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Reason Imitates Nature
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REASON IMITATES NATURE
Reason imitates nature. This statement is a common beginning of the whole use, development, and perfection of our reason. No one has brought out the universality and importance of this beginning more than Thomas Aquinas. With Thomas as our guide, we intend to consider briefly and in outline that reason imitates nature, why it imitates or should imitate nature, and how in general it imitates nature. (It would be impossible to enumerate all the particular ways in which reason imitates nature.)
REASON IMITATES NATURE
We should not be surprised that reason imitates since reason more than anything else is man (10 N. Eth.) and man is by nature the most imitative of the animals (Poetics Ch. 4) Nor should we be surprised that this imitation is fundamental to reason since common experience also tells us that at first we learn by imitation (Poetics, Ch. 4).
That reason imitates nature can be see by a philosophical induction starting from practical or doing reason (which is perfected by art and prudence or foresight) and then proceeding to theoretical or looking reason (whose tool is logic).
Following Aristotle, Thomas points out in his commentary on the second book of the Physics that human art imitates nature. In his proemium to the Politics of Aristotle, Thomas makes the same point in regard to the domain of prudence or foresight. Indeed in explaining the distinction and necessity of both political and military foresight in the Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Thomas again applies the beginning that reason imitates nature which has supplied animals with both a concupiscible appetite to seek goods and an irascible appetite to repel enemies.
There can be no human virtue that is not in accord with nature. In the body of his article devoted to military foresight, Thomas begins with this basic principle for reason:
ea quae secundum artem et rationem aguntur conformia esse oportet his quae sunt secundum naturam, quae a ratione divina sunt instituta.
The things which are done by art and reason should be conformed to the things which are according to nature which are instituted by the divine reason.
Thomas then brings out the following lesson from nature:
Natura autem ad duo attendit: primo quidem, ad regendum unamquamque rem in seipsa; secundo vero, ad resistendum extrinsecis impugnantibus et corruptivis. Et propter hoc non solum dedit animalibus vim concupiscibilem, per quam moveantur ad ea quae sunt saluti eorum accommoda; sed etiam vim irascibilem, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus.
Nature however is directed to two things: first, to ruling each thing in itself; second, to resisting extrinsic attackers and corrupters. And on account of this it gives to animals not only a concupiscible power through which they are moved to those things which are suitable to their salvation, but also an irascible power by which the animal resists those attacking.
Thomas then draws his conclusion from the above two as to the natural basis for military foresight:
Unde et in his quae sunt secundum rationem non solum oportet esse prudentiam politicam, per quam convenienter disponantur ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune; sed etiam militarem, per quam hostium insultus repellantur.
Whence also in those things that are according to reason, it is necessary not only that there be political foresight by which are suitably disposed those things that pertain to the common good; but also military foresight by which the attacks of enemies are repulsed.
And in his major proemium to logic which is the tool of theoretical or looking reason (at the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics), Thomas again uses the beginning that reason imitates nature in explaining the division of the art of reasoning.
REASONS WHY REASON IMITATES NATURE
Thomas gives one reason why reason imitates nature in his commentary on the second book of the Physics and another in his Proemium to the Politics. Appropriately to natural philosophy which most of all resolves to the senses, he gives as the reason in the former the fact that the beginning of our knowledge is in the senses which are moved by sensible and natural things (In II Physicorum, Lectio IV, n 171):
Eius autem quod ars imitatur naturam, ratio est, quia principium operationis artificialis cognitio est; omnis autem nostra cognitio est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta: unde ad similitudinem rerum naturalium in artificialibus operamur.
Ideo autem res naturales imitabiles sunt per artem, quia ab aliquo principio intellectivo tota natura ordinatur ad finem suum, ut sic opus naturae videatur esse opus intelligentiae, dum per determinata media ad certos fines procedit: quod etiam in operando ars imitatur.
The reason why art imitates nature is that the cause of the operation of art is knowledge; but all our knowledge is gotten from sensible and natural things through our senses; whence we act in artificial things after the likeness of natural things.
