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The Natural Beginnings of Philosophy
Wisdom about Beginnings
From his file: NATURAL BEGINNINGS PHILOSOSOPHY.doc.
Read from in 4 classes
- Natural Hearing — 65. The Continuous and Its Basic Role: Beginning, End, and the Point Without a Limit
- Wisdom (2005) — 17. Why Truth Belongs to the Wise Man: Wisdom, Truth, and the Balance of Hope and Fear (Metaphysics II, Reading 2)
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 39. The Three Roads of Knowledge: Natural, Common and Private Ways of Proceeding
- Wisdom (2006, Colorado) — 51. Books Two to Four: Truth, Dialectic, Being as Being and the Axioms
THE NATURAL BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY
WHY IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE NATURAL BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY
οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν[1]
There are at least six good reasons why it is necessary to consider the natural beginnings of philosophy.
The man who considers something from its beginning will understand it the best. But the natural beginnings of philosophy are its first beginnings. Hence, the man who considers philosophy from its natural beginnings will best understand it.
Further, since order is determined in comparison to some beginning, we cannot approach philosophy in an ordered way without taking into account its natural beginnings. For natural order is before any order made by reason.
And as Plato said, the Greek proverb "the beginning is half of all" was an understatement. It is more than half of all since everything else depends upon the beginning. The better we acquire the beginning, the further we can go forward. Hence, a careful consideration of the natural beginnings of philosophy is most necessary.
And the central thinker in human thought, Heraclitus, taught us that "wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature giving ear thereto". Since then the philosopher is a lover of wisdom and wisdom is his goal, he must listen very carefully to the natural beginnings of philosophy so he can follow nature (unless he thinks that he is wiser than nature, a position which does not seem very wise).
And if philosophy has no natural beginnings, it might begin anywhere and go anywhere, which some people seem to like. But this is to empty philosophy of all meaning except an arbitrary or merely customary one.
And as we will find, there are three natural beginnings of philosophy. And these three natural beginnings introduce us to the three kinds of things necessary to be a philosopher. For they are what is first in each of these genera.
DISTINCTION OF THE NATURAL BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY
There are three natural beginnings of philosophy. The first is wonder, our natural desire to understand, the natural desire which moves men to philosophize. The second is the natural road in our knowledge or the natural road we follow in coming to know. And the third is our natural understanding of things, upon which all reasoned out understanding of things is based.
WONDER
Wonder is the natural desire, which is the beginning of philosophy. We can see this desire in the first philosophers who wondered about natural things and figures and numbers. Both Plato and Aristotle state that wonder is the beginning of philosophy.
And if we are philosophers, we should (among other things) also wonder what wonder is and why it is natural for men to wonder and why wonder is the beginning of philosophy.
WHAT WONDER IS: THE DEFINITIONS OF WONDER
Wonder is nothing other than the natural desire to know for its own sake the cause. Or to put it more in native English, it is an inborn wanting to know for itself the cause. This is the first definition of wonder. The intensity of this desire to know the cause in the first philosophers is well expressed in this fragment of Democritus:
I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians.[2]
The second definition of wonder is similar. It is the natural desire to know for itself what and why. When Socrates tells Theaetetus that his teacher was correct in saying that he was something of a philosopher because he wonders, the questions what and why are both mentioned:
Theaetetus:
By the gods, Socrates, how greatly I wonder what these things are and sometimes when looking at them, I am really dizzy.
Socrates:
Theodorus seems to guess not badly about your nature, my friend. For this wonder is very much the undergoing of a philosopher. There is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And the one saying that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas did not make a bad genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so?[3]
These two definitions are in harmony because both the question what and the question why are answered by a knowledge of the cause or causes, as Aristotle shows in the second book of the Posterior Analytics. But the first definition is by what we want to know in things, which is their cause; and the second definition is by the questions our reason asks which can only be answered by a knowledge of the cause.
The third definition of wonder is the natural desire to know for its own sake truth. This is also connected with the natural desire to know the cause. When Aristotle has narrated briefly the opinions of his predecessors about causes in the first book of the Metaphysics, he says in summary:
We have gone over briefly and summarily those who have spoke about the beginnings and truth, and how they spoke.[4]
He speaks thus as if the inquiry into the causes and the truth were the same.
