the properties of quality. In the third, he returns to the connection of some qualities with toward something.
In the first part, Aristotle defines the Greek word for quality by its concrete correspondent, just as the Latins could define qualitas by qualis. This is difficult to imitate in English. It is as if we used the word howness for quality and defined howness as that by which we are said to be how we are. Then, Aristotle distinguishes four species or forms of quality. Finally, returning to the original definition, he points out that how we are is said denominatively from the above species.
The first species or form of quality is habit and disposition. Habits are more stable and longer lasting than dispositions. Reasoned out knowledge and moral virtues are habits, but health and sickness are dispositions. But a habit can also be called a disposition in the broad sense for by a habit we are disposed in some way. Thus the word disposition could be used in general for this species or genus of quality and then be kept for the disposition in particular that is easily movable while the other species, adding something noteworthy (stability and long lastingness), gets the new name of habit.
The second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability. Thomas puts the powers of the soul in this species.
The third species of genus of quality is undergoing qualities and undergoings. The latter are transitory and thus are something imperfect in the genus of quality. They are called undergoing qualities because the senses undergo them. Hence, some call these sensible qualities. But some are called undergoing because they are the result of those having them undergoing something. Thomas alludes to the distinction here of undergoing quality and undergoings in this text:
...nulla potentia passiva potest in actum exire nisi completa per formam sui activi per quam fit in actu; quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu.
Impressiones autem activorum possunt esse in passivis dupliciter. Uno modo per modum passionis, dum scilicet potentia passiva est in transmutari; alio modo per modum qualitatis et formae, quando impressio activi jam facta est connaturalis ipsi passivo; sicut etiam Philosophus in Praedicamentis (c. 8, 9a 28) distinguit passionem et passibilem qualitatem.[1]
The fourth species of quality is figure and form
When Aristotle has finished distinguishing these four species, he says there may be others; but these are the ones mainly spoken of.
In the third part of the first part, Aristotle states that how one is is said denominatively from the above.
In the second chief part of the chapter, Aristotle considers three properties of quality, the first two fitting only some species and the last being a property in a stricter sense.
The first property is to have a contrary which Aristotle exemplifies in the first and third species of quality. This is significant because the second and fourth species do not seem to have contraries. But not every species under the first and third have a contrary either. A connection between the first and third species is seen in the fifth book of Wisdom (the fifth book After the Books in Natural Philosophy) where these two senses are joined. Simplicius says that contrariety is found in other genera as they have something of quality in them.[2]
The second property is to be said more and less. Again, Aristotle exemplifies this is the first and third species. But the fourth species, he says, does not admit of more or less. One circle is not more or less a circle than another.
The third property is more a strict property. By its quality, a thing is like or unlike another thing.
The third chief part of the chapter returns to the connection of quality with toward something. Some qualities are said to be toward another by their genus. Each science is knowledge of something. Nothing prevents these from being put in two highest genera. Although fundamentally in quality, the relation following upon them is in toward something
We can now try to pentrate more these points with the help of some texts from Thomas.
Quality is defined by how.[3] The word how seems to signify the limit or determination of a thing. This can be seen when the word is used in combination as in quantity being called how much or how many. If I say many friends are coming for dinner or many students are coming to the party, and you (who have to prepare the food and drink for them) ask "How many are coming", you want me to limit them to some number. LIkewise, when the difference is defined as signifying how something is what it is, it is limiting the genus to one or some of its species. Likewise, when we ask how is this done or made or known, we want the way to be determined.
The connection between how and limit can also be seen by the correspondence of the four meanings of how in the fifth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy and the four meanings of limit therein. Limit can also be connected with the species of quality through the senses of how. And the reduction of the senses of how to two in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, also points to the distinction of the first and third (and perhaps second) species of quality from the last.
