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The Ante-predicaments in General
Logic of the First Act · Categories
From his file: ANTE-PREDICAMENTS IN GENERAL.doc.
THE ANTE-PREDICAMENTS IN GENERAL
The editorial and reference division of the Categories is into fifteen chapters. But the logical and understandable division (following the logical rule of two or three usually and for the sake of understanding the Categories) made by the Greek and Latin commentators is into three parts: the ante-predicaments (Chapters 1-4), the predicaments (Chapters 5-9) and the post-predicaments (Chapters 10-15). The predicaments are the ten genera of predicates. Predicate here means a name said of many things signifying the same nature, or what it is, when said of each.
Since "brevity is the soul of wit" or wisdom, and logic is like wisdom, it is perhaps good to summarize the teaching of Aristotle in the first four chapters of the Categories.
One could perhaps summarize that teaching in one long sentence: Names said of many things signifying the same nature in each of them and said without intertwining do not signify the true or the false, but they signify either what it is (or substance) or how much (or quantity) or how (or quality) or toward something (or relation) or where or when or to be laid out or to have (to be outfitted) or to act upon or to undergo.
Names said of many things signifying the same what it is when said of each are genera or species, as we learn in the Isagoge of Porphyry. Hence, one could say that Aristotle is speaking about genera and species said without intertwining.
Without intertwining means first without affirming or denying one name of another.
Chapter One contains three definitions: the definition of things named equivocally, the definition of things named univocally (in the narrow sense of having the same definition of what it is according to the name), and the definition of things named denominatively. Chapter Two has two divisions or distinctions: the division of those said (either with or without intertwining) and the division of beings (into universal substance, individual accident, universal accident and, and individual substance). In Chapter Three, Aristotle gives three statements and beginnings for ordering species and differences under diverse genera. And in Chapter Four, one of the two parts of the first division of Chapter Two (those said without intertwining) is divided into (or according to) ten highest genera by what they signify. This also involves distinguishing the ten. These ten will then be considered in the middle part of the book (Chapters 5-9), but only the first four of them at any length.
We can begin a consideration of the ante-predicaments with some questions.
The way to the middle part of the book from the first division of Chapter Two through the division of Chapter Four is clear. These two divisions are continuous[1] with each other and what is considered in the middle part of the book are the results of the second division. Since Aristotle divides something into ten in the ante-predicaments (before he discusses each of these ten in the middle part), it might seem that he has only two things to do in this part: make clear what is being divided and divide it into the ten. But after making clear what is to be divided by the division of those said in the first part of chapter two, he does not divide this into the ten until chapter four. If these two divisions are continuous, why is there another division or distinction between them? And why also is there a chapter on three beginnings of order between them? And why is all this preceded by the three definitions of Chapter One?
Let us ask about this more clearly.
In the beginning of chapter two, Aristotle distinguishes between those said with intertwining and those said without intertwining. Man by itself or animal by itself or courage by itself or virtue by itself or walks by itself or runs by itself are said without intertwining. But in a statement we intertwine man and animal saying man is an animal or we intertwine courage and virtue saying courage is a virtue, or we intertwine man and runs saying that man runs. But we are not told until chapter four that those said without intertwining signify one of the ten genera of categories. Why this apparent lack of continuity? Why does he not go directly from the distinction between those said with or without intertwining to the distinction of those said without intertwining as signifying one of the ten? Since these divisions are continuous, why does he not go immediately from one to the other? Is it a digression when, between these, he gives first a division of beings and then three rules for ordering genera and species and differences? Or are this division and these rules necessary to see how every name said without intertwining signifies one of those ten or how those ten are distinguished?
And why before the distinction between those said with or without intertwining, does Aristotle give three definitions of things as named? If his chief end in the Categories is to consider what those said without intertwining signify, why does he not begin by going to that, starting with the division between those said with or without intertwining?
