The Distinction Between Wonder and the Love of Wisdom

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The Distinction Between Wonder and the Love of Wisdom

Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will

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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WONDER AND THE LOVE OF WISDOM

No one can become a philosopher without wonder because wonder is the beginning of philosophy, as we can see in the first philosophers and as the chief philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, teach us. And no one can be a philosopher without the love of wisdom as the name philosopher itself witnesses. The philosopher is named from the love of wisdom.

Wonder and the love of wisdom are akin and wonder disposes for the love of wisdom, but they are not the same. It would be a mistake to identify them or make them synonymous. We must consider their distinction. And after we distinguish them, we can ask why the philosopher is named from the love of wisdom rather than from wonder.

We can see that philosophy began in wonder in the investigations of the first philosophers before Socrates. The strength of this wonder is expressed in a fragment of Democritus:

I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians.[1]

Plato, coming towards the end of the golden age of Greek philosophy, has Socrates state in the Theaetetus:

Wonder is very much the undergoing of a philosopher. There is no other beginning of philosophy than this.[2]

And Aristotle (in the proemium to wisdom at the beginning of the first book of wisdom, the Metaphysics ) also says:

For men both now and at first began to philosophize through wonder.[3]

This wonder and the love of wisdom seem akin, but are they the same thing? There are upon examination many reasons for distinguishing them. We can give at least three differences between them and one sign of their difference.

The first difference to be considered is their genera. The genus of wonder is desire and the genus of the love of wisdom is, of course, love. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle states that in wonder is the desire to know:

To learn and to wonder are pleasant for the most part. For in wonder is the desire to know, so that the wonderful is desired, but in learning there is a return to nature.[4]

And Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa Theologiae, also speaks of wonder as a desire:

Wonder is a certain desire of knowing which happens in man from seeing an effect and not knowing its cause or from the cause excelling his knowledge or capacity. And therefore wonder is a cause of pleasure insofar as it has joined to it the hope of gaining the knowledge of that which one desires to know.[5]

Shakespeare in Julius Caesar has Cassius speaking to Casca of his wonder proceeding from ignorance of the cause of the strange happenings:

You are dull, Casca, and these sparks of life That should be in a Roman you do want. Or else you use not. You look pale and gaze, And put on fear, and cast yourself in wonder, To see the strange impatience of the heavens; But if you would consider the true cause Why all these fires, why all these gliding ghosts, Why birds and beasts, from quality and kind, Why old men, fools, and children calculate, Why all these things change from their ordinance, Their natures, and pre-formed faculties, To monstrous quality, - why you shall find That heaven hath infus'd them with these spirits To make them instruments of fear and warning Unto some monstrous state.[6]

But the love of wisdom is a love, not a desire.

One should not exaggerate this difference between desire and love for even Thomas sometimes considers desire as an imperfect love. Consider this interesting passage from his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard:

desire and love differ in this way that love implies a certain agreement and natural conformity to the loved which is perfected when the loved is had in some way, but desire implies a motion towards the lovable not yet had

Whence the motion of the heart begins in desire and ends in complete love.

And therefore desire is a certain beginning of love and as an imperfect love[7]

This text shows how close wonder as a desire can be to the love of wisdom. It is a beginning and even an imperfect or incomplete love of wisdom.

What is found in the complete or perfect love of wisdom that is not found in wonder? Perhaps, we should consider how the true philosopher must love wisdom.

First, the true philosopher must love wisdom for its own sake. If he loves wisdom for the sake of fame or money, he is more a sophist than a philosopher. He should be called a lover of fame or money. If a man loves a woman for her money, he should not be said to love the woman, but to love her money. No one then should be called a philosopher who does not love wisdom for its own sake.

Second, he should love wisdom more than anything else which he may love for its own sake. If I love wisdom for its own sake and the music of Mozart for its own sake, but the music of Mozart more than wisdom, I am rightly called a lover of the music of Mozart rather than a lover of wisdom.

Third, he must love wisdom as the end of his life. And this would seem to follow from the first two. For the end is desired for its own sake and more than anything else.

Fourth, he must love wisdom, or that truth of which wisdom is the knowledge, as a common good. That truth of which wisdom is the knowledge can be considered as the common good of the universe according to the argument of Thomas in the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles (Liber I, Capitulum 1):

Moreover, wisdom is the common good of reason and all the other particular forms of knowledge possessed by reason. They are all in some way ordered to wisdom as an end and they all partake of the goodness of wisdom, even the habit of natural understanding. Hence, wisdom is the called the head of all our understanding.