By quality or howness, how something is is said. But this is how simpliciter, not how much or how many as by quantity or how towards another by relation or how something is what it is as in species-making difference. Cajetan in his commentary on the Categories:
Vel, et in idem redit, licet determinans potentiam substantiae secundum esse accidentale qualitas sit, quia tamen qualitatis ratio attenditur penes determinationem potentiae rei et solum genus hoc consistit in ipsa determinatione subjecti et distinguitur secundum quod diversimode subjecti potentiam determinat, ideo qualitatis sibi et rationem et nomen vindicavit, ita tamen quod, ut dictum est, omne aliud accidens ut determinat potentiam subjecti qualitatis rationem sapiat et nomen quodammodo habeat; et haec appropriatio nominis qualitatis fuit causa quare qualitas descripta est per quale simpliciter...[4]
Commentators are rightly puzzled by Aristotle’s second statement in this chapter, that quality is among those things said in many ways (τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων) In the 5th book of Wisdom (Metaphysics), he distinguishes four senses. How can three species of quality be three meanings of how? The species of quality seem distinguished more like the senses of a word than by opposites as in the division of a genus. This seems contrary to species which have one meaning in their genus. There seems more real diversity among the species or genera of quality. Quality seems to be less one genus than quantity. In his commentary on the senses of quality in wisdom, Thomas compares them with the species of quality in the Categories:
Hic distinguit modos qualitatis: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit quatuor modos qualitatis. Secundo reducit eos as duos...
Dicit ergo primo, quod unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur "differentia substantiae", idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt. Et propter hoc dicitur quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid....Hunc autem modum qualitatis Aristoteles in Praedicamentis praetermisit, quia non continetur sub Praedicamento qualitatis, de quo ibi agebat. Hic autem agit de significationbus huius nominis, qualitas.
Secundum ponit....Dicit quod alius modus qualitatis vel qualis est secundum quod immobilia et mathematica dicuntur qualia. Mathematica enim abstrahunt a motu, ut in sexto huius dicetur. Mathematica enim sunt numeri et magnitudines; et in utrisque utimur nomine qualis. Dicimus enim superficies esse quales, inquantum sunt quadratae vel triangulares. Et similiter numeri dicuntur quales, inquantum sunt compositi...Dicuntur enim numeri quales ad similitudinem superficiei "et solidi", idest corporis....Hic autem modus qualitatis est quarta species in Praedicamentis posita.
Tertio ponit....Dicit, quod etiam qualitates dicuntur passiones substantiarum mobilium, secundum quas corporas per alterationem mutantur, ut calidum, frigidum, et huiusmodi. Et hic modus pertinet ad tertiam speciem qualitatis in Praedicamentis positam.
Quartam ponit...Dicit quod qualitas sive quale dicitur quarto modo secundum quod aliquid disponitur per virtutem et vitium, vel qualitercumque per bonum et malum, sicut per scientiam et ignorantiam, sanitatem et aegritudinem, et huiusmodi. Et haec est prima species qualitatis in Praedicamentis posita.
Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in Praedicamentis inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continentur sub potentia, sicut supra posuit.
Deinde...Reducit positos modos ad duos; dicens quod quale dicitur aliquid fere secundum duos modos, inquantum alii duo de quatuor reducuntur ad alios duos. Horum autem unus principalissimus est primus modus, secundum quam differentia substantiae dicitur qualitas, quia per eum aliquid significatur informatum et qualificatum. Et ad hunc modum reducitur qualitas, quae est in numeris, et in mathematicis aliis, sicut quaedam pars. Huiusmodi enim qualitates sunt quasi quaedam differentiae substantiales substantiarum. Nam ipsa significantur per modum substantiae potius quam alia accidentia, ut in capitulo de quantitate dictum est. Sunt enim huiusmodi qualitates differentiae substantiarum "aut non motarum, aut non inquantum sunt motae"....
Secundus modus principalis est, ut passiones motarum inquantum mota, et etiam differentiae motuum dicantur qualitates. Quae quidem dicuntur differentiae motuum, quia alterationes differunt secundum huiusmodi qualitates, sicut calefieri et infrigidari secundum calidum et frigidum. Et ad hunc modum reducitur ille modus secundum quam vitium et virtus dicitur qualitas. Hic enim modus est quasi quaedam pars illius. Virtus enim et vitium ostendunt quasdam differentias motus et actus secundum bene et male. Nam virtus est, per quam se aliquis habet bene ad agendum et patiendum; vitum autem secundum quod male. Et simile est de aliis habitibus sive intellectualibus, ut scientia, sive corporalibus, ut sanitas.
