The Natural Road in Human Knowledge

← Library · Wisdom about Beginnings

The Natural Road in Human Knowledge

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

From his file: NATURAL ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE.doc.

Word doc

THE NATURAL ROAD IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

Since reason is the ability to look before and after, it can find the roads in our knowledge. For a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after, or a continuous before and after, therein.

Moreover, it is necessary for reason to know the roads in human knowledge. For only the man who knows the road can go forward orderly, easily, and without error. Since a road in our knowledge is a before and after therein and before and after define order, it is clear that only the man who knows the road can go forward orderly. And if one does not know the road to where he is going, he either will not get there or only with difficulty. Hence, a knowledge of the roads is necessary to go forward with ease or much less difficulty. And since reason wanders when it does not know the road, and there are more errors to wander into than truths, it is necessary to know the roads to avoid errors. (Error comes from the Latin word for wandering)

In our experience, order is made by nature and by reason. Are the roads in our knowledge made by nature or by reason or by both?

It would seem by both. Since man is by nature an animal with reason, there is a natural road in our knowledge. This is the road from the senses into reason. Every animal by nature has senses. But man has reason by nature in addition so that he can think about what he senses Since what is common is before in generation, the road goes from the senses into reason. It is by nature, not by reason, that we sense before we understand or reason.

But in our reasoned-out knowledge, the roads are made by reason. Reason is responsible for reasoned-out knowledge and hence for the order in it. Reasoned-out knowledge is a work of reason and hence the order in it is also a work of reason.

In Libros Physicorum, Liber 8. Lectio 3, n. 3:

Deinde cum dicit: at vero nihil inordinatum etc., ostendit quod hac ratione inconvenientius utebatur Anaxagoras quam Empedocles. Manifestum est enim quod cum ponitur aliquid esse quasi principium, oportet accipere quod hoc sit secundum rei naturam; hoc est, ut natura rei sit talis quod hoc ei conveniat. Sic enim accipimus quasi principium, quod omne totum maius est sua parte, quia hoc est de ratione et natura totius, quod excedat partis quantitatem. Unde Empedocles dicebat, sic aptum natum esse; dans intelligere quod hoc esset accipiendum quasi principium. Et similiter Anaxagoras diceret, licet non exprimeret.

Sed manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis, nec aliquid eorum quae naturaliter rebus conveniunt, potest esse absque ordine; quia natura est causa ordinationis. Videmus enim naturam in suis operibus ordinate de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem, non est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut principium.

Sed duo infinita non habent ordinem ad invicem, quia infiniti ad infinitum nulla est proportio; omnis autem ordo proportio quaedam est. Sic ergo patet quod quiescere res tempore infinito, et postea incipere moveri per infinitum tempus, sine hoc quod sit aliqua differentia inter hoc tempus et illud, quare nunc magis quam prius motus fiat; neque iterum assignare aliquam aliam ordinationem inter aliqua duo, quorum uno deficiente, alterum incipiat et fiat motus, ut Anaxagoras ponebat; hoc non est opus naturae. Quia quidquid est in natura, aut semper simpliciter, idest eodem modo, se habet, et non aliquando sic, aliquando autem aliter, sicut ignis semper sursum fertur; aut aliqua ratio est quare non semper est eodem modo, sicut non semper animalia crescunt, sed quandoque diminuuntur, et hoc habet aliquam rationem. Sic ergo non videtur secundum naturam procedere, quod infinito tempore res quieverint, et postmodum moveri inceperint, ut Anaxagoras posuit. Unde melius est quod dicatur, sicut Empedocles dixit, vel quicumque alius similiter opinatus est, quod totum universum in quadam parte temporis quiescit, et iterum movetur in alia parte temporis; quia iam hoc potest habere aliquam ordinationem: finiti enim ad finitum potest esse proportio. Est autem considerandum quod sententia fidei nostrae non est similis positioni Anaxagorae. Non enim ponimus ante mundum infinita spatia temporis, cuius sit necesse accipere proportionem ad tempus sequens: sed antequam mundus inciperet, sola Dei simplex aeternitas fuit, sicut dictum est, quae est omnino extra genus temporis.

