The Contrariety of Love and Knowledge

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The Contrariety of Love and Knowledge

Love & Friendship · A Discourse on Love

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THE CONTRARIETY OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE

Before talking about the contrariety of love and knowledge, I want to warn you about two things. The first is that the contrariety of love and knowledge is only a part of the truth about them, the other part being that love and knowledge depend upon each other (although according to different kinds of cause or dependence). The second thing that I want to warn you about is that love and knowledge are not contraries simply, but only in a qualified way.

That love and knowledge depend upon each other is clear because the good must be known in some way before it can be loved and the love of knowledge gives rise to the pursuit of knowledge in the man who does not possess it, as can be seen in the example of the philosopher (whose name means a lover of wisdom).

That love and knowledge are not contraries without qualification, or not contraries in the strict sense, can be seen from their dependence upon each other, for contraries exclude each other from the same subject. Likewise, from the definition of contraries, it is clear that love and knowledge are not contraries: they are not species furthest apart in the same genus, as black and white in the genus color. Rather, in the same genus, the contrary of love is hate; and the contrary of knowledge, error. And since a thing can have only one contrary, if the contrary of love is hate, knowledge cannot be the contrary of love. And if error is the contrary of knowledge, then neither love nor anything else can be the contrary of knowledge.

At this point, someone might wonder why I want to talk about the contrariety of love and knowledge if this is only a part of the truth about them and they are not even contraries in the strict sense.

Man can see only one part of the truth clearly at a time and this is a very important part of the truth, and there is no falsity in seeing one part of the truth unless you think it is the whole truth.

Further, although love and knowledge are not contraries strictly speaking or without qualification, yet in some respect, as we shall see, there is a contrariety between them. And any time there is some kind of opposition between two things, it is good for the mind to bring out that opposition, for opposites are always more clear when laid along side each other. And it hardly need to be said that to become clear about love and knowledge, is one of the most important things in the world. Nothing is better in us than love and knowledge, as is especially clear from their perfections which are friendship and wisdom. And although love and knowledge are not the same thing in us, the theologian tells us that in God, love and knowledge are one and the same thing. The divine substance, while remaining one and simple, is both knowledge and love. Hence, if we understand love and knowledge in us, we can proceed from what is many in us towards what is one in God. This is enough to see the importance of bringing out the contrariety between love and knowledge so as to see them clearly.

We shall consider the contrariety of love and knowledge first in regard to their objects or causes, second in regard to the acts involved in them, and third and last in regard to a couple of signs or effects of them.

The first object of love is the good while for knowledge it is truth. But the good is primarily in things while truth is primarily in the understanding. Hence, in love the movement of the soul is towards things while in knowledge it is from things to the soul. This is the basic contrariety in some respect between love and knowledge. Just as the movement from here to the end of the room and the movement from the end of the room back to here are contrary movements, going in contrary directions; so the movement of the soul in love which is towards things seems to be contrary to the movement of the soul in knowledge which is from things to the soul. The movements go in contrary directions: in love from the soul to things, and in knowledge from things to the soul. Let me manifest this contrariety in a number of ways.

First, there is the same knowledge of opposite things, but not the same love. The knowledge of one opposite helps us to know the other, but the love of one opposite excludes the love of the other. Thus there is the same knowledge of health and sickness, namely medicine; and the knowledge of health helps one to know what sickness is. But the love of health excludes the love of sickness. One cannot love health and sickness at the same time. Again there is the same knowledge of virtue and vice, namely ethics; and the knowledge of virtue helps one to know what vice is. But the love of virtue excludes the love of vice. And vice-versa, the love of vice is incompatible with the love of virtue.

Clearly, love follows the condition of things where one opposite excludes the other; just as the body cannot be healthy and sick at the same time, so too the love of health excludes the love of sickness. The love of health excludes the love of sickness, because health and sickness cannot be together in things. Thus love in tending towards things, follows the condition of things where one opposite excludes the other. But the condition of opposites in the mind where they are known together is obviously a condition of the knower. Things which cannot exist together outside the soul, such as health and sickness, are known together in the mind. So things have been brought into the mind in knowledge according to the condition of the mind or understanding.