A second difference between wonder and the love of wisdom is in their object. Wonder can be found where there is any unknown cause, but the love of wisdom is a love of the knowledge of the first cause or causes. This does not mean that wonder is more universal than the love of wisdom. For wisdom is the most universal knowledge and perfects all other forms of knowledge, even that of natural understanding. And the man who knows the cause of the cause, and especially the first cause, in some way knows all things

There is a third difference between wonder and the love of wisdom. Wonder is natural while the love of wisdom is a chosen love. Hence, when Aristotle begins his proemium to wisdom in the first book of wisdom (the first book of the Metaphysics ) in which he will, following Plato, teach that wonder is the beginning of philosophy, he starts with the famous words that all men by nature desire to know (or to understand). But in the fourth book of wisdom (the fourth book of the Metaphysics ), he states that the philosopher differs from the sophist by his choice of life. [8]

The love of wisdom is not natural, but acquired by choice through the perfection of reason by the forms of reasoned out knowledge. Before Hamlet states why he chose Horatio as his friend, he says:

Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice And could of men distinguish, her election Hath seal'd thee for herself[9]

These words indicate that his soul was not always mistress of her choice. Before he could choose Horatio as a friend, his reason must have developed to the point of being capable of distinguishing Horatio from other men and seeing why he was better than other men. The soul is not mistress of her choice before reason can compare and distinguish things and see their order The same could be said in particular of the chosen love of wisdom. Before one can choose wisdom as a lover of wisdom should, one's reason must be able to distinguish wisdom from every other kind of knowledge and also see the order between wisdom and other kinds of knowledge. Most men, including most so-called philosophers, never get to this point.

Reason must be perfected by many kinds of knowledge before it can distinguish between wisdom and the other forms of knowledge and know what wisdom is, and before it can see the order between wisdom and other kinds of knowledge and how wisdom is the head of all understanding. Hence, the perfect or complete love of wisdom can only be a chosen love.

A sign that wonder and the love of wisdom are not the same is that, when the one grows, the other diminishes. As Thomas teaches, love increases in the presence of its object (unless we discover something not lovable in that object) Hence, as one grows in wisdom, one's love of wisdom should become stronger. In his writings on the third book of the Sentences, Thomas says:

Love implies the relation of the concupiscible to the good, but hate to the bad, because love makes the loved connatural and as one with the lover, the contrary of which hate does. And because this relation is perfected by the presence of the object, therefore love in its full meaning is of something had, as Augustine says in his eighth sermon on Psalm 118.[10]

But wonder, which proceeds from ignorance of the cause, is diminished, if not eliminated, as one comes to know the cause. Wonder is a desire to know for its own sake the cause and desire is in the absence of its object. We should consider this sign more at length.

Desire is for a good not had and the desire is replaced by delight or pleasure when the object has been acquired or reached. Thus hunger is satisfied by food and is replaced by the pleasure in eating. Likewise, wonder diminishes as reason comes to know. Hence, Shakespeare says in As you like It:

Feed yourselves with questioning; That reason wonder may diminish, How thus we met, and these things finish.[11]

As we question and find answers, our wonder diminishes. And in A Midsummer's Night, the Poet says:

Gentles, perchance you wonder at this show; But wonder on, till truth make all things plain.[12]

Wonder lasts until truth has been made plain or explained.

And in King Henry VI, Part Three, Gloucester tells his companions to cease wondering as he explains the cause of being where they are:

Leave off to wonder why I drew you hither, Into this chiefest thicket of the park. Thus stands the case: you know our king, my brother Is prisoner to the bishop here, at whose hands He hath good usage and great liberty And, often but attended with weak guard, Comes hunting this way to disport himself. I have advertised him by secret means, That if about this hour he make this way Under the colour of his usual game, He shall here find his friends with horse and men To set him free from his captivity.[13]

Of course, the wonder described by Shakespeare in these readings is about the singular while the wonder of the philosopher is about the universal.

Hence, too, the Philosopher says towards the end of his Proemium to wisdom in the first book of wisdom (the first book of the Metaphysics ):

It is necessary, however, to place the possession of this in the opposite for us of the searches in the beginning. For all began, as we have said, from wondering that things are thus; as about the turnings of the sun or the incommensurability of the diagonal - for it seems wonderful to all that have not seen the cause if something is not measured by the smallest. It is necessary therefore to finish in the contrary and the better, according to the proverb, just as in those when they have learned - for the geometer would wonder at nothing so much as if the diagonal were to become commensurable.[14]

Love, however, is found both in the presence and absence of its object and is stronger in its presence as Thomas explains in the Summa Contra Gentiles when speaking of why love can be found in God (but not desire):

Love on the part of its object does not imply anything repugnant to God since it is of the good. Nor from the way in which it is towards the object. For love is of some thing not less when it is had, but more, because a good becomes more akin to us when it is had. Whence also the motion to an end in natural things is intensified from nearness to the end. Sometimes however the contrary happens by accident as when we experience in the loved something which is repugnant to love. Then it is less loved when it is had. Love therefore is not repugnant to the divine perfection by reason of its species. Therefore it is in God.[15]

Since love is the conformity of the heart with its object, it is not less, but even more, in the presence of that object. One then is not less a philosopher when one has acquired some wisdom, but even more a philosopher. It is the wonder that diminishes as one comes to know, at least that wonder which was a desire to know what one now does know.