Natural things are able to be imitated by art because the whole of nature is ordered to its end by some intellectual cause, so that the work of nature seems to be a work of intelligence, when it proceeds to definite ends through determined means: which also art imitates in its operation
But in the Proemium to the Politics (In Libros Politicorum, Proemium, n. 1), he gives another reason based on both nature and our reason having God as their source:
Sicut Philosophus docet in secundo Physicorum, ars imitatur naturam. Cuius ratio est, quia sicut se habent principia adinvicem, ita proportionabiliter se habent operationes et effectus. Principium autem eorum quae secundum artem fiunt est intellectus humanus, qui secundum similitudinem quamdam derivatur ab intellectu divino, qui est principium rerum naturalium. Unde necesse est, quod et operationes artis imitentur operationes naturae; et ea quae sunt secundum artem, imitentur ea quae sunt in natura.
Si enim aliquis instructor alicuius artis opus artis efficeret, oporteret discipulum, qui ab eo artem suscepisset, ad opus illius attendere, ut ad eius similitudinem et ipse operaretur. Et ideo intellectus humanus ad quem intelligibile lumen ab intellectu divino derivatur, necesse habet in his quae facit informari ex inspectione eorum quae sunt naturaliter facta, ut similiter operetur.
As the Philosopher teaches in the second book of the Physics, art imitates nature. The reason for this is that as causes are to each others, so proportionally are operations and effects. But the cause of those things which are by art is human understanding which is derived according to likeness from the divine understanding which is the cause of natural things. Whence it is necessary that the operations of art imitate the operations of nature; and the things which are by art imitate the things which are in nature.
For if the instructor in some art makes a work of that art, it is necessary for the learner, who receives the art from him, to pay attention to that work so that he also can work like him. And therefore the human understanding, to which understandable light comes from the divine understanding, must necessarily be informed in those things which it makes by looking upon things naturally made so that it can work in like manner.
This second reason explains why reason can make things like nature does even before it sees them in natural world.
A third reason why reason imitates nature can perhaps be found in an understanding of the distinction between nature and reason. Reason is distinguished from nature as man is distinguished from animal or three from two. Man is an animal but not just an animal. Three contains a two, but three is not just two. This is seen in two texts from the Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars ( Q. 60, Art. 1, c and 60, Art 2, c.):
semper prius salvatur in posteriori. Natura autem prior est quam intellectus: quia natura cuiuscumque rei est essentia eius. Unde id quod est naturae, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum.
semper id quod pertinet ad prius habet rationem principii; unde, cum natura sit quod est primum quod est in unoquoque, oportet quod id quod ad naturam pertinet, sit principium in quolibet. Et hoc apparet in homine et quantum ad intellectum et quantum ad voluntatem. Intellectus enim cognoscit principia naturaliter; et ex hac cognitione causatur in homine scientia conclusionum, quae non cognoscuntur naturaliter ab homine, sed per inventionem vel doctrinam.
Always the before is saved in the after. But nature is before understanding: because the nature of each thing is what it is. Whence what pertains to nature must also be saved in things having understanding.
Always what pertains to the before can be accounted a beginning; whence, since nature is what is first in each thing, it is necessary that what pertains to nature be a beginning in each thing. And this can be seen in man both as regards the understanding and as regards the will. For the understanding knows the beginnings naturally; and from this knowledge is caused in man the knowledge of conclusions. which are not known naturally but by discovery or teaching.
Thus reason must also imitate nature because it has something of nature within it. Reason partakes of the mode of nature just as does the will.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. X, Art 1, c.:
Sicut Boethius dicit in libro de Duabus Naturis et Philosophus in V Metaph., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. - Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, est naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu: nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum.
As Boethius says in the book About the Two Natures and the Philosopher in book five of the Metaphysics, nature is said in many ways. Sometimes the inward beginning in movable things is called nature. And such a nature is either matter or a material form, as is clear in the second book of the Physics. In another way, each substance or each being is called a nature. And according to this, that is said to be natural to a thing which belongs to it by its substance. And this is what is in the thing through itself. For in all things, those that are not within through themselves are led back to something that is within through itself, as to a beginning. And therefore it is necessary that, taking nature in this way, always the beginning of what belongs to a thing is natural. And this clearly can be seen in the understanding: for the beginnings of understandable knowledge are naturally known. Likewise, the beginning of voluntary motions is something naturally willed.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 10, Art. 1, Ad 1:
voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam: quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate: sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.