Later in the second book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle will show why the investigation of the causes and truth are the same. Knowing with certitude the truth requires knowing why it must be so and, hence, its cause. Further, the cause is more true than the effect so someone seeking truth for its own sake most of all wants to know the causes. Here is the passage where Aristotle considers these things:
For we do not know the true without the cause. That by which the same in meaning belongs to others is itself most of all such; as fire is most hot which is to others the cause of heat. Thus that is most true which is the cause of what comes after being true. Hence, the beginnings of what always are, are necessarily most true for they are not sometimes true, nor is there any cause of being for them, but they are for others. Thus as each thing is towards being so also is it towards truth.[5]
Thus the third definition of wonder is also in harmony with the first two. For the truth we know by demonstration is a result of knowing the cause why something must be so or true. And the strongest judgment that something is true is by knowing what something is. And as Aristotle shows in the second book of wisdom, the cause is most true. Hence, wanting to know truth is wanting most of all to know causes.
The three defInItIons are best given in that order because the cause is in things while the questions what and why are in the mind as is truth.[6] But what and why more immediately bring to mind cause than does truth.
If understanding a thing means knowing it by what is said to stand under it, its underlying cause, then wonder can also be called the natural desire to understand. But this is only a way of saying with one word what is said more distinctly in the first two definitions of wonder. We understand a thing when we know its underlying cause and when we know what it is and why it is the way it is.
Thus, there are three definitions of wonder expressing somewhat differently the object of this natural desire.
WHY IT IS NATURAL FOR MEN TO WONDER: WONDER IS A NATURAL DESIRE
Aristotle gives one sign of this natural desire to know for its own sake in the delight that men take in their senses apart from any need of them to do or make. A man looks at a sunset for its own sake, not to make or do something. Another sign is the desire to hear stories and how they turn out. We want to know what will happens to little Red Riding Hood when she gets to her grandma's house, not to make or do something with that knowledge.
Thomas gives three reasons why man naturally desires to understand:
There is naturally in all men a desire to know. A threefold reason can be given for this.
First, because each thing naturally desires its perfection. Whence also matter is said to desire form, as the imperfect desires its own perfection. Since therefore the understanding, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is in ability all things, nor is it reduced to them in act except through knowledge (because it is nothing of the things that are before it understands, as is said in the third book About the Soul ), thus naturally it desire knowledge, just as matter form.
Second, because each thing has a natural inclination to its own operation; as the hot to heating and the heavy that it move downwards. But man's own operation insofar as he is a man, is to understand. For by this he differs from all others.. Whence naturally the desire of man is inclined to understanding....
Third, because it is desirable for each thing to be joined to its beginning for in this consists the perfection of each thing. Whence also circular motion is most perfect, as is proved in the eighth book of the Physics, because it joins the end to the beginning. But man is not joined to the separated substances, which are the beginnings of the human understanding and to which man's understanding is as the imperfect to the perfect, except by understanding. Whence also in this the final happiness of man consists. And therefore man naturally desires knowledge.[7]
Thomas also replies to the objection that most men do not pursue knowledge very much:
Nor does it stand against this if some men do not apply themselves to acquiring this knowledge. For often those who desire some end are withdrawn from the pursuit of that end by some cause, either because of the difficulty of getting there, or on account of other occupations. Thus, though all men desire knowledge, all however do not apply themselves to knowledge because they are detained by other things, either by pleasures or by the necessities of the present life, or also because of laziness they avoid the labor of learning.[8]
Thomas has noted that the desire to know truth (which was in the third definition of wonder) is natural, as is also the desire to avoid error:
Just as all men naturally desire to know truth, so there is in men a natural desire of fleeing errors and of refuting them when it is possible.[9]
WHY WONDER IS THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY
We could ask the kind of question Socrates teaches us to ask in the Euthyphro. Is philosophy a knowledge of causes because it began in wonder, the natural desire to know the cause? Or did it begin in wonder because it is a knowledge of causes?
It would be a mistake to say one and not the other. After Aristotle distinguished and defined the four kinds of cause, he showed that two things can be causes of each other by different kinds of cause. Thus, I may be healthy because I exercise, but I exercise also because of health. But health and exercise are not causes of each other by the same kind of cause. Exercise is a cause of health in the third sense of cause, the mover or maker, while health is a cause of taking exercise in the fourth sense of cause, the end or that for the sake of which. Thus each can answer the question why about the other. Why am I healthy? Because I exercise. Why do I exercise? For the sake of health.
In like manner, we can see that philosophy or (human) wisdom is a knowledge of causes because it began in wonder. But also because philosophy is a knowledge of causes, it had to begin in wonder. Wonder is a cause of philosophy, the knowledge of causes, coming to be as a mover or maker for it is wonder that moved men to seek a knowledge of causes. But a knowledge of causes is that for the sake of which men wonder.
