Some Consequences of Coming Into Philosophy from Its Natural Beginnings and by the Use of Reason

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Some Consequences of Coming Into Philosophy from Its Natural Beginnings and by the Use of Reason

Wisdom about Beginnings · Leading Into Philosophy

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SOME CONSEQUENCES OF COMING INTO PHILOSOPHY FROM ITS NATURAL BEGINNINGS AND BY THE USE OF REASON

Coming into philosophy from the natural desire to know

Since wonder is a desire to know for the sake of the knowing itself and not for the sake of doing or making, philosophy is chiefly a knowledge for the sake of knowing, not for doing or making.

Since wonder is the beginning of philosophy, and wonder is the natural desire to know the cause, it should not surprise us that philosophy is an investigation of causes and in the end a knowledge of causes.

Hence, the distinction of the kinds of cause and the ways of being a cause and their corollaries are fundamental in philosophy

And since wonder is also the natural desire to know what and why, it is to be expected that philosophy should be a knowledge of what things are and why they are as they are.

And since by definition we know what a thing is and by demonstration why this is that, philosophy is a knowledge by definition and by demonstration.

Hence, logic, which is a tool for acquiring philosophy, is chiefly about definition and demonstration.

Porphyry is careful to point out that the Isagoge (the first book in logic) is useful not only for understanding the Categories of Aristotle, but also for understanding definition, division and demonstration.

The second book of the Posterior Analytics stands at the center of the logician's consideration because it is about the questions what and why and their connection with causes and with definition and demonstration and about the connection of definition and demonstration and how they are acquired.

The Prior Analytics and the first book of the Posterior Analytics are about the form and matter of demonstration.

The Topics considers the four tools of dialectic and the dialectical places. The four tools help us to find or make definitions and all the places can be considered parts of the problem whether this is the definition of that.

And since wonder is the beginning of philosophy, we can why the end of philosophy which is called wisdom should be a knowledge of the first cause.

Coming into philosophy from the natural desire to live well

The natural desire to live well leads us into practical philosophy, the philosophy of doing. There we consider how individuals and families and cities or nations can live well.

Coming into philosophy from the natural road

And from wonder arises most of all looking philosophy. But from the natural road, we can see that the philosophy of material things is before the philosophy of immaterial things within looking philosophy. And the philosophy of material things begins with superficial philosophy or plane geometry since we know things in an outward way before inwardly. But after mathematical philosophy comes natural philosophy because nature loves to hide, as Heraclitus so well said.

If logic is about things insofar as they are in reason, as Avicenna and Albert teach us, then the first thing to be considered in logic is the universal since, as Boethius taught, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. But perhaps it is more sensible to say that what should be first considered in logic is name said of many things.

An understanding of the natural road in our knowledge also helps us to see why reason gives examples of a thing before defining it and induces before it syllogizes. For both are results of the singular coming before the universal on the natural road. And the need to define and that we name things before defining them and begin a definition with a genus are all results of the confused coming before the distinct on the natural road. Likewise, reason often encircles a thing before defining it fully because of this and also because the outward comes before the inward along the natural road.

Coming into philosophy from the natural understanding of axioms and their parts

It is impossible to be and not be (in the same way and at the same time) and it is necessary to be or not be (in the same way and at the same time). These statements are the natural beginning of the axioms.

Logic is based very much on these two statements.

The statements naturally understood are considered in logic as common beginnings of our reasoned out knowledge of things. But the two that are the natural beginnings of the rest are necessary in understanding the opposition of statements and especially which statements are opposed as contradictories. These are statements with the same subject and predicate, one affirmative and the other negative, and opposed such that both cannot be true or both false, but one must be true and the other false, regardless of whether we know which one is true and which one is false. Since the logician considers statements for the sake of reasoning, the statements about being and non-being enter into the understanding of reasoning and the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning. For the demonstrator knows which side of a contradiction is true and hence also which side is false. And he lays down the true side and reasons to only one side of a contradiction. But the dialectician asks which side seems probable to the respondent who must take one side before the dialectician reasons. Also, unlike the demonstrator, the dialectician can reason from probable opinions to both sides of a contradiction.

Out of wonder, the first philosophers pursued a reasoned out knowledge of continuous quantity (lines, angles, and figures), a reasoned out knowledge of numbers, and a reasoned out knowledge of natural things. Plato and Aristotle also sought a reasoned out knowledge of being and one once it became clear that what is is not limited to material things.

As we begin to understand what reason is, what it is to use reason, and why we should use reason (through Shakespeare's Exhortation ), we begin to see the connection between the four natural beginnings of philosophy and reason and its use. Since reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after (as Shakespeare's definition enlightens us), and the crowning sense of before is the sense in which the cause is before the effect, it is not difficult to see the connection between wonder and reason. And since the chief good of man is better than all the other goods of man, one can readily see the order between reason's ability to look before in the sense of better and recognizing what is the chief good of man. And if the chief good of man is also the end of man, and end is one of the causes, then there is also a connection between looking before in the crowning sense and the chief good of man. And if the chief good of man involves something more than what the beast has, as Shakespeare demonstrates in the Exhortation; and reason is what man has in addition to what the beast has; then there is a clear connection between the use of reason and man's chief good. Man's chief good must involve some use of reason, but it remains to be investigated in ethics exactly what that use will be.