The will is divided against nature, as one cause against another: for some things come to be naturally and others come to be by will. For there is a different way of causing proper to the will which is mistress of its act apart from the way which belongs to nature which is determined to one. But because the will is founded in some nature, it is necessary that the will, to some extent, partake of the motion [way?] proper to nature: as what belongs to the prior cause is partaken by the posterior cause. For to be which is by nature is before to will which is by will. And hence it is that the will naturally wills something.
De Veritate, q. 22, Art. 5, c.:
Voluntas dividitur contra appetitum naturalem cum praecisione sumptum, id est qui est naturalis tantum, sicut homo contra animal tantum; non autem dividitur contra appetitum naturalem absolute, sed includit ipsum, sicut homo includit animal.
The will is divided against natural desire taken with precision, that is, what is natural only, as man against what is only an animal; however it is not divided against natural desire absolutely, but includes it, as man includes animal.
HOW REASON IMITATES NATURE IN GENERAL
1. REASON IMITATES NATURE BY ACTING FOR AN END
The first way that reason imitates nature is by acting for an end. So basic is this that Thomas can point out as the reason why nature is imitable by art is that it is ordered to an end by an intellect. Consider again the following passsage (In II Physicorum, Lectio IV, n 171):
Ideo autem res naturales imitabiles sunt per artem, quia ab aliquo principio intellectivo tota natura ordinatur ad finem suum, ut sic opus naturae videatur esse opus intelligentiae, dum per determinata media ad certos fines procedit: quod etiam in operando ars imitatur.
Natural things are able to be imitated by art because the whole of nature is ordered to its end by some intellectual cause, so that the work of nature seems to be a work of intelligence, when it proceeds to definite ends through determined means: which also art imitates in its operation.
2. REASON IMITATES NATURE BY ADAPTING MEANS TO AN END.
From this same passage, we can see also that reason imitates nature by adapting mean to an end. This is true not only in art but also in foresight and even in looking reason (the premisses are adapted to the conclusion). However, it would seem that art imitates nature more than foresight because there are determined means as well as ends in art while in the matter of foresight this is not so. It is possible to arrive at our ultimate end by diverse ways which belong to diverse persons (De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 6, C):
Respectu obiecti quidem est indeterminatus voluntas quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, non quantum ad ipsum finem ultimum...quod ideo contingit, quia ad finem ultimum multis viis perveniri potest, et diversis diversae viae competunt perveniendi in ipsum. Et ideo non potuit esse appetitus voluntatis determinatus in ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae ad certum finem et determinatum non habent nisi certam et determinatam viam.
As regards its object, the will is undetermined in those things which are toward the end, not however in the ultimate end itself..This happens because it is possible to arrive at the last end by many ways, and diverse ways of arriving at the end belong to diverse persons. And therefore the desire of the will cannot be determined in those things which are toward the end, as it is in natural things, which have nothing but a sure and determined way of arriving at a sure and determined end.
3. REASON, LIKE NATURE, GIVES THINGS A MATTER AND FORM SUITABLE FOR THEIR END
This is clear most of all in the arts. It is impossible for human art to act for an end without imitating nature in making things out of a material suitable to their end and without forming that material in a way suitable to its end or function. Just as nature has made the teeth and the tongue out of different materials suitable to their respective functions and given the teeth in front a shape suitable for biting and those in back a form suitable for chewing, so likewise, human art does not make a chair out of paper or make the back of the chair meet the seat at an acute angle.
4. REASON, LIKE NATURE, MAKES WHAT IS LIKE THE MAKER
This does not mean that the artist must make something like a man. Rather since art acts through a form understood, it makes something like this form in the mind of the artist. And as dogs give rise to dogs and not to cats in nature, so likewise in the life of the mind statements give birth to another statement (by the syllogism) and numbers to another number (by calculating) and not the reverse. One does not syllogize a number out of two statements and one does not calculate a statement out of two numbers. In doing, too, we see that acts produce habits like themselves.