Here is a second way of seeing that love follows the condition of things themselves while the thing known is in the knower according to the condition of the knower: love of the bad is itself bad while knowledge of the bad is not bad, but good. The man who loves vice is himself by that very fact vicious, but the man who knows well what vice is, is not rendered vicious by his knowledge as such, but perfected in his mind. Here again it can be seen that love follows the condition of the thing: love of the bad is bad itself while knowledge of the bad is not bad, but good. Love of the bad is bad because love tends toward the thing itself. The prophet Osee says about sinners, "they became abominable as were those things which they loved (Osee, Chapter 9, v. 10).

A third way of seeing this contrariety in some respect of love and knowledge is to consider their proper opposites. The opposite of love is hate while the opposite of knowledge is ignorance or error (ignorance being the lack of knowledge and error its contrary). Hate can be good just as love can be bad. It all depends on the things loved or hated: love of virtue is good while love of vice is bad. Hatred of virtue is bad while hatred of vice is good. But all knowledge as such is good, as the Philosopher observes in the beginning of the three books About the Soul; whence all ignorance and error as such are bad. The goodness of love or hate depends upon the things loved or hated, but knowledge which is good and error which is bad can be had of the same thing, whether that thing be good or bad.

Because the lover is drawn toward things as they are in themselves while the thing known is received in the knower according to the condition of the knower, love is rightly held to be more passive than knowledge. This is what St. Thomas says in his Commentary on the Divine Names of Dionysius:

Passio enim magis ad appetitum quam ad cognitionem pertinere videtur, quia cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis et non secundum modum rerum cognitarum, sed appetitus movet ad res secundum modum quo in seipsis sunt, et sic ad ipsas res quodammdo afficitur.

So passive or undergoing is love that the lover is said to be wounded by the one he loves. Hence, in mythology, we speak of Cupid's darts as wounding the hearts of those who fall in love. And Sacred Scripture itself speaks this way, as in the Song of Songs, where Christ or God speaks to the Church or to Mary or to the individual soul with these words (Chapter 4,v. 9):

Thou hast wounded my heart, my sister, my spouse, thou hast wounded my heart.

This is why the great lovers of God, St. Gertrude the Great, St. Teresa of Avila and St. Therese of Lisieux received an immense gift of love of God under the likeness of a dart or spear or arrow. The great St. Teresa of Avila, reformer of the Carmelites, who completed her autobiography in 1562 at the command of her confessor, gives there an account of the following vision (Autobiography, Chapter 29):

It pleased the Lord that I should see this angel in the following way. He was not tall, but short and very beautiful, his face so aflame that he appeared to be one of the highest types of angel who seem to be all afire...In his hands I saw a long golden spear and at the end of the iron tip I seemed to see a point of fire. With this he seemed to pierce my heart several times so that it penetrated to my entrails. When he drew it out, I thought he was drawing them out with it and he left me completely afire with a great love of God. The pain was so sharp that it made me utter several moans; and so excessive was the sweetness caused me by this intense pain that one can never wish to lose it, nor will one's soul be content with anything less than God.

St. Therese of Lisieux received a gift of love in a similar way (Epilogue to the Autobiography of St. Therese of Lisieux by the Carmel of Lisieux):

On another occasion she related the following incident: "A few days after the oblation of myself to God's Merciful Love I was in the choir, beginning the Way of the Cross, when suddenly I felt myself wounded by a dart of fire so ardent that I thought I should die. I cannot describe the transport, and no comparison would convey an idea of the intensity of the flame. It seemed as though an invisible force had plunged me wholly into fire...But what fire! what sweetness!"

St. Gertrude's heart was pierced by an arrow in the shape of a cross (Book II of her Revelations, Chapter 5).

Because love is so much more passive than knowledge, we all use contrary metaphors in talking about love and knowledge, and about the heart where love resides and the head where knowledge is kept. These contrary metaphors are warm or hot and cool or cold. Also, soft and hard. Fire, flame, hot as Dutch love, hot or warm are use in describing the heart that loves. A loving, friendly person is described as warm-hearted. But we describe the head or reason or logic by contrary metaphors. We say "keep your head" or "keep your cool"; we speak of cool reason or cold logic. Cold things keep their own form or shape while warm things, heated things, like the wax, are more easily stamped by another. Consistently with the former metaphors, we also use hard or soft. Just as heat softens things, so coldness hardens things. A heart that has no love in it, is called hard or cold. The Psalmist (Psalm 94) warns us not to harden our hearts. Likewise, it is no compliment to be called soft in the head.

