Readings on What Logic Is About

← Library · Logic as a Whole

Readings on What Logic Is About

Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic

From his file: READINGS ON WHAT LOGIC IS ABOUT.doc.

Word doc

Read from in 1 class

READINGS ON WHAT LOGIC IS ABOUT

LOGIC IS ABOUT THREE ACTS OF OUR REASON

1. Logic is about three acts of our (looking) reason: understanding what something is, understanding the true or the false (which Thomas calls the putting together in an affirmative statement or the dividing in a negative statement), and reasoning. Logic is about directing these three acts to a knowledge of things. This is brought out most of all by Thomas in his two proemia to logic, the Minor and the Major proemia.

THOMAS AQUINAS’ MINOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC

Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Hermeneias, Proemium:

Sicut dicit Philosophus in III De anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et dividentis. Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum.

Harum autem operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse compositio et divisio, nisi simplicium apprehensorum. Secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam: quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis.

Cum autem Logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis.

De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro Praedicamentorum. De his vero quae pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat Philosophus in libro Perihermenias. De his quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat in libro Priorum et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de syllogismo simpliciter et de diversis syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud.

Et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber Praedicamentorum ordinatur ad librum Perihermeneias, qui ordinatur ad librum Priorum et sequentes.

Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Hermeneias, Proemium:

As the Philosopher says in the third book On the Soul, the operation of the understanding is twofold: one which is called the understanding of indivisibles by which the understanding grasps the nature of each thing in itself; and the other is the operation of the understanding putting together and dividing. There is added however a third operation of reasoning by which reason proceeds from the known to an investigation of the unknown.

The first of these operations is ordered to the second because there cannot be a putting together and division except of simples grasped. The second however is ordered to the third because it is necessary that from some known truth to which the understanding assents, one proceeds to getting certitude about something unknown.

Since however Logic is called the science of reason, it is necessary that its consideration be about those things which pertain to the aforesaid three operations of reason.

Aristotle therefore determines in the book of the Categories about those things which pertain to the first operation of the understanding; that is, about those things which are conceived by a simple understanding. The Philosopher determines about those things which pertain to the second operation; namely, about affirmative and negative statements in the book called Peri Hermeneias. He determines about those things which pertain to the third operation in the book of the Prior Analytics and those following it, in which are taken up the syllogism simply and the diverse species of syllogism and argument.

And therefore by the foresaid order of the three operations, the book of the Categories is ordered to the book Peri Hermeneias which is ordered to the book of the Prior Analytics and the following ones.

THOMAS AQUINAS’ MAJOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC

Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Analyticorum, Proemium, nn. 1-6:

Sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio Metaphysicae, hominum genus arte et rationibus vivit: in quo videtur Philosophus tangere quoddam hominis proprium quo a caeteris animalibus differt. Alia enim animalia quodam naturali instinctu ad suos actus aguntur; homo autem rationis iudicio in suis actionibus dirigitur. Et inde est quod ad actus humanos faciliter et ordinate perficiendos diversae artes deserviunt. Nihil enim aliud ars esse videtur, quam certa ordinatio rationis quomodo per determinata media ad debitum finem actus humani perveniant.

Ratio autem non solum dirigere potest inferiorum partium actus, sed etiam actus sui directiva est. Hoc enim est proprium intellectivae partis, ut in seipsam reflectatur: nam intellectus intelligit seipsum et similiter ratio de suo actu ratiocinari potest. Si igitur ex hoc, quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur, adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat.

Et haec ars est Logica, idest rationalis scientia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod est omnibus artibus commune); sed etiam ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam.

Et ideo videtur esse ars artium, quia in actu rationis nos dirigit, a quo omnes artes procedunt. Oportet igitur Logicae partes accipere secundum diversitatem actuum rationis.

Sunt autem rationis tres actus: quorum primi duo sunt rationis, secundum quod est intellectus quidam.

Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quod concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro Praedicamentorum.

Secunda vero operatio intellectus est compositio vel divisio intellectus, in qua est iam verum vel falsum. Et huic rationis actui deservit doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro Peri Hermeneias .

Tertius vero actus rationis est secundum id quod est propium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti. Et huic actui deserviunt reliqui libri Logicae.