If we know that the first philosophers began to philosophize out of wonder (the natural desire to know the cause), we can reason from this to philosophy or human wisdom being a knowledge of causes. But Aristotle shows in the proemium to wisdom at the beginning of the Metaphysics, that wisdom is a knowledge of causes independently of the fact that it began in wonder. Hence we could also reason from wisdom being a knowledge of causes to wonder being its beginning, indeed to why wonder must have been its beginning.
THE NATURAL ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE
Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. Animal is defined by having senses. But man is by nature not only an animal, but an animal with reason. And what is generic is before in time and generation what is specific. Hence, the natural road for man to follow in coming to know is the road from the senses into reason.
When the word road is carried over from the road we walk or drive on to our knowledge, we drop, of course, the tar or cement or rocks making up the road, but keep the before and after on the road. A road in our knowledge is nothing other than an order, a before and after, in our knowledge. Hence, a distinct knowledge of the natural road requires us to see the before and after constituting that road. Knowing distinctly the natural road means knowing distinctly the before and after in that road
A distinct knowledge of the before and after on the natural road requires us to consider both the order in which different kinds of knowing comes along this road and the order in which things are known along this road.
Aristotle teaches us much of the order in which different kinds of knowledge come along the natural road in his proemium to wisdom at the beginning of the first book of wisdom or first philosophy (the first book of the Metaphysics ). Sensing comes first and then memory of what has been sensed. And when many memories of the same have been brought together, they form one experience. And from experience, reason can separate out the universal, what is common to and said of the many similars in experience. The beginning of our knowledge of the universal is the natural understanding of the most universal. This is followed by a reasoned out knowledge of the universal of which there are many forms. At last comes wisdom which is the head of both natural understanding and reasoned out understanding. Sensing, memory and experience are a knowledge of the singular or singulars but understanding is a knowledge of the universal.
Thus along the natural road, sensing comes before memory and memory before experience and experience before knowledge of the universal. And in the knowledge of the universal, natural understanding comes before reasoned out understanding and many forms of reasoned out understanding before wisdom.[10]
We must also consider the before and after in things known to see distinctly the natural road. And here, we should distinguish the order in which different things are known along the road and the order in which the same thing is known along the road.
It is obvious along the natural road that sensible things are known before things that cannot be sensed (and things which are more sensible before those which are less sensible).
And since material things are somewhat sensible and immaterial things are not, it follows that material things will be known before immaterial things. Hence, immaterial things are known by the negation of material things as the word immaterial perhaps indicates.
And since effects are usually more sensible than causes, we usually know the effect before the cause. A sign of this is the frequency of the question why which arises when we know the effect, but not the cause. If immaterial things are causes of material things, the effect can be sensible and the cause is not sensible. But even in sensible and material things, we more often sense an effect than its cause.
We also know composed things before simple things. For composed things are more sensible than simple things and immaterial things are more simple than material things and the cause is simpler than the effect.
It can be seen that we have ascended from the particular to the general in considering that material things are known before immaterial things; and effects, before causes; and the composed before the simple.
There is also an order along the natural road in which the same thing is known. As Boethius said, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. This is why men, when asked what a thing is, give examples of the thing before they can state the universal definition of it. This is also why induction comes before syllogism. For induction leads into the universal from many singulars while the syllogism must begin from a universal statement.
We also know things in an outward way before inwardly. Outward is almost a synonym for sensible in English. The senses know things in an outward way while reason seeks insight into things or understanding of them. Hence, we think about things before we understand them.
And we know things in a confused way before distinctly. This is true, not only because reason is apt to distinguish things that the senses do not, but also in sense knowledge by itself, there is a going from the confused to the distinct; and in reason's knowledge by itself, there is also a movement from the confused to the distinct. This is shown by Aristotle in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing (the Physics ) The commentary thereon by Thomas Aquinas (his first Lectio) is very useful in understanding that teaching.
It can be seen that we have also ascended from the particular to the general in these three befores in knowing the same thing.
Aristotle also teaches a before and after that is common to the order in which one thing is known before another and the order in which the same thing is known. It is natural to go forward from what is more known to us to what is less known to us. But what is more known to us is less known and what is less known to us is more known. The effect is more known to us by itself than the cause. Indeed when we ask why, the effect is known to us, but the cause is unknown to us. But an effect is less known by itself and more known in the light of its cause. Hence, what is more known to us is less known and what is less known to us is more known. And a thing is more known when it is known distinctly than when it is known in a confused or indistinct way. But we know things more in a confused way than distinctly, a sign of which is that we are more sure of the confused than the distinct. This can also be seen in the other befores in which things are known along the natural road.
THE HARMONY OF WONDER AND THE NATURAL ROAD
Since truth is in harmony with truth, the harmony of wonder with the natural road is a sign or confirmation of the truth. How are they in harmony?