The fact that we all use contrary metaphors in talking about love and knowledge is a sign that men in general see some contrariety between love and knowledge. The metaphors do indeed correspond to what has been said already about love tending towards things and being more affected by them than knowledge. Warmth softens a thing, melts it, causes it to expand and overflow. All these can be said metaphorically of love. Soft things take on the form of other things; so the lover becomes like what he loves. Love is in the thing loved, just as things that melt and expand and overflow, reach out to other things. But coldness hardens things, contracts them. Knowledge is attained by concentration. Knowledge is more hard than love because the knower is less affected by the condition of what he knows than the lover, by what he loves.

In the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, St. Thomas gives three basic causes of love: the good, knowledge and likeness. We have already talked about the good. Knowledge as a cause pertains to the part of the truth we are not considering here. So it remains to talk about likeness.

Likeness is a cause of love. I like you because you are like me in some way. The English word like here is a good sign of the connection of loving or liking with likeness. I like you because you are like me.

There is a problem about saying that likeness is a cause of love because it seems, at times, that opposites are attracted to each other. This problem is the subject of Plato's great dialogue on friendship, the Lysis. In that dialogue, Plato is approaching the solution of the problem given in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae of St. Thomas. One is not attracted to one's opposite because of the opposition, but because one is able to be like that opposite. The student is attracted to the professor, not because the professor knows and the student is ignorant, but because the professor knows and the student is able to know. It is by reason of his ability to now that the student is attracted to the professor. Ignorance as such could never desire knowledge or it would be desiring its own destruction. Thus likeness, whether it is actual or merely potential, is the cause of liking or loving. Thus too, matter is said to desire form, not because it is lacking it, but because it is able to have it.

But likeness is not so much the cause of knowledge as it is of deception. The first cause of deception in man and animals is false imagination. False teeth are called false because they are apt to deceive us into thinking they are natural teeth by their likeness to them. At the beginning of his book On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle shows that the general cause of deception is likeness. If falsehood did not seem like truth, we would never take it for truth; and if truth did not sometimes look like falsehood, we would never reject it.

Shelley in the Art of Poetry says that imagination delights in the likeness of things while reason delights in their differences. There is some truth here because, although reason does delight also in likenesses and is helped by seeing them, nevertheless, reason and knowledge are perfected by seeing the differences of things. And deception will often occur when we see the likeness of things, but not their differences. Knowledge in the sciences is perfected by seeing differences. That is why geometry, for example, is based on definitions and divisions which involve seeing the differences of things. Theology is perfected by the via negativa, not likeness.

This is then a second contrariety on the part of the causes of love and knowledge. Love is caused by likeness while knowledge is perfected by seeing difference.

Since acts are distinguished by their objects and causes, we would expect to find contrariety in the acts involved in love and knowledge, corresponding to the above contrariety in objects and causes.

We learn in the books About the Soul and elsewhere, that knowledge involves two acts: grasping and judging what has been grasped. You must grasp what speaker or author is saying before you can judge whether it is true or false. Sometimes Thomas will say that the two fundamental acts in knowledge are finding and judging. Finding and grasping are very close.

The first act of reason is grasping what a thing is. When we have grasped a number of things, we can form statements in which we grasp the true or the false. Sometimes we judge the truth or falsity of these statements by understanding their parts, as we can judge that every whole is greater than one of it parts by understanding what a whole is and what a part is. In other cases this is not possible, and a statement must be judged by other statements whose truth is known.

That grasping is the first act in knowing agrees very well with what has been said before. When I grasp something with my hand, it is contained in my hand. Likewise, when I grasp something with my mind, it is contained in my mind. This agrees with what was said before, that the movement in knowledge is from things to the soul, that things are brought into the knower according to the condition of the knower, that they are grasped by the knower. Further, it harmonizes with the second thing said that knowledge is perfected by seeing the differences between things. Thus grasping what something is, involves dividing and defining; and grasping statements involves the square of opposition etc.

The second act in knowing, judging, also involves seeing differences for judging is always a separating either of the true from the false or of the good from the bad or some other separating.

