← Library · Wisdom about Beginnings
Texts for the Definition of the Wonder of the Philosopher
Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will
From his file: TEXTS FOR DEFINITION OF WONDER.doc.
TEXTS FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE WONDER OF THE PHILOSOPHER
The wonder of the philosopher, the wonder which is the beginning of philosophy, is the desire to know for its own sake the cause of the universal. Or it is the desire to know for its own sake the what and the why of the universal. We can say either "the cause" or "the what and the why" because both the questions what and why are answered by the cause(s) as Aristotle explains in the second book of the Posterior Analytics..
"desire" separates wonder from everything which is not desire. "of the universal" separates it from the wonder of the pure historian. "the cause" or "the what and the why" separates it from the wonder of the philomuthos. "for its own sake" separates it from the wonder of the practical philosopher. Practical philosophy does not begin in wonder simpliciter, but in the desire for true happiness.
Wonder is a desire to know
ARISTOTELOUS, PERI RHTORIKHS A, 1371a 31-34:
καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.
Aristotle, About the Art of Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 11, 1371a 31-34:
To learn and to wonder are pleasant for the most part. For in wonder is the desire to know, so that the wonderful is desired, but in learning there is......
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 32, Art. 8, c.:
Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam; vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat...
for its own sake
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Proemium (Book One, Chapters1-3):
All men by nature desire to know. A sign is the love of the senses. For apart from their usefulness, they are loved for themselves; and especially among the others, that through the eyes. For we choose to see before all the others, not only that we might do something, but also when not aiming to do anything. The cause is that this one among the senses especially makes us know something and shows many differences.......
For men both now and at first began to philosophize through wonder - in the beginning, wondering about strange things close at hand; then going forward thus little by little, raising questions about the greater things, as about the changes of the moon and of the sun and stars, and about the origin of the universe.
But the man in doubt and wondering thinks himself to be ignorant. So the philomuthos is in some way a philosopher for the myth is put together from wonders. Hence, if men philosophized to escape ignorance, it is clear that they sought knowledge for the sake of understanding and not for any use. What happened witnesses this. When almost all necessary things and those for recreation and amusement existed, such knowledge began to be sought. So it is clear that we seek this knowledge through no other need....
It is necessary, however, to place the possession of this in the opposite for us of the searches in the beginning. For all began, as we have said, from wondering that things are thus; as about the turnings of the sun or the incommensurability of the diagonal - for it seems wonderful to all that have not seen the cause if something is not measured by the smallest. It is necessary therefore to finish in the contrary and the better, according to the proverb, just as in those when they have learned - for the geometer would wonder at nothing so much as if the diagonal were to become commensurable.
the cause
Δημόκριτος, DK 118:
Δημόκριτος γοῦν αὐτός, ὥς fasin, ἔλεγε, Βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι:
Democritus, DK 118:
I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 105, Art. 7, c:
nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem consurgit, cum effectus sunt manfesti et causa occulta; sicut aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys....Miraculum autem dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 32, Art. 8, c.:
Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam; vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat...
Thomas Aquinas, In Davidem, Psalmus VIII, n. 1:
Admiratio est quando aliquis videt effectum et ignorat causam. Dupliciter est ergo aliqua causa admirabilis: vel quia ignota totaliter, vel quia non producit effectum manifestantem causam perfecte. Primum non est in Deo: quia producit effectum: Rom. I, 20: Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt etc. Producit dico effectum, non tamen manifestantem perfedte causam: et ideo remanet admirabilis.
or the what and the why
PLATWN, QEAITHTOS, 155C-D:
QEAITHTOS:
καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτα σκοτοδινιῶ.
SWKRATNS:
Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς sou. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν -Irin Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις \dh di' + ταῦτα τοιαῦτ’ ἐστὶν
Plato, Theaetetus, 155C-D:
Theaetetus:
By the gods, Socrates, how greatly I wonder what these things are and sometimes when looking at them, I am really dizzy.
Socrates:
Theodorus seems to guess not badly about your nature, my friend. For this wonder is very much the undergoing of a philosopher. There is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And the one saying that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas did not make a bad genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so?
of the universal
ARISTOTELOUS, PERI RHTORIKHS A, 1371b 4-10:
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν + ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ώ, κἂν ώ μὴ ἡδὺ αὺτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.
ARISTOTELOUS, PERI POINTIKHS, 1451b 5-7:
φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγει.
