The Order in the Road of Reason as Reason

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The Order in the Road of Reason as Reason

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

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THE ORDER IN THE ROAD OF REASON AS REASON

The second road in our looking knowledge is the road of reason as reason.

Knowing this road distinctly involves knowing all the order, all the before and after in it.

The order in this road is found in the order of the acts of reason.

The first order to be seen in the acts of reason is that distinction and order in the acts of reason which is the foundation of the division of logic. Understanding what something is is before the composition or division whereby we understand the true or the false. And understanding the true or the false is before reasoning. This order is most easily exemplified in the first book of Euclid’s Elements.

A second order in the acts of reason can be seen from the definition of reason as reason. Reason as reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after.

The discourse that defines reason is coming to know the unknown through the known and the less known through the more known. Following Socrates in the Meno and Albert the Great in his division of logic, we can see this both in defining and in reasoning, that is in coming to know the simple and the complex unknown. The known or more known comes before the unknown or less known.

The disourse of reason from one thing to another in which one thing is known from knowing another is perhaps fourfold:

Quaestio disputata de creaturis spiritualibus, Q. 3, corpus:

Ipsum autem intelligere animae humanae est per modum motus; intelligit enim anima discurrendo de effectibus in causas, et de causis in effectus, et de similibus in similia, et de oppositis in opposita.

Reason can, of course, go from thinking about one thing to thinking about another without one enlightening the other. And reason can go from one thought to another when the thoughts are not about different things.

And reason sees a distinction before it sees a before and after. This is clear from the axiom of before and after: nothing is before or after itself. Reason must see that this is not that before it can see that this is before or after that (if it is).

In defining, one must distinguish genus from difference and both of these from species. And then one can see that the genus is before the differences and the differences before the species. And reason must see the distinction of statements into affirmative and negative and into universal and particular before it can see the before and after in the syllogism. One cannot syllogize from two negative statements or from two particular ones. But whether there is a conclusion after two affirmative or one affirmative and one negative, at least one of which is universal, can be seen only after one has seen the distinction of the three figures. For example, there is a conclusion after two universal affirmatives in the first figure but not in the second. One sees the order among the three figures only after one has distinguished them.

There is this order of seeing distinction before order in everything reason considers.

And reason must distinguish between what is a beginning and what is not a beginning and one beginning from another beginning. For discourse goes forward from a beginning or beginnings.

Reason looks before and after in all the senses distinguished in the twelfth chapter of the Categories.

The third order to be seen in the acts of reason is that reason (in what it does not know naturally) guesses before it knows. Dialectical reasoning comes before demonstration. Reason also guesses what a thing is before it knows what it is. The tools and places of the dialectician are useful for defining as well as reasoning. It is worth noting that each of the first three tools of the dialectician is an ability to see a distinction.

Although guessing is before knowing in the third sense of before, in the fourth sense of before, knowing is before guessing – it is better than guessing.

The fourth order to be seen in the acts of reason is that reason thinks about something before understanding it. Reason thinks about a thing or a distinction or a definition or a statement or an argument before it understands it fully. (But understanding something is before thinking about it in the fourth sense of before. For it is better.

Reason goes from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out. The senses or kinds of thinking out can be distinguished with the help of the senses of being in, especially the middle six senses.

Reason thinks out the parts of some composed whole. And reason thinks out a definition. And reason thinks out the species of a genus. And reason thinks out the senses of an equivocal word. And if it is equivocal by reason, it also thinks out the order of the senses. And reason thinks out a whole from its parts. In this way it thinks out an axiom. And reason at last thinks out or reasons out a conclusion

The culmination of thinking out which is reasoning out conclusions leads to the end which is a reasoned out understanding of things. This is called an episteme by Plato and Aristotle.

We can also see how reason guessing before it knows and thinking about something before understanding it presupposes the first road, the natural road from the senses into reason, whence we know things in an outward way before inwardly. Here we see a likeness of the third and fourth orders, but the fourth is more universal than the third.

The above touches upon all the order, all the before and after, in this road of reason as reason.