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Role of the Will and Feelings in the Philosophical Life
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ROLE OF THE WILL AND FEELINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE
Our purpose is to understand the role of the will and feelings in the philosophical life and how we may acquire the dispositions of will and feelings that are good for the philosophical life and avoid those that are bad for it.
Before trying to understand the role of the will and feelings in the philosophical life, one must understand the division of the powers of the soul, how these powers move each other, the divisions of the appetitive or desiring powers in particular, and the division and order of the acts of the sensitive appetite (and by proportion of the intellectual appetite). The first three can be found in the Prima Pars and the fourth in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae. Then, one must understand the object(s) of the appetite in the philosophical life: wisdom, truth, cause, order, teacher, etc. Finally, a careful reading of the Platonic dialogues will enable one to be led by the hand to an understanding of the role of the will and feelings in the philosophical life.
Both the name and the origin of philosophy would seem to indicate that there are certain dispositions of will required for philosophy. The name is not only derived form a disposition of the will, the love of wisdom, but it also suggests that a philosopher is so named more from the love of wisdom than from the actual possession of wisdom. Likewise, the origin of philosophy points to the same need. Both Plato and Aristotle, coming at the end of the Golden Age of Greek Philosophy, state that men began to philosophize out of wonder. The reason for this is that the application of the reason depends upon the will.
OUTLINE: DISPOSITIONS OF WILL & FEELINGS NECESSARY FOR PHILOSOPHY
REMOTE DISPOSITIONS OR ACTS
1. love of beauty in the products of the imitative art
acquired by music, painting and fiction that represent men better than ourselves
2. wonder of philomuthos - object of this wonder appeals to imagination and particular reason
acquired especially by epic and tragedy rather than comedy or fiction that represents men as they are
See Metaphysics, Book I on philosopher and philomuthos; also Poetics.
PROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS OR ACTS
Dispositions necessary whether by oneself or with others
1. love of wisdom or of truth (in will)
2. Wonder of philosopher (in will)
3. Tranquility of feelings (in sense appetite)
4. Joy over truth (in will)
Dispositions necessary in particular towards investigating with or learning from others.
1. Friendship - useful, pleasant, and noble (in will)
2. pia affectio (in will) connected with belief
3. docility (in will) connected with belief
4. mildness (tranquility of anger)
There may be other fundamental acts besides the above.
The above list does not attempt to enumerate the moral virtues necessary for the goodness of the above acts.
Dionne okayed the division into remote and proximate, and the first division of proximate.
LOVE OF TRUTH OR WISDOM
The kind of love of truth (or wisdom) which the philosopher must have. (The love of truth and the love of wisdom would seem to be almost the same because the knowledge of truth belongs most of all to wisdom - See Metaphysics, Bk. II)
1. for its own sake - not for money, honor or anything else as the sophist does
If one loves this for the sake of that, he should be called a lover of that. If a man loves a woman for her money, he should be called a lover of money, not of the woman. If one loves truth or wisdom for the sake of glory or money or power, one should be called a lover of glory or of money or of power, but not of wisdom.
Nobility of object should be loved more than certitude; more knowable by its nature should be loved more than the more known to us (See On The Soul, Bk. I, Ch. 1; Parts of animals, Bk. I, Ch. 5; Physics, Bk. I, Ch. 1)
All the lower forms of reasoned-out knowledge should be loved for the sake of wisdom. Whoever does not do so has a perverted attitude towards knowledge unless he be forced to it by necessity. (St. Albert)
2. more than anything else that is desired for its own sake.
If one loves music and wisdom for their own sake, but music more than wisdom. one is best described as a lover of music.
3. as the end or purpose of one's life
If one loves truth or wisdom for its own sake and more than anything else so loved, wisdom seems to be the very purpose of one's life.
4. as a common good - not a private good
WONDER
Object of wonder
The object of wonder is the strange (unfamiliar), rare, or unexpected (contrary to expectation)
Two senses of strange (1) opposite of familiar, (2) opposite of familiar and contrary to expectation.
The familiar is known, the strange is unknown (Metaphysics II, Ch. 3)
What is contrary to the expected seems even more unknown on account of the contradiction. "If you do not expect the unexpected, you will never find it." (Heraclitus) Aristotle's example of the incommensurable in geometry (Metaphysics, Bk. I, Proemium)
The rare is opposed to what happens always or for the most part. The rare happens by luck or by chance.
