Senses of Before — Short Texts
Intro & Logic · Order of Topics for Class 2016
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Senses of Before — Short Texts Duane H. Berquist
Chapter 12: The Ordered Senses of Before Scriptum Super Librum I Sententiarum, Dist. 9, Q. 2, Art. 1 Utrum Pater sit prior Filio Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Pater sit prior Filio. Sicut enim se habet corruptio ad desitionem, ita se habet generatio ad inceptionem. Sed omne quod corrumpitur, desinit esse. Ergo omne quod generatur, incipit esse per generationem. Ergo Filius coepit esse; et ita est posterior Patre. 2. Praeterea, nihil accipit aliquid, nisi quod non habet. Sed omne quod generatur, accipit esse a generante. Ergo omne quod generatur, ante generationem non habet esse; et sic idem quod prius. 3. Praeterea, principium naturaliter prius est eo cujus est principium. Sed Pater est principium Filii. Ergo etsi non tempore, saltem natura est prior ipso. 4. Item, dare esse est aliqua dignitas. Sed Pater dat esse suum Filio. Ergo ad minus dignitate Pater est prior Filio. Contra, omne illud quo aliquid est prius, non est simpliciter primum. Si ergo Filio esset Pater prior, Filius non esset simpliciter primum. Sed omnes dicunt Deum esse primum principium, sicut dicit Philosophus. Ergo Filius non esset Deus: quod Ariani concedunt. Respondeo dicendum, quod Pater nullo modo est prior Filio, neque duratione, neque natura, neque intellectu, neque dignitate. In Patre enim et Filio non possumus nisi duo considerare. Vel id quod absolutum est: et hoc utrique commune est: unde ex hoc unus non habet prioritatem ad alium, cum essentia divina non sit divisibilis, ut supra ostensum est, in hac dist., qu. 1, art. 1. Vel id quod est ad aliquid. Relativorum autem est simul esse natura, secundum Philosophum, et etiam tempore: quia posita se ponunt, et perempta se perimunt: et etiam intellectu, cum unum per alterum definiatur. Quamvis enim in hominibus ille qui est pater, sit prior eo qui est filius, ut Socrates Platone; nihilominus tamen ista duo relativa, inquantum relativa sunt, pater et filius simul sunt omnibus modis praedictis. Unde patet quod Pater nullo modo potest esse prior Filio; neque secundum id quod absolutum, neque secundum id quod ad aliquid est. 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod generatio quae opponitur corruptioni, est mutatio; et tali generationi semper annexa est inceptio. Sed generatio, prout est in divinis, non est mutatio, ut supra dictum est, dist. 4, quaest. 1, art. 1, sed operatio naturae divinae prout est in Patre. Et quia naturalis operatio semper sequitur id cujus est, cum natura divina in Patre sit aeterna, et generatio erit aeterna.
senses of “before” — short texts 2. Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod accipit aliquid, non habet illud a se, non tamen sequitur quod non habeat illud simpliciter: quia potest esse quod illud accipere nunquam inceperit; et ita Filius accepit esse a Patre, nec habet esse a se, sed ab aeterno a Patre accepit esse. 3. Ad tertium dicendum, quod principium potest dupliciter considerari: vel id quod est principium, et hoc est prius naturaliter eo cujus est principium; vel secundum relationem principii, et sic est simul naturaliter cum principiato. Si igitur esset aliquis ab eodem habens quod sit aliquis et quod sit ad aliquid; omnino simul esset naturaliter cum eo ad quod diceretur. Et quia in divinis Pater ab eodem habet quod sit aliquis et quod sit Pater; est simul natura cum Filio, non solum inquantum est Pater, sed simpliciter. 4. Ad quartum dicendum, quod proprietas qua Pater dat esse, est dignitas sua. Sed quia dignitas est de absolutis, ideo eadem dignitas est in Patre et Filio, et eadem dignitas quae in Patre est paternitas, in Filio est filiatio; sicut paternitas in Patre est divina essentia vel divina bonitas, et eadem essentia in numero vel bonitas, est filiatio in Filio. John X, 29 Pater quod dedit mihi, maius omnibus est.
That which my Father hath given me, is greater than all.