Since reason looks before and after, it can also investigate whether there is an order among the roads made by nature and reason.

In general, what is natural comes before what is made by reason. And we also acquire what is not natural through what is natural, as, for example, we acquire various tools by the hands which are by nature or language, by imitation, which is natural to us. The nature of a thing is what it is and what is first in a thing is what it is. Hence, nature or the natural is what is first in a thing. Thus for a general reason we would expect the natural road to be the first road in our knowledge and before the roads made by reason. As we study the natural road and those made by reason we can see how the natural road enters into all the roads made by reason.

The natural road is first not only in time, but also in being. It can be without the other roads, but they cannot be without it.

It is also first in our knowledge. Empedocles and Heraclitus spoke of this road long before Plato and Aristotle discovered the roads in our reasoned-out knowledge.

The natural road is before the roads made by reason as a cause is before its effect. Not only do we acquire the roads made by reason through the natural road, but the natural road is the reason why of many things found in the roads made by reason.

The natural road is also the first road in our knowledge in the sense of the best road. For the cause is better than the effect.

We can see better that the natural road is the first road in our knowledge by considering how in particular it is before the roads in our reasoned-out knowledge. Before we can make this particular consideration, however, we must distinguish the roads of reasoned-out knowledge.

The common road of reasoned-out knowledge should be distinguished from the private roads of reasoned-out knowledge.

There is a common road because reason is common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge. But there are private roads because each reasoned out knowledge has its own matter.

The common road is considered in logic while the private road of each reasoned out knowledge is considered in the beginning of it after its matter is determined. For the private road should fit the matter.

Since the common road of reasoned out knowledge is before any private road, a road before it will be the first road. But the natural road is before the common road. The common road in reasoned-out knowledge has a remote foundation in the natural road.

Logic is about the common road of reasoned-out knowledge. But as was said above, the common road of reasoned-out knowledge has a remote foundation in the natural road. Hence, the logician should understand the natural road.

Reasoned out knowledge is a distinct knowledge of things and hence begins with and is based upon definitions and divisions of things. Things are known in a confused way before distinctly along the natural road. By defining and dividing things, we go from a confused knowledge of them to a distinct one. Defining and dividing are an essential first part of reasoned-out knowledge because of the natural road. For the same reason, other distinctions that are not definitions or divisions are also needed. Logic, in considering definition, division and distinction, is thus seen to be an art that helps nature. For reason naturally tries to go from a confused to a distinct knowledge of things.

We name a thing before we define it. This aspect of the common road of reasoned-out knowledge has its foundation in the natural road. As we saw before, we know things in a confused way before distinctly. One needs only a confused knowledge of a thing to name, but one must know a thing distinctly to define it. Hence, we name a thing before we define it.

When people are asked what a thing is, they usually give examples of it before defining it. The logician finds the road from examples of a thing to its definition. But the natural road explains why we see and give examples of a thing before defining it. Plato often represents all of this in the Dialogues. When Socrates, for example, asks Meno what is virtue or Euthyphro what is piety, they both give examples rather than a definition. The logician then explains the difference between examples of a thing and its definition and how we can go from one to the other.

We begin a definition with a genus and then complete it be adding differences. This order in the common road of reasoned-out knowledge is also a result of knowing in a confused way before distinctly. For the general is to the particular as the confused is to the distinct. The genus, of course, is a general knowledge of the thing and we come to know it in particular by adding differences. When we are asked "What is a dog?', we naturally begin with saying it is an animal. We then add differences until we come to a distinct knowledge of the dog.

We think about a thing and encircle it before we fully understand and define it. This is again because of the natural road. We know things in an outward way before inwardly. Thus we encircle virtue or define it in an outward way as a praiseworthy quality before we get inside to its nature and define it fully, seeing why it is praiseworthy.