The rare and the strange need not be the same. Things that obey laws, but which are remote from our daily experience may seem strange to us.
There is wonder that the strange, rare or unexpected should be, even when we are convinced that they are.
The object of wonder is the unknown cause of an effect known to us.
This is wonder about the what or the why; this is wonder that leads us to ask, "what is it?" or "Why is it so?" - both of which are answered by knowing the cause. (Posterior Analytics, Book II)
"Twinkle, twinkle, little star How I wonder what you are."
These two objects are connected
The unexpected (contrary to expectation) especially leads us to ask why.
When we hear a strange sound, we ask "What was that?" or "What made that sound?"
The rare especially arouses our wonder when it seems to have some deep or hidden meaning or cause behind it (as Aristotle observes in the Poetics)
Wonder (at least, that of the philosopher) is in the rational appetite, and order is an object which distinguishes reason from the senses. The order In things is the first object of the desire in wonder which seeks to know the cause of that order. But the order in our knowledge, the roads, is also an object of wonder, an object of the hope in wonder, but mainly of the fear in wonder. Without order, the mind despairs; and taking things out of order is a sign of boldness or lack of fear. The "orderly, easily and without error" of Thomas' Proemium to Logic (In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio 1) connects order in our knowledge with overcoming difficulty in knowing and avoiding error. Difficulty and possibility of error are more object of hope and fear which are proportional in the will to the irascible appetite. We have here an example of the connection of the appetite and of wonder in particular with the roads in human knowledge.
Order is an object of wonder for the experimental scientist even if he doesn't know the cause.
ORDER OF SOME KINDS OF WONDER
1. Wonder about singular actions or persons
Wonder about the sensed as singular.
Historian's wonder about the rise and fall of nations etc. is more elevated than the wonder of daily life.
Wonder of philomuthos
Poetry "dat modum admirandi." (St Albert In Com. On Metaphysics)
Stepping-stone to wonder of philosopher. Closer to philosophy (which is about the universal) than history. Wonder about the universal singularized. The chorus says "O you generations of men" after the fall of Oedipus.
Philosophy is about things which happen always or for the most part while the philomuthos often wonders about something that happens rarely or by chance. However, when chance events seem to be foreseen or to have a hidden cause or meaning or purpose, they especially arouse wonder (The Iliad, Oedipus Rex etc.)
Wonder of philomuthos has an object more in imagination and particular reason. In this way, it is a mean and stepping-stone between the wonder of daily life and the wonder of philosopher (wonder of historian is something of a mean between wonder of daily life and wonder of philomuthos).
3. Wonder of philosopher
A philosopher is a man primarily motivated by wonder, by wonder about what things are (this is something universal) and why they are the way they are (this is about what is so always or for the most part true). Such wonder is satisfied only by knowing the cause.
The wonder of the philosopher is about an object of the universal reason. This is a reason why the wonder of the philosopher comes after (in time) the wonder of the philomuthos and that of daily life. Again, the things that happen always or for the most part, especially when they a matter of common experience, would not seem strange, rare or unexpected.
There is an order in the philosopher's wonder from geometry and natural philosophy to metaphysics.
PARTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL WONDER
Wonder involves desire, hope and fear - See Augustine's dialogues at Cassiciacum
The man who wonders seeks knowledge he does not yet possess. Knowledge is a good, and a good not possessed is the object of desire. Hence, wonder diminishes or ceases when we come to know. There is in every man a natural desire to know. This is shown by the delight we take in our senses apart from their practical use. This natural desire is developed by the imitative arts - by painting, music, and especially tragedy and epic. It is further developed in our reasoned-out knowledge: geometry, the reasoned-out knowledge of number and natural philosophy. But its furthest development should be found in the philosopher since he is a lover of wisdom and wisdom is the end of all knowledge. Thus our desire for wisdom is only a development of our natural desire to now. Or our natural desire to know is an undeveloped or unformed or indeterminate desire for wisdom. Thus the desire for wisdom is not vain for it is possible to satisfy a natural desire, as we see in hunger and thirst. Nature does not give us a desire for the impossible. One does not, however, always succeed in satisfying his natural desires. People die of hunger and thirst. There are desires that lead to hope and others that end in despair.
