The Three Roads in Our Knowledge

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The Three Roads in Our Knowledge

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

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THE THREE ROADS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

Our paper is about the roads in our knowledge. It is not about the roads we follow when making or doing something. A road in our knowledge is nothing other than an order, a before and after, both in our knowledge and in things as known by us. There is reason to think that Aristotle was aware of three kinds of road in our knowledge, all of which must be known and followed for the good of reason. But nowhere, to my knowledge, does Aristotle, in what has come down to us, distinguish explicitly these three kinds of road. We must piece together the distinction from his words on each of them.

Further, there is reason to think that there is an order among these three kinds of road: that the first is presupposed to the second and enters into our understanding of the second; and likewise, the second, the third. But this order can be seen gradually only after their distinction is seen and each is known.

Before trying to find the distinction of the three kinds of road, we should look at Aristotle's use of certain words in speaking of philosophy and the roads it follows.

The genus of philosophy given by Aristotle is usually either μέθοδος or ἐπιστήμη. The word μέθοδος, by its etymology, brings out that philosophy is knowledge over a road, or knowledge that follows a road. The word ἐπιστήμη, by its etymology, brings out that philosophy is a reasoned out understanding, or a reasoned out knowledge, of things.

Although these two words might be taken often as synonyms, their meanings are distinguished in the beginning of the Parts of Animals where Aristotle speaks more precisely. There he says that ἐπιστήμη is one of two ways of having a μέθοδος. The other way of having a μέθοδος is there called παιδεία.[1] What is this distinction?

The distinction to be learned from the beginning of the Parts of Animals is suggested already by the etymologies of the three words. The etymology of μέθοδος is after a road or over a road. Said of knowledge, μέθοδος means knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road. Hence, a μέθοδος involves both knowledge of a road to follow and going down that road to its end. ἐπιστήμη comes from the Greek word for coming to a halt or stop and thus names the knowledge had by going down the road to its end. Since reason does not of itself come to a halt before it has reasoned out things, we have translated ἐπιστήμη by reasoned out knowledge or reasoned out understanding. But before one can go down the road well to its end, one must know the road. And this beginning of a μέθοδος is called, in the text from the Parts of Animals, παιδεία, which comes from the Greek word for child and, hence, pertains to a first and imperfect having of a μέθοδος.[2]

Aristotle does not use the word for road here (ὁδὸς), but the more abstract word τρόπος. One connection between ὁδὸς and τρόπος can be seen in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing (the Physics) [3] where Aristotle speaks of the road from the more known to us to what is more known by nature or simply and then of the necessity to go forward (proágein) in this way (τὸν τρόπον τοὐτον).[4] This reminds one of Aristotle's teaching in the sixth book of Natural Hearing (the Physics) that the order in motion follows the order in the magnitude over which the mobile moves.

But the Greek word τρόπος can also have the sense of road or path, just like the English word way. And hence, Aristotle more often speaks of = τρόπος ἐπιστήμης[5] or simply = τρόπος[6] (or way) rather than of the ὁδὸς (or road).

Plato has spoken before Aristotle on the importance of a knowledge of roads. One particular text that is important for paideía in the sense of a knowledge of the road to follow is in the Timaeus where Timaeus speaks of the paídeusiß[7] of roads:

νῦν δ’ οὖν τὴν διάταξιν αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρητέον ἑκάστων καὶ γένεσιν ἀήθει λόγῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς δηλοῦν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παίδευσιν ὁδῶν, δι’ ὧν ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα ἀνάγκη, ξυνέψεσθε

Now, however, we must try to take up the disposition and generation of each of these, showing them to you in unaccustomed speech. But since you partake of roads having learned paideía, you will follow the things said through what is necessary to show them.[8]

Knowledge of the road to follow enables one to follow it. Timaeus or Plato speaks here of his way of proceeding as not a customary one. But he adds that the one partaking of roads κατὰ παίδευσιν will not for that reason (custom) be impeded from following the speaker. Aristotle, in the last chapter of the second book of the Meta Ta Phusika, speaks of how men expect the speaker to proceed in the way to which they are accustomed and how they are unable to follow him when he proceeds in a different way. Aristotle then speaks of the necessity of acquiring παιδεία about the way to proceed at the beginning of any reasoned out knowledge. We can see how close Plato and Aristotle, the chief philosophers, are here in their teaching that custom is not a sufficient guide to knowing the road to follow (one cannot simply adopt the road to which one is accustomed), but more an impediment, and hence the need for παιδεία.

paideía of the road or roads to follow in our knowledge enables reason to go forward orderly, easily and without error in knowledge over a road. If one understands that a road in our knowledge is nothing other than an order, a before and after, in our knowledge and in things as known by us, it is obvious that a paideía of roads enables us to go forward orderly.

