Role of Proportion in Development of Our Knowledge

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Role of Proportion in Development of Our Knowledge

Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 1

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ROLE OF PROPORTION IN DEVELOPMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

IN PHILOSOPHY

Aristotle, Places, Book I, Chapters 17-18, The Fourth Tool of Dialectic:

One should consider the likeness of things in other genera; as this is to that, so something other is to another; for example, as knowledge is to the knowable, so sensation is to the sensible; and as this is in that, so something other is in another; for example, as sight is in the eye, so understanding is in the soul; and as calmness is in the sea, so stillness is in the air.

One ought to be exercised especially in those far apart, for we will be able to see with ease the likeness in other cases.

One should also consider things which are in the same genus, to see if something the same belongs to all; for example, to man and horse and dog. For to the extent that the same belongs to these, they will be in that way alike...

The consideration of the like is useful for inductive arguments and for hypothetical syllogisms and for the rendering of definitions.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book II, Chapter 13, Proportion among ways of investigating why:

Further, another way is to select by proportion. For it is not possible to take something one which pounce and spine and bone ought to be called. But something will follow these, just as if they were one nature.

Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Posterior Analytics, Book II, Lectio XVII, n. 563:

Then...he shows how to investigate the reason why, by reducing to something common by analogy; and he says that another way of investigating the reason why is to select something common by analogy; that is, by proportion. For it is possible to take something proportionally one which is not the same in species or genus, as the pounce of the cuttlefish and the spine of fish and the bones of land animals. For all these agree by proportion because spines are to fish in the same way as bones to land animals. And some things follow this analogous community because of the unity of proportion, just as if they had one common nature of genus or species, as to be covered with flesh.

IN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE

Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 95-97:

The physicist who seeks to unite and classify in an abstract theory the laws of a certain category of phenomena, lets himself be guided often by the analogy that he sees between these phenomena and those of another category. If the latter are already ordered and organized in a satisfactory theory, the physicist will try to group the former in a system of the same type and form. The history of physics shows us that the search for analogies between two distinct categories of phenomena has perhaps been the surest and most fruitful method of all the procedures put in play in the construction of physical theories.

Thus, it is the analogy seen between the phenomena produced by light and those constituting sound which furnished the notion of light wave from which Huygens drew such a wonderful result. It is this same analogy which later led Malebranche and then Young to represent monochromatic light by a formula similar to the one representing a simple sound. A similar insight concerning the propagation of heat and that of electricity within conductors permitted Ohm to transport all in one piece the equations Fourier had written for the former to the second category of phenomena. The history of theories of magnetism and dielectric polarization is simply the development of analogies seen for a long time by physicists between magnets and bodies which insulate electricity. Thanks to this analogy each of the two theories benefits from the progress of the other.

The use of physical analogy often takes a more precise form. Two categories of very distinct and very dissimilar phenomena having been reduced by abstract theories, it may happen that the equations in which one of the theories is formulated are algebraically identical to the equations expressing the other. Then, although these two theories are essentially heterogeneous by the nature of the laws which they coordinate, algebra establishes an exact correspondence between them. Every proposition of one of the theories has its homologue in the other; every problem solved in the first poses and resolves a similar problem in the second....this sort of algebraic correspondence between two theories...is an infinitely valuable thing: not only does it bring a notable intellectual economy since it permits one to transfer immediately to one of the theories all the algebraic apparatus constructed for the other, but it also constitutes a method of discovery. It may happen, in fact, that in one of these two domains which the same algebraic scheme covers, experimental intuition quite naturally poses a problem and suggests a solution for it, while in the other domain the physicist might not be so easily led to formulating the question or to giving it this response.