Attendendum est autem quod actus rationis similes sunt, quantum ad aliquid, actibus naturae. Unde et ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest. In actibus autem naturae invenitur triplex diversitas. In quibuscumque enim natura ex necessitate agit, ita quod non potest deficere. In quibusdam vero natura ut frequentius operatur, licet quandoque possit deficere a proprio actu. Unde in his necesse est esse duplicem actum; unum, qui sit ut in pluribus, sicut cum ex semine generatur animal perfectum; alium vero quando natura deficit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, sicut cum ex semine generatur aliquod monstrum propter corruptionem alicuius principii.

Et haec etiam tria inveniuntur in actibus rationis. Est enim aliquis rationis processus necessitatem inducens, in quo non est possibile esse veritatis defectum; et per huiusmodi rationis processum scientiae certitudo acquiritur. Est autem alius rationis processus, in quo ut in pluribus verum concluditur, non tamen necessitatem habens. Tertius vero rationis processus est, in quo ratio a vero deficit propter alicuius principii defectum; quod in ratiocinando erat observandum.

Pars autem Logicae, quae primo deservit processui, pars Iudicativa dicitur, eo quod iudicium est cum certitudine scientiae. Et quia iudicium certum de effectibus haberi non potest nisi resolvendo in prima principia, ideo pars haec Analytica vocatur, idest resolutoria. Certitudo autem iudicii, quae per resolutionem habetur, est, vel ex ipsa forma syllogismi tantum, et ad hoc ordinatur liber Priorum analyticorum, qui est de syllogismo simpliciter; vel etiam cum hoc ex materia, quia sumuntur propositiones per se et necessariae, et ad hoc ordinatur liber Posteriorum analyticorum, qui est de syllogismo demonstrativo.

Secundo autem rationis processui deservit alia pars Logicae, quae dicitur Inventiva. Nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. Unde de his, quae inventa sunt, iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur. Sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus quidam attenditur (quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo effectu), ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur.

Per huiusmodi enim processum, quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositonum, ex quibus proceditur: quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et ad hoc ordinatur Topica sive Dialectica. Nam syllogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus est, de quo agit Aristoteles in libro Topicorum.

Quandoque vero, non fit complete fides vel opinio, sed suspicio quaedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam. Et ad hoc ordinatur Rhetorica.

Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam representationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur Poëtica; nam poëtae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem representationem.

Omnia autem haec ad Rationalem Philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est.

Tertio autem processui rationis deservit pars Logicae, quae dicitur Sophistica, de qua agit Aristoteles in libro Elenchorum.

THOMAS AQUINAS: MAJOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC

As Aristotle says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, the human race lives by art and reasonings: in which the Philosopher seems to touch upon a certain property of man by which he differs from the other animals. For other animals are led by some natural instinct to their acts; man however is directed by the judgment of reason in his acts. And hence it is that diverse arts serve to perfect human acts easily and orderly. For art seems to be nothing other that a certain ordering by reason of how human acts can arrive at a suitable end through determined means.

Reason however is not only able to direct our lesser parts, but also directs its own act. For this is a property of the understanding part, that it reflects upon itself; for the understanding understands itself, and likewise reason is able to reason about its own act. If therefore from this, that reason reasons about the act of the hand, there has been found the art of building or of metal-working through which man is able to perform acts of these kinds easily and orderly; for the same reason, some art is necessary which directs the act of reason itself, by which man can proceed in the very act of reason orderly, easily and without error.

And this art is Logic, that is reasonable science, which is reasonable not only from this that it is according to reason (which is common to all arts), but also from this that it is about the very act of reason as its own matter. And therefore it seems to be the art of arts because it directs us in the act of reason from which all the arts proceed.

It is necessary therefore to take the parts of logic according to the diversity of the acts of reason. There are however three acts of reason of which the first two are of reason according as it is a certain understanding.

One act of understanding is the understanding of the indivisible or incomplex, by which it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the forming of the understanding or imagination through the understanding. and to this operation of reason is ordered the teaching which Aristotle gives in the book of the Categories.

The second operation of understanding is the composition or division of the understanding, in which there is now the true or the false. And for this act of reason serves the teaching which Aristotle gives in the book the Peri Hermeneias.

The third act of reason is according to that which is characteristic of reason, namely to go from one thing to another, so that through what is known it might come to a knowledge of the unknown. And the rest of the books of logic serve this act.