5. REASON’S KNOWLEDGE AND THE VIRTUES, LIKE ANIMALS AND PLANTS, GROW FROM A SEED-LIKE BEGINNING.
The word seed is carried over by Thomas from nature to reason and the will. This carry-over of the wordseed is based on a proportional likeness which exists also especially because of the third reason given before why reason imitates nature. There are, at least, four parts to the likeness: a seed is a (1) beginning, that is (2) natural, (3) small in size but (4) great in power. Because reason is a nature and exists in a nature, it partakes of the mode of nature.
De Veritate, Q. 11, Art. 1 Ad 5:
in eo qui docetur, scientia praexistebat, non quidem in actu completo, sed quasi in rationibus seminalibus, secundum quod universales conceptiones, quarum cognitio est nobis naturaliter insita, sunt quasi semina quaedam omnium sequentium cognitorum.
Knowledge pre-exists in the one who is taught, not to be sure in complete act, but in reasonable seeds, as universal thoughts, whose knowledge is situated in us naturally, are as the seeds of all subsequent knowledge.
De Veritate, Q. 12, Art 1, Ad 3 (second group):
in scientiis demonstrativis sunt quaedam communia, in quibus particulares conclusiones quasi in quibusdam seminibus virtualiter continentur; unde ille qui habet habitum illorum communium, non se habet as particulares conclusiones nisi in potentia remota, quae indiget motore ut in actum pertingat.
In demonstrative sciences, there are common things in whose power particular conclusions are contained as in seeds; whence the one who has the habit of those common things is to particular conclusions in remote ability which needs a mover to get there in act.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 93, Art. 9, Ad 3:
etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad minus secundum quaedam earum semina
Some virtues are also naturally within the soul, at least according to their seeds. De Veritate, Q. 14, Art 2, c:
Nihil autem potest ordinari in aliquem finem nisi praexistat in ipso quaedam proportio ad finem, ex qua proveniat in ipso desiderium finis; et hoc est secundum quod aliqua inchoatio finis sit in ipso, quia nihil appetit nisi in quantum appetit aliquam illius similitudinem.
Et inde est quod in ipsa natura humana est quaedam inchoatio ipsius boni quod est naturae proportionatum: praeexistunt enim in ipso naturaliter principia demonstrationum per se nota, quae sunt semina quaedam sapientiae; et principia quaedam iuris naturalis, quae sunt semina quaedam virtutum moralium.
Nothing is able to be ordered to some end unless there pre-exists in it some proportion to that end from which arises the desire for that end; and this is insofar as there is a beginning of the end in it for nothing desires except insofar as it desires something like itself.
And hence it is that there is in human nature a beginning of the good which is proportioned to nature: for there pre-exist naturally in it the beginnings known through themselves of demonstrations which are the seeds of wisdom; and the beginnings of natural law [right] which are the seeds of the moral virtues.
De Veritate, Q. 18, Art. 4, c:
Cognitio autem naturalis humana ad illa potest se extendere quaecumque ductu naturalis rationis cognoscere possumus. Cuius quidem naturalis cognitionis est accipere principium et terminum.
Principium autem eius est in quadam confusa cognitione omnium: prout scilicet homini naturaliter inest cognitio universalium principiorum, in quibus, sicut in quibusdam seminibus, virtute praexistunt omnia scibilia quae ratione naturali cognosci possunt.
Sed huius cognitionis terminus est quando ea quae virtute in ipsis principiis sunt, explicantur in actum: sicut cum ex semine animalis, in quo virtute praeexistunt omnia membra animalis, producitur animal habens distincta et perfecta omnia membra, dicitur esse terminus generationis animalis.
Natural human knowledge can extend itself to whatever we are able to know led by natural reason. The beginning and the end of this natural knowledge can be taken.
The beginning is in the confused knowledge of all things: insofar as there is naturally in man a knowledge of universal beginnings in which, as in seeds, there pre-exists in ability everything knowable by natural reason.
But the end of this knowledge is when what are in the ability of the beginnings are made explicit in act: just as when from the seed of an animal, in whose power pre-exist all the members of the animal, there is produced an animal having all its members perfect and distinct, there is said to be the end of the generation of the animal.
