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Roads to Knowledge
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: GREEKS ON ROADS TO KNOWLEDGE.doc.
ROADS TO KNOWLEDGE
Our purpose is to follow in the footsteps of the Greek philosophers from Heraclitus to Aristotle, gathering some major passages where they speak about the roads reason must follow when its purpose is to know; and, then, to divide and order these roads. Further, we shall discuss another word Aristotle uses in this context (in addition to the word road) and the significant word used by Moerbeke and Aquinas to translate it.
We may place at the beginning of this investigation the exhortation of the central thinker in human thought, Heraclitus:
Let us not guess at random about the greatest things. [1]
Making the exhortation affirmative, we may say that Heraclitus is urging us to find what his successors (Parmenides, Empedocles, Plato and Aristotle) decided to call very sensibly a road (ὁδὸς in Greek). The choice of a word, so clear to the senses in its first meaning, to name something like it in our knowing powers, was a great help in speaking about and trying to understand the latter. Before looking at some passages in the Greek philosophers on these roads in our knowledge, it is necessary to understand the likeness that is the basis for this extension of the word road.
A road in the first sense is a means for a body to get somewhere, a means that has an order of parts, a before and after in its parts. The road in our mind is similar in both ways: it is a means for reason to get to its goal (in this case a knowledge of something at first unknown), and this means also has an order, a before and after. There are also many particular likenesses. As a road in the first sense may be long or short, smooth or rough, etc., so too a road that reason follows may be long or short, smooth or rough, etc. Thus, for example, Plato speaks in the Republic of a longer and a shorter road that reason can follow.
There is, moreover, another likeness found in this carrying-over of the word road. As Aristotle showed in the sixth book of his Natural Hearing, the movement over a magnitude or along a line is divisible as is that magnitude or line. If I move along the line ABC, my movement can be divided as the line is divided. If the line is divided into two parts at B, my movement can also be divided into two parts: the movement over AB and that over BC. Likewise, the order of the parts of the movement follows the order of the parts of the line. As part AB on the line is before BC, so too the movement over AB is before the movement over BC. Since the act of reason is like a movement in that reason goes from one thing to another, reason's way of going forward will also correspond to the division and the order in the road that it follows. Reason's way of going forward is determined by the road it follows.
Returning now to the exhortation of Heraclitus quoted above, will all be right in the life of the mind if reason finds a road and follows it? By no means. At the very beginning of the investigation of roads in the mind by the Greeks, we are warned of two fundamental mistakes that are possible here. Heraclitus warns us of one and Parmenides (who perhaps comes shortly after Heraclitus) of the other. Parmenides distinguishes between the right road and the wrong road:
Come, I will speak and you listen and carry away my word: only two ways of searching can be thought of. The one is that it is and that it is impossible for it not to be is the road of persuasion for it follows truth; the other that it is not and that it must not be - this I tell you in truth is a wholly unbelievable road. For you could neither know what is not for this is impossible, nor declare it. [2]
It is necessary to say and to understand that what-is is. for it is able to be, but nothing is not able to be. This is what I urge you to ponder. I hold you back from this first road of investigation and then besides from that road which two-headed mortals knowing nothing have made up. For helplessness drives the wandering mind in their breast. They are carried along like those deaf and blind, amazed, tribes without judgment, by whom it is thought that to be and not to be are the same and not the same; for whom the road of all things is turned back. [3]
For this, what-is-not, will never conquer. But you hold back your thought from this road of investigation, and do not let custom from much experience force you along this road where sightless sight and ringing ears and tongue rule, but judge by reason the much contested refutation spoken by me...[4]
Parmenides here makes the distinction between the right road and the wrong road and also touches upon a cause of taking the wrong road, custom. Aristotle developed this thought that custom makes us take the wrong road in the second book of his Metaphysics. Parmenides, however, would seem to be mistaken in thinking that custom makes one take the road from the senses; it is rather by nature that we follow the road from the senses. Further Parmenides may be mistaken in rejecting the road from the senses although he has a reason for rejecting that road: it seems to lead us into contradictions. However, if these contradictions are only apparent, as the later philosophers (especially Plato and Aristotle) were able to show, then there would not seem to be any good reason for rejecting the road form the senses. And we can see that Parmenides himself naturally follows this road in his use of the word road (ὁδὸς in Greek). But the general distinction between the right and the wrong road to take and that custom makes men take the wrong road are important contributions.
But even if reason finds the right road or takes the right road, there is another mistake possible (which we have all made on roads in the first sense also). It is possible to take the right road in the wrong direction, as Heraclitus warns us:
(One must also remember) the man who forgets which way the road leads [5]
There is, for example, a road between the general and the particular which we often take. But should we go from the general to the particular or the reverse? There is also a road between cause and effect. But should we go from the cause to effect or from the effect to the cause? Aristotle praises Plato for asking this very question.[6] Charles De Koninck used to point out how many thinkers deny the more known because of some difficulty about the less known. Such thinkers are on the road between the more known and the less known, but they are going in the wrong direction.