But wisdom is not a only a good, perhaps our greatest good, but a good which is very difficult to achieve. The difficulty of truth for man is considered in the second book of the Metaphysics (Chapter 1). Difficult is in the encircling of wisdom in the Proemium of Book One of the same. The difficulty of this or that truth is touched upon in particular proemia. Hence, the desire for wisdom is not enough for man in the pursuit of it. If a man is unwilling to make the effort necessary to overcome the difficulties that stand in the way of achieving wisdom, or if he despairs of overcoming these obstacles (things that stand in the way), he will not pursue or achieve wisdom. (See Gorgias' or Bias' comparison of those who give up philosophy to the suitors of Penelope who desired Penelope, but slept with her maids.) The philosopher must have a moderate hope of overcoming the difficulties that block the way to wisdom, Despair would make him give up while an excessive hope would make him underestimate the difficulties and proceed carelessly. The skeptic has despair, while the presumptuous have excessive hope, a foolish boldness.
But desire and hope are not enough on the part of the will. They will make a man pursue or search for wisdom and continue to do so, but they will not dispose him to do so well. A moderate fear of being mistaken or of making a mistake is also necessary. For to be mistaken is the usual state of men, as is shown by their disagreement. This moderate fear makes one proceed slowly, step by step. ("Wisely and slow: they stumble who run fast") This fear disposes one for a careful investigation of the roads in human knowledge and strengthens the love of order in our knowledge. (See St. Augustine's De Ordine ) This fear disposes one more for judgment than does hope. (Does hope dispose more for discovery or finding the truth, but fear for judgment?) In the practical order, we find that reasonable fear makes men take counsel and counsel is proportional to dialectic or investigation in the theoretical order. Excessive fear , however, would lead men to abandon investigation; it would stupefy them, And confidence would lead the mind into all kinds of error.
The desire in wonder is more natural than the hope and fear in wonder. Those who have excessive hope are often lacking fear; they are too confident (for example, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel). Those who have excessive fear may despair and become skeptics, positivists and such like. The latter will lose their desire more than the former. Pusillanimous thinkers come to have a weak desire to know. It is necessary to find a balance of hope and fear, as Socrates teaches us in the Phaedo.
TEXTS OF THOMAS AND ARISTOTLE ON WONDER
Object of wonder
Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars, Q. 15, Art 8, c.:
admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito
Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 105, Art. 7, c:
nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem consurgit, cum effectus sunt manfesti et causa occulta; sicut aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys....Miraculum autem dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam.
Parts of wonder
Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 11, 1371A:
en μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 32, Art. 8, c.:
Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam; vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat...
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 32, Art. 8, Ad 1:
admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet ignorantiam: sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam; et inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem non aestimabat.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 41, Art. 4, c.:
Malum autem quod in exteriorbus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis: cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio - Secundo ratione dissuetudinis: quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationis offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 41, Art. 4, Ad 4:
...non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de malo insolito..
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 41, Art. 4, Ad 5:
admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est philosophicae considerationis impedimentum.
Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 180, Art. 3, Ad 3:
...admiratio est specis timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis nostram facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis.
[This is the wonder of Aristotle about God in Metaphysics XII. This is not the wonder that is the beginning of philosophy, which disappears in the end. Philosphy thus begins in one kind of wonder and ends in another or is followed by another when it has reached the end.]
In II De Caelo et Mundo, Lectio XVII, n. 450:
Cum circa stellas sint duae dubitationes de quibus rationabiliter quilibet potest dubitare, tentare debemus circa istas dubitationes id quod nobis videtur; ita scilicet quod nos reputemus dignum esse quod promptitudo hominis considerantis huiusmodi quaestiones, magis debeat imputari verecundiae, idest honestati vel modestiae, quam audaciae, idest praesumptioni; si tamen ille, qui huiusmodi dubitationes considerat, diligat etiam parvas sufficientas, idest parum sufficientes rationes, ad inveniendum de illis rebus, de quibus habemus maximas dubitationes; et hoc propter desiderium quod quis habet ad philosophiam, ut scilicet eius principia stent, idest firma permaneant.