(“Use of mechanical models” helpful in discovery, p. 99C)

Albert Einstein, The Evolution of Physics, Simon and Shuster, N.Y., pp. 270-273:

It has often happened in physics that an essential advance was achieved by carrying out a consistent analogy between apparently unrelated phenomena. In these pages we have often seen how ideas created and developed in one branch of science were afterwards successfully applied to another. The development of the mechanical and field views gives many examples of this kind. The association of solved problems with those unsolved may throw new light on our difficulties by suggesting new ideas. It is easy to find a superficial analogy which really expresses nothing. But to discover some essential common features, hidden beneath a surface of external differences, to form, on this basis, a new successful theory, is important creative work. The development of the so-called wave mechanics, begun by de Broglie and Schrodinger...is a typical example of the achievement of a successful theory by means of a deep and fortunate analogy.

IN THEOLOGY

The Gospel according to St. Matthew, Chapter 22, vv. 15-22:

Then the Pharisees went and took counsel how they might trap him in his talk. And they sent to him their disciples with the Herodians, saying "Master, we know that thou art truthful, and that thou teachest the way of God in truth, and that thou carest naught for any man; for thou dost not regard the person of men. Tell us, therefore, what dost thou think: Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar or not?"

But Jesus, knowing their wickedness, said, "Why do you test me, you hypocrites? Show me the coin of the tribute."

So they offered him a denarius.

Then Jesus said to them, "Whose image is this and the inscription?"

They said to him, "Caesar's"

Then he said to them, "Render therefore, to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's."

And hearing this, they marveled.

Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, Q. 2, Art. 11, c., Ad 2 & Ad 4:

The name science is said of the science of God and ours, neither entirely univocally, nor purely equivocally, but by analogy, which is to say nothing other than by proportion.

But agreement by proportion can be in two ways, And according to this, there are two kinds of community by analogy.

There is one kind of agreement between those things of which there is a proportion to each other in that they have a determined distance or relation to each other; as two with one, in that it is double of it.

But sometimes there is also noted agreement of two things to each other, between which there is not a proportion, but more a likeness of two proportions to each other; as six agrees with four in this, that as six is double of three, so four is double of two.

The first agreement, therefore, is of proportion while the second is of proportionality.

Whence also by way of the first agreement, we find something said analogously of two things of which one has an order to the other; as being is said of substance and accident from the order which substance and accident have; and healthy is said of urine and animal because of this that urine has some relation to the health of the animal.

Sometimes something is said analogously in the second way of agreement; as the name sight is said of bodily sight and understanding, in that, as sight is in the eye, so understanding is in the mind.

Since, therefore, in those things which are said by the first way of analogy, it is necessary that there be some determined relation between those things for which there is something common by analogy; it is impossible for something to be said of God and the creature by this way of analogy. for no creature has such a relation to God that by it the divine perfection can be determined.

But in the other way of analogy, no determined relation is to be noted between those things for which there is something common by analogy. and, therefore, nothing prevents some name being said analogously of God and creatures in that way.

But this can happen, however, in two ways. for sometimes that name implies, in its main signification, something in which there cannot be noted an agreement between God and the creature even in the foresaid way; as in all things which are said metaphorically of God, as when he is called a lion or the sun or something of this kind - because matter falls in their definition, which cannot be attributed to God. Sometimes the name which is said of God and the creature implies nothing in its principal signification by which there cannot be noted the foresaid agreement between the creature and God; as in all things in whose definition defect is not contained, as being, good, and others of this kind.

Ad 2: The Philosopher lays down two ways of likeness in the second book of the Places.

One is found in diverse genera; and this is according to proportion or proportionality, as when one thing has itself to the other, as another to another, as he himself says in the same place.

In another way, it is found in those things which are of the same genus, as when the same is in diverse things.

Likeness which is said in the first way does not require a comparison according to a determined relation, but only that in the second way.

Whence it is not necessary that the first way of likeness be removed from God with respect to the creature.

Ad 4: Likeness which is according to this, that some two things partake of something one, or from this, that one has a determined relation to the other, by which one can be comprehended from the other by the understanding diminishes distance; not, however, the likeness which is by agreement of proportions. For such a likeness is found in those distant much or a little; there is not a greater likeness of proportionality between two & one and six & three, than between two & one and a hundred & fifty.

And therefore the infinite distance of the creature to God does not take away the foresaid likeness.