It should be noted however that the acts of reason are like, to some extent, the acts of nature. Whence also art imitates nature as far as it can. In the acts of nature, however, there is found a three-fold diversity. For in some things nature acts out of necessity, so that it is not able to fail. In some things nature operates for the most part although sometimes it can fail from its proper act. Whence in these there is necessarily a twofold act: one which is for the most part, as when a perfect animal is generated from a seed; and another when nature falls short of what is suitable to it, as when from seed is generated something defective because of the corruption of some principle.

And these three are also found in the acts of reason. For there is a proceeding of reason bringing in necessity, in which a defect of truth is not possible. and through such a proceeding of reason is acquired the certitude of knowledge. There is however another proceeding of reason in which the true is for the most part concluded, not however having necessity. The third proceeding of reason however is that in which reason departs from the true because of the defect of some principle that should have been observed in reasoning.

The part of logic which serves the first proceeding is called the judging part in that judgment is with the certitude of knowledge. and because a certain judgment cannot be had about effects except by resolving to first principles, therefore this part is called analytic, that is resolving. The certitude of judgment, however, which is had by resolution, is either from the very form of the syllogism only and to this is ordered the book of the Prior Analytics, which is about the syllogism simply; or also with this from the matter, because per se and necessary propositions are taken and to this is ordered the book of the Posterior Analytics, which is about the demonstrative syllogism.

Another part of logic, which is called the finding part, serves the second proceeding of reason. For finding is not always with certitude. Whence judgment is required about those things which have been found in order that certitude may be had. Moreover, just as in natural things which are done for the most part a certain gradation can be noted (because the stronger the power of nature, the more rarely it fails in its effect), so also in the proceeding of reason which is not with complete certitude, some gradation is found as it approaches more and less to perfect certitude.

For sometimes through a process of this kind, although knowledge does not come to be, nevertheless belief or opinion comes to be because of the probability of the propositions from which it proceeds; for reason wholly turns to one part of a contradiction although with fear of the other. And to this is ordered Topical or Dialectical for the dialectical syllogism is from probable opinions which Aristotle considers in the book of the Topics.

Sometimes belief or opinion does not come to be completely but a suspicion, because reason does not wholly turn to one part of a contradiction Although it is more inclined to this part than to that. And to this is ordered the Rhetoric.

Sometimes only evaluation inclines to some part of a contradiction because of some representation, in the way in which detesting of some food comes to a man if it is represented to him under the likeness of something detestable. And to this is ordered the Poetics; for it belongs to the poet to lead into something virtuous through a suitable representation.

All of these pertain to reasonable philosophy; for it belongs to reason to lead from one thing of another.

The part of logic which is called Sophistic serves the third proceeding of reason which Aristotle considers in the book of the Refutations.

LOGIC IS ABOUT TOOLS PERFECTING ACTS OF OUR REASON

2. Logic is also about the tools for ordering and perfecting these three acts. The main tools are definition, statement and syllogism. Each of these is a speech. Speech is vocal sound signifying by human agreement having parts that signify by themselves. (Every speech is composed of two or more names. A name is a vocal sound signifying by human agreement not having parts that signify by themselves.) Definition is speech signifying what a thing is and therefore it is the chief tool for perfecting the first act of reason. Statement is speech signifying the true or the false and therefore it is the tool for the second act of reason. Syllogism is speech in which some statements laid down, another follows necessarily, because of those laid down. Syllogism is the chief tool for the third act of reason.

Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2:

Scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio Metaphysicorum, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa. Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias. Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad eam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus. Unde secundum Boetium in Comment. super Porphyrium (L. 1, cap. 3) non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.

[adminiculum: I a prop, a support, the pole on which the vine is trained I Transf. aid help]

Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2:

Looking sciences, as is clear in the beginning of the Metaphysics, are about things the knowledge of which is sought for its own sake. The things however which logic is about, are not sought to be known for themselves, but as a help to the other sciences. And therefore logic is not contained under looking philosophy as a principal part, but as something reduced to it; insofar as it provides looking with its tools, namely syllogisms and definitions and others of this kind which we need in the looking sciences. Whence according to Boethius in his Commentary on Porphyry, it is not so much a science as the tool of science.

Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3:

septem liberales artes… inter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur, quia non solum habent cognitionem, sed opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius rationis, ut constructionem syllogismi vel orationem formare, numerare, mensurare, melodias formare et cursus siderum computare. Aliae vero scientiae vel non habent opus, sed cognitionem tantum, sicut scientia divina et naturalis; unde nomen artis habere non possunt, cum ars dicatur ratio factiva, ut dicitur in VI Ethicorum. Vel habent opus corporale, sicut medicina, alchimia et aliae huiusmodi. Unde non possunt dici artes liberales, quia sunt hominis huiusmodi actus ex parte illa, qua non est liber, scilicet ex parte corporis.

Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3:

...the seven liberal arts...among other sciences are called arts, because they not only have knowledge, but some work that is immediately of reason itself, as to construct syllogisms and to form speech, to number, to measure, to form melodies, to compute the course of the stars. But other sciences either do not have a work but knowledge only, as divine and natural science (whence they cannot have the name of art since art is called making reason, as is said in the N. Ethics, VI.) or they have a bodily work, as medicine, chemistry and others of this kind. Whence they cannot be called liberal arts, because acts of this kind belong to man by that part in which he is not free, namely the bodily part.

In the first of the following texts, Thomas speaks of the subjects of logic as syllogism, enunciation or statement, and predicate or said of. Syllogism corresponds to the the third act of reason, statement to the second act, and predicate to the first act. But in the texts following that, Thomas makes definition correspond to the first act.

In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171:

Sciendum tamen est quod alia ratione dialectica est de communibus et logica et philosophia prima. Philosophia enim prima est de communibus, quia eius consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet circa ens et partes et passiones entis. Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de intentionibus rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi.

In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171:

It should be known that for another reason dialectic and logic and first philosophy are about the common [things]. For first philosophy is about what is common because its consideration is about the common things themselves; that is about being and the parts and passions of being. And because reason has to deal with all that is in things and logic is about the acts of reason, logic also will be about what is common to all, that is about the intentions of reason, which are had for all things. But this is not such that logic is about the common things as its subject. For logic considers as subjects, syllogism, statement, predicate, or something of this sort.

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2:

sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secunda, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio.

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2:

just as in exterior acts one can consider working and the work, as the act of building and the built, so also in the works of reason one can consider the act itself of reason which is to understand and to reason and something constituted by an act of this kind; which, in looking reason, first is definition; second statement; and third, syllogism or argument.

In I Super Ioannem, Lect 1, n. 25:

The understanding however forms two things by two of its operations. For by its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by its operation in which it composes and divides, it forms a statement or something of this kind.

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Q. V. Art I, Ad 7:

veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in primo, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid.

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio, Ad 2, Ad 3:

Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum.

…intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo…

Ad tertium dicendum, quod operationi intellectus nostri componentis et dividentis admiscetur tempus duplici de causa: tum ex parte sua, quia accipit scientiam a continuo et tempore, scilicet a sensu et imaginatione; tum ex parte intellectorum, quae in tempore sunt.

We have noted that, in the text from the commentary on the Posterior Analytics, that Thomas enumerates praedicatum rather than definition with enunciation (or statement) and syllogism as the subjects of logic. But in other texts above (such as Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2), he says that definition is to the first act of reason as enunciation is to the second and syllogism or argument to the third. Perhaps in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Thomas is thinking of the only work in logic corresponding to the first act of reason which has come down to us from Aristotle. The Categories is about predicates, about what can be said of individual substances. (The Isagoge also is about what can be said univocally of many things.) Did Aristotle not complete the logic of the first act with a consideration of definition (and division), or has that part been lost, or did Aristotle consider definition sufficently in the Posterior Analytics and in the books About Places (The Topics )? I am inclined to think the third since there is no mention of such a work (as there is of some other lost works). Nevertheless, I do not think it a mistake to consider definition (and division) in the logic of the first act because definition is to the first act as statement is to the second and syllogism to the third. I call the logic of the first act of reason, the logic of definition. The logic of definition is about definition. It could also be said to be about understanding what a thing is. But it is about definition more as its subject and about understanding what a thing is more as its end.

One should note that the consideration of names (vocal sounds signifying by human agreement not having parts that signify by themselves) belongs first to the logic of the first act, but there is also a distinct consideration of them in the seond and third act:

Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio I, n. 5:

Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro Praedicamentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio.

Una quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, ut sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum Praedicamentorum.

Alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt enunciationem.

Tertio modo, considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinatur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro Priorum.

In his Proemium to the N. Ethics, Thomas speaks of ordering the acts of reason by ordering our thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify those thoughts. Insofar as words signify things through thoughts, they can be used to order our thoughts about things and consequently our thinking about things. Logic is about using words to order our thoughts about things and consequently our thinking about things. Because man is an animal with reason, he needs sensible tools (such as spoken or written words) to order his thoughts about things. But words could not be so used if they did not signify things through thoughts.