That it also enables us to go forward easily, or with less difficulty, is also clear from every art. It is easier to cook when you know the ordered steps to go through and the same in all the arts.

And the very etymology of error which comes from the Latin word for wandering indicates that error is the result of a disordered movement of reason. Reason wanders into errors. The same etymology can be seen in the corresponding Greek word for error which is πλάνη.

A knowledge of the roads to follow is then necessary to go forward orderly, easily and without error in philosophy. Such knowledge can perhaps be called paideía.

Since it belongs to the wise man most of all to order, the distinction of the roads in our knowledge is the work of the wise man. But the wise man from whom we try to learn, Aristotle, has not left us in the written words that have come down to us an explicit distinction of the roads in our knowledge. But we can piece together such a distinction from the words of Aristotle that have come down to us.[9]

The first road in our knowledge is the natural road in our knowledge because the nature of a thing, or what it is, is always what is first in it.

Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. An animal is defined by having senses. But man is not just an animal. He is an animal with reason. And what is generic (in this case, animal) is before what is specific in time and generation.

And since what is first and natural is before, and even enters into, what is second and not natural, the first road is presupposed to every other road and to some extent enters into all the other roads.[10]

And since we acquire what is not natural through what is natural, as our tools through our hands, and our speech by imitation, we also acquire the other roads by the natural road. Indeed one cannot even speak of a road in our knowledge without following the road from the senses into reason. For the word road is carried over to our knowledge by a likeness from the road we can sense and walk or drive upon.

Hence, we should begin our consideration of the roads in our knowledge with the natural road.

Since a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after in our knowledge and in things as known by us, we can consider the natural road by looking for the before and after of different kinds of knowledge (or knowing) along the road and by looking for the before and after in things as known along this road.

By the first looking, we find the following before and afters. Sensing is before memory of what has been sensed. And after many memories of the same, we can gather one experience of the same. And after experience, we can separate out what is common to the many things experienced and this is the beginning of our understanding the universal. And from the universals naturally understood by us after experience, we can reason out a further understanding. There are many forms of this reasoned out understanding. Last along this road comes wisdom which is both a reasoned out understanding of the first cause(s) and a more distinct and defensible understanding of what we naturally understand.

Thus, the before and after among different kinds of knowing along this road is in order: sensing, memory, experience, natural understanding, many forms of reasoned out understanding, and last, wisdom, which is the last perfection of both natural and reasoned out understanding and the greatest perfection of our reason.

We should also look for the before and after in things as known along this road. And here we should not overlook the distinction between the order in which different things are known along this road and the order in which the same things are known along this road. Since the former is easier to see, it should be considered first.

In general, it is obvious that sensible things are known along this road before things that cannot be sensed and things that are more sensible, before those which are less sensible.

But under this, we may consider that material things are known before immaterial things. For the former, or some of them at least, are sensible and the latter are not.

And, for the most part, effects are more known than causes. This is true, not only because immaterial things are causes of material things, but also because in sensible and material things, the effects are usually more sensible than their causes. Everytime we ask why, we give a sign of the truth of this order.

And even more universally, we can see that composed things are known before simple things. This is true, not only because immaterial things are more simple than material things and causes, than effects, but even where the simple is not a cause of the composed. Thus, in geometry, we know the point (which is not a cause of the line) by negation of composition. The point is that which has no parts. It is the end or limit of a line.

But there is also a before and after in knowing one and the same thing. As Boethius said in commenting on the Isagoge, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. Since we sense before we understand, a thing is singular in our knowledge before it is universal.

And since the senses know things in an outward way while reason tries to penetrate to their nature, a thing is known in an outward way before in an inward way. Hence, outward in English is almost a synonym for sensible. And as Heraclitus said, nature loves to hide for the nature of a thing is within it.

And last, but not least, a thing is known along this road in a confused or indistinct way before distinctly. This is true, not only because reason is apt to distinguish what the senses do not, but even in the knowledge of the senses alone or in reason's knowledge as such, there is found this order. For it is the nature of reason and of the senses to be in ability towards their objects and a confused knowledge is between ignorance and a complete knowledge of something. Hence, the senses and reason, in going from ability to act, naturally know things in a confused way before distinctly.

The natural road is based on the nature of man as an animal with reason and upon the nature of his reason and the nature of his senses.

