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The Proemium to Logic
Intro to Philosophy
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THE PROEMIUM TO LOGIC
Thomas has written two proemia to logic, one at the beginning of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, and the second at the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics. Since the second is more complete, we name it the major proemium and the first, the minor proemium. Both divide logic from the distinction of the acts of reason begun by Aristotle in the third book About the Soul.
We give first the two proemia in their original Latin and in an English translation. Following that, we give some short texts from Thomas that cast further light on the matter of the proemia. In both, Thomas distinguishes three acts of reason in order and then distinguishes and orders the books of the Father of logic by the former.
THOMAS AQUINAS: MINOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC
Sicut dicit Philosophus in III De anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et dividentis. Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum.
Harum autem operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse compositio et divisio, nisi simplicium apprehensorum. Secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam: quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis.
Cum autem Logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis.
De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro Praedicamentorum. De his vero quae pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat Philosophus in libro Perihermenias. De his quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat in libro Priorum et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de syllogismo simpliciter et de diversis syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud.
Et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber Praedicamentorum ordinatur ad librum Perihermeneias, qui ordinatur ad librum Priorum et sequentes.
THOMAS AQUINAS: MINOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC
As the Philosopher says in the third book On the Soul, the operation of the understanding is twofold: one which is called the understanding of indivisibles by which the understanding grasps the nature of each thing in itself; and the other is the operation of the understanding putting together and dividing. There is added however a third operation of reasoning by which reason proceeds from the known to an investigation of the unknown.
The first of these operations is ordered to the second because there cannot be a putting together and division except of simples grasped. The second however is ordered to the third because it is necessary that from some known truth to which the understanding assents, one proceeds to getting certitude about something unknown.
Since however Logic is called the science of reason, it is necessary that its consideration be about those things which pertain to the aforesaid three operations of reason.
Aristotle therefore determines in the book of the Categories about those things which pertain to the first operation of the understanding; that is, about those things which are conceived by a simple understanding. The Philosopher determines about those things which pertain to the second operation; namely, about affirmative and negative statements in the book called Peri Hermeneias. He determines about those things which pertain to the third operation in the book of the Prior Analytics and those following it, in which are taken up the syllogism simply and the diverse species of syllogism and argument.
And therefore by the foresaid order of the three operations, the book of the Categories is ordered to the book Peri Hermeneias which is ordered to the book of the Prior Analytics and the following ones.
THOMAS AQUINAS: MAJOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC
Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Analyticorum, Proemium, nn. 1-6:
Sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio Metaphysicae, hominum genus arte et rationibus vivit: in quo videtur Philosophus tangere quoddam hominis proprium quo a caeteris animalibus differt. Alia enim animalia quodam naturali instinctu ad suos actus aguntur; homo autem rationis iudicio in suis actionibus dirigitur. Et inde est quod ad actus humanos faciliter et ordinate perficiendos diversae artes deserviunt. Nihil enim aliud ars esse videtur, quam certa ordinatio rationis quomodo per determinata media ad debitum finem actus humani perveniant.
Ratio autem non solum dirigere potest inferiorum partium actus, sed etiam actus sui directiva est. Hoc enim est proprium intellectivae partis, ut in seipsam reflectatur: nam intellectus intelligit seipsum et similiter ratio de suo actu ratiocinari potest. Si igitur ex hoc, quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur, adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat.
Et haec ars est Logica, idest rationalis scientia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod est omnibus artibus commune); sed etiam ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam.
Et ideo videtur esse ars artium, quia in actu rationis nos dirigit, a quo omnes artes procedunt. Oportet igitur Logicae partes accipere secundum diversitatem actuum rationis.
Sunt autem rationis tres actus: quorum primi duo sunt rationis, secundum quod est intellectus quidam.
Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quod concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro Praedicamentorum.
Secunda vero operatio intellectus est compositio vel divisio intellectus, in qua est iam verum vel falsum. Et huic rationis actui deservit doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro Peri Hermeneias .
