The Roads in Our Knowledge

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The Roads in Our Knowledge

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

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THE ROADS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

WHAT IS MEANT BY A ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

The word road can be carried over from the road we walk or drive upon to our knowledge because of a likeness. This likeness consists in two things.

First, as there is an order in the road we walk or drive upon (one part of the road comes before another), so likewise there is an order in our knowledge and in things as known by us. One knowledge is before another, and some things are known before others, and even the same thing is known in one way before it is known in some other way.

Second, as our body goes forward by following the order in the road we walk or drive upon, so likewise, our mind goes forward in knowledge by following the order in things as known by us.

REASON AND THE ROADS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

Since reason looks before and after, it can find the roads in our knowledge. For a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after in our knowledge and in things as known by us.

After reason has found the roads in our knowledge, it can discover whether there is an order among them. For an order of roads means that one road is before or after another, and reason looks before and after.

Reason can also consider whether a knowledge of the road to follow should come before the pursuit of knowledge that is over a road.

THE DIVISION OF ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

Since both nature and reason make order, there can be a road in our knowledge made either by nature or by reason.

We will consider first the road made by nature since, as will be seen, this road comes before the roads made by reason.

THE ROAD MADE BY NATURE IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in human knowledge is the road from the senses into reason.

And since the nature of man is common to all men (for every man is an animal with reason), the natural road from the senses into reason is also a road common to all men.

We can come to a fuller knowledge of the road from the senses into reason in two ways. The first is by distinguishing in order the kinds of knowledge or knowing along this road. The second way is by seeing the order in which different things are known, or the order in which the same thing is known, along this road.

The first kind of knowing along this road is, of course, sensing. Touching, tasting, smelling, hearing and seeing are the beginning of our knowledge. Sensing is common to man and all other animals (although the lower animals do not have all the senses that we have). But after this, man and the higher animals remember what they have sensed. And from many memories of the same, men gather one experience (in the sense of a collection of many memories of the same). And from experience, man comes to understand what is common to many things by separating out what they have in common. And this understanding of what is common to many things is found only in reason. And after man has understood some things, he begins to reason out an understanding of yet other things. We can see then this natural order in our knowledge: sensing, memory, experience, natural understanding, reasoned out understanding. (Wisdom comes at the end after natural understanding and many forms of reasoned out understanding.)

In what order are things known to us along this road? We should first consider the order in which different things are known along this road.

We know, of course, sensible things before things that cannot be sensed (and the more sensible before the less sensible). But it is necessary to consider this more in particular.

First, we know material and changing things before immaterial and unchanging things. For the former are sensible and the latter are not. Hence, we speak of the latter often by negation of the former (as the words immaterial and unchanging suggest).

Second, we usually know effects before causes for effects are more sensible than causes even in material things and many causes are not sensible at all (especially immaterial and unchanging causes) Hence, we often ask why and this is a sign that an effect is known, but not its cause.

Third, we know composed things before simple things. This is not only because causes are simpler than effects and immaterial things than material things, but also because even in sensible and imaginable things the composed is more able to be sensed or imagined. Although in mathematics we go from the simple to the composed because we make what we know, nevertheless we define the simple by the negation of the composed. as the point is defined as that which has no parts.

But the natural road also explains the order in which we know the same thing.

First, as Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. The triangle I sense or even the one I imagine is singular. But when I understand what a triangle is, I am understanding the universal. For what a triangle is, is found in many and said of many. Hence, we know the singular before the universal.

Second, we know a thing in an outward way before we know it inwardly. Outward is almost a synonym for sensible because the senses know things in an outward way. But reason tries to see within. Hence, insight names more the act of reason. Likewise, we speak of a good reason as sharp or penetrating.

Third, we know the same thing in a confused way before distinctly. This is not only because the senses do not distinguish the universal form the singular and know things only in an outward (and hence confused) way, but also because both the senses and even reason are able to know things before they actually know them. But when one goes from ability to act, one is in-between ability and act before one is fully in act. And to know something in a confused way is in between knowing it only in ability and knowing it fully in act.

The wise man knows that in all these orders what is more known to us is less known simply and what is less known to us is more known simply. The wise man also knows that the road to wisdom is nothing other than the road from the senses into reason continued to where it naturally tends and is completed. For wisdom is the highest perfection of reason. And as we go from sensing to memory and from memories to experience and from experience to an understanding of the universal and the why, we are naturally tending in the direction of wisdom.

THE ROADS MADE BY REASON IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

Since reasoned out knowledge is the work of reason as reason, the roads made by reason as reason are the roads of reasoned out knowledge.

But here we should not overlook the distinction between the common road of reasoned out knowledge and the private road of each reasoned out knowledge.

What is common to all reasoned out knowledge is that it is a result of the discourse of reason. Reasoned out knowledge comes from reason thinking out things.

But the matter of each reasoned out knowledge is different. And the private road of each reasoned out knowledge should fit its matter.

Since all reasoned-out knowledge is a work of reason, there is a road common to all such knowledge based on the use of reason. The common road of reasoned-out knowledge is studied in logic which is the art of reasoning.

But since one reasoned-out knowledge also differs from another by its matter (as geometry is about plane and solid figures and ethics is about human acts), each reasoned-out knowledge has its own private road based on its matter and how our reason is to that matter. Since the private road of any reasoned-out knowledge must fit its matter, the private road of each reasoned-out knowledge should be determined in the beginning of that knowledge (after its matter or subject has been determined)

THE ORDER AMONG THE ROADS

The road made by nature comes before the roads made by reason. This can be considered first in general and, then, in particular.