Aristotle has seen an even more universal truth or, perhaps, we can say, he has seen the most universal truth about the order in which things are known along the natural road. The road is from what is more known to us (but less known by nature or less known simply) to what is more known simply or by nature (but less known to us). We can be led to see this profound truth from the many more particular truths we have seen about the natural order in which things are known by us. An effect is fully known only in the light of its cause or causes, but effects by themselves are more known to us. A thing is more known when it is known inwardly, but we know things more in an outward way. A thing is more known when it is known distinctly, but we know things more in a confused way. A sign that the confused is more known to us than the distinct is that we are more sure of it. Likewise, we are more sure of the effect than of its cause. And we are more sure of the outward appearance of a thing than of its inward nature. Aristotle brings out this most universal truth when showing that and why the confused is before the distinct, and the general before the particular, in our knowledge in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing (the Physics).[11] He also touches upon it in the Nicomachean Ethics in the context of our usually knowing the effect before the cause.[12]

We can understand some of the order of our reasoned out knowledge from the above. The reasoned out knowledge of material things comes before the reasoned out knowledge of immaterial things or things that do not depend upon matter for their existence. This is why natural philosophy is before wisdom (as the latter's other name, meta ta phusika, indicates). Geometry and arithmetic (in the Greek sense of the word) are also about things whose existence depends upon matter although they are defined without (sensible) matter. And since we know things in an outward and superficial way first, and plane geometry is a superficial knowledge in the etymological sense while nature loves to hide as Heraclitus said, it is clear that geometry (and arithmetic) come before natural philosophy along the natural road in our knowledge. But logic will come before they can be acquired well if it is a paideía about the common road of reasoned out knowledge.

The second road in our knowledge is the road of reason as reason.[13] The distinction between reason as a nature and reason as reason is not well understood.[14] This distinction can be seen after we have understood the distinction between a natural ability and a reasonable ability (whether it be reason itself or the will). In Book Nine or Q of the Metaphysics, Aristotle pointed out their distinction:

And all the abilities with reason are of contraries, but those without reason are of one only, as the hot of heating only, but the medical art of sickness and health.[15]

But it should be understood that reason or the will are divided against what is only a nature or just a nature, as we divide man against animal sometimes.[16] When man is divided against animal, he is divided against what is only or just an animal. For man is an animal, but not just an animal. Likewise, reason (and the will, too) is a nature, but not just a nature. For reason naturally understands some things (and likewise, the will naturally wills some things).

Reason as reason knows one thing through knowing other things as when it defines or reasons or calculates. Since reasoned out understanding or reasoned out knowledge is the work of reason as reason, the common road of reasoned out knowledge belongs to the road of reason as reason.

Aristotle considered this road mainly in the Prior and Posterior Analytics.

It is clear from the said that not only all syllogisms can come to be by this this road, but that it is impossible through another.[17]

The road is the same in all regarding philosophy and every art and learning.[18]

The Prior and Posterior Analytics of Aristotle could be said to be about the common road of reasoned out knowledge. And this could be considered the second road in our knowledge. However, reason makes reasonable guesses before it attains reasoned out knowledge. And in his book About Places (the so-called Topics), Aristotle considers the usefulness of the dialectical art and he speaks of this art as having a road towards the beginnings of reasoned out knowledge or knowledge over a road.

ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.

Being investigative, it has a road towards the beginnings of all knowledge over a road.[19]

But insofar as dialectic has a road from reasonable guesses to the beginnings of every knowledge over a road or every reasoned out knowledge, we could perhaps speak more fully of the second road as the road from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge. This also brings out more clearly that we are on the road of reason as reason. For dialectic enables us to reason from probable opinions to contradictory conclusions. And reason as reason reaches knowledge in the strict sense only by coming back to what it naturally understands or knows. Reason as reason can reach reasoned out knowledge only by resolving to reason as a nature. But reason as reason is seen more in distinction from reason as a nature in dialectic than in reasoned out knowledge.

The common road of reasoned out knowledge is based on what is common to all reasoned out knowledge. All reasoned out knowledge is a work of reason as reason. Reason thinks out definitions, divisions, distinctions and the statements which can be understood from these. And then it reasons out conclusions from these statements and from the conclusions reached by these statements.

But each reasoned out knowledge has its own matter or subject. And the road to follow in any reasoned out knowledge must fit this matter and the relation of our reason to that matter. Hence, there is a third kind of road in our knowledge which is the private road of each reasoned out knowledge.

We can distinguish perhaps eight parts of the private or material road of a reasoned out knowledge, the road that fits the matter of that knowledge.

The first three go together: the way of defining; and, in general, the way of making known the private beginnings of that knowledge; and the limit of its judgments.

The second three can also go together: the way of demonstrating (from cause to effect or the reverse); from what causes; and the degree of rigor and certitude in the demonstrations.

The last two do not go together closely. One is the order of determination or consideration. And the other pertains to the need for a practical mode in a practical science.

We can consider first some texts from Aristotle where he touches upon the first three elements in the material and private road of each reasoned out knowledge and knowledge over a road.

The first of these elements is the way of defining. But we find Aristotle distinguishing explicitly ways of defining only in the three parts of looking or theoretical philosophy. He does not use this in distinguishing the parts of practical or doing philosophy or elsewhere (although Thomas Aquinas has pointed out the different ways in which he defines the continuous in logic and in natural philosophy). We place this element first even though it thus seems to be less universal than the second because of its use in distinguishing forms of reasoned out knowledge.