But the acts in love would seem to be contrary to those in knowing. Loving is characterized by giving, which is contrary to taking or grasping. The lover is a giver. And the first thing he gives is his love. We say "I give you my love" or "I have given you my heart." In explaining one of the proper names of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by way of love, St. Thomas points out that the Holy spirit is called "donum Dei", the "gift of God", because he proceeds by way of love and that everything else we give someone, we give them because we have already given them our love. So love is the first gift. Loving is the giving whence arises every other giving of good things to another.

That loving is a giving also agrees well with what was said before, that love tends toward things in themselves. Contrary to knowledge, where the thing known is in the knower, love or the heart is in the thing loved. Thus the words of the song say, "I left my heart in San Francisco." And when Romeo has a hard time leaving the place where Juliet is, he says, "Can I go forward when my heart is here?" And our Lord said, "Where your treasure is, there also shall your heart be."

Loving is not only a giving but a uniting. The lover is joined by his love to the one he loves. Love makes us one with the thing or person we love. So much is this so in the case of true friendship that we can say that a friend is another self. Uniting seems contrary to judging since the one who judges separates. This can be seen in the thought of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Empedocles attributes to love the coming together of the elements and to hate, their separation. But what Empedocles attributes to hate, separation, is assigned by Anaxagoras to mind which is the seat of knowledge. Hence, as hate is contrary to love, so knowledge seems in some way contrary to love.

We said before that St. Thomas sometimes speaks of the acts in knowledge as being finding and judging. Finding is the opposite of losing. The person who falls in love is said to lose his or her heart. It is okay to lose your heart if you lose it to the right person. But keep your head - don't lose that.

We now come to the last part of our consideration of love and knowledge where we shall speak of a couple of their signs or effects. The first is that we can express our knowledge better by words than by deeds, but deeds are a more convincing sign of our love than any words. The second signs or effects are these: teaching and learning are the offspring of knowledge while persuasion is the offspring of love.

Words are closer to knowledge than to things for we name things as we know them. Naming follows the order in our knowledge which is sometimes contrary to the order in things. The word father is first said of our earthly father and then of our heavenly father although in things our heavenly father is the first and complete father. It is not by chance that the Greek word for word (lógoß) is carried over and placed upon thought since a word signifies a thought. the teacher could not express his knowledge, or even his errors, tot he students without using words. Theology also witnesses to the connection between words and knowledge for the Person who proceeds by way of knowledge is called the Word of God.

But as the proverb goes, "actions speak louder than words" as far as manifesting that which is in the heart. Gremio, in The Taming of the Shrew (Act I, Sc. 1), speaking of the fair Bianca says, "Beloved of me; and that my deeds shall prove." And when Julia the faithful lover leaves Proteus in The Two Gentlemen of Verona without a word, his surprise gives way to the point we re making now. Proteus says (Act II, Sc. 2):

Julia, farewell! [exit Julia] What, gone without a word? Ay, so true love should do: it cannot speak; For truth hath better deeds than words to grace it.

The proverb "a friend in need is a friend indeed" gives witness to the same truth. One could take the word indeed and divide it into its parts for a friend indeed, that is a true friend, is not just in his words, but more so in his deeds. This is why Christ said, "greater love than this hath no man than he lay down his life for his friend." Words of love will never convince us of someone's love if their deeds point another way. Troilus is not deceived in Shakespeare's play Troilus and Cressida by the words of the unfaithful Cressida when he learns that her deeds point to another place for her affections. Shakespeare's words here as elsewhere are marvelously to the point. Troilus has received a letter from Cressida and says:

Words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart The effect doth operate another way. Go, wind, to wind, then turn and change together. [tearing the letter] My love with words and errors still she feeds, But edifies another with her deeds.

These lines are like those in the Passionate Pilgrim (XXI):

Words are easy like the wind. Faithful friends are hard to find.

