The Preparation for Wisdom

← Library · Wisdom about Beginnings

The Preparation for Wisdom

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

From his file: The PREPARATION FOR WiSDOM.doc.

Word doc

Read from in 1 class

THE PREPARATION FOR WISDOM

The preparation for wisdom begins with the music of Mozart. Mozart represents the emotions in harmony with reason. Mozart imitates the emotions as partaking of reason. This does not make them less emotions, but it does make them more human. It also makes them more beautiful and more interesting than they are in daily life.

Why should the preparation for wisdom, which is the highest and the greatest perfection of reason, began with something that is reasonable only by participation, something that is not reasonable through itself? Just as in the life of reason, we go from what is more known to us towards what is more known by nature or more known simply or more perfectly known, so too we must begin with what is reasonable by partaking of reason rather than with what is reasonable through itself. For man is an animal with reason and always what is generic in a thing is before in time and generation what is specific. Hence, what is reasonable by partaking is before what is reasonable through itself.

One of the reasons given by Aristotle in the eighth book of his Politics for music having a place in the education of the young is that the right kind of music can dispose for moral virtue. This is music that represents the emotions in harmony with reason and moves our own emotions in that way. Because it is that kind of music, the music of Mozart and, in general, that of the 18th century, disposes for the moral virtues. And the moral virtues dispose for the virtues of reason. Thomas in his commentary on the seventh book of Natural Hearing states this very explicitly:

Et inde est quod exercitium virtutum moralium, per quas huiusmodi passiones refraenantur, multum valet ad scientiam acquirendam.[1]

After the music of Mozart come the plays of Shakespeare which partake more of reason. The plays of Shakespeare are also an imitation or likeness. Man is the most imitative of the animals and, at first, we learn by imitation, as Aristotle teaches us in his book About the Poetic Art. This is another reason why the music of Mozart and the plays of Shakespeare come before reasoned out knowledge in the preparation for wisdom. Reasoned out knowledge is reasonable through itself. It is clear that the plays of Shakespeare are closer to what is reasonable through itself for the plays are made in words. Even though a Mozart opera has words, there, as Mozart said, the words must be altogether the obedient servant of the music. But that the words of Shakespeare are not fully about what is reasonable through itself is seen especially in metaphors which are perhaps the most excellent words of the playwright. As Thomas Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologiae, the poet uses metaphors to express something which is below reason, something which is not properly understandable:

To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow Creeps in this petty pace from day to day To the last syllable of recorded time; And all our yesterdays have lighted fools The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, And then is heard no more; it is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing.

However, Shakespeare arouses wonder by his metaphors and even more perhaps by his characters and most of all by his plots. And this wonder, if not the wonder of the lover of wisdom, is at least a stepping-stone to that wonder. Albert the Great says that fiction "dat modum admirandi". But there is another way that the plays of Shakespeare prepare for wisdom. Fiction, Aristotle notes, is more philosophical than history for the former is more about the universal and the latter, about the singular. But wisdom is the most universal knowledge there is. But the statement used by Aristotle in making known that philosophy begins in wonder, = φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων (Metaphysics, Book One, 982b 18-19). μῦθος comes to mean in Greek, not only myth, but any story, and finally plot in Aristotle's book About the Poetic Art.. One could say that the lover of plots is in some way a philosopher. How is this? A plot is not only composed of wonderful things, but also of a beginning, middle and end. The two kinds of philosophy, looking and doing, both have a beginning, a middle and an end. The beginning of looking philosophy is mathematics which can be learned even by boys; the middle is natural philosophy; and the end is wisdom which is also called meta ta phusika because it comes after natural philosophy in the order of learning. The beginning of doing philosophy is ethics; the middle is domestic philosophy; and the end is, of course, political philosophy.

Further, since beginning, middle and end are defined by before and after, and before and after also define order, there is also a connection between delighting in the beginning, middle and end of a plot and seeking order which is proper to reason and therefore most of all to wisdom which is the highest or greatest perfection of reason.

Aristotle divides the plot in another way into two parts: tying the knot and untying the knot. And we learn in the third book of the Metaphysics that wisdom also has these two parts. And in every part of philosophy, we have a tying of knots and an untying of them. Thus, the lover of plots is being prepared in a remote way for wisdom.