Order of wonder
In I Metaphysicorum, Lectio III, n. 66:
...Initiata est autem inquisitio huius scientiae ab admiratione de omnibus: quia primi admirabuntur pauciora, posteriores vero occultiora. quae quidem admiratio erat, si res ita se haberet sicut automata mirabilia, idest quae videntur mirabiliter a casu accidere. Automata enim dicuntur quasi per se accidentia. Admirantur enim homines praecipue quando aliqua a casu eveniunt hoc modo, ac si essent praevisa vel ex aliqua causa determinata, et admiratio est propter ignorantiam causae. Et ideo cum homines nondum poterant speculari causas rerum, admirabuntur omnia quasi quaedam casualia.
TRANQUILLITY OF FEELINGS
In VII Physicorum, Chapter 3, Lectio VI, nn. 925-927:
In quietari enim et residere anima sciens fit et prudens
1. acquired by moral virtues that rectify feelings, especially moderation
2, acquired by music that represnts the emotions in a better state than our own (the music especially of Mozart and the Baroque)
3. acquired by catharsis from noble fiction
GAUDIUM DE VERITATE
HUMAN BELIEF
What is human belief?
Human belief is the willing assent of reason to a statement on the authority of another man.
The object of belief is the statement in one way and the man on whose authority one believes it in another way. Perhaps the man is the reason why we believe the statement.
Is human belief a habit or only a disposition in the reason?
What in the will moves the reason to believe?
What is pia affectio?
Is pia affectio an act of the will moving reason to believe?
Is pia affectio an amor concupsicentiae?
What is timor reverentiae?
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 7, Art. 1, Ad 1:
supposita fide de aliquibus articulis fidei, puta de excellentia divina, sequitur timor reverentiae, ex quo sequitur ulterius ut homo intellectum suum subjiciat ad credendum omnia quae sunt promissa a Deo.
What is docilitas?
Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 49, Art 4, c:
...docilitas ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habet in acquirendo rectam opinionem ab alio.
Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 49, Art 3, Ad 2:
docilitas...secundum aptitudinem quidem est a natura: sed ad eius consummationem plurimum valet humanum studium, dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et reverenter applicat animum suum documenis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec contemnens propter superbiam.
Is docility an act or disposition or habit?
Does docility come before or after belief?
Do pia affectio, timor reverentiae and docility differ? How are they ordered around belief?
NECESSITY OF HUMAN BELIEF IN PHILOSOPHY
Why some thinkers reject the necessity of human belief in philosophy?
Based on misunderstanding of the kind of belief that is being defended or on defects in some belief.
Belief is opposed to knowledge, an alternative to knowledge; belief is the goal rather than a means
Belief is opposed to wonder and discovery
Belief is a blind acceptance (blind belief)
Belief is fruitless, barren (fruitless belief)
The man who believes is attached to a person more than to the truth.
Based on misunderstanding of the kind of necessity meant here
Based on fallibility of human belief - human belief is fallible.
Based on the disagreement of the famous, ignorance of any criterion for deciding whom to believe, inability to find someone especially worthy of belief
Based on democratic intellectual customs (See de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II) and the belief that there is no one especially worthy of belief
Based on defects of appetite, will and feelings, in those who refuse to believe, such as pride, envy, and anger.
Based on this argument:
If one found a good teacher, he would not have to believe any statements of this teacher. For a good teacher would proceed in order. This order is defined by Descartes as follows (Reply to second set of Objections to his Meditations on First Philosophy, Dover, ed. Vol. II, p. 48):
...order consists merely in putting forward those things first that should be known without the aid of what comes subsequently, an arranging all other matters so that their proof depends solely on what precedes them.
If the teacher follows this order, the students never have to take any statement on faith.
The necessity of human belief in the practical order (for the sake of making or doing) should be considered before and as a manuductio for the need of human belief in the theoretical order (which is for the sake of knowing). Even Descartes did not call for a rejection of belief in the practical order. Human belief should be considered as a means to an end, and its necessity is thus of the kind for achieving an end.