Is the division of those said not enough to know what is being divided in chapter four or must we add something from chapter one? Perhaps it is necessary to know about names said univocally (in the narrow sense) of things from chapter one. It is such names said without intertwining that are distinguished according to the ten genera of categories in chapter four. And why does he begin from things in chapter one if the book is about names signifying things through thoughts?
These questions cannot be answered without understanding each of the four chapters. But since the first division of Chapter Two and the division of Chapter Four are continuous, one might suspect that the second division of Chapter Two and the rules of order in Chapter Three are necessary for understanding the division of Chapter Four. And this is indeed so. The first two definitions of chapter one are necessary for knowing how things are named when ordered under the name being and how they are named when ordered under one of the ten genera. And the third definition is necessary for understanding how accidents are named when said of substance.
Aristotle can kill two birds with one stone. He often considers something for more than one reason. Indeed, if something is useful for more than one good end, it very much worthwhile considering.
Thus when Aristotle considers the opinions of his predecessors about the causes in the first book of the Metaphysics, he says that he is going to do so, not only to see whether they have arrived at the truth about the first causes, but also to see if they spoke of any kind of cause besides the four distinguished in natural philosophy. Two things are accomplished by the narration of the opinions of his predecessors on the causes. One, we are prepared to examine the truth or falsity of what they said. For one must know what someone said and why they said it before one can try to judge whether it is true or false. But a second most valuable thing we gain from this is confirmation that there are indeed only four kinds of cause. And this wonderful advance in our knowledge of causes fortifies us against despair (to which we are sometimes subject) when we find later that none of the first philosophers has succeeded in knowing the first causes. Thomas had pointed out earlier in the Metaphysics two reasons why Aristotle is careful to show that all men by nature desire to know or understand. This shows both that knowledge is a natural good for man and therefore really good for him and also that it is in some way possible for man - for a natural desire is not in vain. (And thus from the beginning, Aristotle helps us to hope and endure and avoid despair.)
Nothing prevents something from being useful for many reasons. Porphyry wrote the Isagoge imitating Aristotle. Porphyry states in the Proemium to his Isagoge that understanding genus, difference, species, property and accident is useful, not only for understanding Aristotle's Categories, but also for understanding definition, division (of a genus into its species) and demonstration.
The three definitions of chapter one are useful for more than one reason.
Logic is a reasoned out knowledge which helps our reason to get a knowledge of things. Since our reason naturally seeks a knowledge of things, logic is clearly an art or knowledge that helps nature.
What logic considers must be connected with things in some way for two good reasons. Since logic is ordered to a knowledge of things and one cannot direct to an end without knowing that end in some way, it is clear that the logician must know or take into account things in some way. And because logic is knowledge and not a figment of the imagination, it must be about what has some foundation in things; if not a proximate, at least a remote foundation in them. If someone uses the word logic to mean something which is not ordered to a knowledge of things or which does not have a foundation in things, he is using the word in a different sense than Aristotle and Thomas. And he is talking about something that is not a sure guide to a knowledge of things.
What Aristotle is going to say about names is useful for understanding what things are and also has a foundation in things. It is because things are named through thoughts derived from things that names are important in knowing things and that some distinctions among them have some foundation in things. And the definitions of Chapter One bring out this connection. But at the same time, these definitions are necessary for understanding the names we shall meet later, the ten names or genera, and the name of what is divided in the second division of chapter two and the names taken up in the third part of the book, the post-predicaments. And because the Categories is about the first placing of names or the placing of names upon things, it fittingly begins with things. For in the beginning, there were things but no names.
As regards the apparent discontinuity between the first division of Chapter Two between those said with or without intertwining and the distinction of what those said without intertwining signify in Chapter Four, there is a reason for the division of beings and the rules of Chapter Three.
