Subject of the Logic of the 1st Act of Reason

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Subject of the Logic of the 1st Act of Reason

Logic of the First Act

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SUBJECT OF THE LOGIC OF THE 1ST ACT OF REASON

One can reason that the chief subject of the logic of the first act of reason is definition from a proportion. Definition is to the first act (understanding what a thing is) as statement is to the second act (understanding the true or the false) or as syllogism or argument is to the third act (reasoning). Thomas often uses this proportion. As syllogism or argument is the tool by which we reason, so likewise definition is the tool by which we distinctly understand what something is. Now as there is no doubt that syllogism or argument is the chief subject of the logic of the third act (as can be seen in the books that have come down to us from the father of logic in the third act), it would seem reasonable that definition is the chief subject of the logic of the first act. And one could reason in the same way from the book that has come down to us in the second act (the Peri Hermeneias) being about statement.

However, no book on definition in the logic of the first act has come down to us from Aristotle, but only the book called the Categories. This book is about names said univocally of many things as genera which are only beginnings of definitions and not definitions. Did Aristotle not get to writing such a book or did he write a book that has been lost or did he think that the consideration of definition in the second book of the Posterior Analytics and the books About Places (called the Topics in English sometimes) was sufficient? I think the last is the answer. And Thomas sometimes speaks as if the subject of the first act corresponding to statement or enunciation and syllogism in the logic of the second and third acts is not definition, but predicate, as in the following text:

In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171:

Sciendum tamen est quod alia ratione dialectica est de communibus et logica et philosophia prima. Philosophia enim prima est de communibus, quia eius consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet circa ens et partes et passiones entis. Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de intentionibus rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi.

In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171:

It should be known that for another reason dialectic and logic and first philosophy are about the common [things]. For first philosophy is about what is common because its consideration is about the common things themselves; that is about being and the parts and passions of being. And because reason has to deal with all that is in things and logic is about the acts of reason, logic also will be about what is common to all, that is about the intentions of reason, which are had for all things. But this is not such that logic is about the common things as its subject. For logic considers as subjects, syllogism, statement, predicate, or something of this sort.

A predicate is a name, not a speech, as are statement and syllogism. A predicate is especially a name said of many things. The Categories and Porphyry’s famous introduction or Isagoge to it can both be said to be about names said of many things. Thomas Aquinas uses the distinction of five names or five kinds of names by Porphyry in the Isagoge as a complete distinction of name said univocally of many things (or with one and the same meaning in mind when said of each). The Categories of Aristotle is especially about ten names said univocally of many things by way of one of the five kinds of names distinguished by Porphyry. But the Categories is also about some times said equivocally by reason of many things.

Thus the logic of the first act of reason must be about name said of many things and by reason. (All names said univocally of many things are said of them by reason, but only some names said equivocally of many thing are so said by reason and some are said by chance. Logic is not much concerned with the latter.)

But since a consideration of these names is useful for defining, dividing and distinguishing, and defining, dividing and distinguishing are necessary for understanding what something is, it is not a mistake to consider definition, division and distinction to some extent in the logic of the first act. And we see this in the logical works of Albert the Great. Likewise, it is not a mistake to consider the distinction of names said univocally of many things with a view to their usefulness in defining and dividing.