In the second book of Natural Hearing (Physics), Aristotle distinguishes between the way of defining in mathematics and that in natural philosophy. After stating that mathematics considers things found in the natural world, but in separation from motion (and consequently from matter), he goes on to show this by the definitions of things and their properties in these two forms of reasoned out knowledge.[20]

And in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, he distinguishes all three looking philosophies by their way of defining.[21]

One text where Aristotle speaks explicitly of this element that the private beginnings of each reasoned out knowledge are known differently is the following text from the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics:

Nor should the cause be sought in like manner in all things, but it is enough in some to show well that it is so, as about the beginnings. For that it is so is first and a beginning.

Some of the beginnings are considered by induction, some by sensation, some by some custom, and others in other ways.

One should try to go over each in the way natural to it and earnestly seek how they are determined well. For they have great influence upon what follows, For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole, and many things sought become clear through it.[22]

Since the most certain judgment is made by definition, and in general judgment is a separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge, there is a connection between the way the private beginnings of a reasoned out knowledge are made known and the limit for judgments in that reasoned out knowledge. This can be seen in this very important text from Aristotle's book One the Universe (De Caelo et Mundo):

It happens that in speaking about appearances they say what does not agree with appearances. The cause of this is their not taking well the first beginnings, but their wishing to reduce all things to certain determined opinions...These through their love of such things seem like those maintaining positions in argument. They uphold anything that follows as having true beginnings, as if some things are not necessarily judged from their consequences, and especially from the end. For the end of the making knowledge is the work and of the knowledge of natural things it is chiefly what appears by sense.[23]

The end or limit of judgment in mathematics and in logic, however, would not be to the senses. The judgments of the geometer must resolve to the imagination while, if the universal is first to be considered in logic, the logician cannot resolve to either sense of imagination, as Plato teaches us in the Parmenides. Another example of the connection between the way in which the private beginnings of a reasoned out knowledge are made known and how one judges in that knowledge can be seen in ethics. As its private beginnings are known by an experience of human acts and passions, so also judgment depends upon experience. Thus, Aristotle points out why the young man is not a good judge of political matters in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics:

Each one judges well what he knows and of these he is a good judge. The one educated about that and universally the one educated about all.

Whence the young man is not the appropriate hearer of political matters. For he is without experience of the actions in life, but the arguments are from and about these. [24]

The next three elements of the material or private road of a reasoned out knowledge could be grouped together because they all pertain to the way of demonstrating.

The first element is whether they proceed from cause to effect or from effect to cause. A key text for this is the one already alluded to from the Nicomachean Ethics regarding the natural road:

It should not remain hidden from us that arguments from the beginnings and to the beginnings are different. For Plato doubted well about this and sought whether the road is from the beginnings or to the beginnings, just as in the race-course from the judges to the goal-post and back again. One ought to begin from the more known, but this is twofold: some to us and some simply. Probably we should begin from the more known to us. Whence it is necessary to be accustomed well about fair and just things and all political matters to be an acceptable student. For the beginning is that it is so, and if this appears sufficiently, one has no further need of the reason why. For such a one has or will easily get the beginnings. [25]

The second element is from which causes they demonstrate. After distinguishing the kinds and ways of cause in the second book of Natural Hearing (the so-called Physics), Aristotle investigates from which of these causes the natural philosopher demonstrates:

Since there are four causes, it belongs to the natural philosopher to know about all and to give naturally the reason why leading up to all: the matter, the form, the mover and that for the sake of which.[26]

Likewise, one of the questions in the third book of the Metaphysics is from which causes the wise man will demonstrate:

There is the first question about which we doubted in the preliminaries, whether it belongs to one or many forms of reasoned out knowledge to consider the causes.[27]

The third element is the precision and certitude of the demonstrations. In the sixth book of the Metaphysics:

There is a cause of health and well-being, and there are beginnings and elements and causes of mathematical things, and generally every discursive knowledge or partaking of discourse is about causes and beginnings either more precisely or more loosely.[28]

And in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle lays down the beginning already anticipated by Plato in the Timaeus that the certitude or precision of a reasoned out knowledge should fit its matter:

It will be said enough if it is made clear according to the underlying matter. For certitude (or precision) should not be sought in the same way in all arguments, just as not in the works of the making arts.[29]

In the following text from the second book of he Metaphysics, Aristotle rejects seeking at the same time (!ma zhteîn) reasoned out knowledge and the way of reasoned out knowledge. The way of reasoned out knowledge, whether the common road or the private road, should be considered before one seeks reasoned out knowledge. And he considers why the precision and certitude of mathematics is not possible in natural philosophy:

Hence, one ought to be educated (πεπαιδεῦσθαι) how each thing should be received, since it is unreasonable to seek at the same time reasoned out knowledge and the way of reasoned out knowledge. And neither is easy to get. Mathematical certitude (or precision) should not be asked for everywhere, but in those things not having matter. Whence it is not the natural way. For all nature perhaps has matter. Whence one should investigate what is nature and thus it will become clear what natural philosophy is about. [30]

The seventh element in the material or private road pertains to the difference between theoretical or looking reasoned out knowledge and practical or doing reasoned out knowledge. This is connected with the element we have just considered since practical knowledge applies the universal and simple to the singular and the composed. Hence, ethics proceeds παχυλῶς or roughly as Aristotle said.[31] And as we descend towards the singular, there are more things to be considered and, hence, less certitude. Aristotle connects the sixth element with the seventh in the following passage from the Nicomachean Ethics:

It is necessary to remember the aforesaid and not seek certitude (or precision) equally in all things, but in each according to the underlying matter and to the extent suitable to the knowledge over a road. For the carpenter and the geometer seek differently the right angle: the one to the extent it is useful for his work and the other what it is or how it is - for he looks at truth.[32]

The eighth element is much different from the first six especially and the seventh somewhat. This is the order of consideration. When the scholastics considered the way of a book under its form, they distinguished between the forma tractandi and the forma tractatus. The former elements pertain to the forma tractandi and the order of consideration to the forma tractatus. Likewise, in commenting on the first chapter of the Physics, Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between the ordo determinandi considered there and the ordo demonstrandi considered in the second book.

The order of consideration or determination in natural philosophy, as Aristotle determines it in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing (the Physics) is from the general to the particular and towards matter.

The order of consideration in wisdom or first philosophy is in a way contrary to this in that it is towards the immaterial. And to some extent, wisdom goes from the particular (or less universal) to the general (or more universal). This is particularly clear in the ninth book where Aristotle ascends from a consideration of act and ability as they are found in changing or material things to act and ability in their complete universality. But something like this also occurs in his consideration of substance where he seeks to understand substance in general starting from material substances. And likewise in his consideration of the one. For the Platonists had confused the one convertible with being with the one which is the beginning of number. Hence, Aristotle rises from the one which is in the genus of quantity and the beginning of number to the one which is convertible with being.

The order of consideration in mathematics is different from both that of natural philosophy and that of first philosophy. As the diligent student of Euclid's Elements can learn, geometry proceeds from the simple to the composed (not only in the whole of geometry which goes from plane geometry to solid geometry, but even in plane geometry). It also proceeds from the equal to the unequal. And both of these are found, not only in the order of the theorems, but also in the order of the definitions and even the order of the axioms.

After the distinction of the three roads, it is necessary to see their order. The natural road and the common road of reasoned out knowledge are before the private road of each reasoned out knowledge. If we consider the private roads of the three looking philosophies, it can be seen, as Boethius saw, that natural philosophy most of all follows the natural road while mathematics follows the common road of reasoned out knowledge most perfectly. Wisdom also follows the natural road more than mathematics.

But the natural road is also before the common road of reasoned out knowledge. The first part of the common road of reasoned out knowledge which is defining, dividing and distinguishing is obviously based on the natural road which goes from the confused to the distinct. Again, defining by separating out what is common to many singulars and reasoning by induction from many singulars to the universal follow the natural road from the senses into reason - for as Boethius has said, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. And the need usually to encircle things before defining them fully is clearly based on the outward being known before the inward on the natural road. Likewise, the fact that we usually define a thing by it effect before by its cause. And the simple being defined by the negation of the composed is also following the natural road.

The common road of reasoned out knowledge is also clearly before the private roads in our understanding. Unless we had learned in logic that reasoned out knowledge must be based on definitions of things, we could not see why the looking forms of reasoned out knowledge are distinguished by the ways they define and how the way they define is so essential a part of their private roads.

Again, if we had not seen that reasoned out knowledge is an effect of demonstration and that demonstration proceeds from private as well as common beginnings, we would not be in a position to consider how the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge differ in the way their private beginnings are made known.

Again, if we had not learned in logic that the art of demonstration is the art of judging with certitude, we would not have looked for the term of judgment in each particular reasoned out knowledge.

And, if we did not know the difference between demonstration propter quid by cause and demonstration quia by effect, we would not be prepared to consider the difference in this regard between mathematics and natural philosophy and ethics.

And if we did not understand the possibility of demonstrating by diverse causes, we could not understand the diversity among the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge in the causes from which they do or do not demonstrate.

And if we did not understand that demonstration about any matter or subject must proceed from what is proper to that matter, we would not understand why the way of demonstrating is more or less rigorous according to the matter of a reasoned out knowledge.