We have seen that on the natural road, the effect is known before the cause. Wonder arises from knowing an effect whose cause is unknown to us. Thus wonder is result of our natural way of knowing.
Moreover, men would not wonder what something is unless they knew it in some imperfect way. We have seen that along the natural road, a thing is known in an outward way before it is known in an inward way. But the nature of a thing is within in it, as can be seen in the second book of Natural Hearing and the fifth book of First Philosophy. Hence, Heraclitus said that nature loves to hide. Thus one reason why we wonder what things are is because we know them in an outward way, but are ignorant of their nature which is inward or within them.
And when we wonder what something is, we seek a distinct knowledge of it by defining it. Since we naturally know things in a confused way before distinctly, we can wonder exactly what a thing is when we know it in some confused way, but not distinctly. If we did not know things in a confused way before distinctly, we would never wonder what they are.
And since a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood and defined, we can know a thing by example without yet knowing distinctly what it is by definition. Hence in the dialogues of Plato, Meno and Euthyphro and Theaetetus and others give examples of a thing before they can define it or even attempt a definition. Here then is a third connection of the before and after on the natural road with the wonder what something is.
We can wonder what something is because of each of these three befores in the natural road. We could not wonder what something is if we were completely ignorant of it. and we would not wonder either unless it were unknown to us in some way. So because it is known to us by example or in an outward way or in a confused way, but not by universal definition or inwardly as regards its nature or distinctly and fully as by definition, there can be wonder in man about what something is.
THE NATURAL UNDERSTANDING OF THINGS
The nature of a thing is what it is. And since a thing must be what it is before it can be anything else, what is natural in a thing comes before everything else. Hence, what reason as a nature understands is before what it thinks out, or reasons out, and is a beginning of the latter.
We acquire what is not natural through what is natural. This can be seen with the hands and artificial tools such as a knife or pen. We make and use these artificial tools by our hands. Likewise, we learn at first by imitation which is natural to man (Indeed man is by nature the most imitative of the animals).
Natural understanding does not mean that we are born understanding some things, but rather that we naturally come (along the natural road) to understand some things without having to reason them out. If we did not come to understand some things naturally before reasoning, we could not begin to reason. For we would have nothing to reason from.
We naturally understand the most general statements and their parts; such as the statement that a thing cannot both be and not be and a thing must either be or not be and a whole is more than one of its parts and nothing is before or after itself. So naturally known are these statements that we usually proceed from them in our thinking without even stating them to ourselves or to others.
THE HARMONY OF THE NATURAL ROAD AND THE NATURAL UNDERSTANDING
Since we know the confused before the distinct along the natural road, and the general is confused while the particular is more distinct, the first things we understand are the most general statements about things and the parts of those statements. And the first things we understand are the thing we naturally understand since the nature of a thing is what is first in it.
THE NATURAL BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY& WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS
Since wonder is the beginning of philosophy, philosophy must be a knowledge of causes. For wonder is nothing other than the natural desire to know for its own sake the cause.
And in the end, it must be a knowledge of the first cause. Since a cause may have a cause, wonder moves us to ask even for the cause of the cause. Hence, wonder is not satisfied until we reach the first cause. Socrates (or Plato) would seem to hint at this in his enigmatic statement that it was not a bad genealogy (in Hesiod) to say that Iris is the offspring of wonder
And if wonder is the beginning of philosophy and a knowledge of the first cause is the end of philosophy, then philosophy has limits, a beginning and an end. Hence, philosophy cannot begin just anywhere and go just anywhere. If philosophy had no limits, the word would be without meaning.
And the parts of philosophy in-between cannot be unlimited. Otherwise, philosophy would not have a beginning and an end.
Further, from the second and third definitions of wonder, it is clear that philosophy is a knowledge of what things are and why they are, as they are. Likewise, it is a knowledge of the truth.
Since we know material things before immaterial things along the natural road, knowing the cause of material things is before knowing the cause of immaterial things. By material things we means things whose existence depends upon matter.
Since some things that depend upon matter for their existence can be defined without matter, such as sphere, cube, number and in general mathematical things while others depend upon matter for their definition, such as tooth, tongue, bone, flesh and in general natural things, there are two parts of philosophy before wisdom which is a knowledge of the things which do not depend upon matter for their existence: natural philosophy and mathematical philosophy.
THE NATURAL BEGINNINGS AND LOGIC, THE TOOL OF THE PHILOSOPHER
Logic is more remote from the beginning of philosophy because it is not pursued out of wonder. Hence, it was the last kind of philosophy to be investigated. But it is the tool of the man who wonders. And in that way, it does have a connection with wonder.