True love often prefers to be silent. In the Poet's Twenty-third Sonnet, we read, "O learn to read what silent love hath writ." The contrast is especially striking in King Lear (Act I, Sc. 1) when Cordelia listens to her sisters' wordy, but false protestations of love for their father. After Goneril's word, Cordelia says to her self, "What shall Cordelia do? Love and be silent"; and after Regan's words "I am sure my love's more ponderous than my tongue"; and to the angry Lear, who demands a like protestation in words, she says, I cannot heave my heart into my mouth." There is a beautiful example of the silence of love in the account of the last days of St. Therese of Lisieux by the Carmel of Lisieux:

until two days before her death she would never allow anyone to remain with her through the night. In spite of her entreaties, however, the infirmarian looked in from time to time. Finding her, on one of these occasions, with hands joined and eyes raised to heaven, she asked: "What are you doing? You ought to try and get some sleep." "I cannot, sister, I am suffering too much, so I pray." "And what do you say to Jesus?" "I say nothing - I love Him"

The last thing to be considered is that teaching is the offspring of knowledge while persuasion is the offspring of love. The contrariety of love and knowledge is also seen in their offspring: persuasion and teaching. We can be very brief in considering teaching as the offspring of knowledge, but we must say more about love and persuasion.

That teaching is the offspring of knowledge can be seen both on the part of the teacher and on the part of the one he teaches, the student. The teacher is able to teach because of the knowledge he possesses. This is why the philosopher says in the Metaphysics that the ability to teach is a sign of knowledge. But likewise, on the part of the student, knowledge is required because the teacher leads the student to a knowledge of something unknown to him through things already known to him. Aristotle shows this in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics. This agrees with the tool of the teacher which is the word. The words of the teacher would not help the student to know unless they brought to the mind of the student things he already knows from which he can come to know something new.

Since the teacher is in some way a cause of the new knowledge in the student, one could also say that some knowledge is an effect of teaching. Knowledge then is intimately connected with teaching. The knowledge of the teacher is a cause of his teaching and the new knowledge of the student is, to some extent, an effect of the teaching.

Persuasion, however, is not through knowledge, but, as the etymology of the word shows, through the sweet. Persuasion comes from the Latin words per meaning through and suadere meaning to sweeten. Persuasion then is through the sweet. Hence, before we can see how persuasion is the offspring of love, we must see that sweetness comes from love.

Towards the end of his life on this earth, St. Thomas Aquinas was lecturing on, or giving sermons on, the Psalms which he had memorized at the beginning of his life. In explaining the verse of Psalm 24 - "The Lord is sweet and upright", St. Thomas explains that upright refers to the divine justice and sweet to his mercy or kindness. Clearly, mercy or kindness comes from love. The corporal and spiritual works of mercy come from charity which is the highest form of love; and the kindness which parents show their children comes from their natural love for them. To be kind to someone is to treat them as your own kin, whom you naturally love.

The connection of sweetness with love comes out in every kind of love that we experience. Lovers call each other sweet-heart in which it is clear that sweetness comes from the heart that loves. We more often call a woman sweet than a man because women are more loving and kind than men as a rule. One of the most famous prayers to Mary, the Mother of God, calls her both sweet and sweetness. In the beginning of this prayer, we have the words "Hail, Holy queen, Mother of Mercy, our Life, our Sweetness and our Hope." and it ends with the words "O Clement, O Loving, O Sweet Virgin Mary." In the first words, her sweetness is associated with her being the Mother of Mercy. And mercy comes from love. In the second words, she is called "Loving" and this is immediately followed by "Sweet." Mary's sweetness comes from her love for us. Pius XII spoke of the ineffable sweetness of Mary. Her sweetness is ineffable because her love for us is ineffable. The sweetness of Christ on the Cross comes from the love which moved him to die for us and which is shown by his death for us. The famous prayer before the crucified Christ begins, if you look at the Latin, with calling Him most sweet: "Behold, O good and most sweet (dulcissime) Jesus."

If sweetness comes from love, then persuasion, which is through the sweet, will also come at last from love. Both in Greek and in Roman mythology, the goddess Persuasion (Suadela in Latin and peiqø in Greek) is the daughter of love.

If persuasion is the daughter of love, we can also understand the order of the forms of persuasion by their greater or lesser connection with love. And since persuasion is through the sweet and sweetness comes from love, it can be seen that the order in sweetness and persuasion will be the same in their greater or lesser connection with love.

The three main forms of persuasion are through the ear: music, poetry (or fiction including drama and epic) and rhetoric or the speech. this is also the order in their greater or lesser connection with love. Music is the closest to love and poetry is closer to music and, hence, to love than is the speech.