Tertius vero actus rationis est secundum id quod est propium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti. Et huic actui deserviunt reliqui libri Logicae.
Attendendum est autem quod actus rationis similes sunt, quantum ad aliquid, actibus naturae. Unde et ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest. In actibus autem naturae invenitur triplex diversitas. In quibuscumque enim natura ex necessitate agit, ita quod non potest deficere. In quibusdam vero natura ut frequentius operatur, licet quandoque possit deficere a proprio actu. Unde in his necesse est esse duplicem actum; unum, qui sit ut in pluribus, sicut cum ex semine generatur animal perfectum; alium vero quando natura deficit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, sicut cum ex semine generatur aliquod monstrum propter corruptionem alicuius principii.
Et haec etiam tria inveniuntur in actibus rationis. Est enim aliquis rationis processus necessitatem inducens, in quo non est possibile esse veritatis defectum; et per huiusmodi rationis processum scientiae certitudo acquiritur. Est autem alius rationis processus, in quo ut in pluribus verum concluditur, non tamen necessitatem habens. Tertius vero rationis processus est, in quo ratio a vero deficit propter alicuius principii defectum; quod in ratiocinando erat observandum.
Pars autem Logicae, quae primo deservit processui, pars Iudicativa dicitur, eo quod iudicium est cum certitudine scientiae. Et quia iudicium certum de effectibus haberi non potest nisi resolvendo in prima principia, ideo pars haec Analytica vocatur, idest resolutoria. Certitudo autem iudicii, quae per resolutionem habetur, est, vel ex ipsa forma syllogismi tantum, et ad hoc ordinatur liber Priorum analyticorum, qui est de syllogismo simpliciter; vel etiam cum hoc ex materia, quia sumuntur propositiones per se et necessariae, et ad hoc ordinatur liber Posteriorum analyticorum, qui est de syllogismo demonstrativo.
Secundo autem rationis processui deservit alia pars Logicae, quae dicitur Inventiva. Nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. Unde de his, quae inventa sunt, iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur. Sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus quidam attenditur (quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo effectu), ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur.
Per huiusmodi enim processum, quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositonum, ex quibus proceditur: quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et ad hoc ordinatur Topica sive Dialectica. Nam syllogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus est, de quo agit Aristoteles in libro Topicorum.
Quandoque vero, non fit complete fides vel opinio, sed suspicio quaedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam. Et ad hoc ordinatur Rhetorica.
Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam representationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur Poëtica; nam poëtae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem representationem.
Omnia autem haec ad Rationalem Philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est.
Tertio autem processui rationis deservit pars Logicae, quae dicitur Sophistica, de qua agit Aristoteles in libro Elenchorum.
THOMAS AQUINAS: MAJOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC
As Aristotle says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, the human race lives by art and reasonings: in which the Philosopher seems to touch upon a certain property of man by which he differs from the other animals. For other animals are led by some natural instinct to their acts; man however is directed by the judgment of reason in his acts. And hence it is that diverse arts serve to perfect human acts easily and orderly. For art seems to be nothing other that a certain ordering by reason of how human acts can arrive at a suitable end through determined means.
Reason however is not only able to direct our lesser parts, but also directs its own act. For this is a property of the understanding part, that it reflects upon itself; for the understanding understands itself, and likewise reason is able to reason about its own act. If therefore from this, that reason reasons about the act of the hand, there has been found the art of building or of metal-working through which man is able to perform acts of these kinds easily and orderly; for the same reason, some art is necessary which directs the act of reason itself, by which man can proceed in the very act of reason orderly, easily and without error.
And this art is Logic, that is reasonable science, which is reasonable not only from this that it is according to reason (which is common to all arts), but also from this that it is about the very act of reason as its own matter. And therefore it seems to be the art of arts because it directs us in the act of reason from which all the arts proceed.
It is necessary therefore to take the parts of logic according to the diversity of the acts of reason. There are however three acts of reason of which the first two are of reason according as it is a certain understanding.