Sed tamen bene et male maxime pertinet ad qualitatem in rebus animatis; et praecipue in habentibus "prohaerisim" idest electionem. Et hoc ideo, quia bonum habet rationem finis. Ea vero, quae agunt per electionem, agunt propter finem. Agere enim propter finem maxime competit rebus animatis...[5]
We can see that the four senses of quality in wisdom do not correspond exactly to the four species of quality in the Categories. There is one in each that is not found in the other. Thomas explains why the second species of quality not under the meanings of quality in wisdom:
Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in Praedicamentis inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continentur sub potentia, sicut supra posuit.[6]
The wise man is interested in the ways of being and ability or power more readily comes under the divison of being into act and ability, or act and potency, than the division of being according to the figures of predication. Moreover, the second species is more a beginning than an end; and how signifies more a limit or end than a beginning.[7] One might also note in passing that the reason given here for it being a species in the Categories - propter modum denominandi rather than propter modum essendi - is a sign of the priority of names over things in the skopos of the Categories. Moreover, this might also contain the clue to the logician’s considering thse things as having a common genus from their common way of denominating substance.
The sense of quality found in wisdom, but not in the genus of quality in logic, is that of the species-making difference. Clearly, this could not be a species of the genus quality in the Categories for it is found in every genus which is divided by differences and especially in substance. Moreover, no difference is a species. Further, it does not signify simply how something is but how something is what it is.
How do we think out the division of quality into four species? Usually, a logical and understandable division is into two or three. We have seen how both Thomas and Albert distinguish the ten highest genera by dividing and subdividing them always into two or three, until they arrive at the ten of Aristotle. Likewise, when Aristotle distinguished five species of continuous quantity, he seemed to touch upon a distinction between the first three and the last two (time and place).
Is it by criss-crossing divisions into two as in the division of being in chapter two or by dividing and sub-dividing? Thomas gives a division into three:
Philosophus, in Praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum...
Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit:[8] unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram.
Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per Philosophum in V Metaphys. [9]
Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem vel passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem.
Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum suam rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni vel mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens.
Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia species qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, quod sit cito transiens vel diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali: quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem.
Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio: dicit enim Philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in II Phys.;[10] ideo in prima specie consideratur bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.
Unde in V Metaphys. Philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male.
Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni: quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.
Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.[11]
Why does Thomas use modus to distinguish the species of quality? If modus means measure and the species of quantity are distinguished by measure (Thomas Aquinas, In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XV, n. 986: "Philosophus in Praedicamentis...distinxit species quantitatis secundum diversas rationes mensurae."), why should Thomas use the word modus to lead into the distinction of the species of quality? But it can also have the sense of boundary or limit.[12] Perhaps we are to understand modus in this way when trying to understand the species of quality. In the above text, Thomas uses the words modus and determinatio as synonyms.[13] To be measurable, a quantity must also be limited. As Shakespeare says of mother earth in Timon of Athens: "Common mother, thou, whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast teems and feeds all."; the infinite or unlimited is immeasurable. And in the The Winter's Tale, Act II, Sc. 1:
With thoughts so qualified as your charities Shall best instruct you, measure me
And in one edition, the note gives - qualified: moderated
And in King John, Act V, Sc. 1:
This inundation of mistemper'd humour Rests by you only to be qualified.
[qualified: moderated in Yale Shakspeare note]
Modus also has the sense of way. Both words can be nouns corresponding to the word how. The mode or way of doing something is how you do it. The mode or way of knowing is how you know. Now the word qualis in Cassell's Latin dictionary is said to be derived from quam meaning how:
quam: how, in what manner
qualis: (from quam as talis from tam ): of what sort, what kind of (= GR. ποίος)
When we ask the quantitative questions "how much?" or "how many?", does the word how indicate limited and therefore measurable? If someone says that he expects many people or that it will take many days, we ask how many seeking a more precise answer, but also a determination or limit. It is curious to note that the limit of a continuous quantity is either not continuous or not continuous in the way that is of which it is the limit.
One could also divide the four into two. In the Nicomachean Ethics, when investigating the genus of virtue and vice, Aristotle asks which of three they are. These three are the first three species of quality. Thomas in his commentary explain what these three have in common
tria sunt in anima, scilicet passiones, potentiae et habitus...Nihil autem est in anima, quod est operationis principium, nisi aliquid horum trium.[14]
The fourth species is not a principe of any operatiion as is clear from there being no motion in geometry. Good and bad are used to get at the genus of virtue and vice. The first reason why virtue and vice are neither passion nor potency is in terms of good and bad which also separate the fourth species from the first.
