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Socrates on the Fear of Mistake
Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will
From his file: SOCRATES ON THE FEAR OF MISTAKE.doc.
SOCRATES ON THE FEAR OF MISTAKE
Fear of being mistaken leads one to look before and after
Plato, Cratylus, 428D:
τὸ γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ πάντων χαλεπώτατον· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῇ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ παρῇ ὁ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς οὐ δεινόν; δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ, βλέπειν ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.
To be deceived by one self is the most dangerous of all. For when the deceiver is never distant, but always present, how could it not be terrible? It is necessary, as it seems, to turn back often to what has been said and to try, as the poet says, to look at the same time forwards and backwards.
Fear of being mistaken leads one to examination (also the fear should be great because truth is a common good)
Plato, Charmides, 166 C-D:
O)on, |n d' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν « o”per ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν diereun/mhn τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, eïd÷ß δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων· ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει; Και μάλα, | d' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
How can you think. I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words - from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing. I tell you. I am examing the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered? Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.
Fear of mistake distinguished from fear of being laughed at (also fear of being mistaken should be great because truth is a common good)
Plato, Republic, Book V, 450E-451A:
ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, + δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὔ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν· παιδικὸν γὰρ τοῦτό γε· ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεὶς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους ξυνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ 2 ἥκιστα δεῖ σφάλλεσθαι.
But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks, as I am doing, is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at, for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble.
[The fear of being laughed at is, not only childish, but also somewhat sophistical since the sophist seeks honor or glory, not the truth.]
Fear of being mistaken should lead one to begin well
Plato, Cratylus, 436C-D:
εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος t™lla \dh πρὸς τοῦτ’ ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὑτῷ ξυμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ αδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα \dh ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις.
δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς αρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα
If the one laying down the first erred and forced the other things towards this and compelled them to harmonize with the same, it is nothing strange, just as sometimes in geometrical figures when there has come to be a first small and hidden falsehood, all the rest following are made to agree with each other.
It is necessary then for every man to have much thought and much consideration about the beginning of every thing, whether it has been laid down rightly or not. For that having been considered well, the rest following it will be seen.
Fear of mistake leads one to seek knowledge of the road to follow and to listen to those who are the fathers of wisdom for us
Lysis, 213E-214 A:
-W Λύσι, ἀληθῆ moi δοκεῖς λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὕτως ἐπλανώμεθα. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν μηκέτι ἴωμεν· καὶ γὰρ χαλεπή τίς moi φαίνεται ὥσπερ ὁδὸς ἡ σκέψις: Ç δὲ ἐτράπημεν, δοκεῖ moi χρῆναι ἰέναι, σκοποῦντα κατὰ τοὺς ποιητάς: o”toi γὰρ ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες.
Lysis, I think your remark is true, that if we were inquiring correctly we could never have gone so sadly astray. Well. let us follow our present line no further, since our inquiry looks to me a rather hard sort of path: I think we had best make for the point where we turned off, and be guided by the poets; for they are our fathers, as it were, and conductors in wisdom.
Lysis, 215 C:
'´Arqrei δή, ὦ Λύσι, πῇ παρακρουόμεθα. ™rá ge ὅλῳ τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα;
Now observe, Lysis, how we are missing the track. Can it be, indeed, that we are deceived in the whole matter?