If wonder is the natural desire to know the cause, to know what and why, and logic is the tool of the philosopher, logic must be chiefly about the questions what and why, and how they can be answered. Hence, the second book of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle is central to seeing the connection of wonder and logic. For in that book, Aristotle considers the questions what and why, how they both ask for the cause, and how definition, which answers the question what is it, and demonstration, which answers the question why is it so, are connected (the famous teaching that a definition may be the beginning or the end of a demonstration or differing from a demonstration by position only) and how we can come to a definition or demonstration. A logic which did not contain this teaching would not be a tool of the man who wonders what and why; it would not be the tool needed by the philosopher.
The first book of the Posterior Analytics which is about demonstration, the syllogism making us know the cause and that of which it is the cause and that it cannot be otherwise, is also clearly connected with wonder which is the natural desire to know the cause.
In a more remote way, even the Prior Analytics is connected with the wonder of the philosopher since it is about the form of the syllogism and demonstration, which makes known why or the cause, is a syllogism.
The eight books About Places (the Topics ) is connected with wonder about what a thing is. The third and fourth tools of dialectic are explicitly useful for definition which makes known what a thing is; and all four problems (and the places for them) contribute to the ultimate problem, the problem of definition, whether this is the definition of that.
But since wonder is also the natural desire to know truth and to avoid error or falsehood, logic must also be about statements. For it is only statements that are true or false. Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias is about the statement which is speech signifying the true or the false. But do we learn in the Peri Hermeneias how to separate the true from the false statements?
We learn what contradictory statements are. These are statements with the same subject and predicate, one affirmative and the other negative, and opposed such that both cannot be true and both cannot be false, but one must be true and the other false (regardless of whether we know which is the true and which is the false one). In that way, we have learned to separate the true from the false. We know that one of the contradictory statements is true and the other false. But this still does not teach us which is the true statement and which is the false one.
Logic, if it is the tool of the man who wants to separate the true from the false and know which is which, must contain something in addition to the teaching of the Peri Hermeneias. We say in addition because he must know what is taught therein, that the true and the false are found in statements and that all statements cannot be true or false and that one of two contradictory statements is true and the other false. And this corresponds to a natural beginning about things, the first axioms about things, the axioms about being and non-being. Something cannot both be and not be (in the same way and at the same time) And something cannot neither be, nor not be. But something must either be or not be. These axioms are the reason why contradictory statements cannot both be true or both be false, but one must be true and the other false. For one of the contradictory statements says that something is so and the other that it is not so. Thus the Peri Hermeneias is connected not only with the natural desire to know the truth, but also with our natural understanding of things and in particular with the first axioms, those about being and non-being.
But the natural road starts us separating the true from the false. Since a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood, we separate the true from the false in contradictory statements whose subject is a singular by sense. Socrates is sitting and Socrates is not sitting. One of these two contradictory statements is true and the other false. but we determine which is true by sense. But if the subject is universal, we may need induction or syllogism unless it is clear from the definition of the parts. One might know that it is true that no odd number is even (and false that some odd number is even) by the definitions of odd and even number, as well as by induction.
Since the premisses and the conclusion of a syllogism, whether a demonstration or a dialectical syllogism, are statements, the teaching of the Peri Hermeneias is obviously before the consideration of the syllogism. But the understanding of contradictory statements in the Peri Hermeneias is also a beginning for understanding the differences between a demonstration and a dialectical syllogism. For the demonstrator lays down the side of a contradiction which is obviously true or has been shown to be necessarily true and rejects the side which is obviously false or has been shown to be necessarily false. But the dialectician asks the respondent which side is probable. Likewise, the demonstrator reasons to one side of a contradiction with certitude and necessity while the dialectician reasons to one side with fear of the other side or even to both sides with some probability.
A logic that respects the natural road from the senses into reason cannot limit itself to the syllogism or to "necessary inference". It must also considers the kinds of arguments that are closer to the senses and which our reason therefore needs. These are the arguments called example, induction and enthymeme. Example and induction begin from the singular or singulars which can be sensed. And the enthymeme proceeds from likelihood and signs; and a sign is that which strikes the senses and brings to mind something other than itself. Aristotle considers these arguments even in the Prior Analytics as well as in the more particular books of logic.
A logic that follows the natural road will also follow Aristotle in considering words and speeches that signify things through thoughts. A logic that purports to talk immediately and directly about thoughts, a logic that is about the "laws of thought", could not be the tool of an animal with reason.
THE NATURAL BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY AND WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR A PHILOSOPHER
The three natural beginnings of philosophy may not be all the beginnings necessary for the philosopher. But they give us three starting points for bringing out all that is necessary for being a philosopher.