But hope or desire cannot be found in God because their object is a good not yet had by the one who desire or hopes. Hence, Thomas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles:

Hope however, although it has a good for an object, does not have a good already obtained, but one to be obtained. This however cannot belong to God by reason of his perfection which is so great that no addition can come to it. Hope therefore cannot be in God even by reason of its object. And likewise neither desire which is of something not had.[16]

We can see now see why the philosopher is named from the love of wisdom rather than from wonder. Wonder arises from ignorance and ceases when we come to know. But love can be found both in the presence and the absence of its object. Hence, one can be said to love wisdom whether one is wise or not wise. But one wonders only when one is ignorant.

Thus we can distinguish wonder and the love of wisdom by at least three differences and one sign of their difference. They differ in genus, and in object, and in the one being natural and the other chosen. The sign of their difference is that one is diminished as we learn, but the other increases as we learn. Their first difference explains the sign. Because wonder is a desire to know, it must diminish or cease when we come to know. But love can be also in the presence of its object and is even stronger in its presence (unless there is something repugnant to love in the object).

We said in the beginning that no one can become a philosopher without wonder because wonder is the beginning of philosophy and that no one can be a philosopher without the love of wisdom. But as often happens, two is not enough. There is a third disposition of will necessary for the philosopher in addition to wonder and the love of wisdom. One cannot get very far in philosophy without this third disposition. This third disposition is teachableness which is nothing other than the firm will to hear or read carefully, frequently and reverently the words of those wiser than we are.

Duane H. Berquist ----------------------- [1]Democritus, DK 118: [Δημόκριτος γοῦν αὐτός, Ê%ß fasin, 7lege], Βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι:

[2]Dhmókritoß γοῦν αὐτός, ὥς fasin, 7lege], Βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι:

[3]Plato, Theaetetus, 155D: "μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη"

[4]Metaphysics, Book One, 982b, 12-13: "διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον \rxanto φιλοσοφεῖν" [5]Aristotle, About the Art of Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 11, 1371a 31-34: "καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι."

[6]Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 32, Art. 8, c.: "Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam; vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat..." [7]Julius Caesar, Act I, Sc. 3 [8]Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist XXVI, Q. II, Art III, Solutio II: "...desiderium et amor in hoc differunt quod amor importat quamdam convenientiam et connaturalitatem ad amatum, quod quidem perficitur dum amatum aliquo modo habetur; desiderium autem importat motum in ipsum amabile nondum habitum. Unde motus appetitus incipit in desiderio et terminatur in amore completo. Et ideo desiderium est quaedam inchoatio amoris et quasi quidam amor imperfectus." [9]Metaphysics, Book 4, 1004b 22-26: "περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει· ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ’ οὔ." [10]Hamlet, Act III, Sc. 2 [11]Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest I, Art. III, Responsio: "Amor enim importat habitudinem concupiscibilis ad bonum, odium vero ad malum; quia amor amatum ponit connaturale et quasi unum amanti, cujus contrarium odium facit. Et quia haec habitudo perficitur ex praesentia objecti, ideo amor secundum perfectam sui rationem est habiti, ut Augustinus dicit (In Psal. CXVIII, serm. 8; L. 36, 1518)" [12]As You Like It, Act V, Sc. 4 [13]A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act V, Sc. 1 [14]King Henry VI, Part Three, Act IV, Sc. 5 [15]Metaphysics, Proemium, Book One, Chapter 2, 983a 12-21 [16]Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput 91: "Amor ex parte obiecti non importat aliquid repugnans Deo: cum sit boni. Nec ex modo se habendi ad obiectum: nam amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur; unde et motus ad finem in rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate finis intenditur (quandoque autem contrarium per accidens accidit, utpote quando in amato experimur aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc enim minus amatur quando habetur). Non igitur amor repugnat divinae perfectioni secundum rationem suae speciei. Est igitur in Deo." [17]Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Chapter 89: "Spes autem, quamvis habeat obiectum bonum, non tamen bonum iam obtentum, sed obtinendum. Quod quidem Deo non potest competere, ratione suae perfectionis, quae tanta est quod ei additio fieri non potest. Spes igitur in Deo esse non potest, etiam ratione suae speciei. Et similter nec desiderium alicuius non habiti."