The necessity of belief in philosophy should be investigated in the following way. There are two ways of coming to know that which is unknown to us: the first is to discover it by one self, and the second is by learning it from another. Discovery comes first in time and is more honorable than learning and discovery could be without learning, but not vice-versa. And the man who discovers something often understands it better than those who learn it. Nevertheless, the road of the learner is not essentially different from the road of discovery. Teaching and learning should imitate discovery. Why then is learning necessary besides discovery? Because what a man can discover by himself is very small or little in comparison to what he can learn from others. Moreover, the sciences and arts could not be developed if every man started from scratch and no man could build upon the work of another he had learned from. Moreover, we would make many mistakes or remain within them without good teachers.
After we have seen the necessity of learning, we can proceed to see the necessity of belief or of reasonable belief. the learner must learn from someone. but from whom? He cannot listen to or read everyone. And he can give his full and undivided and repeated attention (all of which are necessary to learn much) to very few. Chance encounters through the spoken or the written word play an enormous role here. The choice of whom we shall try to learn from cannot be based on knowledge (at least not in the full sense). We would have to have listened to and read everyone in order to make a choice based on knowledge, and even this would not be enough Nevertheless, our belief that one man will be a better teacher than another can be more or less reasonable.
The first criterion is the fame or position of the man. Fame is as stronger argument in the case of a man whose fame has endured for centuries than for a contemporary. The man who is more famous in his life-time may be less read a hundred years later than another man who was less famous in the same age.
The second criterion is whether the teacher knows how to proceed, whether he knows the road.
The third criterion is whether the teacher contradicts himself.
The order of these criteria is clear in the Protagoras of Plato. The importance of order is seen in this matter; there is a gradually increasing belief, not one degree of belief; we are able to judge whether someone is worthy of belief in some things before others (for example, the liberal arts as in the experience of Augustine with Faustus). There are two other criteria (the first of these is especially pointed out in the Platonic dialogues): the appetite, will and feelings, of the supposed teacher, and his intellectual customs. both of his age and personal. In addition, for Catholics there is the Magisterium and tradition of the Church which is most useful. This is extremely important in the beginning where a reasonable belief is difficult.
* * *
Once the would-be learner has found his man, is belief necessary to learn from him. We are considering belief as a means rather than as an end even though in many case we may not get beyond this. (The true philosopher seeks a reasoned-out knowledge. But where this is not possible or before it is possible, he seeks a reasonable guess or a reasonable belief. This is not bad; it is better than complete ignorance.No man is satisfied with what he knows first hand and with evidence.) Why cannot one merely judge as he goes along? The teacher proposes either the obvious or what is in need of proof. In the former case, the stduent can assent with knowledge rather than belief. And in the latter, he can and perhaps should withhold his assent until the proof is given.
It is necessary for the learner to believe, not just the man, but also some statements proposed to him:
First, to avoid mistakes or to get free of them. For to be mistaken is the usual conditon of our mind. Belief will make one look for the cause of his mistake.
Second to accept a beginning as a beginning. Even if one understands a beginning, he must believe it to be a beginning before he sees what follows from it. One must believe that it is a beginning and important before one will be fruitful and see enough consequences to begin to know it as a beginning and important for its power.
Third, to accept that this is the road to what he wants ot now. One believes this is the road until he has travelled it to the end or a good ditance,or until he knows where it goes or will go. One bleeives the road until he sees that it take shim to his goal.
Fourth, one must believe an elevated thought (whether a definition, division, a statement or a demonstration) before he will find or follow a given sometimes lengthy manuductio for it. One believes the usefulness of the manuductio until he see where it leads or that it leads somewhere
Fifth, the man who believes a true conclusion will more easily find a reason for it.
A great teacher is a father of the life of the student's reason.
Some famous examples of men excellent in their knowledge who learned from others.
Milton from Spenser and Spenser from Chaucer
Bach from Vivaldi
Handel from Corelli
Mozart from Haydn and J. C. Bach etc.
Hesienberg and Pauli from Bohr
Plato from Socrates, Pythagoras and Parmenides
Aristotle from Plato
Aquinas from Albert and the Church Fathers.
