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The Universal Distinctions on the Natural Road
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: UNIVERSAL DISTINCTIONS ON N.RD.doc.
THE UNIVERSAL DISTINCTIONS ON THE NATURAL ROAD
Since a road in our knowledge is a before and after therein and nothing is before or after itself, it is clear that every road presupposes a distinction.
If one could not distinguish between confused knowledge and distinct knowledge, for example, one could not know that the former is before the latter. Likewise, for any of the other particular befores.
Corresponding then to the universal befores are universal distinctions.
Socrates in his conversations showed that men often think they know what they do not know. They mix up what is unknown to them with what is known to them. Since we need to use what is known to us to investigate and come to know what is unknown to us, this mix-up prevents true learning.
But one can reason from the existence of this mix-up to several others. In the second book of Natural Hearing, Aristotle reasons that men can also think that they do not know what they do know. They mix up what is known to them with what is unknown to them. The former mix-up is more common and therefore more known to us. Most men think they know what they do not know because of false imagination, custom, deceptive arguments and other human causes. But thinkers are more apt to make the second mistake of thinking they do not know what they do know. Whether trying to avoid the opposite mistake or mislead by sophistical arguments they cannot resolve or suffering from apaideia, many thinkers fall into this serious mistake. Aristotle can reason from the possibility of the first mistake to that of the second since the first shows that men have difficulty distinguishing between what they know and what they do not know. And hence the mistake can go in either direction. (If someone could think a man is a woman, someone else could think a woman is a man. If one can think that someone is older than they are, one can also think that someone is younger than they are. )
If it is possible to mix up the known and the unknown, it is even more possible to mix up the more known and the less known, and the known through itself with the known through another. For these are not as far apart as the known and the unknown.
A knowledge of the natural road is a help to distinguishing between the more known and the less known and this is a help to recognizing what is most known. And both of these are a help to distinguishing between what is known through itself and what is known through another and in distinguishing between the known and the unknown.
To some extent we separate the known from the unknown and the more known from the less known by nature or naturally; just as we naturally proceed from the more known to the less known, However, nature does not insure that we shall never confuse the more known and the less known and even the known and the unknown. But a knowledge of the natural road is help to nature. We can distinguish between the more known and the less known by one of the befores in the natural road or by their distance from a beginning. We could recognize, for example, that the general is more known to us than the particular because confused knowledge comes before distinct knowledge. Or we could know that what is closer to the senses (the beginning of our knowledge) is more known than what is further from the senses. And since what is more known is more agreed upon and we are more sure of it, a sign that something is more known is that we are more sure of it or men agree more about it. We are more sure, for example , of the effect than the cause and men will agree about the effect who disagree about its cause
The statement about contradiction is found to be the most known statement with the help of the natural road. This statement is used to distinguish the known from the unknown as Socrates showed and is a help to recognizing many statements known through themselves whose denial would involve a contradiction.
The before and after seen after these distinctions directs all our thinking. But does it belongs to logic to consider how we can come to know the unknown through the known? It would seem to belong to the natural road to distinguish between proposing the order of beginnings to conclusions and manuductio and between learning from another and discovery by oneself.
But it is not always clear where the line should be drawn between the consideration of the natural road and the consideration of the logician.