We usually define a thing by its effect before by its cause. Comedy is a play that makes us laugh. Light makes things visible.

If we turn from the art of defining to the art of reasoning, we also find that the natural road is the reason for many things. Induction comes before syllogism because induction in an argument from many singulars to the universal while syllogism begins with the universal; and on the natural road, we have seen, the singular is before the universal. For the same reason the argument called example is before the enthymeme. Likewise, we reason more from the effect to the cause than the reverse because of the natural road. And dialectic also is usually necessary before reasoned out knowledge since we start from sense.

* * *

The natural road enters into all the private roads of reasoned out knowledge since they all involve the common road of reasoned out knowledge. But some forms of reasoned out knowledge have a special dependence upon the natural road.

The philosophy or wisdom of nature especially follows the natural road from the senses into reason. Natural science begins and ends in sense experience, as Aristotle and Thomas and Einstein noted. This is part of the reason why natural philosophy is said to proceed rationabiliter as Boethius and Thomas note in the De Trinitate. Both the order of determination and the order of demonstration in natural philosophy are closely tied to the natural road. the order of determination in the philosophy of nature which is to consider natural things in general before in particular follows directly from the order in the natural road in which the confused or indistinct comes before the distinct. We usually reason and demonstrate from the effect to the cause in considering natural things.

A knowledge of the natural road is most necessary for wisdom and the wise man. At least, three reasons for this can be given.

The first reason is that the road from the senses into reason is also the road to wisdom which is the last end of reason and the highest perfection of reason. We can see that the natural road goes in the direction of wisdom. Animals seem wise in comparison to plants for the former have sensation and awareness of their surroundings while the latter do not. And the animals that have memory are wiser than those lowly forms of animal life that have only sensation without memory, an animal would never go forward in knowledge. One would always be starting over again. The new born baby would be as wise an any of us. And the man of experience is wiser than the man of one memory. And the man of art or science who has reasoned out why things are so is wiser than the man who only has experience that they are so. Hence, we think the chief artist who directs the subordinate artist is wiser because he knows why; as the medical doctor is wiser than the pharmacist. One reason then why a knowledge of the natural road is important for wisdom is because that road is the road to wisdom.

A second reason why a knowledge of the natural road is necessary for wisdom is because that road is followed within wisdom although not as much as in the philosophy of nature. The wise man often orders by the natural road the meanings underlying the words in the axioms since we name things as we know them. We investigate substance through material substance and we consider ability and act in changing things before ascending to a more universal consideration of act and ability applicable to immaterial and unchanging things. And in general, we consider the common things (substance, act, one etc.) before the separated or immaterial substances.

A third reason why a knowledge of the natural road is necessary for wisdom can be seen from the sixth attribute of the wise man. It belongs to the wise to direct others and not be directed by another. Since all our knowledge is directed and ordered along the natural road, the wise man cannot fulfill his office of directing others without a superior knowledge of this road.

The natural road enters into logic, not only insofar as logic is about the common road, but also insofar as the private road of logic follows to some extent the natural road. The logician defines the definition, statement and syllogism in words which are sensible and through these orders our thoughts and thinking which are not sensible.

The natural road is followed least in mathematics where the simple is considered before the composed, as plane geometry before solid geometry (even though the definitions of the simple reveal a dependence upon the natural road), and where the demonstrations go from cause to effect. But Euclid would seem to follow the natural road in doing geometry before the books on number.

We have seen (all to briefly, perhaps) that the natural road comes before the roads made by reason and enters into them. The roads made by reason are built upon the natural road and are acquired by the natural road. Indeed the word road is used in this sense by following the natural road. We carry the word road over from the sensible road upon which we walk or drive to the roads in our knowledge by a likeness.

Since reason is the ability to look before and after, it is reason that comes to see the order in both the natural road and in the roads made by reason. And for the same reason (reason is able to look before and after), it can also come to see that the natural road is before the roads made by reason and is, in truth, the first road in human knowledge, the road underlying all our knowledge.