Since wonder is in the will and is necessary for the philosopher, it suggests the question of what else in the will is necessary for a philosopher. Likewise, the second beginning, the natural road, starts us asking if there are any other roads which the philosopher must know. And the third beginning, the natural understanding of things, moves us to ask if there are other beginnings about things which are necessary for the philosopher.
In what follows, we do not intend to make a full or even adequate consideration of what is necessary for the philosopher. Rather, we wish to indicate briefly how, anchored or rooted firmly in the three natural beginnings of philosophy, we are led into the full consideration of what is necessary for the philosopher. For the full consideration of what is necessary for the philosopher can be divided into three parts, of which the natural beginnings are the starting point in each and lead to the general questions that open up the whole consideration of what is necessary for the philosopher
WHAT BESIDES WONDER IS NECESSARY IN THE WILL OF A PHILOSOPHER
One could ask whether any other dispositions of will besides wonder are necessary for the philosopher.
Since wonder is the beginning of philosophy, no one can become a philosopher without wonder. But as the name philosopher itself indicates, no one can be a philosopher without the love of wisdom.
At first sight, it might seem that wonder and the love of wisdom are the same thing. For wonder is the natural desire to know the cause and wisdom is a knowledge of causes, indeed a knowledge of the first causes.
But wonder is something that all men, to some extent, and philosophers, most of all, naturally undergo while the love of wisdom is a chosen love. When Aristotle distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist, he says that they differ by their choice of life.[11]
But in saying that the love of wisdom is not a natural, but a chosen love, we are saying that it involves choice and therefore reason knowing which knowledge is better and why. One cannot choose wisdom before any other knowledge if one does not know what wisdom is and why it is better than any other knowledge. Since reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, and better is the fourth sense of before, and the question why looks before in another of before, it is clearly impossible to choose wisdom before any other knowledge and know why it should be so chosen without using reason.
And wonder because it is a desire or wanting is diminished by coming to know while the love of wisdom increases with knowing since love is stronger in the presence of its object. Hence, if one increases while the other decreases, they can by no means be the same thing.
If wonder is necessary for the pursuit of knowledge, one might wonder why the love of wisdom is necessary, especially if the love is perfected after the knowledge has been acquired. But to answer this, it is necessary to consider more fully how the philosopher needs to love wisdom.
The philosopher must love wisdom for its own sake. If he loves wisdom for the honor or glory of being considered wise, he should be called a lover of honor or glory rather than a lover of wisdom. Likewise, if he loves wisdom for anything else. If he loves wisdom for the sake of money, he is more a lover of money than of wisdom; just as a man who loves a woman for her money is correctly called a lover of money, not of the woman.
Second, he must love wisdom more than anything else which he loves for its own sake and especially more than any other knowledge he desires for its own sake. One is said to be a lover of what he loves most of all.
Third, if he loves wisdom for its own sake and more than anything else he loves for it own sake, he must love wisdom as the end or purpose of his life.
Wisdom is the end of human knowledge and the common good of human knowledge and the last perfection of the particular forms of knowledge. To understand this a bit it is necessary to consider what Aristotle points out when about to show that wisdom is about being as being and what belongs to it as such, in the fourth book of the Metaphysics:
There is a reasoned out knowledge which considers being as being and what belongs to this through itself. This is not the same as any of those said in part. For none of these others looks over being as being, but cutting off a part of this, they consider what happens to it, as do the mathematical forms of reasoned out knowledge.[12]
Aristotle then reasons that wisdom, the knowledge whose end is to know the first cause(s), is also this reasoned out knowledge which considers being as being and what belongs to this through itself.
Wisdom is said to proceed intellectualiter by Boethius because we resolve secundum rem there to the first causes and secundum rationem to what is most universal.[13]
And since wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, one cannot love wisdom without also loving reason (or love reason to the fullest without loving wisdom). And since reason is the ability to look before and after, one cannot love reason without loving order which is defined by before and after.
The love of wisdom then not only makes one seek the order within wisdom and the order which wisdom is about, but also the order in the knowledge which should be learned before wisdom.
Is the natural road in our knowledge also the road to wisdom? Or must we take some other road to wisdom? Aristotle thought the natural road in our knowledge was also the road to wisdom. But Plato and others have sought some other road to wisdom.
The love of wisdom makes one consider the road to wisdom and also the road within wisdom. And it is not easy to find either.
