The Four Kinds of Opposite - Chapter 10

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The Four Kinds of Opposite - Chapter 10

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THE FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITE - CHAPTER 10

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθε ἀντιτίθεσθαι, ῥητέον.

Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις.

ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις οἷον κάθηται οὐ κάθηται.

Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά· οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ διπλάσιον λέγεται· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ· καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται:

τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον. ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον: [ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον πάντως.] οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι z–ou πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ z–ou σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν· καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον· καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον· οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν· καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται· οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν. καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε σπουδαῖον. ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρόν· ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον.

Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν· καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν.ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ· νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν· τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν οὔτε ὀδόντας ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐ λέγεται νωδὰ οὐδὲ τυφλά. τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τυφλότης· στέρησις γάρ tiw ≤ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδαμῶς λέγεται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι λόγος. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι μὴ καθῆσθαι.)

ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου· ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ’ ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης λέγοιτ’ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται. ἔτι τὰ πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις τυφλότητος ὄψις.

Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί· τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου· ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ Ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν· ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ Ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ Ἓν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πεφυκὸς ῇ ἔχειν ὄψιν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν, οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισίν, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ’ οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.

ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι, εἰ μή τινι φύσει τὸ Ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι· ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπιδοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι· ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται, κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφώς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ῇ, ὥστε καὶ πλείω εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν· καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον τελείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ ἐξείργηται· ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός tiw πάλιν ἔβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς Ãn κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς Ãn ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.

Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, φανερὸν ὅτι κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται· ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως· οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος· οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης· ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν· πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δόξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγομένων, τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι· ὄντος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος γε ὅλως οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, ὄντος δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτη τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτη ἀντίκειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, καὶ ὄντος γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, ὅτε γὰρ μήπω πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν αὐτὸν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι.

ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ῇ ἐάν τε μὴ ῇ, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές· ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται

The first three post-predicaments are connected. Opposition is the basis of formal distinction and distinction is before order which consists in a before and after (since nothing is before or after itself, there is always some distinction between what is before and what is after). Reason always sees some distinction before it sees a before and after.[1] The third post-predicament is the word together, what is neither before nor after. And there is the same knowledge of opposites.

The distinction and order of the highest genera has been found in what has gone before. But we also want to see the basis for the distinction and order of genera and species under the highest genera. Genera and species are distinguished by opposition and a genus is before its species but the species into which a genus is immediately divided are together. So the distinction and placing of genera and species are connected with these three post-predicaments. The logic of the Categories is giving the basis for this although it will be the work of other forms of reasoned out knowledge to complete this.

This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle briefly enumerates or names the four kinds of opposites and exemplifies each. In the second part, he considers each kind of opposite in particular. In the third part, he considers the differences of these opposites not already shown in the particular consideration of them.

In the first part, he names the opposites which are those toward something or relatives, contraries, lack and having, and affirmation and negation. He then exemplifies each.

In the second part, he considers each kind in particular. And first those said toward something. Aristotle here points out something that separates this kind of opposites from the other three kinds. They are said to be of each other or in some other way toward each other. Thus father is the father of his son and the son is the son of his father. But contraries like virtue and vice are not said to be of each other. A virtue is not the virtue of a vice or a vice, the vice of a virtue. Likewise, sight is not the sight of blindness, or blindness, the blindness of sight. And affirmation is not the affirmation of negation, or negation, the negation of affirmation.

Contraries are not said to be of each other, but one is said to be contrary to the other. Some contraries have something between them and these are contraries where neither necessarily belongs to their subject. But other contraries have nothing in-between them and these are the contraries where one or the other must belong to their subject.

Lack and having are in the same subject, but not at the same time. A thing is said to lack something when it does not have what it should have and when it should have it. To lack and to have are not the same as the lack or the having, but are opposed in the same way.

The opposition of affirmation and negation is in speech, but what they are said of are opposed in the same way. These opposites can also be called contradictories.

In the third part of the chapter, Aristotle shows the differences between the four kinds of opposites that have not been show before. Since he has already shown a difference between relatives and contraries, he needs to show that lack and having are not opposed as relatives or as contraries; and then that affirmation and negation are opposed differently than all the other three.

Aristotle shows that lack and having are not opposed as those toward something in the same way that contraries are not relatives. Sight is not the sight of blindness and blindness is not the blindness of sight.

But that lack and having are not opposed as contraries is shown by Aristotle in two ways. In this first way, he shows that in contraries that have a middle, one of the contraries does not necessarily belong to its subject while a subject either lacks what it should have or has it. And in the contraries that have no middle, some necessarily have one of the contraries (as fire is hot), which again is not true of lack and having.

The other way that Aristotle shows that a difference between contraries and lack & having is that there is change between contraries in both directions (as a man becomes sick and then again healthy) while the man who become blind from seeing does not return to seeing from being blind.

Affirmation and negation are separated from the other three kinds of opposites because one of these is always true and the other false.

We can now consider some of these points at greater length.

In what order does Aristotle enumerate the four kinds of opposites?

Since towards something is one of the ten genera of predicates and has been considered at some length before, he begins from things opposed as relatives.

But this is not the order from what is most opposed to what is least opposed. This latter order would be exactly the reverse. When Aristotle enumerates the four kinds of cause, he begins from the cause most known (matter) and ends with the cause of the causality of all the others (the end or that for the sake of which). He begins in a way with what is least a cause.

Aristotle divides opposites into four kinds. However, it is difficult for our reason to understand fully a division or distinction into more than two or three. A logical and understandable division is usually into two or three.