REFERENCES AND A FEW NOTES FROM DIONNE ON HUMAN BELIEF
Voluntas membrum intellectus
Scriptum super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist 23, Q. 22, 1st sol
Hamlet, Act I, Sc. 2, King:
...................What wouldst thou beg, Laertes. That shall not be my offer, not thy asking? The head is not more native to the heart The hand more instrumental to the mouth Than is the throne of Denmark to thy father
De Virtutibus, Q. 7 - Will in prudence and in faith
finis in intellectu and finis in affectu - intention of end through moral virtues necessary for discourse in prudence.
proper way of moving reason (from one to another) is saved in discourse of prudence. Only the beginning is given by will. But in faith, the will determines the object and not only the end
Will in applying is agent cause, but in faith gives the object
Will enters into definition is both cases, but for end in one case and other for object
Reason at beginning cannot move itself or even be moved by another in its own or proper way. but faith is necessary.
De Virtutibus, Q. 14, Art. 10:
1. manuductio per viam naturae - only to dignitates, the per se nota omnibus.
2. manuductio per viam voluntatis, by faith and not secundum proprium modum
3. manuductio per viam rationis - secundum proprium modum - Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 117, Art. 1
De Virtutibus, Q. 14, Art. 2, Ad 3 Reason not determined according to proper mode
De Ver. Q. 14, Art. 1
Scriptum super LIb. I Sententiarum, d. 41, 5
FRIENDSHIP
Friendship between equals in dialectical discussion and between unequals where one man is teaching another. Dionne suspects that there are different friendships between equals and between teacher and student, but is not sure - possibly the same virtue.
Envy and pride are opposed to friendship
Anger is opposed to friendnship
Docility required in friendship towards a superior
What is the pia affectio? Pertain to friendship of student for teacher? (compare with text from Republic on friendship and reverence for Homer.)
TRANQUILLITY OF ANGER
In II Ad Timotheum, Caput II, Lectio IV, n. 84:
Generale quod debet habere qui vult disputare est quod sit mansuetus, Ps. XXIV Docebit mites vias suas. Est enim mansuetudo virtus compescens ab ira, quae perturbat iudicium rationis, quae necessaria est in quaestione et iudicio veritatis.
ORDER OF THE ACTS OF THE APPETITE IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE
Love, desire, hope, fear and joy over the truth come in an order where those that are before are causes of those which come after. But then those which come after are in some way causes of those that come before. Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 34, Art 6, Ad 1:
....quia vis appetitiva, sicut et apprehensiva, reflectitur super suos actus, squitur quod in motibus appetitivae virtutis sit quaedam circulatio. Secundum igitur primum processum appetitivi motus, ex amore consequitur desiderium, ex quo consequitur delectatio, cum quis consecutus fuerit quod desiderabit. Et quia hoc ipsum quod est delectari in bono amato habet quandam rationem boni, sequitur quod delectatio causet amorem. Et secundum eandem rationem, sequitur quod tristitia causet odium.
Tranquillity of the feelings enables the above acts of the will to be intensified while the intensification of the above acts leads to a quieting of the feelings.
Love and desire of and joy over the truth as a common good will dispose for a more perfect friendship than loving truth as a private good. Likewise, love of truth as a common good helps to moderate anger in disputation and dialectical discussions.
Belief proceeds from wonder because a man whose desire to know was satisfied with what he can discover by himself would have a very weak desire. Again the fear in wonder would make a man adhere to a mind superior to his own in order to avoid error. But belief in turn can then become a cause of wonder, as when one wonders about a proposition of Euclid before he sees the proof. The wonder that comes after human belief is distinct in comparison to the confused wonder preceding human belief. Belief in a great teacher (such as Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas) can keep one from despair of achieving the truth which despair easily comes to those who cannot find someone they think worthy of belief.
MORAL VIRTUES RECTIFYING THE APPETITE IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE
Virtues attached to temperance
Integral parts of temperance: honestas (pulcherrime definitur in Physics, Book IV and verecundia (fear of error or falsehood, turpitude of falsity)
1. Studiositas without doubt rectifies the love of wisdom and the desire in wonder. Consequently, it would rectify the joy over truth or wisdom.
Since verecundia, a kind of fear, is an integral part of temperance, perhaps studiositas rectifies the fear in wonder.
But the hope in wonder would not seem to have the mode of temperance.
In II ad Timotheum, Cap. III, Lect. 2, n. 107:
Curiositas semper nova nititur quaerere, et non vult insistere.