There is a problem about the distinction of the species of quality which Thomas considers in a couple of objections and solves in replying to them:
1. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur dispositum. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem: nam et secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.
2. Praeterea, Philosophus, in Praedicamentis, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur bene vel male, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis.
Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones: nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a Philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.
Unde patet solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvitur ut Simplicius dicit, in Commento Praedicamentorum. [15]
We can compare here the four senses of limit or end with the four senses of quality in wisdom and with the four species of quality in the Categories. But first we give Thomas” exposition of Aristotle’s text in wisdom on the word limit:
Primo ponit rationem termini; dicens, quod terminus dicitur quod est ultimum cuiuslibet rei, ita quod nihil de primo terminato est extra ipsum terminum; et omnia quae sunt eius, continentur intra ipsum. Dicit autem "primi" quia contingit id, quod est ultimum primi, esse principium secundi; sicut nunc quod est ultimum praeteriti, est principium futuri.
Secundo ponit quatuor modos, quibus dicitur terminus;
quorum primus est secundum quod in quolibet specie magnitudinis, finis magnitudinis vel habentis magnitudinem, dicitur terminus; sicut punctus dicitur terminus lineae, et superficies corporis, vel etiam lapidis habentis quantitatem
Secundus modus est similis primo, secundum quod unum extremum motus vel actionis dicitur terminus, hoc scilicet ad quod est motus, et non a quo: sicut terminus generationis est esse, non autem non esse; quamvis quandoque ambo extrema motus dicantur terminus largo modo, scilicet a quo et in quod, prout dicimus, quod omnis motus est inter duos terminos.
Tertius modus dicitur terminus, cuius causa fit aliquid, hoc enim est ultimum intentionis sicut terminus secundo modo dictus est ultimum motus vel operationis.
Quartus modus est secundum quod substantia rei, quae est essentia et definitio significans quod quid est res, dicitur terminus.
Est enim terminus cognitionis. Incipit enim cognitio rei ab aliquibus signis exterioribus quibus pervenitur ad cognoscendum rei definitionem, quo cum perventum fuerit, habetur perfecta cognitio de re.
Vel dicitur terminus cognitionis definitio, quia infra ipsam continentur ea, per quae scitur res. Si autem mutetur una differentia, vel addatur, vel subtrahatur, iam non erit eadem definitio.
Si autem est terminus cognitionis, oportet quod sit rei terminus, quia cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam.
Concludit comparationem termini ad principium; dicens quod quoties dicitur principium, toties dicitur terminus, et adhuc amplius; quia omne principium est terminus, sed non terminus omnis est principium. Id enim ad quod motus est, terminus est, et nullo modo principium est: illud vero a quo est motus, est principium et terminus, ut ex praedictis patet.[16]
And now a brief comparison of thse four senses to the senses of how or quality in wisdom and to the fours species of quality in the Categories.
The first sense of limit is connected with the second sense of how. The second sense of limit is connected with the third sense of how. The third sense of limit is connected with fourth sense of how. The fourth sense of limit is connected with first sense of how.
The first sense of limit is connected with the fourth and last species of quality. The second sense of limit is connected with the third and to some extent also the second species of quality. The third sense of limit is connected with the first species of quality which involves the good and the bad which are determined by the end or purpose. The fourth sense corresponds more to substantial quality in a definition. Note how the order is reversed.
There follows some texts on particular species of quality in particular.
We have alrady seen why the Philosopher place potentia in quality rather than in relation:
licet potentiae conveniat ratio principii, quod in genere relationis est, tamen id quod est principium actionis vel passionis, non est relatio, sed aliqua forma absoluta; et id est essentia potentiae;
et inde est quod Philosophus ponit potentiam non in genere relationis, sed qualitatis, sicut et scientiam, quamvis utrique aliqua relatio accidat.[17]
The word natural modifying ability is necessary. (Aristotle, Categories, 9a 15-17: καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικῆν ἢ ἀδυναμιαν legetai ) For acquired abilities are in the first species of quality.