Thus, just as man can make a mistake in regard to roads in the original sense of the word, by either taking the wrong road or taking the right road in the wrong direction, so likewise reason can make two similar mistakes about the roads in our mind when it seeks knowledge. How clear the Greeks have been able to speak of these two possible mistakes by carrying over the word road! And if we ask here why they have succeeded so well, it is not hard to see that it was by following the right road (the road between the senses and the reason) and in the right direction (from the senses to reason and not the reverse).
Even to ask the question about the roads in our knowledge is seen thus to involve already the following of one road, the road from the senses into reason. Heraclitus would seem to have touched upon this road in several fragments:
The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize the most.[7]
We should not act and speak like those asleep.[8]
But it is Empedocles who calls this a road:
It is not possible to draw God near within easy reach of our eyes or to take hold of him with our hands which is the greatest road of persuasion that falls into the mind of man.[9]
The Greek word for road here is not ὁδὸς, but ~máx0toß which is a path or road traversed by heavy wagons. The words "falls into" indicate how natural is this road in its direction. Just as stones fall to the ground and do not naturally go in the opposite direction, so the natural direction in this road is from the senses to reason and not the reverse. And in calling this road the "greatest", Empedocles would seem to be pointing out how no other road in the long run can go against this road. So basic is this road to the mind that Democritus, although questioning (like Parmenides, but not as much) the reliability of the road from the senses, sees that the overthrow of that road would result in the downfall of the mind itself:
Color is by custom, the sweet is by custom, the bitter is by custom, but in truth, the atoms and the empty. [And he makes the senses reply to the mind]: Wretched mind, taking your beliefs from us, you try to overthrow us. The overthrow will be your downfall.[10]
Empedocles has also touched upon the bad custom of "fastening one summit to another, never to complete one path of words."[11] The word translated here by path is ἀτραπός means first a path with no turnings or branches and then, generally, any path, road or way. The Greek word for word here is μῦθος in its earlier sense of anything delivered by word of mouth; hence, a word or speech. (It is from the time of Pindar that μῦθος takes on its later sense equivalent to the Latin fabula). This path or road of words and, hence, of thoughts (since words signify thoughts) would seem to be different from the above road from the senses into reason. The word used by Empedocles here (ἀτραπός) has something in common with words we use such as line of thought and straight thinking. If men did not follow the road from the senses into reason, they would not be able to think at all. but if they are able to think, it does not follow that they will complete the path or road of thoughts. (In English, we can say that to complete a path of thoughts is to think out something. The man who fastens one summit to another without ever completing any path of thoughts thinks of one thing after another without ever thinking out anything.) Plato, in his Socratic Conversations, often represents men who (unlike Socrates) are not even willing to complete a path of words or thoughts; for example: Euthyphro, Meno, Protagoras. It is worth noting that the word used by Empedocles to name the road of words or thoughts involves etymologically a negation of the word used by Aristotle in discussing another kind of road that must fit the particular matter or subject of a given science. The word used by Empedocles here (ἀτραπός) involves a negation (the negative prefix ä) of turn (τρόπος, turn, way). The minds of men would seem to turn in different directions when they begin to follow roads that are adapted to different matters or subjects. Hence, too, we speak of someone's "turn of mind."
In the fragment where Empedocles is closest to talking about a road that fits a particular subject, he uses the word πόρος which means originally a means of passing a river, a ford or ferry:
...But come, observe with every means in which way each thing is clear; neither hold any sight in trust more than hearing, nor loud-sounding hearing above what is made clear by the tongue, nor hold back belief from any of the other limbs where there is a way (πόρος) to understanding, but understand in which way each is clear.[12]
Although Empedocles is her speaking more of the senses as ways of knowing rather than the roads adapted to particular subjects, he nevertheless is enunciating the basic principle followed by Plato and Aristotle in speaking about those roads. This is the principle that the way of knowing must fit the thing to be known.
We can now turn to Plato's and Aristotle's development of these three roads touched upon by Empedocles. We can begin from the last considered in Empedocles and proceed in the reverse order. Although Empedocles sees the common beginning that the way of knowing should fit what is to be known, he does not see distinctly (as Plato and especially Aristotle were to bring out) that there are distinct sciences (science here means a reasoned-out knowledge), each with its own road adapted to its matter.
The Timaeus of Plato is different from the other dialogues. (Plato's dialogues are not all dialogues; the naming here is Anaxagorean.) Timaeus rather than Socrates is the principal speaker and he gives a discourse rather than leads a conversation. Because of this second difference, the Timaeus is more concerned with following a road adapted to the subject of the discourse while the Socratic conversations emphasize more the common road of dialectic which can be used even by those not experts in the subject of discussion. And this can be seen in the beginning of Timaeus' discourse which has a proemium (like an Aristotelian treatise) in which he proposes how he is going to proceed in the matter of his discourse. The key text is as follows:
Let the gods then be called upon in this way, but we must also call upon ourselves as to how you may most easily learn and how I may purpose to show most about the foresaid.
But in my judgment, we must first divide thus: what is a being always, but having no becoming; and what is becoming always, but never being.?