Are wonder and the love of wisdom enough dispositions in the will of a philosopher? Or does he need other dispositions in his will? Since no man goes very far by himself, there is also need of teachableness in his will. (There is also a teachableness in reason, but that is not our concern now.) Teachableness is the strong and stable will to hear or read carefully, frequently and reverently the words of those wiser than us in some matter. Without this disposition of will, one will be at worst repeating the mistakes refuted by wise men before oneself and at best, as the expression has it, be "reinventing the wheel." In short, one will not get very far.
Wonder, the love of wisdom, and teachableness: are they enough in the will of a philosopher? There is one other chief disposition of will most necessary in the philosopher. The other three dispositions cannot exist, or exist well, without it; and it is most necessary for avoiding mistakes in one's thinking. This is humility.
Men make mistakes when they overestimate their abilities by pride or arrogance. And when through pride they don't listen to others who have refuted mistakes and warned us about them, they are apt to repeat the same mistakes.
Likewise, humility makes possible, or removes impediments to, the other three main dispositions of will. This is most of all clear as regards teachableness. For pride makes one think one is above others, but learning from another involves putting oneself under another. And the man who wonders thinks himself ignorant. But the proud man is not apt to admit ignorance (even after a Socratic examination). And the scorn and contempt for others of the proud man seems an inhospitable environment for wonder which is more childlike. And the love of wisdom involves the love of the whole good of reason. But pride makes us exaggerate a part of the truth. As Empedocles taught us:
For narrow are the means spread throughout the limbs and many are the miseries that burst in and blunt the thoughts. And having seen only a small part of life during their lives, and doomed to early death, they are lifted up and carried off like smoke, and believing only that which each one meets with as he is driven every way, they boast of having found the whole. But things are not thus seen or heard by men or grasped by their minds. You, however, since you have withdrawn to here, shall not learn more than mortal wisdom can attain.[14]
And since it pertains to the wise man both to teach the truth and to refute error, he cannot be in a position to refute error without humility that guards one from error. For pride or presumption is the mother of error.
WHAT ROADS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE PHILOSOPHER BESIDES THE NATURAL
Since a road in our knowledge is nothing other than an order (a before and after) in our knowledge or underlying it; and order is made by nature and by reason; the question of whether there are other roads necessary for the philosopher is a question about roads made by reason. Does reason need to follow only the natural road? Or does it need also to follow some road or roads made by reason? Any roads made by reason, however, would presuppose the road made by nature.
Man's reasoned out knowledge is a work of reason. And as there is order found in every work of reason, there is also order in man's reasoned out knowledge. In no reasoned out knowledge does man consider everything at once. Hence, the philosopher, who seeks a reasoned out knowledge of things, must also know the road of reasoned out knowledge.
Some think that we should distinguish between the common road of reasoned out knowledge and the private roads of reasoned out knowledge. If this distinction was based simply on reason's ability to consider the same thing in general and in particular, there would perhaps not be enough reason to speak of different roads. That would be like speaking of quadrilateral and square as different figures. However, the distinction is based on reason as reason and the matter or subject of each reasoned out knowledge. There is a common road of reasoned out knowledge because reasoned out knowledge is the work of reason as reason. Reason thinks about something before it understands it. And reason guesses before it knows. Hence, there is a road based on reason as reason, a road from guessing to knowing and from thinking about something to understanding it. But there is a road private to each reasoned out knowledge that fits its matter.
The philosopher then must know not only the natural road, but also the common road of reasoned out knowledge and the private roads of each kind of philosophy or reasoned out knowledge.
It is not by chance that Aristotle usually calls philosophy a méqodon which means knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road. The natural road underlies all our knowledge, both the knowledge of our senses (the outward and the inward senses) and the knowledge of reason. The road from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge (which includes the common road of reasoned out knowledge) underlies all philosophy. And the private or particular road of each part of philosophy underlies that kind of philosophy.
WHAT UNDERSTANDING OF THINGS IS NECESSARY FOR THE PHILOSOPHER
The third natural beginning of philosophy is the natural understanding of things in the most general axioms and their parts. Are there other beginnings about things necessary for the philosopher?
Just as each kind of philosophy, or reasoned out knowledge, has its own matter or subject, so each would seem to have also beginnings about the things particular and private to it. The geometer, for example, cannot reason out from the axioms alone his theorems. He cannot, to take the example of the Pythagorean theorem, reason out that a right angled triangle has the square on the side opposite the right angle always equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle without knowing what a triangle is and what a right angle is and what a square is. These are beginnings about what is particular or private to geometry.
Thus, there seems to be two kinds of beginnings about things necessary for the philosopher. One is the natural understanding of the most common statements and their parts and the other is the understanding of the things private or particular to each kind of philosophy.