In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio, Caput IV, Lectio III, n. 310 Rationem autem tam temporis quam numeri sequitur ordo, quia una species numeri naturaliter est alia prior et tempus est etiam numerus motuum secundum prius et posterius.
De Potentia, Q. 3, Art. 17, ad 20 Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod Deus praecedit mundum duratione, non quidem temporis, sed aeternitatis, quia esse Dei non mensuratur tempore. Nec ante mundum fuit tempus reale, sed solum imaginarium, prout scilicet nunc possumus imaginari infinita temporum spatia, aeternitate existente, potuisse revolvi ante temporis inceptionem.
To the twentieth it must be said, God does indeed precede the world by duration, not of time but of eternity, since God’s existence is not measured by time. Nor was there real time before the world, but only imaginary; thus now we can imagine an infinite space of time running with eternity and preceding the beginning of time.
De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 11, c., & Objection 3 and Ad 3 …sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has
…just as a real relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a logical relation is the order of thought to thought; and this may occur in two ways: First, when the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is expressed in a relative term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and species: for the
duane h. berquist enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationis creatu-
mind discovers these relations by observing the order between that which is in the mind and that which is outside the mind, or again the order between one idea and another. Secondly, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely when the mind understands one thing in its relation to another, although that relation is not discovered by the intellect but follows by a kind of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which has objective reality. This happens forasmuch as certain things not mutually related are understood in relation to one another, although the mind does not understand them to be related, for in that case it would be in error. Now in order that two things be related they must each have existence, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears a relation to itself ), and be referable to the other. Now the mind sometimes conceives two things as having existence, whereas one or neither of them is a being: as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and considers one in relation to the other by placing one before the other; wherefore such relations are purely logical since they arise from the mode of understanding. And sometimes the mind considers one thing as though it were two, and considers them in the light of a certain relationship: as when a thing is said to be identical with itself, and such a relation is purely logical. Sometimes the mind considers two things as referable to each other, whereas there is no relation between them, in fact one of them is itself essentially a relation: as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject, wherefore such a logical relation has merely a logical relationship to anything else. Again the mind sometimes considers something in relation to another inasmuch as it is the term of the relationship of another thing to it, and yet itself is not related to the other: as when it considers something knowable as terminating the relationship of knowledge to it; and thus it imputes to the thing knowable a certain relation to knowledge, and such a relation is purely logical. In like
rarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.
manner our mind attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the term of the creature’s relation to him: wherefore such relations are purely logical. ⁂
3. Praeterea, hoc nomen Dominus relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est Dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coërcendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum. Et eodem modo apparet quod Dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu.
3. This name Lord signifies a relation since it is a predicamental relative. But Lordship is not merely a logical relation in God. Therefore neither are these relations in God only logical. To the Third Objection it should be said, that just as a man is identical with himself really and not only logically (although such a relation is merely logical) inasmuch as the cause of the relation is real, namely substantial identity, which the mind considers in the light of a relation: even so the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our mind considers it in relation to the subjects on account of the subjects’ relation to God: and thus he is called Lord really, although in him the relation is merely logical. For the same reason it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created mind in existence.
Q.D. de Veritate, Q. 1, Art. 5, Obj 15 & 16 and Ad 15 & Ad 16 15. Praeterea, ab aeterno Deus fuit prior mundo. Ergo relatio prioritatis in Deo fuit ab aeterno. Sed posito uno relativorum, necesse est poni et reliquum. Ergo ab aeterno fuit posterioritas mundi ad Deum. Ergo ab aeterno fuit aliquid aliud extra Deum cui aliquo modo competit veritas; et sic idem quod prius.