The close connection between music and love has often been noted. This can be seen both in secular music and in church music. Music comes first in sweetness and persuasion because it comes first in love Kierkegaard writes well in Either/Or:

The experts...all continue to reiterate that Mozart’s Don Juan is the crown of all operas, but without explaining what they mean by that, although they all say it in a manner which clearly demonstrates that by this statement they intend to say something more than Don Juan is the best opera, that there is a qualitative difference between it and all other operas, which cannot well be sought in anything other than in the absolute relationship between idea, form, subject and medium.

The happy characteristic that belongs to every classic, that which makes it classic and immortal, is the absolute harmony of the two forces, form and content. this concord is so absolute that a later reflective age will scarcely be able to separate, even for thought, the two constituent elements here so intimately united, without running the risk of entertaining or provoking a misunderstanding. Thus when we say that it was Homer’s good fortune that he had the most remarkable epic subject conceivable, we may forget that we always see this epic material through Homer’s eyes, and that it seems to us the most perfect subject, is clear to us only in and through the transubstantiation which we owe to Homer. But if, on the other hand, we stress Homer’s poetic energy in interpreting the material, we easily run the risk of forgetting that the poem would never have become the thing it is, if the thought with which Homer has imbued it were not its own thought, if the form were not precisely the form that belongs to it.

The fortunate has two factors: it is fortunate that the most distinguished epic subject fell to the lot of Homer; here the accent falls as much on Homer as on the material. It is this profound harmony which reverberates through every work of art we call classic. and so it is with Mozart; it is fortunate that the subject, which is perhaps the only strictly musical subject, in the deeper sense, that life affords, fell to - Mozart. With his Don Juan, Mozart enters the little immortal circle of those whose names, whose works, time will not forget, because eternity remembers them.

....it is not probable that Mozart will ever have a rival. It was Mozart’s good fortune to have found a subject that is absolutely musical, and if some future composer should try to emulate Mozart, there would be nothing else for him to do than compose Don Juan over again.

Pope Paul VI, in a homily delivered during the Mass celebrated on Sunday, Sept. 24, 1972 in the Basilica of St. Peter for the Italian St. Cecilia Association:

Singing is a necessity of love and manifests it. Listen to how St. Augustine speaks about it: ‘singing comes from cheerfulness, but if we observe more carefully, from love: canticum res est hilaritatis, et si diligentius consideremus, res est amoris.’(Sermo 34) and again: "cantare et psallere negotium esse solet amantium: singing and chanting is characteristic of those who love." (Sermo 33)

The natural sign of love, singing, has, therefore, an irreplaceable role in Christian worship, which is service of charity: of that love, in which, as we recalled in the prayer of Holy Mass, ‘the foundation of the whole law is placed.’ Since "de illo quem amas cantare vis" (St. Augustine, Sermo 34, PL 38), our love for God is also expressed in singing.

Love and praise call for each other, as St. Augustine again says: "amare et laudare: laudare in amore: amare in laudibus: to love and to praise, to praise in love, to love in praises (Enarr. in Ps. 147).

But singing manifests and foments also love among brothers. The community is formed in singing, assisting with the fusion of voices that of hearts...uniting everyone in one aspiration, in praise.

Because singing or music is the "natural sign of love" and "a necessity of love" and "manifests it", music is also the sweetest. Hence Lorenzo in the Merchant of Venice speaks of the "sweet power of music." And because persuasion is through the sweet, music is also the most persuasive. we often start humming a melody that someone else has been humming in our presence. but Homer has given us the classic example of the persuasive power of music in the Sirens. And Sirens are persuasive even in the face of contrary knowledge. Circe warned Odysseus about the Sirens so that he knew the danger of listening to their singing. Yet if force did not prevent him, and if his companions restraining him did not have wax in their ears, nothing could have prevailed against the persuasive power of music or their singing. Listen to Homer speak of the effect of their music upon Odysseus in Book XII of the Odyssey:

So they sang in sweet utterance, and the heart within me desired to listen, and I signaled my companions to set me free, nodding with my brows, but they leaned on and rowed hard, and Perimedes and Eurylochos, rising up, straightway fastened me with ever more lashings and squeezed me tighter.