Thomas clearly places the powers of the soul in the second species of quality:
cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens; et est in secunda species qualitatis.[18]
And another text from Thomas placing the powers of the soul in the second species of quality:
si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae (et manifestum est quod non sunt aliae substantiae), sequitur quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis, quae dicitur potentia vel impotentia naturalis.[19]
Three texts from Thomas on the third species of quality:
Omnis alteratio fit secundum qualitatem sensibilem, quae est tertia species qualitatis. Secundum illa enim alterantur corpora, quibus primo corpora ab invicem differunt; quae sunt sensibiles qualitates: ut gravitas et levitas, durities et mollities quae percipiuntur tactu.....Huiusmodi enim sunt quaedam passiones sub genere qualitatis contentae; et dicuntur passiones, quia passionem ingerunt sensibus vel quia ab aliquibus passionibus causantur, ut in Praedicamentis dicitur.[20]
Huic enim generi alludit hoc commune nomen quod est alteratio: nam alterum solet dici quod differt secundum qualitatem. Loquimur autem nunc de qualitate, non secundum quod quale invenitur in genere substantiae, secundum quod differentia substantialis dicitur praedicari in eo quod quale sed de quali passivo, quod continetur in tertia specie qualitatis, secundum quod quale dicitur aliquid pati aut non pati, ut calidum et frigidum, album et nigrum, et huiusmodi.[21]
Philosophus in VII Physic. probet quod in prima et quarta specie qualitatis non est motus alterationis, sed solum in tertia, quae dicitur passio vel passibilis qualitas: et propter hoc forte signanter dixit quod alteratio est transmutatio in passionibus.[22]
In this text on the fourth species of quality, Thomas also sees a distinction betwenn form and figure:
dicit ergo primo, quod praeter qualitates sensibiles, maxime videtur esse alteratio in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, scilicet forma et figura; et in prima specie qualitatis, quae continet sub se habitus et dispositiones.
...considerandum est quod forma et figura in hoc ab invicem differunt, quod figura importat terminationem quantitatis; est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur: forma vero dicitur, quae dat esse specificum artificiato; formae enim artificiatorum sunt accidentia.[23]
Appendix
Thomas uses the teaching of this chapter in theology when discussing the genus of grace. In this text, Thomas identifies grace as a quality and place it in the first species of quality:
3. Praeterea, gratia est qualitas quaedam. Sed manifestum est quod non est in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est forma et circa aliquid constans figura : quia non pertinet ad corpus. Neque etiam in tertia est: quia non est passio vel passibilis qualitas, quae est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII Physic.; ipsa autem gratia principaliter est in mente. Neque iterum est in secunda specie, quae est potentia vel impotentia naturalis: quia gratia est super naturam; et non se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut potentia naturalis. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in prima specie, quae est habitus vel dispositio. Habitus autem mentis sunt virtutes: quia etiam ipsa scientia quodammodo est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia est idem quod virtus.
Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis. Nec tamen est idem quod virtus: sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix.[24]
And in another text where Thomas does the same, he notes that grace is a quality not known by the philosophers:
...gratia ad genus qualitatis reducitur, et ad primam speciem qualitatis; nec proprie tamen naturam habitus habet, cum non immediate ad actum ordinet; sed est velut habitudo quaedam, sicut sanitas se habet ad corpus. Et ideo dicit Chrysostomus quod gratia est sanitas mentis; unde non computatur nec inter scientias, nec inter virtutes, nec inter alias qualitates quas philosophi numeraverunt; quorum non fuit tractare nisi habitus naturales et acquisitos.[25]
And a third text where Thomas also notes the difference of this qaulity which is grace from those known by the philosophers:
...gratia est in prima specie qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dici habitus, quia non immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spirituale quod in anima facit, et est sicut dispositio quae est respectu gloriae, quae est gratia consummata. Nihil tamen simile gratiae in accidentibus animae quae Philosophi sciverunt, invenitur: quia Philosophi non cognoverunt nisi illa animae accidentia quae ordinantur ad actus naturae humanae proportionatos.[26]
Another interesting text of Thomas using this genus in theology is on character in the sacraments:
...characterem in sacramentis quibusdam imprimi, omnes Moderni confitentur; sed in modo ponendi ipsum in anima partim differunt, et partim conveniunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc quod omnes dicunt per characterem importari relationem triplicem. Est enim character signum distinctivum et configurativum....Differunt autem in hoc, quod quidam ponunt istis relationibus non subesse aliquod accidens absolutum, sed immediate in anima fundari istas relationes. Hoc autem esse non potest, quia signum per formam quam sensibus vel intellectui imprimit, facit aliquid in cognitionem venire. Similiter etiam nihil distinguitur ab alio nisi per aliquam formam. Similitudo etiam est relatio super unitate qualitatis fundata, ut dicitur in V Meta. Unde patet quod quaelibet illarum relationum quam importat character, requirit aliquam formam substratam; et cum non sit forma substantialis, quia forma substantialis in sacramentis non datur, relinquitur quod forma substrata sit qualitas quaedam, cujus unitas consignificationis similitudinem facit.