16. Sed dicebat, quod illa relatio prioritatis et posterioritatis non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum. — Contra sicut dicit Boetius in fine de Consolat., Deus est prior mundo natura, etsi mundus semper fuisset. Ergo illa relatio prioritatis est relatio naturae, et non rationis tantum. 15. Ad quintum decimum dicendum, quod cum alia genera, in quantum huiusmodi, aliquid ponant in rerum natura — quantitas enim ex hoc ipso quod quantitas est, aliquid dicit — sola relatio non habet, ex hoc quod est huiusmodi, quod
15. Since from eternity God was prior to the world, this relation of priority in God was eternal. But when one member of a relation is posited, the other must also be posited. Therefore, from eternity the posteriority of the world with respect to God existed; consequently, there was from all eternity something outside of God to which truth belonged in some way. Hence, our original position stands. 16. It must be said that that relation of before and after is not something in nature but merely a rational relation. — On the contrary, as Boethius says, God is by nature prior to the world, even if the world had always existed. Therefore, that relation of priority is a relation of nature and not of reason alone. 15. To the fifteenth it should be said that all genera as such, with the exception of relation, posit something in reality. For example, quantity by its very nature posits something. But relation, alone, because of what it is, does not posit anything in re-
duane h. berquist aliquid ponat in rerum natura, quia non praedicat aliquid, sed ad aliquid. Unde inveniuntur quaedam relationes, quae nihil in rerum natura ponunt, sed in ratione tantum; quod quidem quadrupliciter contingit, ut ex dictis Philosophi et Avicennae sumi potest. Uno modo, ut quando aliquid ad seipsum refertur, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem; si enim haec relatio aliquid in rerum natura poneret additum ei quod dicitur idem, esset in infinitum procedere in relationibus, quia ipsa relatio per quam aliqua res diceretur eadem, esset eadem sibi per aliquam relationem, et sic in infinitum.
Secundo, quando ipsa relatio ad aliquid refertur. Non enim potest dici quod paternitas referatur ad subiectum suum per aliquam relationem mediam, quia illa etiam relatio media indigeret alia media relatione, et sic in infinitum. Unde illa relatio quae significatur in comparatione paternitatis ad subiectum, non est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum. Tertio, quando unum relativorum pendet ab altero, et non e converso, sicut scientia dependet a scibili, et non e converso; unde relatio scientiae ad scibile est aliquid in rerum natura, non autem relatio scibilis ad scientiam, sed in ratione tantum.
Quarto, quando ens comparatur ad non ens; ut cum dicimus, quod nos sumus priores his qui sunt futuri post nos; alias sequeretur quod possent esse infinitae relationes in eodem, si generatio in infinitum protenderetur in futurum. Ex duobus igitur ultimis apparet quod relatio illa prioritatis nihil ponit in rerum natura, sed in intellectu tantum; tum quia Deus non dependet a creaturis, tum quia talis prioritas dicit comparationem entis ad non ens. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliqua veritas aeterna, nisi in intellectu divino, qui solus est aeternus; et haec est veritas prima. 16. Ad sextum decimum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus natura prior sit rebus creatis, non
ality, for what it predicates is not something but to something. Hence, there are certain relations which posit nothing in reality, but only in reason. This occurs in four ways, as can be seen in the writings of the Philosopher and Avicenna. First, there occurs a relation merely in reason when a thing is referred to itself; for example, when we say that a thing is identical with itself. If this relation posited something in reality in addition to the thing which is declared to be identical with itself, we should have an infinite process in relations; for the very relation by which something is said to be identical with itself would also be identical with itself through an added relation, and so on to infinity. Second, a relation existing only in reason occurs when the relation itself is referred to something. For example, one cannot say that paternity is referred to its subject by some intermediate relation; for that mediate relation would need another intermediate relation, and so on to infinity. Consequently, the relation signified when paternity is compared to its subject is not real but only rational. Third, a relation existing in reason alone occurs when one of the related things depends on the other and not conversely. For example, knowledge depends on the thing known but not the other way about. Hence, the relation of knowledge to a thing known is something real, but the relation of the thing known to knowledge is merely rational. Fourth, a rational relation occurs when a being is compared with a non-being. For example, we say that we are prior to those who are to come after us. If this were a real relation, it would follow (if future generations were infinite) that there could be an infinite number of relations in the same thing. From the last two types it is clear that that relation of priority posits nothing in reality but only in the intellect, because God does not depend on creatures and because such a priority is a relation of being to non-being. From this argument, therefore, it does not follow that there is an eternal truth except in the divine intellect, which alone is eternal. This is the first truth. 16. Although God is prior by nature to created beings, it does not follow that this relation is real.
tamen sequitur quod illa relatio sit relatio naturae; sed quia intelligitur ex consideratione naturae, eius quod prius dicitur, et eius quod posterius dicitur; sicut et scibile dicitur prius natura quam scientia, quamvis relatio scibilis ad scientiam non sit aliquid in rerum natura.
Since it arises merely from a consideration of what is naturally prior and what is naturally posterior — in the way in which a thing known is said to be naturally prior to knowledge — the relation of the thing known to knowledge is not a real relation.
De Potentia, Q. 3, Art, 13, corpus Fuit autem difficile considerare generationem Filii Patri coaeternam, propter assuefactionem humanae cognitionis in consideratione productionis rerum naturalium, in quibus una res ab alia per motum producitur; Res autem producta per motum in esse prius esse incipit in principio quam in termino motus. Cum autem principium motus de necessitate terminum motus duratione praecedat, quod necesse est propter motus successionem, nec possit esse motus principium vel initium sine causa ad producendum movente; necesse est ut causa movens ad aliquid producendum praecedat duratione id quod ab ea producitur.
The difficulty of regarding the begetting of the Son as co-eternal with the Father arose from the fact that in our human observation of nature’s works one thing proceeds from another by movement: A thing brought into being by movement begins to be at the beginning sooner than at the end of the movement. And since the beginning of a movement must needs in point of time precede the end on account of movement implying succession, and again since movement cannot have a beginning without a moving cause to produce it: it follows that the moving cause in the production of anything must precede in point of duration that which it produces.
Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XVIII, Art III, Objs. 1 & 3 & Ad 3 Videtur quod Christus non potuerit mereri in instanti suae conceptionis. 1. Nullus enim meretur nisi agendo. Sed prius est esse rei quam ejus agere. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis, quando Christus primo esse habuit secundum humanam naturam, mereri non potuit…. 3. Praeterea. Quidquid Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, habuit ab alio, non a se. Sed meriti sui ipse ipse causa fuit. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis non meruit. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod esse est prius quam agere natura, non tempore de necessitate. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, scilicet meritum, et ab alio habuit, scilicet inquantum ad meritum exigitur gratia, et a seipso habuit, inquantum meritum procedit ab libero arbitrio. Non enim semper necessarium est ut causa causatum tempore praecedat, sed quandoque sufficit quod pracedat natura.
Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate et Bonitate, Q. VI, Art 2, Obj 13 & 14 and Ad 13 & 14 13. Praeterea, prius est a quo non convertitur consequentia, secundum Philosophum; sed hoc modo se habet praescientia ad praedestina-
13. According to the Philosopher: “One thing is said to be prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed.” But God’s fore-
duane h. berquist tionem, quia omnia Deus praescit quae praedestinat; mala autem praescit, quae non praedestinat. Ergo praescientia est prius quam praedestinatio. Sed prius in quolibet ordine est causa posterioris. Ergo praescientia est causa praedestinationis.
14. Praeterea, nomen praedestinationis a destinatione vel missione imponitur. Sed missionem vel destinationem cognitio praecedit: nullus enim mittit nisi quem cognoscit. Ergo et cognitio est prior praedestinatione; et ita videtur esse causa ipsius; et sic idem quod prius. 13. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet illud a quo non convertitur consequentia, sit aliquo modo prius, non tamen sequitur quod semper sit eo modo prius quo causa prius dicitur, sic enim coloratum esset causa hominis; et propter hoc non sequitur quod praescientia sit causa praedestinationis. 14. Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum.
knowledge is related to predestination in this way, because God knows beforehand what He predestines, while He foreknows the evil which He does not predestine. Foreknowledge, therefore, is antecedent to predestination. But what is prior in any order is the cause of what is posterior. Consequently, foreknowledge is the cause of predestination. 14. The word predestination is derived from sending or destining. But knowledge precedes sending or destining, because no one can send a person without knowing him first. Knowledge, therefore, is prior also to predestination; hence, it seems that it is the cause of predestination. Consequently, our thesis stands. 13. To the thirteenth it should be said that although that with which the consequent cannot be interchanged is prior in some way, it does not always follow that it is prior as a cause is said to be prior; for, if this were true, then to be colored would be the cause of being a man. Consequently, it does not follow that foreknowledge is the cause of predestination. 14. The answer to this difficulty is clear from our last response.