Poetry comes after music as an expression of love. Touchstone in As You Like It ((Act III, Sc. 3) says what we all know: "lovers are given to poetry." And Berowne, in Love's Labour's Lost (Act IV, Sc. 3), speaks first of poetry's origin in love and then of the persuasive power it derives therefrom:

Never durst poet touch a pen to write Until his ink were temper'd with Love's sighs; O: then his lines would ravish savage ears, And plant in tyrants mild humility.

Poetry is also much closer to music than is the speech or rhetoric. Poetry was originally accompanied by musical instruments. How many words in poetry are taken from music; for example, sonnet or ode mean song, tragedy and comedy are formed from the word ode, canto comes from sing in Latin and lyric poetry is named from a musical instrument.

It is clear that the words of the speaker cannot be as sweet as those of the poet who can use meter and metaphor much more than the speaker. Yet the speaker also persuades through the sweet. When the French send Joan of Arc to persuade the Duke of Burgundy to return to them in King Henry VI, Part One (Act III, Scene 3) Joan says:

By fair persuasions mix'd with sugar'd words, We will entice the Duke of Burgundy To leave the Talbot and to follow us.

The closeness of rhetoric or the speech to poetry is shown by the Greeks regarding Homer as not only the father of their poetry, but also of their rhetoric or art of speech in the character of Nestor. Notice how Homer speaks of the sweetness of Nestor's words when he rises up to speak between the angry Achilles and Agamemnon in the first book of the Iliad:

...............................................between them Nestor the fair spoken rose up, the lucid speaker of Pylos, from whose lips the stream of words ran sweeter than honey.

Also as Aristotle observes in the Rhetoric, the speaker is more persuasive by the good-will he shows towards his audience and the friendly feeling he arouses in them (and the good jokes he tells) than by any arguments he gives. Nevertheless, the public speaker is clearly not so close to love as is the poet.

We have seen something of the order of the three forms of human persuasion, starting from love which is the mother of persuasion. This order is music first, poetry second, and rhetoric third. but if we were to arrange these three forms of persuasion by their distance from teaching and knowledge, we would get exactly the contrary order. Rhetoric, which argues on both sides of a question about the singular in human affairs, is the closest to dialectic which is a tool of the teacher in all reasoned out knowledge, except perhaps the mathematical. The poet is less argumentative and the musician not at all. (We are not here referring to the science of musical sounds which can be argumentative, but to musicians playing for our enjoyment or Don Giovanni under the window of Donna Elvira.)

And since there can be music without words, while the teacher must use words, as do also the poet and the speaker, it is clear that music (which is the closest to love and first in persuasion) is the farthest from teaching and knowledge. The speaker is the closest to the teacher in that he uses enthymeme and example which resemble syllogism and induction, the tools of the teacher. The poet does not so much reason or argue as he represents. In this and many other ways he is more like the musician.

There is then a contrariety between persuasion and teaching. what is first in persuasion is furthest from teaching and what is last in persuasion is the closest to teaching.

The contrariety of teaching and persuasion is also seen in the highest point of teaching which is called a demonstration in logic. Demonstration is a syllogism making us know the cause and that of which it is the cause and that it cannot be otherwise. Demonstration seems to force the mind to assent to the conclusion. But force and persuasion are contraries. Force is also spoken of as contrary to love. Thus when Proteus is about to force himself upon Sylvia, Shakespeare has him say (The two Gentlemen of Verona, Act V, Sc. 4):

Nay, if the gentle spirit of moving words Can no way change you to a milder form, I'll woo you like a soldier, at arms' end, And love you 'gainst the nature of love, - force ye.

The contrariety of persuasion and teaching is a sign of the contrariety of love and knowledge. For love is the mother of persuasion and knowledge, of teaching. Further, teaching also leads to knowledge in the student while persuasion leads to love - for persuasion is through the sweet And everyone knows that sweetness is a cause of love. Sweetness is either the cause or the effect of love (for it is sweet to be loved) while knowledge is either the cause or the effect of teaching.

We have not by any means exhausted the subject of the contrariety of love and knowledge. But what we have said is perhaps sufficient to see that love and knowledge are in some respect contrary. This, of course, is only a part of the truth about them.