The seventh element of the private road of a reasoned out knowledge adds something more to the practical philosophies than to the looking philosophies. For the former, besides defining and demonstrating, must also have a consideration of how these things can come about. Thus Aristotle in the Politics considers not only what is government and the kinds of government and which are better, but also how governments are overthrown or preserved or instituted. And since what can be done is singular and not universal, these forms of practical philosophy must approach closer to the singular whence also they are less certain than the forms of looking philosophy because of the multitude of contingent things that must be considered as one gets close to the singular. And this reason for less certitude is also considered in the Analytics.[33]

The eighth element of the private road of every reasoned out knowledge, the order of determination or consideration, seems more connected with the natural road than the common road. For we follow here the natural road from the more known to the less known. But the order of consideration of natural philosophy follows more fully the natural road than does wisdom. And mathematics seems almost to go contrary to the natural road in knowing the simple before the composed and the equal before the unequal.

If we call knowledge of all these roads universal paideía, it is clear that this universal paideía is very much a work of reason. For reason is nothing other than the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, as Shakespeare has taught us in his Exhortation to Use Reason. For each of these roads is a before and after in our knowledge or in things as known. But in addition, reason needs to see that one of these roads is before or after another. And reason needs to see also that the well-being of knowledge over a road depends upon knowledge of the road or roads to follow and that one cannot at the same time pursue knowledge over a road and knowledge of that road. Likewise, it is clear that the lack of this paideía in many is the result of a massive failure to use reason.

Duane H. Berquist

----------------------- [1]Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Bk I, Ch. 1, 639a 1-16: "Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ’ οἷον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγωνς καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ’ οἷον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ δή tina καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθ’ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν tina νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἄν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους πρὸς o¨ß ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως."

[2]There are also texts where Aristotle uses the word μέθοδος to mean either a knowledge of the road or the road (or way of knowing) itself. Logic could be called a μέθοδος both because it follows a road (as does every part of philosophy) and because it is about a road. In the first book About the Soul (De Anima), 402a 11-19: "καὶ γὰρ ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι τάχ’ ἄν τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος" Prior Analytics, Book One, 46a 31-32: ""´Oti d' ] διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσις μικρόν τι μόριόν ἐστι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου, Ü4dion ἰδεῖν:"; 46b 26: "Φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι οὔτ’ ἀνασκευάσαι ταύτῃ τῇ μεθόδῳ ἔστιν..." [3]Aristotle, Physics, Book One or A, Chapter One, 184a 16 - 184b 5: "πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμῶτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοὐτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμῶτερα." [4]In Moerbeke's Latin translation, ὁδὸς is translated by via and τὸν τρόπον τοὐτον προάγειν by secundum hunc modum procedere. Hence, the Latins speak of the modus procedendi or simpy the modus of a scientia. [5]Metaphysics, 995a 14 [6]Metaphysics, 995a 16-17; [7]Plato's definition of παίδευσις is παιδείας παράδοσις (Republic, 416b), the handing down or transmission of παιδεία. [8]Plato, Timaeus, 53C [9]We have been helped in this by the late Msgr. Maurice Dionne of Laval University who was the first, to our knowledge, to make explicit the universal distinction of the ways of proceeding in our knowledge, a distinction which corresponds to the universal distinction of the roads in our knowledge. In reading carefully, frequently and with reverence, the words of Aristotle in the first chapter of the Physics, I began to see the correspondence between the distinction of the ways of proceeding and the distinction of the roads in our knowledge. [10]The need to define, divide and distinguish in every reasoned out knowledge, or that defining, dividing and distinguishing are part of the common road of reasoned out knowledge, obviousy presupposes that aspect of the natural road which is that we know things in a confused way before distinctly. Men give examples of a thing before defining it and induction is the beginning of reasoning and not syllogism are both consequences in the common road of reasoned out knowledge that follow from the natural road. For it is natural to sense a thing before understanding it and a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. Hence, examples which are singulars and induction which begins with singulars come first. For the same reason, in rhetoric, the argument from one singular to another comes before enthymeme. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book Two, Chapter 20, 1393a 23-27: "Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων. εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήατός ἐστιν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δ’ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή." And in the private roads of the three parts of looking philosophy, the natural road is followed most of all in the philosophy of nature which is about sensible things and then in wisdom (since the road from the senses into reason is the road to wisdom) and least in mathematics which induces from the imagined and returns to the imagination as the limit of its judgments. [11]Aristotle, Physics, Book One or A, Chapter One, 184a 16 - 184b 5:

πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμῶτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοὐτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμῶτερα.

ἔστι δ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πρώτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ’ ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα.διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα δεῖ pro0énai:

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου.

πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα.

καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

[12]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1095a 30 - 1095b 4:

μὴ λανθανέτω δ’ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ’ ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.