THOMAS AQUINAS, PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Sicut philosophus dicit in principio Metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis.

Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem partium alicuius totius seu alicuius multitudinis adinvicem, sicut partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic ordo est principalior, quam primus. Nam, ut Philosophus dicit in XII Metaphysicae, ordo partium exercitus adinvicem, est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem.

Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur.

Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium.

Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae.

Tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis.

Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo.

Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae.

Nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam.

Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones.

Ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae.

Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, pertinet ad artes mechanicas.

Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae adinvicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas, quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis. Nam si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur, quae non subiacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur proprie humanae, sed naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut igitur subiectum philosophiae naturalis est motus, vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem.

Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicuius multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. Quo quidem auxilio indiget ad duo.

Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitae necessaria, sine quibus praesens vita transigi non potest: et ad hoc auxiliatur homini domestica multitudo, cuius est pars. Nam quilibet homo a parentibus habet generationem et nutrimentum et disciplinam et similiter etiam singuli, qui sunt partes domesticae familiae, seinvicem iuvant ad necessaria vitae.

Alio modo iuvatur homo a multitudine, cuius est pars, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis, cuius ipse est pars, non solum quantum ad corporalia, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus sufficere non potest, sed etiam quantum ad moralia; inquantum scilicet per publicam potestatem coercentur insolentes iuvenes metu poenae, quos paterna monitio corrigere non valet.

Sciendum est autem, quod hoc totum, quod est civilis multitudo, vel domestica familia habet solam ordinis unitatem, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum; et ideo pars huius totius potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium, sed totius, puta conflictus totius exercitus. Et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem. Est autem aliud totum quod habet unitatem non solum ordine, sed compositione, aut colligatione, vel etiam continuitate, secundum quam unitatem est aliquid unum simpliciter; et ideo nulla est operatio partis, quae non sit totius. In continuis enim idem est motus totius et partis; et similiter in compositis, vel colligatis, operatio partis principaliter est totius; et ideo oportet, quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat consideratio talis totius et partis eius. Non autem ad eamdem scientiam pertinet considerare totum quod habet solam ordinis unitatem, et partes ipsius. Et inde est, quod moralis philosophia in tres partes dividitur.

Quarum prima considerat operationes unius hominis ordinatas ad finem, quae vocatur monastica.

Secunda autem considerat operationes multitudinis domesticae, quae vocatur oeconomica.

Tertia autem considerat operationes multitudinis civilis, quae vocatur politica.

THOMAS AQUINAS, PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it belongs to the wise to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason whose property it is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to understanding or reason.

But a twofold order is found in things. One is of the parts of some whole or some multitude to each other, as the parts of a house are ordered to each other. The other is the order of things to their end. And this order is more the chief one than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the XII book of the Metaphysics, the order of the parts of an army to each other is because of the order of the whole army to its leader.

Order however is compared to reason in four ways:

There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things.

There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds..

There is moreover a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will.

And there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is the cause, such as a box or a house.

And because the consideration of reason is perfected by the firm disposition of knowledge, there are diverse forms of knowledge according to the diverse orders which reason properly considers.

For the consideration of the order of things which human reason considers but does not make belongs to natural philosophy; thus that with natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics.

The order however which reason by considering makes in its own act belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of a speech to each other and the order of beginnings to conclusions.

But the order of voluntary acts belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy

And the order which reason by considering makes in exterior things constructed by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.

Thus therefore it belongs to moral philosophy, about which turns the present intention, to consider human acts as they are ordered to each other and to the end. I call acts human which proceed from the will of man according to the order of reason. For if there are some acts in man which are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called human, but natural, just as is clear about the acts of the plant soul which in no way come under the consideration of moral philosophy. Therefore just as the subject of natural philosophy is motion or a movable thing, so also the subject of moral philosophy is human act ordered to an end, or also man insofar as he is voluntarily acting for an end.

It should be known however that, because man is naturally a social animal, since he needs many things for his life which he cannot himself alone prepare for himself, it follows that man is naturally a part of some multitude through which he is given help to live well. This help he needs for two things.