The one is grasped by understanding with reason, always being the same; while the other is thought by opinion with reasonless sensation, becoming and perishing, never really being.[13]
We have separated the above continuous words in the Timaeus into three parts. In the first part, Timaeus states his intention which is to find the way of proceeding that is suitable both to the teacher and the student. It is indeed the same way that the teacher should manifest the truth about a subject and the student should learn it. Aristotle follows Plato in the proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics when he determines the way of proceeding in ethics and political philosophy, first on the side of the teacher, and then adds that it should be received in the same way on the side of the student:
We should be content, therefore, in speaking about such things And from such things, to show the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about such things and from such things as are for the most part, to conclude such as are the same
In the same way, one ought to receive each thing said.[14]
In the second part of the above text of Plato, we find Timaeus distinguishing two subjects or matters, which distinction or division he says must come first. Why first? What is the reason for the order? We must (as we learn in the third part) distinguish subjects or matters before we can find the ways of knowing adapted to them. Hence, in the second part, Timaeus distinguishes two subjects and in the third part he determines the ways of knowing them or he distinguishes the ways in which the mind will grasp them. The latter are not the same, but differ by being fitted to matters that are themselves diverse.
A full consideration of this text from the Timaeus would involve a comparison with Parmenides and Aristotle. There is a likeness between the two ways the mind attains its object here and the two roads Parmenides distinguished. Even though Parmenides rejects one of these two roads, he does show how one can proceed along it:
Here, I will cease my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth. From hence, you will learn the opinions of mortals, hearing the deceitful order of my words....[15]
Plato begin in the Sophist and elsewhere the task of untying the apparent contradictions which held back Parmenides from accepting one of his roads as even a lesser road. As Plato began to untie these apparent contradictions, he saw that there were two roads to be followed. Even though one was far better than the other, both roads were necessary, being adapted to diverse subjects. Here again we can see how useful it is to carry over the word road, how it helps us to grasp the proportional situation. As regards roads in the original sense, it is easy to grasp that the best road is not always the road to take. If it does not lead to where one wants to go, one may have to take a lesser road, even a dirt road or a bumpy road. Likewise, for reason, the road to the knowledge of one subject may be a better road than that to knowledge of another subject. But one should not take the former road to know the latter subject. One cannot always take the best road.
Aristotle follows Plato in distinguishing between a greater and a lesser road and in maintaining that the best road should not be followed when it do not fit the matter one is studying. But Aristotle's key example is not between the study of being and the study of becoming, but between the latter and the mathematical sciences:
One ought not to demand mathematical precision [or certitude] in all things, but in those not having matter. Whence the way is not natural science's for probably all nature has matter. Whence one ought to consider first what is nature. For thus it will become clear what natural science is about and whether it belongs to one or more than one science to consider the causes and beginnings. [16]
Aristotle's examples are perhaps more known. but leaving this aside, and not entering into the differences between Plato and Aristotle as regards the study of being and the study of becoming, we can safely say that both see a greater and a lesser road as far as certitude is concerned and that both roads must be followed since they fit diverse subjects. Further, the difference in subject they both see is between a subject that is changeable or variable and has matter, and one that is unchangeable and without matter (or so considered). Although Plato does not use the word road here in the above text from the Timaeus, he does later in the same work use this word in a very revealing text. Timaeus speaking later says:
Now however one must attempt to make known to you the order and generation of each of these in an unaccustomed speech.
But since you partake by education of the roads through which it is necessary to show the said things, you will understand.[17]
The word for road here is again ὁδὸς (in the gentive plural). One should note here also the necessity that Timaeus or Plato sees for an education (παίδευσις) in roads so that one will know which road to take. Further, Plato sees this education as especially important when one is proceeding in an "unaccustomed" (ἀήθης) way. Aristotle, just before the passage quoted above (n. 16), also insists upon the need for an education in how to proceed and especially because of custom:
Listening happens according to customs. for as we are accustomed, so do we expect it to be said; and what is beside this, does not seem similar, but more unknown and strange through unfamiliarity - for the familiar is known. The laws in which the mythical and childish prevail through custom over our knowledge of them, show how much strength the customary has.
Thus some will not accepts what is said if one does not speak mathematically; others, if not by example; while others expect a poet to be brought in as witness. And these, all things precisely [or with certitude]; while the precise saddens those either through not being able to join one thing with another or through stinginess. for the precise has something of this sort; so that just as in contracts, so also in discussions, it seems to some to be illiberal.
Hence, it is necessary to be educated as to how each should be received because it is out of place to seek at the same time reasoned-out knowledge and the way of reasoned-out knowledge - for neither is easy to get.[18]
Aristotle's verb for to be educated has the same root as Plato's word for education in the above text from the Timaeus (πεπαιδεῦσθαι and παίδευσις). Aristotle however does not use the word ὁδὸς here, but τρόπος (turn, way - which we will discuss later). But we must now turn to some texts in Plato and Aristotle which speak of a common road in reasoned-out knowledge, a road that corresponds to Empedocles' path of words or thoughts.