2. Humility disposes for docility. If docility is a virtue, it is also attached to temperance (Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 162, Art. 3, Ad 1)
Humility would also seem to dispose for the fear in wonder and perhaps even something of the hope in wonder. The humble man has fear of his own failure (while pride goeth before a fall) and recognizes the need for an effort. (Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, Q. 162, Art. 3, Ad 4: "praesumptio ...proprie pertinet ad superbiam." Presumption is a cause of audacity.
Pia affectio is an act of the will moving reason in faith. Pia affectio for master makes one docile. docility also follows faith. (Docility - faith -docility) Docility disposes for the fear and hope in wonder.
3. Mansuetudo
In II Ad Timotheum, Caput II, Lectio IV, n. 84:
Generale quod debet habere qui vult disputare est quod sit mansuetus, Ps. XXIV Docebit mites vias suas. Est enim mansuetudo virtus compescens ab ira, quae perturbat iudicium rationis, quae necessaria est in quaestione et iudicio veritatis.
Mansuetudo would also seem to dispose especially for friendship and docility
Are studiositas, mansuetudo and humilitas (and perhaps docilitas) the only moral virtues attached to temperance which rectify the philosophical life?
Virtues attached to fortitude
1. Magnanimity disposes for the hope in wonder and perhaps disposes for the fear in wonder insofar as it removes presumption which is the mother of audacity.
Commentary Super Lib.Boetii De Consolatione Philosphiae. Liber II, Prosa VII:
secundum Commentatorem in prologo in octavo Physicorum "verus philosophus debet esse perfectus omnibus generibus virtutum, et per consequens debet esse magnanimus"
2. Patience helps us to overcome or bear with the many difficulties and problems on the way to truth.
3. Perseverance helps man who proceeds slowly, bit by bit, towards truth over a long time.
(ignavia - idleness, laziness, listlessness sloth cowardice "contrary - -, Q. 49, Art. 3, Ad 2)
Virtues attached to justice
1. Pietas Can this be said in reference to teachers?
Pietas which renders the appropriate honor and reverence to our masters and great teachers is necessary to preserve the tradition in philosophy and consequently philosophy itself. Honor is due to excellence. And excellence is followed by Timor reverentiae Thus pietas seem to dispose for belief by disposing us toward pia affectio , Timor reverentiae and docility.
see Plato's reverence for Parmenides
Aquinas veneration of the Church Fathers such that he seems to have inherited the intellect of them all(Cajetan as quoted in Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII)
2.Friendship (?) pia affectio is only an amor concupiscentiae
Envy is opposed to friendship
In II Ad Timotheum, Caput II,Lecxtio IV, n. 87:
et resipiscant a diaboli laqueis,idest, ab occasionibus errorum ex parte intellectus, sicut false phantasiae, et ex parte affectus, sicut invidia, superbia, et huiusmodi.
The Ephesians cast out Hermodorus, saying they would have no one best among them, as Heraclitus recounts.
Virtues attached to prudence ?
HOW THE DISPOSITIONS OF WILL & FEELINGS GOOD FOR PHILOSOPHY COME TO BE IN US
1. by nature, imperfectly or in part
All men by nature desire to know Metaphysics, Book One, Chapter One)
Some men are naturally disposed more than other men to the foregoing virtues.
2. by custom
Will and feelings are more like nature than reason is (Dionne agrees). Hence custom which perfects the desiring powers is often considered an impediment to the development of reason (Metaphysics, Book Two, Chapter Three) Thus we acquire these virtues by practice or repeated acts. The help of others here is essential.
by our parents
by our parents
By example and imitation of good teacher
* * * * by listening to music which represents well feelings more noble and more in repose than our own, the music of the Baroque and classical periods
by hearing or reading fiction that represent men as greater than us, tragedy and epic (Shakespeare, Homer and Sophocles)
3. By reason
by exhortation: Hortensius of Cicero and its effect on Augustine
by dialogues of Plato
by basic road and logic
by proemium
by dialectic and in general by order of manuductio
by order of determination and demonstration in reasoned-out knowledge
As we understand more, our desire to now increases. and as we understand difficulties, we become more humble and careful etc.
De Utilitate Credendi of St, Augustine
4. By the Church