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Second Part of Lesson I Book One of Lectures on Nature and Motion
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: CONF TO DIST - EFF TO CAUSE.doc.
Second Part of Lesson I Book One of Lectures on Nature and Motion
The confused comes before the distinct in our knowledge. But the general is to the particular as the confused is to the distinct. Hence, the general comes before the particular in our knowledge.
1. The reason why the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge. 2. Manifestation of this reason by likeness to other kinds of education 3. Manifestation of this reason by effect to cause 4, The reason for the reason. 5, Sign or kinds of examples to show that the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge and also the general before the particular. 6. Confused is more sure than the distinct. Hence distinct never replaces the confused but adds to it. 7. Sophistical objection that the confused is mistaken and hence less sure. 8. Sophistical objection that the particular is before the general because the senses know the particular. 9. Sophistical objection from the general as spec. relativity before general relativity.
Two Senses of general: Troilus & Cressida, Act IV, Sc. 5, lines 19-22:
Nestor to Cressida: “Our general doth salute you with a kiss.”
Ulysses: “Yet is the kindness but particular; ‘Twere better she were kiss’d in general.”
Nestor “And very courtly counsel, I’ll begin.”
10. Confused knowledge of general comes before distinct knowledge of particular.
Distinct knowledge of general comes before distinct knowledge of particular.
Distinct knowledge of general need not come before a confused knowledge of particular.
11. Manifestation of n. 10 by sensation, memory, experience, understanding: One need not sense everything before remembering anything. One need not remember everything before having experience of anything; one need not experience everything before understanding anything. Common experience before general understanding, special experience before special understanding.
12. Do general statements comes before particular statements?
Which comes first ?: every mammal has a four chambered heart or every man has a four-chambered heart.
If all univ, affirmative statements are known by induction and by induction alone, then universal statements about particular would comes before univ. statements about general.
THE VAGUE AND THE PRECISE IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
I Two senses of vague (and of confused), which is meant here.
II Propositions about the vague and the precise in human knowledge. 1. Vague knowledge comes before precise knowledge in time 2. Vague knowledge is more sure or certain than precise knowledge. 3. Precise knowledge depends upon vague knowledge although it cannot be deduced from it. 4. Vague knowledge can be without precise knowledge but not vice- versa (from Props. 1,2,3) 5. Vague knowledge is not replaced by precise knowledge (from Props. 2,3,4. 6. Precise knowledge is a continuation & completion of vague knowledge.
III The same knowledge may be considered precise with respect to what comes before and vague with respect to what comes after.
IV The vague may be more universal than or equally universal with the precise.
See Aristotle’s examples in the first chapter of Physics, Book I; the passage from Ch. 5 to Ch. 6 in Bk. I of the Physics the movement from encircling happiness to the definition of it in I N. Ethics The order of definition and division in Euclid’s Elements
The above six propositions should be applied to both these kinds of vague and precise
V One very important example of going from the more universal to the less universal is going from knowledge based on common experience to knowledge based on private experience in natural science and in the sciences of human action. All six propositions above should be applied to applied here as well.
TWO MOVEMENTS OF REASON FROM THE CONFUSED TO THE DISTINCT
We should distinguish between the movement from an integral whole to its parts or from a name to a definition and the movement from the general to the particular. In the former, one moves from the confused to the distinct while staying on the same level of universality, but in the latter, one moves from the more universal to the less universal. When the geometer moves from triangle to plane figure contained by three straight lines, he stays on the same level of universality. But when the geometer moves from triangle to scalene, isosceles, and equilateral triangles, he is moving from the more universal to the less universal. When the student of poems moves from sonnet to composed of fourteen lines, he is staying on the same level of universality. But when he moves from sonnet to English sonnet and Italian sonnet, he is moving from the more universal to the less universal. Which movement should comes before?
One should move from the confused to the distinct on the same level before moving down from a higher level to a lower level. The geometer moves from triangle to plane figure before moving from triangle to scalene, isosceles and equilateral triangles. The reason for this is that one cannot understand the basis for the second without understanding the first. If one does not know that the triangle is contained by three st. lines, how can one understand the reason for dividing triangle into scalene, isosceles and equilateral. Again, if one does not know that the sonnet is composed of fourteen lines, how could one understand the distinction of dividing those lines into an octet and sextet or into three quatrains and a couplet.
The Greeks proceeded in this way: triangle to definition of triangle and then down to scalene, isosceles and equilateral. In general, the Greeks moved from a confused knowledge of the general to a distinct knowledge of the general, then down to a confused knowledge of the particular and on to a distinct knowledge of the particular.
But the moderns try to bypass the second step. They proceed from a confused knowledge of the general down to a confused knowledge of the particular and on to a distinct knowledge of the particular.
This difference is seen in both the study of natural things and in the study of human acts and society. The Greeks move from the confused knowledge we have of these things on the basis of common experience to a distinct knowledge of these things in general and then down to a knowledge of these things based on private experience and on to a distinct knowledge of these things in particular. The moderns try to avoid the second step as seen in their jumping into the experimental sciences without the philosophy of nature and the social sciences without ethics and political philosophy
The Greek order is from (1) common experience to a (2) confused understanding of common experience and the general to a (3) distinct knowledge of common experience and the general down to (4) private experience, the (5) confused understanding of private experience and the particular and on to a (6) distinct knowledge of the particular and private experience. The moderns leave out step (3).
As Heisenberg points out at the end of Chapter IV of Physics and Philosophy, a distinct understanding of common experience (or what he calls ordinary experience or general experience) is not sufficient to reach a distinct understanding of private or special experience, as Aristotle also so well understood in his biological and political studies. But as both Heisenberg and Aistotle point out, it is necessary to descend to a private or special experience before one can reach an adequate understanding or knowledge of things known by private experience. Nevertheless, as Heisenberg says, it is remarkable to what extent a distinct understanding of common experience does anticipate in a vague way the much later distinct understanding of private experience (as for example, Heraclitus’ fire, our concept of energy.)
The question too may be raised to what extent a distinct understanding of private or special experience is possible without a previous distinct understanding of common experience. To the extent that the latter must be expressed in words and not only in mathematical symbols, it seems necessary top have some distinct understanding of our common experience and the general. Heisenberg, Bohr, Einstein and others have insisted on the need of the physicist to express himself in words, not only for the general reader, but also for himself. They have also spoken of how the scientific language is a refinement of the language of everyday life and how it is necessary to return to the latter in trying to understand the former.
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS
I Propositions about the order in our knowledge of causes and effects 1.Knowledge of the effect usually comes in time before the cause 2.Knowledge of the effect usually is more sure than of the cause 3.Knowledge of the cause usually depends upon knowledge of the effect. 4.Knowledge of the effect usually can be without knowledge of cause, but not vice-versa. 5. Knowledge of effect is not replaced by knowledge of cause 6. Knowledge of the cause completes our knowledge of the effect.
II Something can be a cause of one thing and an effect of another. And thus the above order is repeated.
III Order of cause & effect in things and in our knowledge are the reverse.
IV We can be led from a recognition that our knowledge goes from effect to cause and from vague to precise to see that the more known to us is less known by nature as Aristotle observes in the first book of Physics and N. Ethics. This is proportional to what we find in every other kind of education.