First for those things necessary for life without which the present life is not able to be gone through. And the domestic household, of which he is a part, aids man in this. For every man has from his parents generation and nourishment and discipline and likewise also the individuals who are parts of the domestic family aid each other in the necessities of life

In another way man is aided by the multitude of which he is a part for a complete sufficiency of life, so that man not only lives, but lives well, having all the things which suffice for his life. And thus the civil multitude, of which he is a part, helps him not only as far as bodily things (as regards many artificial things for which one household is not sufficient), but also as regards moral things insofar as insolent youth, whom paternal admonition is not able to correct, are forced through public power by the threat of punishment.

It should de known however that this whole which is a multitude of citizens or the domestic family has only a unity of order by which something is not simply one. And therefore a part of this whole can have an act which is not an act of the whole, as the soldier in the army has an act which is not that of the whole army.

Nevertheless the whole itself has some act which is not private to some part, but of the whole, as the striking together of the whole army. And the drawing of the ship is an act of the multitude drawing the ship. There is however another whole which has a unity not only in order, but in composition or binding together, or even in continuity by which unity something is one simply; and therefore there is no act of the part which is not of the whole. For there is the same motion of the whole and the part in continuous things. And likewise in things composed or bound together, the act of the part is chiefly of the whole. And therefore it is necessary that the consideration of such a whole and its part belong to the same knowledge. However it does not belong to the same knowledge to consider the whole which has only a unity of order and its parts. And hence it is that moral philosophy is divided into three parts.

The first of these considers the acts of one man ordered to an end and is called monastic. [about the one or the individual – we call this part sometimes ethics, but that name can be used more broadly]

The second however considers the acts of the domestic multitude and is called domestics.

But the third considers the acts of the civil multitude and is called politics.

Thomas speaks in general of how reason can use speech as a tool:

In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio VI, n. 81:

ratio potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus, quasi instrumentis.

In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio VII, n. 83-84:

oratio, quamvis non sit instrumentum alicuius virtutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumentum rationis, ut dictum est.

Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine, qui est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut et omnis vocis significativae est significare conceptionem intellectus, ut supra dictum est.

Duae autem sunt operationes intellectus, in quarum una non invenitur veritas vel falsitas, in alia autem invenitur verum vel falsum. Et ideo orationem enunciativam definit ex significatione veri et falsi, dicens quod non omnis oratio est enunciativia, sed in qua verum vel falsum est…

Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse verum vel falsum, sicut in signo intellectus veri vel falsi: sed sicut in subiecto est verum et falsum in mente, ut dicitur in VI Metaphysicae, in re autem sicut in causa: quia ut dicitur in libro Praedicamentorum, ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est.

One could say that logic is about using words (speech and its parts) to order one’s thoughts about things and consequently one’s thinking about things. Words are useful in this way because they signify things through thoughts.

In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio II, n. 13:

Sed quia Logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam. Significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius; significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici.

Reason can also use words to command or to pray or to exhort. But logic is not about such uses of words. The poet also use words to delight our ears and our imagination. But this also is not the logician’s use of words.

3. If logic is about words signifying things through thoughts, and there is the same knowledge of opposites, and relatives are one kind of opposites, and sign and signified are relatives, logic could also be said to be about things as signified by words through thoughts. In this way, logic could be said to be about things as they are known by reason or as they are in reason. As Boethius said, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. And hence, Albert the Great says that the universal is the first thing to be considered in logic. Logic is about what happens to things insofar as they are known by reason. They are named and defined and become the subject or predicate in a statement and the major or minor or middle term in a syllogism. They are related in certain ways because they are known by reason and these relations could also be considered the subject of logic.

Logic is about ens rationis or ens ut verum:

Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 574:

Differunt autem abinvicem. Philosophus quidem a dialectico secundum potestatem. Nam maioris virtutis est consideratio philosophi quam consideratio dialectici. Philosophus enim de praedictis communibus procedit demonstrative. Et ideo eius est habere scientiam de praedictis, et est cognoscitivus eorum per certitudinem. Dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem.

Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae.

Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis. Speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.

Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt.

Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est ens naturae.

Philosophus igitur ex principiis ipsius procedit ad probandum ea quae sunt consideranda circa huiusmodi communia accidentia entis. Dialecticus autem procedit ad ea consideranda ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere.

Thomas Aquinas, In VI Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 1233:

Verum et falsum, etsi sint in mente, non tamen sunt circa illam operationem mentis, qua intellectus format simplices conceptiones, et quod quid est rerum. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod “verum et falsum, circa simplicia et quod quid est, nec in mente est.’ Unde relinquitur per locum a divisione, quod ex quo non est in rebus, nec est in mente circa simplicia et quod quid est, quod sit circa compositionem et divisionem mentis primo et principaliter; et secundario vocis, quae significat conceptionem mentis.

Et ulterius concludit, quod quaecumque oportet speculari circa ens and non ens sic dictum, scilicet prout ens significat verum, et non ens falsum, “posterius perscrutandum est”, scilicet in fine noni et etiam in libro de Anima, et in logicalibus.

Tota enim logica videtur esse de ente et non ente sic dicto.

Beings of reason only are either negations and lacks or relations of reason (there are also relations in things). Sometimes logic is described as being about one kind of relation of reason:

Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest. II, Art.I, Solutio:

…in relatione, sicut in omnibus accidentibus, est duo considerare: scilicet esse suum, secundum quod ponit aliquid in ipso, prout est accidens; et rationem suam, secundum quam ad aliud refertur, ex qua in genere determinato collocatur; et ex hac ratione non habet quod ponat aliquid in eo de quo dicitur; sicut omnes aliae formae absolutae ex ipsa sua ratione habent quod aliquid in eo de quo dicuntur, ponant.

Et ideo inveniuntur quaedam relationes nihil ponentes in eo de quo dicuntur; et hoc attendentes quidam philosphi dixerunt, quod relatio non est aliquod unum genus entium, nec est aliquid in rerum natura; sed est tantum quidam respectus in omnibus entibus, et quod relationes sunt de intentionibus secundis quae non habent esse nisi in anima. Cui etiam Porretanorum opinio consentire videtur. Sed hoc falsum est: quia nihil quod est ens tantum in anima, in genere determinato collocatur.

Unde distinguendum est inter relationes. Quaedam enim sunt quae habent aliquid in re, supra quod esse eorum fundatur, sicut aequalitas fundatur supra quantitatam; et hujusmodi relationes aliquid realiter in re sunt.

Quaedam vero sunt quae non habent fundamentum in re de qua dicuntur, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in illis in quibus non sunt determinatae istae positiones secundum naturam sicut in partibus animalis. Ibi enim, scilicet in animali, istae relationes realiter sunt, quia fundantur in diversis virtutibus determinatarum partium; sed in aliis non sunt nisi secundum rationem habitudinis unius ad alterum; et ideo dicuntur relationes rationis.

Et hoc contingit quatuor modis, scilicet quod sint relationes rationis, et non rei.

Uno modo, ut dictum est, quando relatio non habet aliquid in rei natura supra quod fundetur: et inde est quod quandoque contingit quod relatio realiter est in uno et non in altero: quia in uno habet motum quemdam supra quem fundatur, quem non habet in alio; sicut est in omnibus illis relationibus quibus Deus ad creaturam refertur, quae quidem realiter sunt in creatura, et non in Deo.

Secundo modo quando relatio non habet aliquam realem diversitatem inter extrema, sicut relatio identitatis; et ideo hoc nihil ponit secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem.

Tertio modo quando designatur relatio aliqua entis ad non ens, ut cum dicitur quod nos sumus priores illis qui futuri sunt: ista enim prioritas non est aliqua relatio secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem: quia relatio realis exigit utrumque extremorum in actu.

Quarto modo quando ponitur relatio relationis: ipsa enim relatio per seipsam refertur, non per aliam relationem. Unde in creaturis paternitas non conjungitur subjecto per aliquam relationem mediam.

Et hos ultimos duos modos ponit Avicennna, tract. III Metaphy., cap. X. Primi duo possunt etiam extrahi ex verbis Philosophi, V. Metaph., text. 10.

One could also say that logic is about one kind of relation of reason, those that belong to things as understood:

De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 11, c.:

sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere:

Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem.

Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re.

Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus.

Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.

Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes.

Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum.

Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum.

Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationis creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.

3. Praeterea, hoc nomen Dominus relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est Dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coërcendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum. Et eodem modo apparet quod Dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu.

The following text casts some light upon adinvenit in the Commentary on the N. Ethics:

In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio X, n. 126:

Est autem considerandum quod de universali aliquid enunciatur quatuor modis.

Nam universale potest uno modo considerari quasi separatum a singularibus, sive per se subsistens, ut Plato posuit, sive, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. Et sic potest ei aliquid attribui dupliciter.

Quandoque enim attribuitur ei sic considerato aliquid, quod pertinet ad solam operationem intellectus, ut si dicatur quod homo sit praedicabile de multis, sive universale, sive species. Huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas naturae intellectae, secundum quod comparat ipsam ad res, quae sunt extra animam.

Quandoque vero attribuitur aliquid universali sic considerato, quod scilicet apprehenditur ab intellectu ut unum, tamen id quod attribuitur ei non pertinet ad actum intellectus, sed ad esse, quod habet natura apprehensa in rebus, quae sunt extra animam, puta si dicatur quod homo est dignissima creaturarum. Hoc enim convenit naturae humanae etiam secundum quod est in singularibus. Nam quilibet homo singularis dignior est omnibus creaturis irrationalibus; sed tamen omnes homines singulares non sunt unus homo extra animam, sed solum in acceptione intellectus; et per hunc modum attribuitur ei praedicatum, scilicet ut uni rei.

Alio autem modo attribuitur universali, prout est in singularibus, et hoc dupliciter.

Quandoque quidem ratione ipsius naturae universalis, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod ad essentiam eius pertinet, vel quod consequitur principia essentialia; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, vel homo est risibilis.

Quandoque autem attribuitur ei aliquid ratione singularis in quo invenitur, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod pertinet ad actionem individui; ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat.

Singulari autem attribuitur aliquid tripliciter: uno modo, secundum quod cadit in apprehensione; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est singulare, vel praedicabile de uno solo.

Quandoque autem, ratione naturae communis; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est animal.

Quandoque autem, ratione sui ipsius; ut cum dicitur, Socrates ambulat.

When we consider that logic is in some way about things, we see the remote foundation that logic has in things. The following texts are useful for considering the foundation which logic has in things.

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist II, Q. 1, Art. III, Solutio:

ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam.

Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine “homo” et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur.

Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit, sicut significatum hujus nominis “genus” non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi.

Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa.

Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XIX, Q. V, Art. I, Solutio and Ad 5:

eorum quae significantur nominibus, invenitur triplex diversitas.

Quaedam enim sunt quae secundum esse totum completum sunt extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt entia completa, sicut homo et lapis.

Quaedam autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio chimerae.

Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio secundum quam dicitur species:

et similiter est de tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus; sed quantum ad id quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis.

Similiter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re sed ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est. Unde dicit Philosophus VI Metaph., text. 8, quod verum et falsum sunt in anima; sed bonum et malum in rebus.

Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipentis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus. Sed tamen ratio veritatis per prius invenitiur in intellectu quam in re.

Ad 5: semper veritati respondet aliquod esse; nec oportet quod semper respondeat sibi esse in re extra animam, cum ratio veritatis compleatur in ratione animae.

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio & Ad 1:

…secundum theologos et philosophos verum est communiter, quod relationes quibus Deus ad creaturam refertur, non sunt in Deo secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; quia intellectus noster non potest accipere aliquid relative ad alterum dici, nisi ipsum sub opposita habitudine intelligat.

Sciendum tamen est, quod ratio in intellectu rerum tripliciter se habet.

Quandoque enim apprehendit aliquid quod est in re secundum quod apprehenditur, ut quando apprehenditur forma lapidis.

Quandoque vero apprehendit aliquid quod nullo modo in re est, ut quando quis imaginatur chimaeram, vel aliquid hujusmodi.

Aliquando autem apprehenditur aliquid cui subest in re natura quaedam, non tamen secundum rationem qua apprehenditur; sicut patet quando apprehendit intentionem generis substantiae, quae in re est natura quaedam non determinata secundum se ad hanc vel illam speciem; et huic naturae apprehensae, secundum modum quo est in intellectu apprehendente, qui ex omnibus accipit unum quid commune in quibus invenitur natura illa, attribuit rationem generis, quae quidem ratio non est in re.

Ita etiam est in hujusmodi relationibus, quas intellectus noster attribuit Deo. Invenit enim in ipso virtutem, et essentiam, et operationem, qua creatura producitur in ipsum relationem habens; et ideo essentiae illi vel operationi habitudinem attribuit, et secundum quod intelligit, nomina relativa imponit.

Unde patet responsio ad primam: quia intellectus noster neque cassus neque vanus est quia habet aliquid respondens in re, quamvis non secundum modum quo est in ratione; sicut etiam intellectus mathematicorum non est falsus neque vanus est, quamvis nulla linea sit abstracta a materia in re, sicut ipsi considerant. Unde dicit Philosophus, II Physic., text 18: “Abstrahentium non est mendacium.”

Duane H. Berquist