Aristotle, About the Poetic Art, Chapter 9, 1451b 5-7:
Fiction is more philosophical and more noble than history. For fiction says more what is universal, but history, the singular.
Thomas Aquinas, In I De Caelo et Mundo, Lectio XXII, n. 228:
Dicunt autem quidem quod isti poetae et philosophi, et praecipue Plato, non sic intellexerunt secundum quod sonat secundum superficiem verborum; sed suam sapientiam volebant quibusdam fabulis et aenigmaticis locutionibus occultare; et quod Aristotelis consuetudo fuit in pluribus non obiciere contra intellectum eorum, qui erat sanus, sed contra verba eorum, ne aliquis ex tali modo loquendi errorem incurreret, sicut dicit Simplicius in commento.
Alexander tamen voluit quod Plato et alii antiqui philosophi hoc intellexerunt quod verba eorum exterius sonant; et sic Aristoteles non solum contra verba, sed contra intellectum eorum conatus est argumentari.
Quidquid autem horum sit, non est nobis multum curandum: quia studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum.
of what is contrary to the expected
Perhaps a sixth part is needed in the definition which would give us wonder in the fullest sense:
Thomas Aquinas, Two Causes of Wonder, Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum, Dist. XVIII, Q. I, Art. III, Sol. and Ad 1:
sicut ex verbis Philosophi habetur in principio Metaphysic. in proem., admiratio ex duobus causatur, scilicet ex hoc quod alicujus effectus causa occulta est, et ex eo quod aliquid in re videtur per quod aliter esse deberet; unde in hoc quod est diametrum quadrati non posse commensurari lateri, admiratio causatur ex hoc quod hujus causa ignoratur, et ex hoc quod ex parvitate linearum videtur quod una lateri commensurari possit.
Contingit ergo aliquid esse admirabile simpliciter, et aliquid esse admirabile quoad hunc. admirabile huic est omne ilud cujus causa occulta est sibi, et cui videtur secundum suam aestimationem aliquid obviare, quare non ita esse deberet: quamvis in re nihil sit repugnans, nec causa in se sit nimis occulta; et hoc potest dici mirum illi. Admirabile autem in se est id cujus causa simpliciter occulta est, ita etiam quod in re est aliqua virtus secundum rei veritatem per quam aliter debeat contingere. Hujusmodi autem sunt quae immediate a virtute divina causantur, quae est causa occultissima, alio modo quam se habeat ordo causarum naturalium.....
[Ad 1] creatio, proprie loquendo, non est opus miraculosum, quia deficit una conditio miraculi: quamvis enim causam occultam habeat, tamen non est in re unde aliter esse deberet: immo esse rerum naturali quodam ordine a primo ente producitur, quamvis non per necessitatem naturae.
Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, Q. 6, Art. 2, Corpus:
Ad admirationem autem duo concurrunt, ut potest accipi ex verbis Philosophi in principio Metaphysicorum:
quorum unum est, quod causa illius quod admiramur, sit occulta;
secundum est quod in eo quod miramur, appareat aliquid per quod videatur contrarium eius debere esse quod miramur, sicut aliquis posset mirari si videret ferrum ascendere ad calamitam, ignorans calamitae virtutem, cum videatur quod ferrum naturali motu debeat tendere deorsum.
Albert Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Harper Torchbooks, Vol. I, p. 9:
For me it is not dubious that our thinking goes on for the most part without use of signs (words) and beyond that to a considerable degree unconsciously. For how, otherwise, should it happen that sometimes we ‘wonder’ quite spontaneously about some experience? This ‘wondering’ seems to occur when an experience comes into conflict with a world of concepts which is already sufficiently fixed in us. Whenever such a conflict is experienced hard and intensively, it reacts back upon our thought world in a decisive way. The development of this thought world is in a certain sense a continuous flight from "wonder".
A wonder of such a nature I experienced as a child of 4 or 5 years, when my father allowed me a compass. That this needle behaved in such a determined way did not at all fit into the nature of events, which could find a place in the unconscious world of concepts (effect connected with direct ‘touch’). I can still remember - or at least believe I can remember - that this experience made a deep and lasting impression upon me. Something deeply hidden had to be behind things. What man sees before him from infancy causes no reaction of this kind; he is not surprised over the falling of bodies, concerning wind and rain, nor concerning the moon or about the fact that the moon does not fall down, nor concerning the difference between living and non-living matter.