De Veritate, Q. 18, Art. 6, c:
dicit etiam Commentator in III de Anima , quod falsa opinio ita se habet in cognoscibilibus, sicut monstrum in natura corporali. Sed enim falsa opinio proveniet praeter intentionem ipsorum primorum principiorum, quae sunt quasi virtutes seminales cognitionis, sicut monstra eveniunt praeter intentionem virtutis naturalis agentis; et hoc ideo quia omne malum est praeter intentionem, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de divinis Nomin. Unde, sicut in conceptione humani corporis in statu innocentiae nulla monstruositas accidisset, ita in intellectu eius nulla falsitas esse potuisset.
The Commentator also says on the third book About the Soul, that a false opinion is in the knowable, as a monster in bodily nature. For false opinion comes to be outside the intention of the first beginnnings, which are the seedlike powers of knowing, as monsters come about outside the intention of the power naturally acting; and this because everything bad is outside intention, as Dionysius says in chapter four About the Divine Names. Whence, as no monstrosity happened in the conception of the human body in the state of innocence, so also no falsity was able to be in his [Adam’s] understanding.
6. REASON, LIKE NATURE, BUILDS UPON A FOUNDATION
Ad Ephesios, III, Lectio IV, n. 172:
Et ideo subdit in charitate radicati et fundati....sicut arbor sine radice, et domus sine fundamento de facili ruit, ita spirituale aedificium, nisi sit in charitate fundatum et radicatum, durare non potest.
And therefore he adds rooted and founded in charity...just as a tree without root, and a house without a foundation easily falls, so also the spiritual building is not able to endure unless it is founded and rooted in charity.
Paideia gives one a foundation and roots in some science. Art imitates nature; the foundation of a house, the roots of a tree.
Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist. XXIII, Q. II, Art. V, ad 2:
fundamentum dicitur in spiritualibus metaphorice ad similitudinem fundamenti materialis. Potest autem ista similitudo attendi quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad ordinem, quia fundamentum praecedit alias partes; et etiam quantum ad virtutem fundamenti, quia fundamentum totum aedificium sustentat: quorum utrumque in fide per similitudinem invenitur, quia ipsa omnibus aliis naturaliter prior est et aliae in ipsa firmantur, quia ‘sine ipsa impossibile est placere Deo’ Hebr., XI, 6.
Fortitudo autem dicitur fundamentum quantum ad alterum, inquantum scilicet spirituale aedificium contra adversa firmum reddat; humilitas contra prospera quae sunt occasio culpae; sed timor contra ipsam culpam, quia ‘timor Domini expellit peccatum’, Eccli., I, 27; et praeterea timor praecedit alia quae ad affectionem pertinent, cum caritatem introducat, ut Augustinus dicit (In Ep. I Joann., tract 9, n. 4; L. 35, 2048)
foundation is said metaphorically in spiritual things, to the likeness of a material foundation. And this likeness can be noted in two things: first as regards order, for the foundation precedes other parts; and also as regards the power of the foundation, because the foundation sustains the whole building: both of these are found by likeness in faith because it is naturally before all others and the others are made firm in it because “it is impossible to please God without it” Hebr., XI, 6
But courage is said to be the foundation as regards another insofar as it renders the spiritual building firm against adverse things; humility, against good things which are an occasion of guilt; but fear against guilt itself because “the fear of the Lord expels sin, Eccli.I, 27; and moreover fear precedes other things which pertain to the affections since it introduces charity, as Augustine says (In Ep. I Ioann., tract 9, n. 4; L. 35, 2048)
Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist XXXIII, Q. II, Art. I, Sol. II, Ad. 2, nn 147-148:
fundamentum, anchora et radix nominant id in quo aliquid firmatur quantum ad suam quietem. Et ideo competunt illa nomina virtutibus quae habent finem pro objecto, in quo est quies.
Sed cardo dicit aliquid in quo alterum firmatur quantum ad motum, ut dictum est, Et ideo convenit hoc nomen virtutibus quae sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem, per quae est transitus in finem.
foundation, anchor and root name that in which something is made firm as regards its rest. And therefore those names belong to virtues which have the end for object, in which there is rest.