In one text, Thomas divides the four kinds of opposites into two, dividing relatives against the other three:

Primo enim dicit quot modis dicuntur opposita; quia quatuor modis; scilicet contradictoria, contraria, privatio et habitus, et ad aliquid.

Aliquid enim contraponitur alteri vel opponitur aut ratione dependentiae, qua dependet ab ipso, et sic sunt opposita relative.

Aut ratione remotionis, quia scilicet unum removet alterum quod quidem contingit tripliciter.

Aut enim totaliter removet nihil relinquens, et sic est negatio.

Aut relinquit subiectum solum, et sic est privatio.

Aut relinquit subiectum et genus, et sic est contrarium. Nam contraria non sunt solum in eodem subiecto, sed etiam in eodem genere.[2]

Another logical and understandable way to divide the four is into two parts of two each. Thomas, in the this text, toward something and contraries against the last two:

...opposita reducuntur in idem genus in quo vel utrumque est per se, ut patet in contrariis et relativis; vel unum est per se et alterum per reductionem, ut patet in privatione et habitu, et affirmatione et negatione; unde habitum est in XXVIII dist. I libri ab Augustino, quod in eodem genere est genitus et non genitus...

...peccatum omissionis non est peccatum originale, sed actuale; nec dicitur actuale quasi in aliquo actu existat, sed quia ad genus actus reducitur cujus negatio est; sicut Augustinus ingenitum in genere relationis ponit, ut habitum est in I libro, dist. XXVIII, et iterum sicut actus est in potestate voluntatis, ita et negatio ejus.[3]

We could divide contradiction against the other three. One way in which contradiction can be distinguished from the rest is because in it non importatur aliqua convenientia. (Aristotle in the text also points out another reason for distinguishing contradiction from the others: one must be true and other false about anything).

affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia: in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem: in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam.

Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum; et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis; et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori. Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam.

Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter [in obj,: essentia non est generans, Pater est generans, ergo they are not the same] immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem, cum quaelibet distinctio, ut dictum est, includat affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam. Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem: et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt; aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem.[4]

We could also divide into three by no agreement, agree in subject and agree in subject and genus.

We should also note that affirmation and negation are included in every opposition:

Impossibile quod dicitur secundum nullam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsum, dicitur ratione discoherentiae terminorum. Omnis autem discoherentia terminorum est in ratione alicuius oppositionis; in omni autem oppositione includitur affirmatio et negatio, ut probatur X Metaph.; unde in omni tali impossibili implicatur affirmationem et negationem esse simul.[5]

And in another text:

contradictio includitur in omnibus aliis tamquam prius et simplicus. Opposita secundum quodcumque oppositionis genus impossibile est simul existere. Quod quidem contingit ex hoc, quod alterum oppositorum de sui ratione habet negationem alterius. Sicut de ratione caeci est quod non sit videns. Et de ratione nigri quod non sit album. Et similiter de ratione filii est quod non sit pater eius cuius est filius.[6]

What is the order of the four kinds of opposite?

Aristotle would seem to order the four kinds of opposites by their likeness and difference. But why begin with relatives rather than contradiction? One reason is because he has already had a chapter on toward something. [Again, because one opposite is said to be the opposite of another, there is something like toward something in all opposites.] Moreover, this post-predicament is ordered to distinguishing species and genera under the highest genus where they belong, and only relatives and contraries can be species or genera.

Substance and accident were distinguished in chapter two by contradictories. Species are distinguished by contraries more in quality than in quantity and substance where we divide by contradictories:

naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam materia super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariorum formarum.

Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis; sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis.[7]

Scriptum super Librum II Sententiarum, Dist 35, Q. 1, Art 3, As 1:

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, opposita reducuntur in idem genus in quo vel utrumque est per se, ut patet in contrariis et relativis; vel unum est per se, et alterum per reductionem, ut patet in privatione et habitu, et affirmatione et negatione; unde habitum est in 28 distinct. 1 libri ab Augustino, quod in eodem genere est genitus et non genitus; et ideo in dicto excluditur etiam omissio dicti, et in facto omissio facit, et sic de aliis. Non enim hoc habet dictum inquantum est affirmative dictum, ut sit peccatum; sed inquantum est in voluntatis potestate, a rectitudine finis exiens. In hoc autem convenit cum dicto affirmativo etiam non dicere, quod similiter est in potestate voluntatis, et a recto ordine exiens finis.

Appendix

DIVISION OF CHAPTER TEN: THE FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITE

Brief distinction of four kinds of opposites Enumeration of the four kinds (Notice tà & one word only in first two) The four kinds exemplified

Each kind considered in particular Towards something - said of each other Contraries Not said of each other, but one the contrary of the other Some have an intermediary and some do not Lack and having Both in same subject (but not at same time) When a thing is said to lack in strict sense To lack and to have not the same as the lack or having, but opposed in same way As affirmation and negation (the things?) under affirmation and negation are not aff. and neg. but are opposed in the same way

The differences of the opposites (not already shown) Lack and having Not opposed as relatives or towards something (Not said of one another or turned around) Not opposed as contraries Shown from contraries having and not having a middle Shown from change between contraries Affirmation and negation - shown from one of these always true and other false

----------------------- [1] We see also in the fifth book of Wisdom that Aristotle also takes up opposition and before together in the same order. Hence, also Anaxagoras attributed to the greater mind both the distinction of things and their order. [2]In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XII, n. 922 [3]Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXV, Quaest. I, Art. III, Ad 1 & Ad 2 [4]Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist V, Q. I, Art I, Ad 1 [5]Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, Q. I, Art. 3, corpus [6]In X Metaphysicorum, Lectio VI, n. 2041 [7]Quaestio Disputata de Anima, Art. 7, Ad 18