[13]Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (et Bonitate), Q. 26, Art. 9, Second Objections, Ad 4: "...ratio ut ratio non nominat aliquam potentiam distinctam a ratione ut natura est, sed nominat quemdam modum considerandi ipsam potentiam." [14]Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones De Veritate (et Bonitate), Q. 26, Art. 9, First Objections, Ad 7: "...distinctio illa qua distinguitur ratio ut ratio, et ratio ut natura... potest intelligi..ut dicamus rationem ut naturam intelligi secundum quod ratio comparatur ad ea quae naturaliter cognoscit vel appetit; rationem vero ut rationem, secundum quod per quamdam collationem ordinatur ad aliquid cognoscendum vel appetendum, eo quod rationis est proprium conferre." [15]1046b 4-7: "καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας’ [16]Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 22, Art. 5, Sed Contra 6 & Ad 6: "6. Praeterea, quod de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid, naturaliter est determinatum ad illud. Sed voluntas contra naturalem appetitum dividitur. Ergo voluntas non de necessitate aliquid vult. Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas dividitur contra appetitum naturalem cum praecisione sumptum, id est qui est naturalis tantum, sicut homo contra id quod est animal tantum; non autem dividitur contra appetitum naturalem absolute, sed includit ipsum, sicut homo includit animal."

[17]Prior Analytics, Chapter 29, 45b 36-38: "Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἐγχωρεῖ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ γίνεσθαι πάντας τοὺς συλλογισμούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι δι’ ἄλλης ἀδύνατον." [18]Prior Analytics, Chapter 30, 46a 3-4: ""H μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα:" [19]About Places, Book One, Chapter Two, 101a 25 - 101b4:

"Epomenon d' ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία. ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσιφίαν ἐπιστήμας...

πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος:

7ti δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων εἰσί, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ’ ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.

[20]Physics, Book Two, 194a 1-7:

γίγνοιτο δ’ ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἑκατέρων πειρῷτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα, ἄνευ κινήσεως, σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἄνθροπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥὶς σιμὴ ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται.

[21]Metaphysics, Book 6 or E, 1025b 28 - 1026a 13:

δεῖ δὲ τὸ τί |ν εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον πῶς ἐστὶ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς ἄνευ γε τούτου τὸ ζητεῖν μηδέν ἐστι ποιεῖν.

ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὁριζομένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ σιμὸν τὰ δ’ ὡς τὸ κοῖλον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμὸν κοίλη ῥίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλότης ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς.

εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ ὁμοίως t? sim? λέγονται, οἷον ῥὶς ὀφθαλμὸς πρόσωπον σὰρξ ὀστοῦν, ὅλως ζῷον, φύλλον ῥίζα φλοιός, ὅλως φυτόν (οὐθενὸς γὰρ ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἔχει ὕλην), δῆλον πῶς δεῖ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι, καὶ διότι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας θεωρῆσαι τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ὅση μὴ ἄνευ ὕλης ἐστίν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητική ἐστι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ ἡ μαθηματικὴ θεωρητική· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀκινήτων καὶ χωριστῶν ἐστί, νῦν ἄδηλον, ὅτι μέντοι ἔνια μαθήματα Ç ἀκίνητα καὶ Ç χωριστὰ θεωρεῖ, δῆλον.

εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν ἀιδιον καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ χωριστόν, φανερὸν ὅτι θεωρητικῆς τὸ γνῶναι, οὐ μέντοι φυσικῆς γε [περὶ κινητῶν γάρ τινων ἡ φυσικὴ] οὐδὲ μαθηματικῆς, ἀλλὰ προτέρας ἀμφοῖν.

[22]Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, 1098a 34 - 1098b 8:

οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ’ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ’ ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ’ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή.

τῶν αρχῶν δ’ α( μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, α( δ’ αἰσθήσει, α( δ’ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ’ ἄλλως.

μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας Ç πεφύκασιν καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίγνεσθαι δι’ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

Thomas Aquinas, In I Ethicorum, Lectio XI, nn. 137-138:

Aliam autem diversitatem tangit...quae attenditur secundum differentiam principiorum et eorum quae sunt ex principiis.

Et dicit quod non est in omnibus eodem modo causa inquirenda. Alioquin procederetur in infinitum in demonstrationibus. Sed in quibusdam sufficit quod bene demonstretur, idest manifestetur quod hoc ita est; sicut in his quae accipiuntur in aliqua scientia, ut principia: quia principium oportet esse primum. Unde non potest resolvi in aliquid prius.

