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The Reasonable Fear of Mistake in a Philosopher
Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will
From his file: REASONABLE FEAR OF MISTAKE.doc.
THE REASONABLE FEAR OF MISTAKE IN A PHILOSOPHER
We must first consider why it is reasonable for a philosopher to fear mistake and what is a reasonable fear of mistake. We should then consider the effects of a reasonable fear of mistake. This will serve two purposes. First, since we know causes especially by their effects, this will help us know better what is a reasonable fear of mistake and help us recognize whether we, or others, have this fear. And second, seeing these effects will help us to see better the importance and necessity of a reasonable fear of mistake in the philosopher.
The classical text on why it is reasonable for the philospher to fear mistake is in the second book of Aristotle's About the Soul.
A reasonable fear of mistake must be balanced by the reasonable hope of finding and coming to know what is true. Neither of these two can stand by itself. Each must be balanced by the other. The fear of mistake without the hope of finding and coming to know what is true would lead to despair and the abandoning of the life of the philosopher. But the hope of finding and coming to know what is true without the fear of mistake would lead to presumption, the mother of error.
Perhaps the balance is not the same or should not be the same everywhere. The hope of finding and coming to know what is true in geometry should be greater than in the philosophy of nature or in metaphysics while the fear of mistake should be greater in the latter.
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The first effect of the fear of mistake is to make us, in general, go forward "wisely and slow" since "they stumble who run fast."
The second effect, in particular, is to proceed dialectically. Just as fear make practical reason take counsel, so fear makes looking reason proceed dialectically. We are in a better position to judge after we have heard both sides while not to have done so leads to precipitous judgment. It is also interesting to note the connection between dialectic and the discovery of truth which points again to the balance between the hope of finding the truth and the fear of mistake. Untying the difficulties is also a sign that we have arrived at the truth.
The third effect of a reasonable fear of mistake is the careful consideration of the beginnings about things. The reason for this being an effect of the reasonable fear of mistake is given by Plato and Aristotle and Thomas: Even a small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end. Hence, one must especially fear a mistake about the beginnings. One should note the care with which Aristotle considers the axiom about contradiction in book four of the Metaphysics and his distinguishing in order the senses of the words used in other axioms in book five of the same. Likewise, one should note the care with which he distinguishes private beginnings as in the first book of Natural Hearing.
The fourth effect of a reasonable fear of mistake is to seek a knowledge of the roads to follow in philosophy. As Thomas says in his proemium to logic (which considers the common road of reasoned out knowledge and the road of the dialectician), such knowledge helps us to proceed orderly, easily, and without error in the act of reason. Indeed the origin of the word error from the Latin word for wandering points to the importance of knowing the road to follow if we are to avoid error.
The fifth effect of a reasonable fear of mistake is to consider universally the causes of error. For as Boethius said, the bad cannot be avoided if its cause is not known.
The sixth effect of a reasonable fear of mistake is to restrain our pride and curiosity which so often lead us into error.
The seventh effect of a reasonable fear of mistake is to hear or read carefully, frequently and with reverence the words of those wiser than us. For the wise not only teach us many truths, but also recall us from, or prevent us from falling into, many errors. However, the good student must have not only humility, but also good sense to judge who should be listened to on what.
The eight effect of a reasonable fear of mistake is to be willing to undergo a Socratic examination of our thinking.
Fear of being mistaken leads one to look before and after
Plato, Cratylus, 428D:
τὸ γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ πάντων χαλεπώτατον· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῇ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ παρῇ ὁ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς οὐ δεινόν; δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι, τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ ποιητοῦ, βλέπειν ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.
To be deceived by one self is the most dangerous of all. For when the deceiver is never distant, but always present, how could it not be terrible? It is necessary, as it seems, to turn back often to what has been said and to try, as the poet says, to look at the same time forwards and backwards.