Et ideo quidam dicunt quod non est in aliqua quatuor specierum qualitatis, et tamen est in genere qualitatis, innitentes illi verbo Philosophi in Praedicamentis (Categ. c. 8, 10a 25) Fortasse, inquit, apparebunt alii qualitatis modi.
Sed hoc est fuga quaedam, quia quamvis sint alii modi qualitatis, tamen omnes reducuntur ad has species: quod patet ex hoc quod nulla alia species inveniri adhuc potuit.
Et ideo dicunt alii quod est in quarta specie qualitatis, quia ipsa configuratio quam character suo nomine exprimit, importat unitatem figurae, quae est in specie quarta qualitatis. Et quidam dicunt hanc figuram esse crucem Christi.
Sed hoc non potest stare, quia aut figura proprie accipitur, aut metaphorice. Si proprie accipitur, sic importat terminationem quantitatis dimensivae quam constat in anima non esse. Si autem metaphorice dicatur, tunc oportet quod metaphora reducatur ad proprietatem, quia res non ponitur in genere per id quod de eo metaphorice dicitur: sicut non dicitur quod Apostoli sint in genere qualitatis, quia eis dictum est Matt V, 14, Vos estis lux mundi. Nec poterit aliquid in quarta specie qualitatis inveniri quod sit in anima secundum proprietatem. Unde character de quo loquimur non potest fundari supra qualitatem quartae speciei.
Et ideo quidam dicunt quod est in tertia specie qualitatis, eo quod sensui spirituali infert quandam mulcebrem passionem, inquantum animam ornat et decorat.
Sed hoc iterum non potest stare, quia sicut probat Philosophus in VII Phys. (244b 14 - 245a 5) tertia species qualitatis non est nisi in sensibili parte animae. Character autem a nullo ponitur in hac parte animae, sed in intellectiva. Et praeterea illae qualitates semper habent ordinem ad aliquam transmutationem corporalem, vel quam inferunt, vel a qua causantur.
Et ideo alii dicunt quod est in prima specie qualitatis, et est quasi media inter dispositionem et habitum. Inquantum est difficile mobilis, convenit cum habitu, inquantum autem non est ultima perfectio, sed ad gratiam disponit, cum dispositione convenit.
Sed hoc non potest stare, quia, secundum Philosophum in II Eth. habitus est quo habemus nos ad passiones bene vel male. Et universaliter consideranti haec apparet differentia inter habitum et potentiam, quia potentia est qua possumus aliquid simpliciter, habitus autem quo possumus illud bene vel male: sicut intellectus quo consideramus, scientia qua bene consideramus, concupiscibilis qua concupiscimus, temperantia qua bene concupiscimus, intemperantia qua male. Et similiter est de dispositione, quia dispositio nihil aliud est quam quidam habitus incompletus. Cum ergo character ordinetur ad aliquid simpliciter, non ad illud bene vel male, quia sacerdos potest conficere bene vel male, non potest esse quod qualitas supra quam fundatur relatio characteris sit habitus, sed magis potentia.
Unde relinquitur quod non sit in prima specie qualitatis; sed magis reducitur ad secundam, ut quidam alii dicunt. Et hoc sic patet. Sicut enim cujuslibet existentis in aliqua natura, sunt aliquae operationes propriae, ita etiam in spirituali vita regenerati, ut Dionysius dicit in 2 c. Eccles. Hier.. Ubicumque autem sunt operationes propriae, oportet quod sint principia propria illarum operationum. Unde sicut in aliis rebus sunt potentiae naturales ad proprias operationes, ita etiam renati ad vitam spiritualem habent quasdam potentias, secundum quod possunt illa opera...