But hinge says that in which something is made firm as regards its motion, as has been said. And therefore this name belongs to virtues which are about what is towards the end, through which one passes to the end.
7. REASON, LIKE NATURE, PERFECTS THINGS GOING FROM THE SIMPLE TO THE COMPOSED.
Very close to adapting means to an end is the third way in which reason imitates nature which is by going from the simple to the composed.This is emphasized by Thomas in his Proemium to the Politics (In libros Politicorum, Proemium, n. 3):
Procedit autem natura in sua operatione ex simplicibus ad composita; ita quod in eis quae per operationem naturae fiunt, quod est maxime compositum est perfectum et totum et finis aliorum, sicut apparet in omnibus totis respectu suarum partium. Unde et ratio hominis operativa ex simplicibus ad composita procedit tamquam ex imperfectis ad perfecta.
Nature proceeds in its operation from the simple to the composed; thus that in those things which come to be by the operation of nature what is most composed is perfect and whole and the end of others, as appears in all wholes with respect to their parts. Whence also human reason, working from the simple to the composed, also proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.
Hence, art makes the bricks before the brick wall. And in logic, we define before we make the starements involving definitions and then out of these statements we make syllogisms. And in geometery, we proceed from plane geometry to solid geometry. And in doing, one proceeds from the individual to the family and then to the city.
8. REASON, LIKE NATURE, TRIES TO SUBORDINATE PRIVATE GOOD TO COMMON GOOD.
One place where Thomas brings this out is in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars (Q. 60, Art 5, c):
Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit, ad conservationem totius: sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque deliberatione, ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, huiusmodi inclinationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis: est enim virtuosi civis, ut se exponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione; et si homo esset naturalis pars huius civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis.
We see that the part naturally exposes itself to conserve the whole; as the hand is exposed without deliberation to a blow in order to conserve the whole body. And because reason imitates nature, we find an inclination of this kind in political virtues; for it belongs to a virtuous citizen to expose his life for the conservation of the whole republic; and if man was a natural part of this city, this inclination would be natural to him.
9. REASON, LIKE NATURE, FITS THE FORM TO THE MATTER (MODUS FITS THE WORD FIT)
Just as nature gives each matter its own form so that matter and form seem to be relative to each other, so likewise does reason. To see the universality of this in the teaching of Thomas, one should consider briefly a key word of Thomas, modus.
Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Q. II, Art I, Sol. III, n. 203:
Sed timor qui est donum facit abstinere a malis propter fugam inconvenientis, quod est in separatione a Deo; et ideo ipsum Deum habet pro mensura suae operationis. Et quia modus a mensura causatur, ideo operatur supra humanum modum et propter hoc est donum. [my underlining]
Mode is caused by a measure.
Just as nature gives each matter its own form, so likewise one can say that the mode of reason is measured by the matter or that the mode should fit the matter in every work of reason; whether it be the mode of making something in the practical arts or the mode of manifesting the truth in science or the mode which reason should impose upon the passions or the will. There is something proportional in all three modes; the mode to be followed by reason in making and the mode to be followed in doing and the mode to be followed in knowing. This will become clearer if we consider two texts of Thomas. In the first, Thomas points out the likeness between the mode of science and the mode of the artist or maker. In the second, he points out the likeness between the mode of science and the mode in moral virtues.
Following Aristotle in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas points out that the mode of manifesting the truth in a science should fit the matter of that science and that this is proportional to the artist’s mode of working fitting the matter out of which he intends to make something:
In I Ethicorum, Lectio III, n. 32:
Modus manifestandi veritatem in qualibet scientia, debet esse conveniens ei quod subiicitur sicut materia in illa scientia. Quod quidem manifestat ex hoc, quod certitudo non potest inveniri, nec est requirenda similiter in omnibus sermonibus, quibus de aliqua re ratiocinamur. Sicut neque etiam in conditis, idest his quae fiunt per artem, non est similis modus operandi in omnibus; sed unusquique artifex operatur ex materia, secundum modum ei convenientem, aliter quidem ex terra, aliter ex luto, aliter ex ferro. Materia autem moralis talis est, quod non est ei conveniens perfecta certitudo.
The mode of manifesting the truth in each science ought to fit what comes under that science as its matter. And he [Aristotle] manifests this by the fact that certitude is neither able able to be found, nor should it be required, in like manner in every discourse in which we reason about something. Just as there is not the same way of working in prooucts, that is in those things which come to be by art; but each artist works from the matter in the way suitable to it - in one way from earth, in another from clay and in a third way from iron. But moral matter is such that perfect certitude does not fit it.
And like this is the mode to be sought in moral virtues, As Thomas points out in a passage from his commentary on the Sentences:
Scriptum Super LIb. III Sententiarum, Dist XXXIII, Quaest III, Art II, Sol I, nn 306-308:
Sicut enim in scientiis modum oportet secundum materiam inquirere, ut dicitur in I Eth., ita et in virtutibus. Materia autem virtutum moralium actiones et passiones humanae sunt. In passionibus autem quaedam sunt in quibus passionem inferens de sui ratione natum est in prosecutionem movere, sicut delectabile quod concupiscibili passionem infert; et in his difficile est retrahi a prosecutione et facile est prosequi. Unde temperantia quae circa principalia delectabilia est, modum habet in retrahendo. Et propter hoc temperatus plus assimilatur insensibili qui superabundat in fuga, quam intemperato qui superabundat in prosecutione talium delectabilium.
In passionibus autem in quibus passionem inferentia nata sunt ad fugam movere, sicut sunt timores et audaciae, difficile est prosequi vel sustinere, facile autem fugere. Unde modus fortitudinis quae circa timores et audacias maximorum terribilium est, modus est in aggrediendo. Et ideo fortis magis similatur audaci qui superabundat in aggrediendo, quam timido qui superabundat in fugiendo.
In actionibus autem non consideratur inclinatio affectus magis ad unum quam ad aliud nisi per accidens, inquantum convincitur passionibus. Et ideo justitiae quae circa actiones est, modus est aequalitas, sicut fortitudinis superextensio, et temperantiae refrenatio et diminutio.
Just as it is necessary to seek the mode in sciences according to their matter as is said in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics. so also in the virtues. But human actions and passions are the matter of the moral virtues. But in the passions there are some things in which what brings in the passion is apt by its very nature to move one to pursuit, as the pleasant which brings about a passion in the concupiscible appetite; and in these it is difficult to refrain from pursuit and easy to pursue. Whence temperance which is about the chief pleasant things has its mode in drawing back. And because of this, the temperate man is more like the one without sense [the puritan] who flees too much than to the intemperate who goes to excess in the pursuit of such pleasant things.
But in those passions in which what causes the passion is naturally apt to move one to flight, as are fear and boldness, it is difficult to pursue and sustain, but easy to flee. Whence the mode of courage, which is about fear and boldness in the most terrible things. is in approaching. And therefore the courageous man is more like the foolhardy man who goes too far in pursuit than like the coward who is excessive in fleeing.
But the inclination of the affections more to one than the other is not considered in action except by accident insofar as one is overcome by the passions. And therefore equality is the mode of justice which is about actions, as overextending oneself of courage and restraining and lessening of temperance.
Hence, we learn in political philosophy that the mode or form of government should fit the people with their parts and customs.
Nature acts for an end through determined means from a seed so as to perfect the simple before the composed.
Nature is modest or simple and reason, especially in the arts, tries to accomplish as much, or more, with less.
Reason imitates nature. This is a beginning that Thomas often uses. In his major Proemium to logic (in the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics), Thomas uses this beginning in explaining the distinction of reasoning and the parts of logic and the books of Aristotle devoted to these kinds of reasoning.
Not only in this his major proemium to logic, but also in talking about law, Thomas speaks of the threefold course of nature.
Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVII, Art. III, Responsio:
Dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus invenitur triplex cursus rerum.
Quaedam enim sunt semper, quae nunquam deficiunt, ex natura sua hoc habentia ut sint, et impediri non possint; quaedam vero sunt frequenter, quae in paucioribus impediuntur; quaedam vero sunt raro, sive in minori parte.
