The Aim of the Categories and of Logic

← Library · Logic as a Whole

The Aim of the Categories and of Logic

Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic

From his file: AIM OF CATEGORIES AND LOGIC.doc.

Word doc

THE AIM OF THE CATEGORIES AND OF LOGIC

The discussion of the aim or σκοπος of Aristotle's book the Categories by the Greek commentators touches upon a more general question. This more general question is about the aim of any logical treatise. What is being defined or divided in a logical treatise? What the Greek commentators (and Boethius) have said about the aim of the Categories has influenced my thinking on the general question. The importance of the question for logic cannot be denied. And since logic is the tool of philosophy, its importance for philosophy is immense.

The general question arose in my mind years before I ever read the discussion of the σκοπος or aim of the Categories by the Greek Commentators. Perhaps then this will be the best order in which to proceed. First, the way in which the general question arose in my mind. I suspect it may have arisen in the minds of many others in the same way. The second, the answer which I first gave to this question. I suspect also that many others have given this same answer. Third, what led me to doubt my answer and be disposed for another answer. Fourth, the confirmation that the Greek Commentators gave to this doubt and the new answer. And fifth, what makes me think that the new answer is correct or why it is correct.

The general question arose in my mind when I had to translate the definition of definition and the definition of syllogism into English from Greek. What is the genus in those definitions? Should λογος be translated as speech (something in words and vocal sounds) or should it be translated as composite thought or something like that in thoughts.

The answer I then gave was that λογος can have both meanings. The definitions could be understood in either way. Or better, it should be said that there are two definitions. These two definitions correspond to the λογος in words and that in thoughts. There is a definition in the mind and a definition in words, a syllogism in the mind and a syllogism in words. Further, I would have said that the definition in words signified the definition in thoughts and the syllogism in words signified the syllogism in thoughts.

Now when asking what logic was about, I would have said that it is primarily about the definition in the mind or in thoughts and the syllogism in the mind or in thoughts. But in order to talk about the definition or syllogism that is in the mind, we must make use of the definition or syllogism that is in words.

When I then approached the definition of syllogism or the definition of definition in a logical treatise of Aristotle, I assumed that what was being defined primarily was a λογος in the mind. I was influenced also by the words of Albert the Great in his Tractatus on the nature of logic at the beginning of his commentary on the predicables. In Caput IV, De quo sit logica ut de subiecto, he said the following (pp. 9-10 Doyon ed.):

logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens, et non per se...Ratiocinatione autem utitur per se...Solus autem logicus sermone utitur prout est pars instrumenti per quod solum fides fit de incognito, cum notitia ipsius ex noto arguitur per complexionem argumenti. Propter alterum ergo sermone utitur et non propter seipsum.

The logician uses speech to himself and to another by happening [per accidens], and not through itself [per se]…However he uses reasoning as such [per se]…The logician alone uses speech insofar as it is a part of the tool through which alone belief comes to be about the unknown since knowledge of it is reasoned from the known through the weaving of an argument. Therefore he uses spech for the sake of another and not for itself.

If the logician uses speech per accidens, how can his principal subject be the λογος in words.

How did I begin to doubt this? It began with a rereading of the Peri Hermeneias with the commentary of Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle begins that great work with a short proemium in which he tells us what he is going to talk about. He is going to talk about noun and verb, negation and affirmation, statement or enunciation, and λογος. When he defines these, the genus is always voice or vocal sound, not thought or composite thought. The conclusion seemed unavoidable. Aristotle had written a book about a vocal sound, not a thought. I had been prevented from seeing what was staring me in the face by my preconceived notions. ("intus existens extraneum prohibet") What was defined was a vocal sound, the statement in words, not the statement in thoughts. But no disciple is above his master. Either Aristotle was my teacher or I would be my own teacher. Remembering the aphorism of Ben Jonson that the man who has himself for a teacher has a fool for a teacher, I decided to listen to Aristotle more carefully and frequently.

Sometime after this doubt about my original position arose, I started to read the Greek Commentators on the Categories.

Logical treatises are about vocal sounds, not by themselves, but in the order which they have to things through thoughts.

Logic is a tool and is about tools. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to talk about, and direct in the use of, a tool that cannot be sensed. Further, the necessity of the beginner learning logic at the beginning of his philosophical education makes it especially difficult to talk about a tool that cannot be sensed. (But the tool that cannot be sensed is involved in the definition and use of the tool that can be sensed.)

Since logic is about vocal sounds in the order which they have to things through our thoughts, nothing prevents logic from talking about things in some way and even about thoughts; but the logical treatise is anchored in a sensible sign such as a name or a speech. Thus in the beginning of the Categories, Aristotle talks about things as named or as having a name in common. This is a proper way for logic to talk about things. Since we name things as we know them, to talk about things as named is to talk about them as known. Since reason names things, to talk about things as named is to talk about them as known by reason or as they are in reason, but in a more sensible way.

If reason could order its thoughts sufficiently to know things well without using names or speeches, then logic would not be about names or speeches. But reason cannot order its thoughts enough without using names and speeches. Reason is not even clear what it thinks without expressing its thoughts in words. Hence, logic is about using names and speeches to order our thoughts about things so that we can come to know those things better. Logical treatises are about the names or speeches reason uses to order its thoughts about things so that it can come to know them or know them better.

In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio II, nn. 1287-1289:

Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae. Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicta praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicentur, et unicuique eorum quae de "ipso praedicantur," idest diversa quidditas et essentia.

Sciendum autem est, quod id, quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative.

Non est ergo intelligendum, quod substantia actu existens (de qua hic loquimur) de materia praedicetur praedicatione univoca, sive quae est per essentiam. Iam enim supra dixerat, quod materia non est quid, neque aliquid aliorum. Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur. sicut enim haec est vera: homo est albus, non autem haec: homo est albedo, vel humanitas est albedo, ita haec est vera: hoc materiatum est homo, non autem haec: materia est homo, vel: materia est humanitas. Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliud est forma a formis substantialibus. Quare sequetur quod illud quod est ultimum subiectum per se loquendo, "neque est quid", idest substantia, neque quantitas, neque aliquid aliud quod sit in aliquo genere entium.

Duane H. Berquist