Since the nature of a thing or what it is, is first in that thing, the natural road from the senses into reason is also the first road in our knowledge.

And since we acquire what is not natural through what is natural (as we acquire through our hands the tools we handle or as we acquire the customs and language of our country through our natural or inborn tendency to imitate), the road from the senses into reason is also the basic road upon which all other roads are built and through which all other roads are acquired Hence, we must consider the natural road before the roads made by reason. (we speak more of one road made by nature because nature is determined to one. But reason is capable even of opposites.)

But we should consider in particular how the natural road comes before the common road of reasoned-out knowledge.

Since sensible things are known along the natural road before things that cannot be sensed, we must name things that can be sensed before things that cannot be sensed (and more sensible things before less sensible things). For we name things as we know them so that the order in naming must follow the order in knowing. Hence, reason carries over the names of things that can be sensed and places them upon things that cannot be sensed by the likeness, or other connection, which the latter have with the former. Almost all key words in reasoned-out knowledge are carried over in this way so that we must understand them or their meanings in that order. The word seeing, after having been first placed upon the act of the eye, is carried over and placed upon the interior act of imagining. And then it is carried over and placed upon the completely immaterial act of understanding. We have seen earlier that the word road has been carried over by a certain likeness from the sensible and material road we walk or drive upon to the immaterial roads in our knowledge.

We have seen why the effect is usually more known along the natural road than the cause. Hence, the logician must consider not only the perfect definition by cause, but also the imperfect one by effect. For most things we must define by effect before by cause. And likewise, the logician must consider not only the perfect demonstration showing why something is so, but also the imperfect demonstration that merely shows that it is so. Demonstration that it is so (going from effect to cause) will often precede demonstration showing why it is so (going from cause to effect).

We have seen reasons why the composed is known before the simple along the natural road. This is why reason must take apart things to know them. And why reason must define the simple by the composed.

We have seen that along the natural road, we know the singular before the universal. This explains why we give examples of a thing before we define it. When Socrates asks someone what something is, he invariably gets examples before even an attempt is made at a definition. And why induction to universal statements comes before syllogism from a universal statement. And proportional to this is example (the argument) before the enthymeme.

We have also seen why along the natural road we know things in an outward way before inwardly. This is why on the common road made by reason, we name things and encircle them before defining them fully. Reason must think about a thing before it can define it inwardly or fully. Reason draws a line around a thing long before it is able to penetrate to its nature. Nature loves to hide, said Heraclitus, He might have added from us.

Again, we saw that the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge of things along the natural road. This is why reason must define and divide and, in general, distinguish. And also why we name things and encircle them before we define them fully. This also explains why the first part of a definition (the genus) is more general than the thing being defined and the most general part of the definition.

We have shown in general why the natural road comes before the roads made by reason and in particular that the natural road comes before the common road of reasoned-out knowledge.

If the common road of reasoned-out knowledge comes before the private roads of reasoned-out knowledge, clearly the natural road will also be before the privates roads of reasoned-out knowledge. But in addition, some reasoned-out knowledge especially follows the natural road.

The parts of philosophy that especially require experience seem to follow the natural road more than those which can be developed without reference back to experience. Hence, the mathematical sciences seem to follow the natural road the least. But natural philosophy and practical philosophy (ethics, domestics and politics) all require extensive experience. Wisdom seems to require experience in another sense as the great Dionne pointed out. If one has not acquired the basic parts of the particular philosophies, one does not have the experience necessary to mount to the universal philosophy which is wisdom. Logic, too, seems to require some experience of reasoned-out knowledge (such as geometry) and dialectic (as in the Socratic conversations). But natural philosophy would seem most of all to follow the natural road as Thomas explains In Boetii de Trinitate.

The common road of reasoned-out knowledge is before the private roads of such knowledge. For example, the reason why we define things belongs to an understanding of the common road. But the reasons why we define differently in mathematics and in natural philosophy pertain to a consideration of the private roads.

WHETHER A KNOWLEDGE OF THE ROAD SHOULD COME BEFORE

Before we can pursue well knowledge over a road and, even more so, perfect it, we must have a knowledge of the road.

As in any art, the man who knows the road to follow can go forward orderly, with ease or less difficulty and avoid mistakes.

Reason wanders before it knows the road to follow. This statement seems almost obvious once we define wandering and road in our knowledge. Wandering is a disordered movement of our reason and a road is an order in our knowledge. Since the true is one and the false many or infinite, when reason wanders, it is apt to end up in error. Hence, the Latin word error comes from the Latin verb meaning to wander. Likewise, the Greek word plánh means first a wandering, then going astray and erring. The man who attempts to go forward without knowing the road is apt to end in a mistake rather than in reasoned-out knowledge.

But there is a problem about the common road of reasoned out knowledge. A knowledge of the common road of reasoned out knowledge should come before any reasoned out knowledge. And logic is the knowledge of the common road of reasoned out knowledge. But logic is itself one of the most difficult forms of reasoned out knowledge. Therefore, logic should come before itself which is impossible.

And if logic can be learned before we know the common road of reasoned out knowledge, then even more so can an easier reasoned out knowledge such as geometry. And indeed some experience of geometry woud seem to be necessary for acquiring logic, as can be seen in the Theaetetus of Plato and the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. But as one learns more logic, one can learn both geometry and logic much better.

Hence, when it is said that one must know the common road of reasoned out knowledge before one can learn any reasoned out knowledge, the necessity is not absolute, but to learn well.

Something like this is also true about the private roads. Some knowledge of the subject or matter of a reasoned out knowledge is before knowing the road that fits this matter. But one cannot know well this matter or subject without first knowing the road to follow in it.