Fear of being mistaken leads one to examination (also the fear should be great because truth is a common good)
Plato, Charmides, 166 C-D:
O)on, |n d' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν « o”per ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν diereun/mhn τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, eïd÷ß δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων· ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει; Και μάλα, | d' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
How can you think. I said, if my main effort is to refute you, that I do it with any other motive than that which would impel me to investigate the meaning of my own words - from a fear of carelessly supposing, at any moment, that I knew something while I knew it not? And so it is now: that is what I am doing. I tell you. I am examing the argument mainly for my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates. Or do you not think it is for the common good, almost, of all men, that the truth about everything there is should be discovered? Yes indeed, he replied, I do, Socrates.
Fear of mistake distinguished from fear of being laughed at (also fear of being mistaken should be great because truth is a common good)
Plato, Republic, Book V, 450E-451A:
ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, + δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὔ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν· παιδικὸν γὰρ τοῦτό γε· ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεὶς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους ξυνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ 2 ἥκιστα δεῖ σφάλλεσθαι.
But to speak when one doubts himself and is seeking while he talks, as I am doing, is a fearful and slippery venture. The fear is not of being laughed at, for that is childish, but, lest, missing the truth, I fall down and drag my friends with me in matters where it most imports not to stumble.
Fear of being mistaken should lead one to begin well
Plato, Cratylus, 436C-D:
εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος t™lla \dh πρὸς τοῦτ’ ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὑτῷ ξυμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ αδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα \dh ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις.
δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς αρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα
If the one laying down the first erred and forced the other things towards this and compelled them to harmonize with the same, it is nothing strange, just as sometimes in geometrical figures when there has come to be a first small and hidden falsehood, all the rest following are made to agree with each other.
It is necessary then for every man to have much thought and much consideration about the beginning of every thing, whether it has been laid down rightly or not. For that having been considered well, the rest following it will be seen.
The above text is urging us to begin well as regards the beginnings about things, as does the following text
Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XLIII, Quaest. I, Art. IV, Solutio and Ad 2:
...ut Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. VIII, finis in operabilibus est sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis.
Error autem in speculativis, qui est circa principia indemonstrabilia, difficile removeri potest, eo quod non possunt accipi aliqua magis nota, per quae error improbetur.
Ita etiam in practicis, quando aliquis alicui peccato ut fini adhaeret quasi in eo suam beatitudinem constituens, non potest tali peccato de facili remedium adhiberi: quia nihil est aliud magis a peccante dilectum, propter cujus consecutionem hoc in quo ultimum finem ponit, dimittat.
Quicumque autem ex electione peccat, vel ex industria, adhaeret peccato quod eligit, quasi per se bono, et sic fini; et ideo tale peccatum non de facili medicinam recipit; unde Philosophus in VII Ethic., ubi supra, per hoc ostendit quod incontinens, quia ex passione peccat, sive infirmitate, facilius curatur quam intemperatus, qui peccat ex electione sive ex industria.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod spes directe est eorum in quae sicut in ultimum finem tendimus; et ideo remotio spei tollit finem; et ideo desperatio est irremissibile peccatum, sicut et error principiorum est insanabilis.....
Fear of mistake leads one to seek knowledge of the road to follow and to listen to those who are the fathers of wisdom for us
Lysis, 213E-214 A:
-W Λύσι, ἀληθῆ moi δοκεῖς λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὕτως ἐπλανώμεθα. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν μηκέτι ἴωμεν· καὶ γὰρ χαλεπή τίς moi φαίνεται ὥσπερ ὁδὸς ἡ σκέψις: Ç δὲ ἐτράπημεν, δοκεῖ moi χρῆναι ἰέναι, σκοποῦντα κατὰ τοὺς ποιητάς: o”toi γὰρ ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες.
Lysis, I think your remark is true, that if we were inquiring correctly we could never have gone so sadly astray. Well. let us follow our present line no further, since our inquiry looks to me a rather hard sort of path: I think we had best make for the point where we turned off, and be guided by the poets; for they are our fathers, as it were, and conductors in wisdom.
Lysis, 215 C:
'´Arqrei δή, ὦ Λύσι, πῇ παρακρουόμεθα. ™rá ge ὅλῳ τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα;
Now observe, Lysis, how we are missing the track. Can it be, indeed, that we are deceived in the whole matter?