One act of understanding is the understanding of the indivisible or incomplex, by which it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the forming of the understanding or imagination through the understanding. and to this operation of reason is ordered the teaching which Aristotle gives in the book of the Categories.
The second operation of understanding is the composition or division of the understanding, in which there is now the true or the false. And for this act of reason serves the teaching which Aristotle gives in the book the Peri Hermeneias.
The third act of reason is according to that which is characteristic of reason, namely to go from one thing to another, so that through what is known it might come to a knowledge of the unknown. And the rest of the books of logic serve this act.
It should be noted however that the acts of reason are like, to some extent, the acts of nature. Whence also art imitates nature as far as it can. In the acts of nature, however, there is found a three-fold diversity. For in some things nature acts out of necessity, so that it is not able to fail. In some things nature operates for the most part although sometimes it can fail from its proper act. Whence in these there is necessarily a twofold act: one which is for the most part, as when a perfect animal is generated from a seed; and another when nature falls short of what is suitable to it, as when from seed is generated something defective because of the corruption of some principle.
And these three are also found in the acts of reason. For there is a proceeding of reason bringing in necessity, in which a defect of truth is not possible. and through such a proceeding of reason is acquired the certitude of knowledge. There is however another proceeding of reason in which the true is for the most part concluded, not however having necessity. The third proceeding of reason however is that in which reason departs from the true because of the defect of some principle that should have been observed in reasoning.
The part of logic which serves the first proceeding is called the judging part in that judgment is with the certitude of knowledge. and because a certain judgment cannot be had about effects except by resolving to first principles, therefore this part is called analytic, that is resolving. The certitude of judgment, however, which is had by resolution, is either from the very form of the syllogism only and to this is ordered the book of the Prior Analytics, which is about the syllogism simply; or also with this from the matter, because per se and necessary propositions are taken and to this is ordered the book of the Posterior Analytics, which is about the demonstrative syllogism.
Another part of logic, which is called the finding part, serves the second proceeding of reason. For finding is not always with certitude. Whence judgment is required about those things which have been found in order that certitude may be had. Moreover, just as in natural things which are done for the most part a certain gradation can be noted (because the stronger the power of nature, the more rarely it fails in its effect), so also in the proceeding of reason which is not with complete certitude, some gradation is found as it approaches more and less to perfect certitude.
For sometimes through a process of this kind, although knowledge does not come to be, nevertheless belief or opinion comes to be because of the probability of the propositions from which it proceeds; for reason wholly turns to one part of a contradiction although with fear of the other. And to this is ordered Topical or Dialectical for the dialectical syllogism is from probable opinions which Aristotle considers in the book of the Topics.
Sometimes belief or opinion does not come to be completely but a suspicion, because reason does not wholly turn to one part of a contradiction Although it is more inclined to this part than to that. And to this is ordered the Rhetoric.
Sometimes only evaluation inclines to some part of a contradiction because of some representation, in the way in which detesting of some food comes to a man if it is represented to him under the likeness of something detestable. And to this is ordered the Poetics; for it belongs to the poet to lead into something virtuous through a suitable representation.
All of these pertain to reasonable philosophy; for it belongs to reason to lead from one thing of another.
The part of logic which is called Sophistic serves the third proceeding of reason which Aristotle considers in the book of the Refutations.
SHORT TEXTS FROM THOMAS ON THE MATTER OF THE PROEMIUM
Thomas casts some light also on the connection and order of these three acts of reason in the following two passages by considering that order in the light of action or motion depending upon some form and upon something immobile:
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Responsio:
Unumquodque autem agit secundum exigentiam suae formae quae est principium agendi et regula operis.
...Unde...intellectus formatus per quidditates rerum ex hoc dirigitur in cognitione principiorum, quae scitis terminis cognoscuntur, et ulterius in cognitionibus conclusionum quae notae fiunt ex principiis...
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Responsio:
Each thing acts according to the requirement of its form which is the origin of its acting and the rule of its work.
Whence the understanding formed by the what it is of things is directed from this to a knowledge of the beginnings [premises] which are known when their terms are known, and further to a knowledge of conclusions which become known from the beginnings [premises].
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Responsio:
In omnibus autem hoc invenitur quod motus procedit a primo immobili quieto. Quod quidem patet in naturalibus; quia primum movens in quolibet genere est non motum illo genere motus, sicut primum alterans est non alteratum.
Similiter patet in intellectualibus; quia motus rationis discurrentis procedit a principiis et quidditatibus rerum, quibus intellectus informatus terminatur.
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Responsio:
In all things it is found that motion proceeds from a first immobile at rest. This is clear in natural things because the first mover in every genus is not moved by that kind of motion, as the first altering is not altered.
Likewise, it is clear in things of the understanding because the motion of reason discoursing proceeds from beginnings and the what it is of things by which the formed understanding is determined.
In the following passage, Thomas stays close to the proemium where we see the chief subject of each part of logic in the book or books that have come down to us from the father of logic, Aristotle. Thus the syllogism is the chief subject of the logic of the third act of reason. And the enunciation or statement is the chief subject of the logic of the second act. And praedicatum, or what is said of many things, fits the book called the Categories and also Porphyry’s Isagoge or introduction to the Categories. And this is reflected in the Latin names for the matter of these two books, one of which is called the praedicabilia and the other the praedicamenta.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171:
Sciendum tamen est quod alia ratione dialectica est de communibus et logica et philosophia prima. Philosophia enim prima est de communibus, quia eius consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet circa ens et partes et passiones entis. Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de intentionibus rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171:
It should be known that for another reason dialectic and logic and first philosophy are about what is common. For first philosophy is about the common because its consideration is about the common things themselves, to wit, about being and the parts and passions of being. And because reason is employed about all that is in things while logic is about the acts of reason; logic also will be about what is common to all things, that is about the intentions of reason, which are related to all things. But not thus that logic is about the common things as subjects. For logic considers as subjects, syllogism, statement, predicate, or something of this kind.
But in another place, Thomas sees definition as being to the first act as statement is to the second act and syllogism or argument to the third:
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2)
sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secunda, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2:
just as in exterior acts one can consider working and the work, as the act of building and the built, so also in the works of reason one can consider the act itself of reason which is to understand and to reason and something constituted by an act of this kind; which, in looking reason, first is definition; second statement; and third, syllogism or argument.
And in many places, he compares the first and second act, bringing out that a definition is formed by the first as statement by the second:
Thomas Aquinas, In I Super Ioannem, Lect 1, n. 25:
Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas eius operationes. Nam secundum operationem suam, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam, qua componit et dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiusmodi
Thomas Aquinas, In I Super Ioannem, Lect 1, n. 25:
The understanding however forms two things by two of its operations. For by its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by its operation in which it composes and divides, it forms a statement or something of this kind.
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Q. V. Art I, Ad 7:
veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in primo, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid.
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Q. V. Art I, Ad 7:
truth and falsity are properly found in the second operation, and in its sign which is the statement, and not in the first, or its sign which is definition, except in some qualified way.
The question arises then whether the logic of the first act is chiefly about what is said of many or about definition for which the former is considered.
Since definition is a beginning of demonstration, Aristotle considered how to define in the second book of the Posterior Analytics. And he also alludes there to the importance of dialectic for getting and examining definitions. In the book About Places (the Topics), which is about dialectic, we learn how the four tools of dialectic are useful for getting or making definitions and how the places for all four problems contribute to the examination of definitions. Perhaps Aristotle saw no need to consider definition beyond the ample consideration of it in the Posterior Analytics and in the eight books About Places. At any rate, no book or hint of a book on definition in the logic of the first act has come down to us from him.
But Albert the Great considered definition in the logic of the first act and the above proportions in Thomas also suggest that some consideration of definition is not out of place in the logic of the first act.
One might also ask whether some consideration of division and distinction belongs to the logic of the first act. For reason cannot grasp what something is without dividing and distinguishing.
The following text of Thomas makes a surprising connection between the first two acts of reason and what is found in things:
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio, Ad 2, Ad 3:
Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum.
...intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo...
Ad tertium dicendum, quod operationi intellectus nostri componentis et dividentis admiscetur tempus duplici de causa: tum ex parte sua, quia accipit scientiam a continuo et tempore, scilicet a sensu et imaginatione; tum ex parte intellectorum, quae in tempore sunt.
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio, Ad 2, Ad 3:
Since in a thing are these two, the what it is of the thing and its existence, to these two correspond a twofold operation of the understanding. One is that called by the philosophers formation, by which it grasps the what it is of things, which is also called the understanding of indivisibles by the Philosopher in the third book About the Soul. The other however comprehends the existence by putting together an affirmation because also the existence of a thing put together from matter and form, from which it gets knowledge, consists in a certain putting together of form with matter, or of accident with subject.
…Our understanding whose knowledge arises from things, which have a put together existence, does not grasp that existence except by putting together and dividing…
To the third it should be said that time is mixed with the operation of our understanding putting together and dividing for two causes: both on its side because it gets knowledge from the continuous and time, to wit by sense and imagination, and on the side of the things understood which are in time.
The following text of Thomas helps to separate an opinion or a suspicion from the knowledge produced by a demonstration. It also indicates that both an opinion and a suspicion can be called a guess, although the opinion is stronger than the suspicion. And since logic is an art, it can be seen that there are two general arts of reasonable guesses. Dialectic helps us to make reasonable guesses about the universal. And rhetoric helps us to make reasonable guesses about the singular in human affairs. We are more aware to day of particular arts of reasonable or educated guesses. The art of the weatherman or the art of the economist are, for example, arts for making educated guesses about the singular.
Thomas Aquinas, In VI Ethicorum, Lect. III, n. 1143:
…virtutes intellectuales sunt habitus, quibus anima dicit verum. Sunt autem quinque numero quibus anima semper dicit verum vel affirmando vel negando: scilicet ars, scientia, prudentia, sapientia et intellectus. Unde patet quod ista sunt quinque virtutes intellectuales.
Ab horum autem numero excludit suspicionem, quae per aliquas coniecturas habetur de aliquibus particularibus factis; et opinionem quae per aliquas coniecturas habetur de aliquibus universalibus. Quamvis enim per ista duo quandoque verum dicatur tamen contingit quod eis quandoque dicitur falsum, quod est malum intellectus, sicut verum est bonum intellectus. Est autem contra ratione virtutis, ut sit principium mali actus. Et sic patet quod suspicio et opinio non possunt dici intellectuales virtutes.
Thomas Aquinas, In VI Ethicorum, Lect. III, n. 1143:
…the intellectual virtues are the habits by which the soul says what is true. But they are five in number by which the soul always says the true either affirming or denying: namely art, science, foresight, wisdom, and understanding. And thus it is clear that these are the five intellectual virtues.
From the number of these, he excludes suspicion which is had through some guesses about particular doings; and opinion which is had through some guesses about some universals. For although through these two sometimes the true is said, nevertheless it happens that by them sometimes the false is said which is the bad of the understanding, just as the true is the good of the understanding. It is however against the definition of virtue that it be the source of a bad act. And thus it is clear that suspicion and opinion cannot be called virtues of the understanding.
A key text for why judgment is considered under the third act in the major proemium while grasping, in the first two acts (even though the judgment of natural understanding is better and more firm than that in reasoned out knowledge):
Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 1, Ad 4:
iudicare non est proprium rationis, per quod ab intellectu distingui possit, quia etiam intellectus iudicat hoc esse verum, illud falsum.
Sed pro tanto iudicium rationi attribuitur, et comprehensio intelligentiae, quia iudicium in nobis ut communiter fit per resolutionem in principia, simplex autem comprehensio per intellectum.
Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 1, Ad 4:
To judge is not something private to reason by which it can be distinguished from the understanding because the understanding also judges this to be true and that false.
But judgment is attributed to reason to some extent and grasping to the understanding because judgment in us commonly comes to be by resolution to beginnings, but simple grasping by the understanding.