Ipsa autem principia non eodem modo manifestantur. Sed quaedam considerantur inductione, quae est ex particularibus imaginariis, utputa quod omnis numerus est par aut impar; quaedam vero accipiuntur sensu, sicut in naturalibus; puta quod omne quod vivit indiget nutrimento. Quaedam vero consuetudine, sicut in moralibus, utpote quod concupiscentiae diminuuntur, si eis non obediamus. Et alia principia aliter manifestantur; sicut in artibus operativis accipiuntur principia per experientiam quamdam.

Deinde...determinat modum quantum ad id quod est communiter observandum in omnibus. Et dicit quod homo debet insistere ad hoc, quod singula principia pertranseat, scilicet eorum notitiam accipiendo et eis utendo, secundum quod nata sunt cognosci et studendum qualiter determinentur in hominis cognitione, ut scilicet sciat distinguere principia ab invicem et ab aliis.

Cognitio enim principiorum multum adiuvat ad sequentia cognoscenda. Principium enim videtur plus esse quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur in principiis. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum, quae quaeruntur in scientia.

He touches upon another diversity which is seen in the difference of beginnings and those things which are from the beginnings.

And he says that a cause should not be sought in all things in the same way. Otherwise one would proceed in demonstrations without end. But in some it is enough that it be well shown, that is, made clear, that it is thus; as in those things which are taken in some reasoned-out knowledge as beginnings: because a beginnning must be first. Whence it cannot be resolved into something before.

The beginnings themselves, however, are not made known in the same way. But some are considered by induction which is from particular imaginings, as that every number is even or odd; some indeed are taken by sense, as in natural things, as that every thing which lives needs food. Some by custom, as in moral matters, as that concupiscible desires are weakened if we do not obey them. And other beginnings are made known in other ways; as the beginnings in the active arts are gotten by some experience.

Then he determines the way as regards what should be observed generally in all. And he says that a man ought to insist on this that one go over the individual beginnings, by getting knowledge of them and using them, as they are naturally known and one should seek out how they are determined in man's knowledge, so that he knows how to distinguish the beginnings from each other and from other things.

For the knowledge of the beginnings helps much in knowing what follows. A beginning truly seems to be more than half of the whole because all the rest is contained in the beginnings. And this is what he adds, that many of those things sought in reasoned-out knowledge become clear through one beginning, well understood and considered.

[23]On the Universe (De Caelo et Mundo), Book III, Chapter 7, 306a 5-18:

συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων λέγουσι μὴ ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν τοῖς φαινομένοις. τούτου δ’ αἴτιον τὸ μὴ καλῶς λαβεῖν τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βούλεσθαι πρός τινας δόξας ὡρισμένας ἀνάγειν. δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως τῶν μὲν ἀισθητῶν ἀισθητάς, τῶν δὲ ä0díwn ä0díouß, τῶν δὲ φθαρτῶν φθαρτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅλως δ’ ὁμογενεῖς τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν τούτων φιλίαν ταὐτὸ ποιεῖν ἐοίκασι τοῖς τὰς θέσεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διαφυλάττουσιν· ἅπαν γὰρ ὑπομένουσι τὸ συμβαῖνον ὡς ἀληθεῖς ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνίας δέον κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, καὶ μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ τέλους. Τέλος δὲ τῆς μὲν ποιητικῆς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἔργον, τῆς δὲ φυσικῆς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ κυρίως κατα τὴν a9sqhsin. [24]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1094b 27- 1095a 4:

ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς 2 γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ’ ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἁπλῶς δ’ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. [25]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1095a 30 - 1095b 4:

μὴ λανθανέτω δ’ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ’ ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.

διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν |χθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. [26]Book Two of Natural Hearing, 198a 22-24:

ἐπεὶ δ’ αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοὐ φυσισκοὐ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ ο” ἕνεκα.

[27]Metaphysics, Book Three or B, 995b 4-6:

ἔστι δ’ ἀπορία πρώτη μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροιμιασμένοις διαπορήσαμεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας:

[28]Metaphysics, Book Six or E, 1025b 47:

ἔστι γάρ τι αἴτιον ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας, καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια, καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας. [29]Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, 1094b 11-27:

Λέγοιτο δ’ ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ¨lhn διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις.

τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ tina πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν: \dh γάρ τινες ἀπῶλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι’ ἀνδρείαν.

ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. [30]Metaphysics, Book Two or A ELATTON, 995a 12-19:

διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης· ἔστι δ’ οὐδὲ θάτερον Ü4dion λαβεῖν.

τὴν δ’ ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην.

διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος· ἅπασα γὰρ ἴσως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην. διὸ σκεπτέον πρῶτον τί ἐστιν ἡ φύσις· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ περὶ τίνων ἡ φυσικὴ δῆλον ἔσται. [31]Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b 20 [32]Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a 26-33:

μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ’ ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ.

καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν: + μὲν γὰρ ἐφ’ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, + δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίνηται. [33]Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book One, Chapter 27