Duane H. Berquist
----------------------- [1]Aristotle, Politics, Book VII, 1325b 9-10 [2]Democritus, DK 118: "[Δημόκριτος γοῦν αὐτός, ὥς fasin, 7lege], Βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι:" [3]Plato, Theaetetus, 155C-D: "QEAITHTOS: καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτα σκοτοδινιῶ. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΝΣ· Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς sou. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν -Irin Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις \dh di' + ταῦτα τοιαῦτ’ ἐστὶν " [4]Metaphysics, Book One, 988a 18-20: "Συντόμως μὲν οὖν καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπεληλύθαμεν τίνες τε καὶ πῶς τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες περί τε τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας:" " [5]Metaphysics, Book Two, 993b 23-31: "οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας· ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθ’ + καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον (οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος)· ὥστε καὶ ἀληθέστερον τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις αἴτιον τοῦ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι. διὸ τὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀληθεστάτας (οὐ γάρ ποτε ἀληθεῖς, οὐδ’ ἐκείναις αἴτιόν τί ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοις), ὥσθ’ ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας." [6]Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVII, n. 736: "Verum autem et falsum pertinent proprie ad considerationem logici; consequuntur enim ens in ratione de quo considerat logicus: nam verum et falsum sunt in mente, ut in sexto huius habetur." [7]In I Metaphysicorum, Lectio I, nn. 1-4: "...omnibus hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest ad sciendum. Cuius ratio potest esse triplex:
"Primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res naturaliter appetit perfectionem sui. Unde et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem. Cum igitur intellectus, a quo homo est id quod est, in se consideratus sit in potentia omnia, nec in actum eorum reducatur nisi per scientiam, quia nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de Anima: sic naturaliter unusquisque desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam.
"Secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem inclinationem habet ad suam propriam operationem: sicut calidum ad calefaciendum, et grave ut deorsum moveatur. Propria autem operatio hominis inquantum homo, est intelligere. Per hoc enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad sciendum.
"Tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est, ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc enim uniuscuiusque perfectio consistit. Unde et motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut probatur in octavo Physicorum, quia finem coniungit principio. Substantiis autem separatis, quae sunt principia intellectus humani, et ad quae intellectus humanus se habet ut imperfectum ad perfectum, non coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum: unde et in hoc ultima hominis felicitas consistit. Et ideo naturaliter homo desiderat scientiam."
[8]In I Metaphysicorum, Lectio I, n. 4: "Nec obstat si aliqui homines scientiae huic studium non impendant; cum frequenter qui finem aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias occupationes. Sic enim licet omnes homines scientiam desiderent, non tamen omnes scientiae studium impendunt, quia ab aliis detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam propter pigritiam vitant laborem addiscendi." [9]De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas, beginning of Proemium: "Sicut omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant veritatem, ita naturale desiderium inest hominibus fugiendi errores, et eos cum facultas adfuerit confutandi." [10]The latter parts of this road are not natural in the sense that they are assured by nature. But they are in accord with the natural direction in which this road goes. [11]Metaphysics, Book 4, 1004b 22-26: "περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει· ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ’ οὔ." " [12]Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Four, 1003a 20-26: "'´Estin ἐπιστήμη τις } θεωρεῖ τὸ ἓν Ç ἓν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος Ç ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τοῦτο θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν."
[13]Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, q. II, a. 1: "Tota autem rationis consideratio resolventis in omnibus scientiis, ad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur. Ratio enim, ut prius est dictum, procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio per causas, vel effectus extrinsecos, componendo quidem cum proceditur a causis ad effectus, quasi resolvendo, cum proceditur ab effectibus ad causas eo quod causae sunt effectibus simpliciores, et magis immobiliter et uniformiter permanentes, resolvendo autem, quando e converso. Utltimus igitur terminus resolutionis in hac via est, cum pervenitur ad causas supremas maxime simplices, quae sunt substantiae separatae.
Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas, componendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particularia proceditur; resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod universalius est simplicius. Maxime autem universalia sunt, quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis, et eorum quae sunt entis inquantum huiusmodi.
Haec autem sunt de quibus divina scientia considerat, ut supra dictum est, substantiae scilicet separatae, et communia omnibus entibus. Unde patet quod sua consideratio est maxime intellectualis." [14]Empedocles, DK 2: "στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται· πολλὰ δὲ δείλ’ ἔμπαια, τά τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας.παῦρον δ’ ἐν ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος πάντοσ’ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν· οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά οὔτε νόωι περιληπτά. σὺ d' o”n, ἐπεὶ <δ’ ἐλιάσθης, πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν."