The Approach to Logic
Logic as a Whole · Place of Logic
From his file: APPROACH TO LOGIC.doc.
THE APPROACH TO LOGIC
Since Logic is (1) a part of reason's knowledge (as its name indicates) and (2) also a part of philosophy (hence, Socrates in the Phaedo says that we need an art about arguments and Aristotle is called the father of logic) and (3) one of the liberal arts, we can approach logic by dividing each of these and seeing where logic belongs in each of them.
Thomas distinguishes reason's knowledge at the beginning of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Starting from the connection between reason and order, he distinguishes order in comparison to reason and then divides reason’s knowledge by the order it considers. We learn where logic is in this division and that logic is about the order made by reason in our thinking when we order our thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify those thoughts.
Thomas’ texts will be given in the original Latin followed by an English translation
THOMAS AQUINAS, PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Sicut Philosophus dicit in principio Metaphysicae, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem. Nam etsi vires sensitivae cognoscant res aliquas absolute, ordinem tamen unius rei ad aliam cognoscere est solius intellectus aut rationis.
Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem partium alicuius totius seu alicuius multitudinis adinvicem, sicut partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic ordo est principalior, quam primus. nam, ut Philosophus dicit in XII Metaphysicae, ordo partium exercitus adinvicem, est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem.
Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur.
Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium.
Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae.
Tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis.
Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo.
Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae.
Nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam.
Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones.
Ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae.
Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, pertinet ad artes mechanicas.
Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae adinvicem et ad finem. Dico autem operationes humanas, quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis. Nam si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur, quae non subiacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur proprie humanae, sed naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetabilis, quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut igitur subiectum philosophiae naturalis est motus, vel res mobilis, ita etiam subiectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem.
Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicuius multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. Quo quidem auxilio indiget ad duo.
Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitae necessaria, sine quibus praesens vita transigi non potest: et ad hoc auxiliatur homini domestica multitudo, cuius est pars. Nam quilibet homo a parentibus habet generationem et nutrimentum et disciplinam et similiter etiam singuli, qui sunt partes domesticae familiae, seinvicem iuvant ad necessaria vitae.
Alio modo iuvatur homo a multitudine, cuius est pars, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis, cuius ipse est pars, non solum quantum ad corporalia, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus sufficere non potest, sed etiam quantum ad moralia; inquantum scilicet per publicam potestatem coercentur insolentes iuvenes metu poenae, quos paterna monitio corrigere non valet.
Sciendum est autem, quod hoc totum, quod est civilis multitudo, vel domestica familia habet solam ordinis unitatem, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum; et ideo pars huius totius potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium, sed totius, puta conflictus totius exercitus. Et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem. Est autem aliud totum quod habet unitatem non solum ordine, sed compositione, aut colligatione, vel etiam continuitate, secundum quam unitatem est aliquid unum simpliciter; et ideo nulla est operatio partis, quae non sit totius. In continuis enim idem est motus totius et partis; et similiter in compositis, vel colligatis, operatio partis principaliter est totius; et ideo oportet, quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat consideratio talis totius et partis eius. Non autem ad eamdem scientiam pertinet considerare totum quod habet solam ordinis unitatem, et partes ipsius. Et inde est, quod moralis philosophia in tres partes dividitur.
Quarum prima considerat operationes unius hominis ordinatas ad finem, quae vocatur monastica.
Secunda autem considerat operationes multitudinis domesticae, quae vocatur oeconomica.
Tertia autem considerat operationes multitudinis civilis, quae vocatur politica.
THOMAS AQUINAS, PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it belongs to the wise to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason whose property it is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to understanding or reason.
But a twofold order is found in things. One is of the parts of some whole or some multitude to each other, as the parts of a house are ordered to each other. The other is the order of things to their end. And this order is more the chief one than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the XII book of the Metaphysics, the order of the parts of an army to each other is because of the order of the whole army to its leader.
Order however is compared to reason in four ways:
There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things.
There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds..
There is moreover a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will.
And there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is the cause, such as a box or a house.
And because the consideration of reason is perfected by the firm disposition of knowledge, there are diverse forms of knowledge according to the diverse orders which reason properly considers.
For the consideration of the order of things which human reason considers but does not make belongs to natural philosophy; thus that with natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics.
The order however which reason by considering makes in its own act belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of a speech to each other and the order of beginnings to conclusions.
But the order of voluntary acts belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy
And the order which reason by considering makes in exterior things constructed by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.
Thus therefore it belongs to moral philosophy, about which turns the present intention, to consider human acts as they are ordered to each other and to the end. I call acts human which proceed from the will of man according to the order of reason. For if there are some acts in man which are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called human, but natural, just as is clear about the acts of the plant soul which in no way come under the consideration of moral philosophy. Therefore just as the subject of natural philosophy is motion or a movable thing, so also the subject of moral philosophy is human act ordered to an end, or also man insofar as he is voluntarily acting for an end.
It should be known however that, because man is naturally a social animal, since he needs many things for his life which he cannot himself alone prepare for himself, it follows that man is naturally a part of some multitude through which he is given help to live well. This help he needs for two things.
First for those things necessary for life without which the present life is not able to be gone through. And the domestic household, of which he is a part, aids man in this. For every man has from his parents generation and nourishment and discipline and likewise also the individuals who are parts of the domestic family aid each other in the necessities of life
In another way man is aided by the multitude of which he is a part for a complete sufficiency of life, so that man not only lives, but lives well, having all the things which suffice for his life. And thus the civil multitude, of which he is a part, helps him not only as far as bodily things (as regards many artificial things for which one household is not sufficient), but also as regards moral things insofar as insolent youth, whom paternal admonition is not able to correct, are forced through public power by the threat of punishment.
It should de known however that this whole which is a multitude of citizens or the domestic family has only a unity of order by which something is not simply one. And therefore a part of this whole can have an act which is not an act of the whole, as the soldier in the army has an act which is not that of the whole army.
Nevertheless the whole itself has some act which is not private to some part, but of the whole, as the striking together of the whole army. And the drawing of the ship is an act of the multitude drawing the ship. There is however another whole which has a unity not only in order, but in composition or binding together, or even in continuity by which unity something is one simply; and therefore there is no act of the part which is not of the whole. For there is the same motion of the whole and the part in continuous things. And likewise in things composed or bound together, the act of the part is chiefly of the whole. And therefore it is necessary that the consideration of such a whole and its part belong to the same knowledge. However it does not belong to the same knowledge to consider the whole which has only a unity of order and its parts. And hence it is that moral philosophy is divided into three parts.
The first of these considers the acts of one man ordered to an end and is called monastic. [from one: we call it ethics]
The second however considers the acts of the domestic multitude and is called domestics.
But the third considers the acts of the civil multitude and is called politics.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV, Capitulum XLI:
Nec discrepat a rerum naturalium consuetudine quod aliquid sit naturaliter proprium instrumentum alicuius quod tamen non est forma ipsius. Nam lingua, prout est instrumentum locutionis, est proprium organum intellectus: qui tamen prout Philosophus probat, nullius partis corporis actus est.
Philosophy is divided into two chief parts, looking philosophy and practical or doing philosophy. Hence, when Lady Wisdom appears to Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy, she has on her dress the first Greek letters in their names. These differ by their end. The end of looking philosophy, as its name indicates, is to see or understand. And the end of practical philosophy, as its name also indicates, is to do well. This is like the use we make of our eyes, sometimes just to see something beautiful, and at other times, to do something like walking or driving. Thomas explains where logic belongs in this division in the following text.
Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2:
…scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio Metaphysicorum, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa. Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias. Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad eam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus. Unde secundum Boetium in Comment. super Porphyrium (L. 1, cap. 3) non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.
[adminiculum: I a prop, a support, the pole on which the vine is trained I Transf. aid help]
Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2:
Looking sciences, as is clear in the beginning of the Metaphysics, are about things the knowledge of which is sought for its own sake. The things however which logic is about, are not sought to be known for themselves, but as a help to the other sciences. And therefore logic is not contained under looking philosophy as a principal part, but as something reduced to it; insofar as it provides looking with its tools, namely syllogisms and definitions and others of this kind which we need in the looking sciences. Whence according to Boethius in his Commentary on Porphyry, it is not so much a science as the tool of science.
The distinction of the seven liberal arts into the quadrivium and the trivium goes back to Pythagoras (who divided the four mathematical sciences of the quadrivium) and Plato (who was distinguishing the trivium). The distinction of the seven and their place in education was formalized in the Middle Ages (hence, their Latin names). In the following text, Thomas explains why they are called liberal arts and their place and that of logic in particular at the beginning of philosophy.
Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3:
Ad tertium dicendum quod septem liberales artes non sufficienter dividunt philosophiam theoricam, sed ideo, ut dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore in III sui Didascalicon, praetermissis quibusdam aliis septem connumerantur, quia his primum erudiebantur, qui philosophiam discere volebant, et ideo distinguuntur in trivium et quadrivium, eo quod his quasi quibusdam viis vivax animus ad secreta philosophiae introeat. Et hoc etiam consonat verbis Philosophi qui dicit in II Metaphysicae quod modus scientiae debet quaeri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam, quae docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias scientias, ad quam pertinet trivium. Dicit etiam in VI Ethicorum quod mathematica potest sciri a pueris, non autem physica, quae experimentum requirit. Et sic datur intelligi quod post logicam consequenter debet mathematica addisci, ad quam pertinet quadrivium; et ita his quasi quibusdam viis praeparatur animus ad alias philosophicas disciplinas.
Vel ideo hae inter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur, quia non solum habent cognitionem, sed opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius rationis, ut constructionem syllogismi vel orationem formare, numerare, mensurare, melodias formare et cursus siderum computare. Aliae vero scientiae vel non habent opus, sed cognitionem tantum, sicut scientia divina et naturalis; unde nomen artis habere non possunt, cum ars dicatur ratio factiva, ut dicitur in VI Metaphysicae. Vel habent opus corporale, sicut medicina, alchimia et aliae huiusmodi. Unde non possunt dici artes liberales, quia sunt hominis huiusmodi actus ex parte illa, qua non est liber, scilicet ex parte corporis.
Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3:
To the third it should be said that the seven liberal arts do not sufficiently divide looking philosophy, but therefore, as Hugo of St. Victor says in the third book of his Didascalicon, seven are numbered (setting aside some others) because those who wish to learn philosophy are first instructed in these, and therefore they are distinguished into the trivium and the quadrivium, in that by these as by certain roads the lively soul enters into the secrets of philosophy. And this also fits with the words of the Philosopher who says in the second book of the Metaphysics that the mode of science ought to be sought before the sciences; and the Commentator there says that one ought to learn logic, that teaches the common mode of all the sciences and to which pertains the trivium, before all the other sciences. And he [Aristotle] says also in the sixth book of the Ethics that mathematics is able to known by boys. But not natural science which requires experience. And thus is given to be understood that after logic one ought to learn mathematics to which pertains the quadrivium; and thus by these as by certain roads the soul is prepared for the other philosophic disciplines.
Or therefore those among the other sciences are called arts, because they not only have knowledge, but some work that is immediately of reason itself, as the construction of a syllogism or to form a speech, to number, to measure, to form melodies, and to compute the course of the stars. But other sciences either do not have a work but knowledge only, as divine and natural science (whence they cannot have the name of art since art is called making reason, as is said in the N. Ethics, VI.) or they have a bodily work, as medicine, chemistry and others of this kind. Whence they cannot be called liberal arts, because acts of this kind belong to man by that part in which he is not free, namely the bodily part.