The division of beings is necessary for distinguishing the ten genera of predicates. For substance is one of the ten and the other nine are accidents. And further we must know that accidents exist in substance without being what it is, so that they must be distinguished in names said denominatively of substance. And in the division of beings, we separate individual substances from all other things. And the ten genera of categories are distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances, either univocally or denominatively
But the Categories helps us not only to distinguish the names of the ten highest genera, but also the names of what are placed under one of them And for these, it is necessary to consider the rules of Chapter Three. One has to see how the species in a way signifies the genus (as when we say something is a dog, we are also in some way saying it is an animal) in order to see how all the names can be said to signify either substance or quantity or quality etc.
About Cajetan's Putting Together the First Two Ante-Predicaments
There is much to be said for Cajetan's putting together the first two ante-predicaments. The reason for putting together these two would seem to be not only that they are both about things as said (and known in some way), but also because both are necessary to see what can be placed in a category. Those said univocally and without intertwining can be placed in a category. Things as named univocally and said without intertwining can be placed in a category.
Even if one says that the division twn legomenwn is a division more of voices or vocal sounds than of things as said, one might still say that both are necessary for seeing what can be placed in a category.
There is also a question why Aristotle doe not make mention of the definitions of Chapter One when he divides into the ten, saying merely each of those said without any intertwining signifies either substance or how much etc. Would it be forced to say that equivocal names involve some kind of intertwining?
To know that things can be named equivocally is important both to the logic of the first act and the logic of the third act.
To know that things can be named equivocally is important to the logic of the first act when considering how things as named can be put in a category and when things as named can have one definition or must have more than one definition (also division and predicables)
To know that things can be named equivocally is important to the logic of the third act because such equivocation can be a source of fallacious reasoning (indeed, the most common source according to the Philosopher)
Hence, to know that things are named equivocally is in some way of more general concern than the logic of the first act and, a fortiori, of the treatise of the predicaments, the Categories.
Thus the division of those said tôn legoménwn in some way restricts our interest in things named equivocally (or univocally)
But we should be aware that equivocal and univocal can be taken in a large or narrow sense.
We shall not attempt to explain here the sufficiency of the division of those said without intertwining into those that signify substance and those that signify how much etc. This would require a long discourse following St. Thomas expositions of this division in two slightly different forms in the third book of the Physics [2] and in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. [3] There are, I think, serious defects in Albert's explanation of their sufficiency.
It is important to note Aristotle's word signifies (shmaínei) here for it makes clear that he is speaking about names. Cajetan's paraphrase here leaves out the key word while Albert retains it. Albert also distinguishes here those said without any intertwining against orationes which involve an intertwining. Here Albert is close to saying that we are dividing some names by their signification.
The division of those said without intertwining into those that signify substance, those that signify how much, etc. could be considered as the beginning of the consideration of the ten categories or the ten highest genera, If then we wish to divide and consider the order of the ante-predicaments before these, we would begin by separating the three definitions, the division of those said and the division of beings from the rules of Chapter Three. For the former pertain to what can or cannot be a highest genus or placed under a highest genus. Distinction is naturally before order. (Hence, in the post-predicaments, we consider opposition first which is the basis of formal distinction. Then we consider before and after which define order.)
Since formal distinction is based on opposition, both the division of those said and the division of beings are based on opposition. (The latter, of course, is based on two oppositions.) Since the four members of the division of beings seem to pertain to one member of the division of those said (those said without intertwining) the divisions of those said is rightly placed before the division of beings.
We have given a reason before why Aristotle begins with things as named and shown the necessity of understanding these three ways things are named, both to see what is or is not able to be a highest genus or placed under a highest genus and to see the other ante-predicaments.
----------------------- [1]Divisions are said to be continuous when one is a division of a part of the other. Likewise, definitions are said to be continuous when one is a definition of a part of the other definition. And two syllogisms are said to be continuous when the conclusion of one is a premiss of the other. Reasoned out knowledge is a result of continuous definitions, divisions and syllogisms. [2]Lectio V [3]Lectio IX