Ad secundum dicendum quod reducitur ad secundam speciem qualitatis, et est aliud modus ab illo quem Philosophus ibi ponit; quia Philosophus non cognoscebat nisi operationes naturales, et ita nonnisi potentias naturales. Constat autem quod apud nos oportet ponere potentias spirituales, sicut potentiam conficiendi et absolvendi et hujusmodi, et quod ad secundam speciem qualitatis reducantur: sicut habitus infusi in eadem specie qualitatis sunt cum habitibus naturalibus vel acquisitis.[27]
This text also is interesting because of Aristotle’s remark that there might be other species of quality besides the four he has distinguished? How are we to understand tropos τρόπος at 10a 25?[28] Thomas takes the division into four as complete in the above text on character.
Could understanding be also in the first species of quality?
DIVISION OF CHAPTER EIGHT: QUALITY
Quality in itself The definition of quality (or howness)
The forms or species of quality (howness) The four forms of quality Habit and disposition They are under one species of quality Their difference shown How one is called the other Natural ability or inability Undergoing qualities and undergoings They are a third genus Examples Showing that they are qualities Why they are called undergoing qualities The distinction between undergoing qualities and undergoings Figure and form
Are there other tropoi of quality?
How (ποιος orqualis ) is said denominatively from the above
Quality in its properties Have contrary (but not all) and they are in same genus Said more or less (except especially figure) Like and unlike (strict property)
Quality in comparison to toward something Objection about quality and toward something Reply to objection (genus and species and the rules of chapter 3) Putting same in two genera.
----------------------- [1]Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XIV, Art. 1, Solutio II [2] Recall the question in lectio 11 of the first book of Natural Hearing whether there is contrariety in substance or not. Aristotle reasoning from both the affirmative and the negative. But on the side of the differences is found the contrariety and difference is said in quale quid or how it is what it is. Likewise, in quantity. And it is the relatives secundum dici that were contrary. [3] . Cassell's Latin-English: qualis, -e (from quam, as talis from tam) = ποιος quam (acc. of quae, analogous to tam) how, in what way [4] Cajetan, Commentaria in De Praedicamenta Aristotelis, M.H. Laurent, O.P., pp. 172-173 ? [5] In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVI, nn. 987-1000 [6] In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVI, n. 995 [7] Is this also the reason why the second species is exemplified more by something other than the mere ability (so that people wonder whether the powers of the soul belong there)? [8] figo: to fix, fasten, make fast praefigo: to fix in front, fasten before
[9] Thomas: Lect. 16, n. 987 [10] 198b, 13-16, Lectio II, n. 6; 194a, 21-29, Lectio IV, nn. 6-7 [11]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, corpus [12] Cassell’s dictopnary: modus: Ia: a measure, standard of measure II Transf. A size, quantity length B. 1. measure, bound, limit, boundary [hence determination ?] 2. moderation, control C. order rule D manner, mode, fashion, way, method
[13] determinatio: boundary, end determino: to bound, fix the limits of determine termino: to bound, limit
[14]In II Ethicorum, Lectio V, n. 290 [15]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, Utrum habitus sit determinata species qualitatis, Obj. 1 & 2 and Ad 1 & 2 [16]n V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XIX, nn. 1044-1049 [17]De Potentia, Q. 2, Art. 2, corpus [18]Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 77, Art. 1, Ad 5 [19]De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 11, C [20]In VII Physicorum, n. 910 [21]In V Physicorum, Lectio IV, n. 6679 [22]In I De Generatione et Corruptione, Lectio X, n. 74 [23]In VII Physicorum, Lectio V, n.n 914-915 [24]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 110, Art. 3, Obj. 3 & Ad 3 [25]Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest.I, Art. V, Ad 1 [26]De Veritate, Q. 27, Art. 2, Ad 7 [27]Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio IV, Quaestio I, Art. 1, Responsio & Ad 2 [28] This does not necessarily mean other species. See for example the two tropoi of habit, τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως, in the beginning of the Parts of Animals, 639a 2-3.