Ea autem quae sunt semper, sunt causa et origo eorum quae sunt frequenter et raro; unde etiam in ea quae sunt semper reducuntur, ut in VI Meta(1026b 27 seq.) probatur; sicut motus caelestes, qui semper sunt, sunt causa et regula motus pluviarum et imbrium, qui ut frequenter currunt eodem modo; et utrique sunt regula et causa casualium motuum, ut inventionis thesauri vel alicujus hujusmodi, secundum quod homo vel ex pluvia vel ex aliquo hujusmodi, quod ad motum caeli reducitur, habet occasionem fodiendi in agro, ubi thesaurum invenit.
Ita etiam est de legibus, quibus humani motus diriguntur.
Quaedam enim sunt leges quae ipsi rationi sunt inditae, quae sunt prima mensura et regula omnium humanorum actuum; et haec null modo deficiunt, sicut nec regimen rationis deficere potest, ut aliquando esse non debeat; et hae leges jus naturale dicuntur.
Quaedam vero leges sunt quae secundum id quod sunt, habent rationem ut observari debeant, quamvis aliquibus concurrentibus earum observatio impediatur; sicut quod depositum reddatur deponenti. Impeditur quando gladius furioso deponenti reddendus esset; et hae leges similantur his quae frequenter in natura accidunt; et ideo directe et immediate ad jus naturale reducuntur. Et ideo Tullius, in I Rhetor.(II Invent., c. 36), nominat hujusmodi jus a naturali jure profectum.
Quaedam vero leges sunt quae secundum se consideratae nullam rationem habere videntur suae observationis; sed rationem hujusmodi nanciscuntur ex aliquibius concurrentibus quae faciunt decentiam observandi; et hujusmodi similantur his quae raro accidunt in natura. Unde sicut illa non reducuntur in causas naturales nisi observato concursu omnium, quibus aliquis rarus eventus accidebat; ita etiam hujusmodi legalia quae dicuntur positive jura, reducuntur ad legem naturae non secundum se absolute, sed consideratis omnibus circumstantiis particularibus, quae faciebant decentiam suae observationis.
Unde patet quod omnia praecepta legis divinae vel civilis ad haec praecepta reducantur aliquo modo.
In his proemium to the Politics, Thomas again makes use of this principium or beginning.
This beginning is again very prominent in the second book of Natural Hearing (the Physics), where there is a consideration of nature and whether nature acts for an end.
Thus in the three parts of philosophy, logic, natural philosophy and political philosophy, reason imitates nature is a beginning.
A principium or beginning, a Thomas himself says in the Compendium Theologiae, should be unchangeable and most excellent in virtue or power. (Compendium Theologiae, n. 216 "Principium autem et immobile esse oportet, et virtute praestantissimum." Hence, it behooves us to see that reason imitates nature is unchangeable and most potent.
We can see the unchangeable character of this beginning by a consideration of the reasons why reason imitates nature.
There are perhaps three major reasons for this. One is touched upon by Thomas when he considers why art imitates nature in the second book of Natural Hearing. Another is touched upon in his Proemium to the Politics. A third reason can perhaps be pieced together from those texts where Thomas distinguishes between nature and reason. Perhaps a good reason can be given for saying that these three are all the major reasons why reason imitates nature .
But to see that this beginning is virtute praestantissimum, we must look in general (at least) on the major consequences of this beginning or what it gives rise to. For as Thomas also notes in the above Caput of the Compendium Theologiae:
"Quantitas virtutis secundum effectus mensurari solet"
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 60, Art. 5, corpus: "ratio imitatur naturam"
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 60, Art. 1, Ad 3:
Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturalis non sit recta, est derogare Acutori naturae.
In II Physicorum, Lectio IV, n. 174:
Eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, una est scientia. Sed materia est de numero eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, quia dicitur ad formam. Quod non ideo dicitur quasi ipsa materia sit in genere relationis, sed quia cuilibet formae determinatur propria materia: et hoc est quod subdit, quod sub alia forma oportet esse aliam materiam. Unde relinquitur quod eiusdem scientiae naturalis sit considerare formam et materiam.