A plot also arouses wonder when chance events seem to have some hidden purpose. Aristotle gives as one of the three opinions about luck or chance that it is something divine. Hence, at the end of Romeo and Juliet, the Prince says to the bereaved parents and longtime enemies:

Where be these enemies? - Capulet! Montague! See what a scourge is laid upon your hate, That heaven finds means to kill your joys with love

Since the end or goal of wisdom is a knowledge of the first cause and the first cause is God, there is a connection between this wonder and wisdom's goal. However, the philosopher does not reason from chance events to the existence of God.

Democritus said that Homer built a cosmos in verse. In like manner, one speaks of the Shakespearean universe. As one of my first teachers in Shakespeare said: "Shakespeare has one of everything." Washington Irving, our first recognized writer in Europe and after whom our first literary period is named, at the end of his life, in full fame spoke to his nephew and biographer. (Washington Irving, Moderation Displayed by Edward Wagenknecht. p. 56):

During his last days Irving told his biographer that "SHAKESPEARE has a phrase for everything." Considering Shakespeare and "one or two others; it seemed idle for anyone else to pride himself upon authorship."

The universality of Shakespeare is another reason why his plays prepare for wisdom. Man is a little cosmos, as Democritus also said. Wisdom is about the universe.

When we reflect upon Shakespeare's words, we find that he is more than a playwright, as unusal as Plato. We can see in Plato's Dialogues that he is a philosopher with certain poetic gifts. Shakespeare is a poet with certain philosophic gifts. Nobody knows for sure where Shakespeare's wisdom comes from. He is wiser than any of the modern philosophers.

We can now turn to the ways in which the lower kinds of philosophy or reasoned out knowledge prepare for wisdom. And here, we shall emphasize the other two parts of looking philosophy (mathematics and natural philosophy) and their tool (logic) which is sometimes reduced to looking philosophy because it is the tool.

[Are the beginnings of philosophy by custom or by fashion or by chance or by choice or by nature? I cannot think of any other way one might begin philosophy, except by following a teacher or author. But they, or their teachers, would have to begin in one of these ways.]

In the second book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle speaks of the influence of custom upon the way in which men consider something or the way they proceed in considering it and the way they expect it to be considered. If the ways of considering are too different, it is almost impossible for reason to adjust to another way of considering things. Although the way of considering things should fit those things and how our reason is towards knowing those things, it is extremely difficult to proceed in a way which is much different from one's usual way of proceeding. We can consider in what way the lower parts of philosophy can dispose for wisdom by their way of proceeding or considering by being less different from that of wisdom's way of proceeding or way of considering its subject. Does the way of considering or proceeding in the lower parts of philosophy dispose us at all for the way of considering things in wisdom? We must first consider the way of proceeding in wisdom.

The way of considering things in wisdom is most universal, most immaterial, and towards the immaterial. We learn in the fourth book of the Metaphysics that wisdom is the reasoned out knowledge of being and one which are most universal. And in the sixth book, we learn that wisdom is about things that do not depend upon matter for their definition or their existence. These are the common things like being, one, substance, act and ability which need not involve matter and the separated substances which cannot be material. And since we proceed from the common things towards the separated substance in wisdom (for the common things are more known to us than the separated substances), we can say that wisdom goes towards the immaterial; that is, from the less immaterial (the common things) to the more immaterial (the separated substances).

Since the study of natural things proceeds from the general to the particular and towards matter, it is unlike wisdom. For wisdom proceeds towards the immaterial and, to some extent, from the particular to the general. Aristotle considers act and ability in the ninth book of the Metaphysics first as they are found in motion and then proceeds to an entirely universal consideration of act and ability as found even in immobile things. Likewise, he ascends from material substance to an understanding of substance in general and from the one which is the beginning of number to the one that is convertible with being.

But the parts of the study of natural things for which common experience is sufficient experience are enough like the way of considering in wisdom to dispose for wisdom. These are the parts contained in Aristotle's eight books of Natural Hearing and his three books About the Soul. The eight books of Natural Hearing contain the most universal, the most general part of the study of natural things. Although not as universal as the consideration of the wise man, it is the part of natural studies closest to wisdom in its universality. And it is not immersed in matter to the extent that the parts comiing after it are. As one proceeds from the eight books of Natural Hearing to the four books About the Universe and then to the two books About Coming to Be and Passing Away, one is descending more and more into matter. Thus, in terms of its universality and less materiality, the eight books of Natural Hearing are closer to wisdom. The mind accustomed to the study of the eight books of Natural Hearing can more easily make the transition to the way of considering things in wisdom than the mind accustomed to the later books. Most minds could not make the transition. ----------------------- [1]In VII Physicorum, Lectio VI, n, 925