Plato in the Sophist and the Statesman touches upon a road that is not adapted or limited to any particular subject. In the Sophist, we read:
But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing to grasp as to what it is. Now about whatever great things ought to be worked out well, everyone has agreed long ago that one ought to practice the same in small and easy things before in these great things. Now then, O Theaetetus, I also advise us, who think the race of the sophist difficult and hard to catch, to practice beforehand the method of this in something easier, unless you have somewhere a more favorable road to propose.[19]
The Greek word translated here by method (μέθοδος) is a compound of ὁδὸς (road) and metá (after, with, over). When one is going to practice a μέθοδος, one is going to be concerned with a road. Hence, in the Statesman, which is a continuation of the discussion of the Sophist and where the same method is practiced, we find the Stranger speaking of two roads:
An d now in the part where our consideration has begun, it seems that one can look down upon two roads placed there - the one short, dividing a smaller part form a larger, and the other longer, having more what we said before, that one ought to divide in the middle as much as possible.[20]
This μέθοδος, and the road or roads it involves, does not seem to be adapted to any particular matter or subject. This becomes even clearer in the conversation shortly after in the Statesman between the Stranger and the Young Socrates:
Stranger: For now, O Socrates, what was said yesterday in the search for the sophist is more clear.
Y. Socrates What was it?
Stranger: That in this method of definitions, one does not care more for the grand than the lowly, one does not honor the lesser before the greater, but always by this one concludes the most true.[21]
We have translated the genitive plural of λόγος by definitions. If we recall that λόγος first means that which is said or spoken and that μέθοδος involves a road, we can see continuity and development from the "path of words" of which Empedocles spoke. Empedocles' word was, instead of λόγος, μῦθος. But as we have pointed out before, μῦθος first meant anything delivered by word of mouth, a word or speech. μῦθος and λόγος are thus originally almost synonyms and here we can then see part of the continuity of Plato's thought with Empedocles'. (The word λόγος in Plato, however, is taking on more precise meanings such as definition here and argument in the Phaedo)
Another continuity is in road. Empedocles speaks of a path or road(ἀτραπός) of words and likewise Plato in speaking of a μέθοδος of words since a μέθοδος involves a road. The common nature of this road is also brought out by calling it a road of words since words are not adapted to or limited to any particular subject. (The use of words is sometimes taken as a sign of the universality of man's mind or reason.)
We can also see a development in Plato's word μέθοδος since it adds to road the notion of art. In the Phaedo, Socrates speaks of the need for an art about arguments in the famous comparison of the misologist (hater of argument) and the misanthrope. Socrates shows how both come about due to an inability to distinguish the good from the bad and, hence, from trusting what is not worthy of trust. He speaks then of the man who believes an argument "without the art about arguments."[22] The word for argument here is again λόγος and for art, τέχνη. Later, Socrates speaks of such a man's lack of art, ἀτεχνία.[23] In these two places, μέθοδος and τέχνη are almost synonyms. Socrates or Plato seems to be the first to say we need an art about definition and argument, which art is called logic.
Aristotle, in determining that there is an art (técnh.) of rhetoric at the beginning of the Rhetoric, ties this up with the ability of making a road (in some texts, it is one word in Greek: =dwpoieîn)[24] Plato then and Aristotle following him, see that there can be an art about the road of words (and more precisely of those words that form a definition or an argument). This art was eventually called logic.
We have mentioned above that Aristotle called rhetoric an art and that he sees art as involving a road. Likewise, in his proemium to the Places (Topics), he says that he is trying to find a "μέθοδος from which we will be able to syllogize about every problem from probable opinions."[25] And in the even more general method of the Prior Analytics, he speaks of a road through which we may grasp the principles of each:
Now it ought to be said how we may always abound in syllogism towards what is proposed and through what road we may grasp the principles about each.[26]
The word Aristotle uses here for road is ὁδὸς. He also use the Greek preposition dià with it which means straight through (as in the diameter of a circle). we have seen before how Empedocles has spoken of this road as being straight.
We can now turn to Plato's and Aristotle's deeper understanding of the most basic road that Empedocles talked about - the road from the senses into reason.
In discussing the ascent of the soul form the sensible world to the understandable world, Plato gives a famous definition of philosophy:
a turning around of the soul from a day that is night to the true day, a rising up to what is, which we will affirm to be true philosophy.[27]
The word in Greek for rising up here is ἐπάνοδος. We should compare this with the road of Empedocles "that falls into the mind of man" from the eyes and the hands. (One should not fail to admire Empedocles for pointing out the two senses that most of all make us know what is in things and the only two senses that know the forms of things.) One is first struck by the contrariety of the images used by these two great thinkers in speaking of this basic road. For Empedocles, the road is falling into the mind from the senses while in Plato ,the mind is turning away from and rising up from the world of the senses.
Empedocles sees the road from the senses as falling into the mind or reason of man because he sees that reason is in some way acted upon buy the objects of the senses:
If you press these things hard upon your firm mind with a friendly disposition and a watchful attention that is pure, certainly all these things will remain with you throughout life.[28]
Further, he does not see the radical difference between the senses and reason, still thinking that reason and thought are something material:
Nourished in the sea of blood which goes in two directions, here especially is what men call thought, for the blood around the heart in men is thought.[29]
Plato, however, had seen something of the radical distinction between reason and the senses and that the object of reason is above that of the senses. And there are two ways in which the object of reason may be said to be above the object of the senses. If only reason knows immaterial things (such as the soul or truth or God) and these are better than the material things which the senses also in some way know, then the object of reason is above that of the senses. For we all say that what is better is above and what is not as good is below. Moreover, we all place the singular under the universal. But as Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. Hence, the road from the senses to reason, being a road from the singular to the universal, is also a road that goes up, an ἐπάνοδος as Plato said. And also being a road to better or higher things (as we have noted above), it is for another reason a road going up. But if one regarded thoughts as faded images (like Hume does), then the road from the senses would a road downhill in excellence.
Aristotle also speaks of a road that is similar to Plato's ἐπάνοδος. In the first book of his Natural Hearing (Physics), for example, he describes that road thus:
But the road from the more known and more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature is inborn. For the known to us and the known simply are not the same. Wherefore it is necessary to go forward in this way from the more uncertain by nature but more certain to us to what is more certain and more known by nature.[30]
He applies this principle there to our reason's going from the confused to the distinct. His examples there show that the senses also go from the confused to the distinct and, hence, Aristotle is deepening our knowledge of the road from the senses into reason. The word in Greek for road here is again ὁδὸς, but the word for way is τρόπος (turn, way). τρόπος, like way in English, can be applied to how we go forward along a road. Moerbeke uses via for ὁδὸς and modus for τρόπος. We shall have occasion later to discuss the word modus which makes explicit something very important. The same principle is applied in the Nicomachean Ethics when Aristotle is discussing whether the road is from the beginnings (or causes) or to the beginnings (or causes):
It should not remain hidden to us that arguments from the beginnings and those to the beginnings differ. For Plato did well to ask about this and to investigate whether the road is form the beginnings or to the beginnings, just as in the race-course from the judges to the goal and back again. One ought to begin with from the known, but these are twofold: those to us and simply. Probably one ought to begin from those known to us. Whence it is necessary that an adequate hearer about good and just and all political things be brought up well in morals. For the starting-point is that it is so...[31]
This principle or beginning is applied again by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Metaphysics when he gives the reason for considering sensible substances before the immaterial substances.[32] Their common acceptance of this beginning and road leads Plato and Aristotle to use somewhat similar likenesses from the sense of sight to describe it. Plato compares our reason to the eyes of those born in a cave in the Republic[33] and Aristotle, to the eyes of the bat which he thought too weak to stand the light of day in the Metaphysics.[34] For both, it is a road going up from darkness to light.
Empedocles. Plato and Aristotle, with the help of their predecessors, seem thus to have touched upon three roads in our knowledge: the road from the senses into reason, the road of words or in the thoughts signified by those words (the road of defining and reasoning), and the road that fits a particular subject. Plato and Aristotle, of course, do this more precisely and fully than Empedocles, and there are subtle differences between all three; yet they are all working their way towards an enumeration of these three roads.
We have spoken in the beginning of the importance of the word road (especially ὁδὸς in Greek, with some other more or less synonyms in our text). But there is another word used by Aristotle when talking about the road that fits the matter of a particular reasoned-out knowledge and about how reason should go forward along a road which has a most interesting translation in Moerbeke's text and Thomas Aquinas' commentaries.
If we examine one of Aristotle's most important texts on proceeding in a way that is suitable to a particular reasoned-out knowledge, or that fits its matter, the third chapter of the second book of the Metaphysics, we find that he uses τρόπος rather than ὁδὸς.[35] The word τρόπος means turn, direction, or way. (The verb τρέπω means to turn or direct towards a thing. ) Although τρόπος could in some contexts be a synonym for road, it does not seem to signify this as concretely as does ὁδὸς in Greek or via in Latin or road in English. It is in some respects (but not in others) like the English word way which can signify a road as in highway, but also signify more abstractly how something is or is done. The word τρόπος seems well chosen in that the mind must turn in different directions when it follows the roads that are adapted to particular forms of reasoned-out knowledge. When men specialize in different forms of reasoned-out knowledge, their minds would seem to turn in different directions or they acquire different turns of mind.
The word used by Moerbeke in his translation of the Metaphysics and by Thomas in following and commenting on Aristotle here is modus.. The Latin word modus is tied to measure in its meaning. Thomas, following Augustine, explains thus:
Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit: unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. [36]
What is especially signified by the use of the word modus here is that the way of going forward of reason in a particular reasoned-out knowledge must be measured. The Latin word brings out something that is in the thought of Aristotle, but which the word τρόπος does not bring out explicitly. (It is curious to note that the English word used here, way, is a cognate ofweigh.) The great and common beginning of Greek thought "Nothing too much" (attributed to the Seven Wise Men of Greece), could not fail to be applied to something as important as the way of going forward in a reasoned-out knowledge. Every man knows in some way this common beginning and will not deny (except in words sometimes) that something too much is bad. Even the man who drinks too much, or charges too much for his product. will not deny that something too much is bad, but will deny that he has had too much too drink or that he is charging too much for his product. Hence, also the question arises as to how much is too much (or too little). This question, however, seeks a measure. Measure is first used in quantity, but is later carried over to other kinds of things.
But what does it mean to say that the way of going forward in a reasoned-out knowledge must be measured? By what is the way of going forward in a reasoned-out knowledge to be measured?
The way of going forward in a reasoned-out knowledge should be measured by three things: by the matter of that reasoned-out knowledge, by its end, and by how our reason is towards knowing that matter for that end.
If the student seeks more certitude than the matter admits (for example, the certitude of geometry in human affairs) or is satisfied with less certitude than the matter admits (for example, with rhetorical suspicions in mathematics), then his way of going forward is not measured by the matter at hand:
It is necessary to remember the things said before and not to seek certitude in the same way in all, but in each according to the subject matter and as far as how much is proper to the inquiry.[37]
Words of Aristotle like those I have just underlined are clearly borrowed from quantity as is the word measure. Thomas even uses the word equal in expounding the words of Boethius making the thought of Aristotle his own:
Et quod modus congruus est in inquisitione qualibet observandus, probat inducendo auctoritatem Philosophi in I Ethic. cum dicit: Nam sicut optime dictum videtur, ab Aristotele in principio Ethic., eruditi hominis est unumquodque ut ipsum est, idest per modum congruum ipsius rei, ita de eo fidem capere tentare. Non enim omnibus potest aequalis certitudo et evidentia demonstrationis servari.[38]
Something can also be too much (or too little) in comparison to the end or when measured by the end. Hence, Aristotle adds, immediately after the words quoted above about being measured by the matter, the following:
And the carpenter and geometer seek differently the straight: the former, to the extent it is useful to his work but the latter, what it is or what sort it is - for he looks at truth. It ought to be done in the same way in others so that many things besides the point do not come to be.[39]
Again, we see the use of words whose first meaning is found in reference to quantity. Thomas Aquinas, in commenting on Boethius' De Trinitate, says that the way of proceeding or going forward ought to fit both things and us:
et hoc modo convenienti: unde subdit: Et unumquodque dicendorum discutiamus, ut possit intelligi atque capi, idest per modum quo possit intelligi et capi.
Et dicit haec duo, quia modus quo aliqua discutiuntur, debet congruere et rebus et nobis. Nisi enim rebus congrueret, intelligi non possent; nisi congrueret nobis, nos capere non possemus. [40]
Thomas also use the word modus when talking about logic: "logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis."[41] Likewise, in discussing that basic road from the known to the unknown, he uses the word modus:
iste est naturalis modus sive ordo addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis.[42]
We cannot here investigate by what the common way of going forward in reasoned-out knowledge is measured or by what the natural mode or order of learning is measured. But we can bring these words under a more general beginning.
Every way of going forward of reason should be both ordered and measured. When we speak of the road reason should follow, we are especially thinking of the order in which it should proceed. But when we use the word modus, we are especially thinking that reason's way of proceeding should be measured. Thus reason's way of going forward can be brought under the general beginning that every action should be ordered and measured:
Privatio autem ordinis aut commensurationis debitae in actione, est malum actionis. Et quia cuilibet actioni est debitus aliquis ordo et aliquis commensuratio, necesse est ut talis privatio in actione simpliciter malum existat.[43]
We can see in countless other actions which are more known to us that the act of reason, that they should be both ordered and measured; e.g., parents tell their children to eat the candy after dinner and not to eat too much. Hence, one should not be surprised that the act of reason also requires order and measure. Indeed, order and measure seem to have a special connection with reason.
We can now return to the enumeration of roads reason must follow when its purpose is to know, an enumeration made by the Greek philosophers Empedocles, Plato and Aristotle. How should these roads be divided? And what is their order?
The division would seem to be this: the road is made by nature or by reason. More precisely, there is the road made by nature and the roads made by reason. Further, one can subdivide road made by reason into the common road of reasoned-out knowledge (studied in logic) and the roads private to particular forms of reasoned-out knowledge (studied at the beginning of each science or reasoned-out knowledge.)
We should consider the division before the subdivision. The road from the senses into reason cannot be a road made by reason since reason itself depends on this road to function. Since it is the nature of reason to depend upon the senses and to be able to know before it actually knows, and reason cannot be responsible for its own nature (it would then have to be before itself), clearly a road based on the nature of reason must be by nature rather than by reason. Hence, Aristotle, in deepening our knowledge of such a road in the beginning of his Natural Hearing (usually incompletely and confusingly translated as the Physics), says that it is inborn or natural:
But the road from the more known and more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature is inborn.[44]
The Greek word translated here by is inborn is péfuke which has the same root as the Greek word for nature (φύσις). Moerbeke translates it innata est.
But the roads of science or reasoned-out knowledge are made by reason since reasoned-out knowledge is itself an effect of reason. Reasoned-out knowledge is a result of thinking out (by reason) definitions, divisions and arguments. Definitions, divisions and arguments are not inborn, but are made by reason. Hence, Thomas says that science or reasoned-out knowledge is a work of reason, not of nature, in his commentary on the De Caelo et Mundo of Aristotle:
processus scientiarum est opus rationis[45]
We may now proceed to the subdivision of the roads made by reason. The distinction between the common road of reasoned-out knowledge and the private roads seems to be due to every reasoned-out knowledge being a work of reason and each reasoned-out knowledge having its own matter or subject. Reason then is common to all reasoned-out knowledge, and logic (which is about the acts of reason) will thus study a road which is common to all reasoned-out knowledge. But since reason proceeds or goes forward in a different matter in each reasoned-out knowledge, its way of going forward in each reasoned-out knowledge must vary according to the matter being investigated.
We can see how this is like an earlier meaning of proceeding or going forward. A man can walk uphill and downhill, on level ground or on rocky ground, on dry surface and on ice. What is common to all of these is the act of walking. Yet he walks differently in each case. He walks because he has legs. but he walks slowly or fast and so on, not because he has legs, but because of the ground on which he is walking. Likewise, in every reasoned-out knowledge, man defines and divides and makes statements and arguments because he uses his reason. But he defines and reasons with ease or difficulty, with more or less precision and certitude and so on because of the matter in which he is reasoning and defining.
The unity of the road made by nature and the multiplicity of the roads made by reason reflect that fundamental difference between nature which is limited to one and reason which is open even to opposites.
We must next consider the order of these roads. But since order presupposes distinction, we must first understand better in what way reason is distinguished against nature. They differ as causes in that reason is able to reason to opposite conclusions while nature is determined or limited to one of two opposites. But this difference does not divide reason absolutely against nature unless we understand nature with the exclusion of any ability for opposites. But if we understand nature without making that exclusion, then reason includes nature. What we have said is in need of some likeness in order to be grasped (as to its meaning) and of arguments in order to be judged (as to its truth or falsity).
Reason is distinguished against nature as man is divided against animal or three against two. Man is not divided against animal absolutely, but includes animal - for man is an animal. Man is divided against what is only an animal; that is, against animal understood to be without reason. Likewise, three is not divided against two in the absolute sense that three in no way contains two. Rather, three is divided against what is only two or no more than two. Likewise, we are saying that reason is not divided against nature in the absolute sense as if reason is in every way cut off from nature or that reason in no way includes what belongs to nature. Rather we are saying that reason is divided against the nature that is only nature, the nature that is no more than nature Now it is not difficult to see that three contains two in some way or even that man includes animal in some way, but it is more difficult to see that reason contains nature in some way. Next then we must give some reasons why reason includes nature in some way and some signs that it does.
Before taking up these reasons and signs, we should recall that the word nature is said in many ways. (See Book Five of Aristotle's Metaphysics). Here we understand it in the broad sense of what a thing is. And since a substance (such as a man or a dog) is a thing in the first and fullest sense, and an accident which exists in a substance as a subject (such as the shape or knowledge of a man) is a thing only in a secondary and imperfect sense; nature, in the sense of what a thing is, will be found most fully in substance, but also in accidents in a lesser way.
The reasons then why nature is included in reason are two-fold: reason is founded in the nature of man and especially his soul (Hence, Thomas talks about the modus animae in cognoscendo) and reason itself is a nature in the sense in which an accident can be a nature. Both of these reasons need to be unfolded.
Reason is founded in the nature of man. It is not a predicable accident of man, but a property of man, something that flows from his nature or follows upon it. But something of a thing's origin is always found in it; and this must especially be true when it is not separated from its origin, but exists in it and is incapable of existing apart from it. Hence, something of the nature of man and of his soul especially will be found in reason. Indeed, it is not so much reason that understands, but man who understands through or by his reason. Hence, because man is an animal and his soul is in a body, his reason is naturally turned towards sensible and bodily things so that he understands nothing but these things and what can be understood through them.
Reason itself is also a kind of nature or one kind of thing. It is one natural ability of man, distinct from each of his other natural abilities. Reason is not responsible for its own nature as an ability, that it is able to know before it actually knows. Hence, that reason must go from ability to act when it tries to know things, is determined by its own nature or the kind of ability it is.
Two things can be noted here: reason does know some things naturally, and the will, which follows reason, naturally wills some things. Both of these signs should now be unfolded.
That reason knows some things naturally without reasoning them out can be seen in those common beginnings (such as the whole is larger than one of its parts) which men agree about without needing proof. If men did not come naturally to understand some things without reasoning, they would have nothing to reason from or nothing with which to begin their reasoning.
Moreover, experience points out that when men begin to reason, they will often come to opposite conclusions or to conclusions unknown by other men. In either case, it can be seen that reasoning leads to something that is not common to all men. Hence, the existence of principles or beginnings common to all men is a sign that some things are known naturally by men rather than by reasoning.
The knowledge which reason has before reasoning is sometimes called the habit of principles or beginnings and distinguished from reasoned-out knowledge or the habit of conclusions which is a result of reasoning. We have noted before that science in the sense of reasoned-out knowledge) is a work of reason, an opus rationis. But the habit of beginnings is a work of nature, an opus naturae. The habit of principles or beginnings might be called natural understanding and distinguished from the reasoned-out understanding or knowledge. Since nothing comes to be out of nothing, reasoned-out knowledge and thought-out knowledge must come to be eventually out of some knowledge that is had naturally (or comes to be in us naturally) rather than as a result of reason trying to think and reason out things.
That we will something naturally is seen both in our common desire for happiness (and turning away from wretchedness) and in our willing things only under the appearance of the good. Since the will follows upon some knowledge of reason, it seems that reason must know something naturally in order for the will to want something naturally.
We can begin to see from the above, not only in what way reason is distinguished from nature, but also that nature is before reason. What is first in anything is its nature since, without its nature, a thing wouldn't even exist. Hence, what is natural in a thing is before everything else in it. Therefore, the natural road in our knowledge must be before the roads made by reason in our knowledge. Thus, we may call the natural road in our knowledge, the first road in our knowledge.
We can also say that the roads made by reason are built upon the road made by nature; just as reason is built upon nature. Further, we can see that the road made by nature enters into the roads made by reason, just as nature enters into reason. The natural road is from the senses into reason. Plato represents well in his dialogues how the road to definition made by reason is built upon this road, both when the character asked what something is, gives examples rather than a definition and when Socrates tells him that he must find what these examples have in common.[46] The road from the senses into reason is the foundation of, and enters into, our common practice of giving examples before a definition or of trying to find a definition by finding the likeness (and differences) of the examples. Thus the natural and first road in our knowledge may also be called the fundamental or basic road in our knowledge.
Further, there is reason to think that the roads made by reason are acquired through the road made by nature. For we acquire what is not natural through what is natural, as we acquire artificial things through our natural hands and the habit of conclusions through the natural habit of beginnings. Hence, it is reasonable to think that the roads made by reason are acquired through the road made by nature. What belongs to a thing through itself is a cause (whether active or passive) of what does not belong to it through itself. But it is the natural which belongs to a thing through itself. Therefore,we acquire what is not natural through what is natural.
As the road made by nature enters into our understanding of the roads made by reason, so also the common road of reasoned-out knowledge enters into our understanding of the private road of each reasoned-out knowledge. Before investigating the way of demonstrating in a given reasoned-out knowledge, it would seem necessary to understand what is demonstration and that science or reasoned-out knowledge is an effect of demonstration. Thus, Thomas in commenting on Aristotle's determination of the private road of ethics makes reference to the art of demonstrative science (considered in the Posterior Analytics):
materia moralis est varia et difformis, non habens omnimodam certitudinem. Et quia secundum artem demonstrativae scientiae, oportet principia esse conformia conclusionibus, amabile est et optabile, de talibus, idest tam variabilibus, tractatum facientes, et ex similibus procedentes ostendere veritatem.[47]
Following thus in the footsteps of the Greek philosophers (and their great commentators), we have come to three roads that reason must follow when its purpose is to know, the divisions and subdivision of these roads, and their order. Since road means order, and nature and reason are the causes of order in us, it can be seen why the division and order of these roads is based on the distinction and order of nature and reason.
DUANE H. BERQUIST
----------------------- [1]Heraclitus, DK 47. Translations are the author's. [2]Parmenides, DK 2 [3]Parmenides DK 6 [4]Parmenides DK 7 & 8 [5]Heraclitus, DK 71 [6]Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1094a 32-33 [7]Heraclitus, DK 55 [8]Heraclitus, DK 73 [9]Empedocles, DK 133 [10]Democritus, DK 125 [11]Empedocles, DK 24 [12]Empedocles, DK 3 [13]Timaeus, 27D-28A [14]Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1094b 19-23 [15]Parmenides, DK 8 [16]Metaphysics, Book II, Chap. 3, 995a 14-20 [17]Timaeus, 53 C [18]Metaphysics, Book II, Chap. 3, 994b 32 - 995a 14
[19]Sophist, 218 C-D [20]Statesman, 265 A [21]Statesman, 266 D-E [22]Phaedo, 90 B [23]Phaedo, 90 D [24]Rhetoric, Book I, 1354a 8 [25]Topics, Book I, 100a 18-20 [26]Prior Analytics, Book I, 43a 20-22 [27]Republic, 521 C [28]Empedocles, DK 110 [29]Empedocles, DK 105 [30]Physics, Book I, Chapter I, 184a 16-21 [31]Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1095a 30 - 1095b 6 [32]Metaphysics, Book VII, 1029b 1-12 [33]Republic, Book VII, 514A-517A [34]Metaphysics, Book II, Ch. 1, 993b 9-11 [35]Metaphysics, Book II, Ch. 3, 995a 12-17 [36]Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, c [37]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1098a 26-29 [38]In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, Expositio, n. 4, Marietti ed. [39]Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1098a 26-29 [40]In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, Expositio, n. 3, Marietti ed. [41]In II Metaphysicorum, Lectio V, n. 335, Marietti ed. [42]In I Physicorum, Lectio I, n. 7. Marietti ed. [43]Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles,. Bk. III, Caput 6 [44]Physics, Book I, Chapter I, 184a 16-18 [45]Proemium, n. 1, Marietti ed. [46]See, for example. Euthyphro 5D-6, Meno 71E-72C, Theaetetus, 146C-147D [47]In I Ethicorum, Lectio III, n. 35