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Thomas Aquinas and the First Errors About the Ways of Going Forward (Pmr Conference, 1984)
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THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE FIRST ERRORS ABOUT THE WAYS OF GOING FORWARD (PMR CONFERENCE, 1984)
In his work De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas, Thomas Aquinas notes that an error about the understanding "through which we are apt to know the truth by avoiding errors, seems to be more unbecoming (or ugly) among other errors." (1) But the same judgment and reason could be made in regard to an error about any of the ways of going forward (modes of proceeding) which Aquinas distinguishes. For each way of going forward is necessary for directing reason and helping it to avoid error. Since an error about that whereby we are to avoid error is always a most serious error (for it takes away that which would prevent our making many other errors), it is always important to recognize and refute any errors bout the ways of going forward.
But there seems to be one kind of error or mistake that is prominent and stands out among the first or fundamental mistakes that can be made about them. When Thomas considers them, he touches upon the possibility of being deceived by the second kind of mistake outside of speech (in his book On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle gives six kinds of mistake in speech and seven outside of speech.) This is the mistake from mixing up what is so simply and what is not so simply, but in some imperfect way.
Given the importance, or rather danger, of a mistake about that whereby we are to avoid mistakes, one can ask why this kind of mistake dominates the first mistakes about the ways of going forward. A clue to the answer can be found in a work on fallacies sometimes attributed to Thomas, the De Fallaciis Ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas. (2) The distinction there of the mistake from mixing up the simply and the not simply, but in some way, from the other mistakes outside of speech according to certain general conditions of beings - "secundum quasdam generales entium conditiones" (3) is the beginning of an understanding why this kind of mistake is fundamental in regard to the ways of going forward. This explanation of the mistake from mixing up what is so simply and what is not so simply, but in some limited way, also fits the universal role in the judgments which men make about what is good or bad in human acts, where Thomas also sees it universality.
We must first consider a number of texts where Thomas speaks of the ways of going forward and touches upon the possibility of the mistake of simply and not simply, but in some respect, in regard to them.
Then we must consider the distinction of this kind of mistake or fallacy from the other kinds outside of speech in the De Fallaciis.
Finally, we shall attempt to see why this kind of mistake plays the role it does in regard to the ways of going forward. At the same time, we shall seek confirmation for this in the universality which Thomas sees for this kind of mistake in the judgments which men make about what is good or bad in human acts.
In his commentary on the second book of Aristotle's Metaphysics (4), Thomas distinguishes between the common way of going forward in reasoned out knowledge (which is studied in logic) and the ways of going forward private to this or that reasoned out knowledge.
The reason for this distinction is that every reasoned out knowledge is a work of reason, but in regard to a different matter. The common way of going forward in reasoned out knowledge is based on what is common to all of them. The use of reason is common to all of them. Each is a work of reason whereby reason knows what it could not know otherwise. But the private ways of going forward in reasoned out knowledge fit the diverse matters considered in each reasoned out knowledge, just as the tools and way of working of the craftsman fits his matter.
But in addition to these two ways or modes, Thomas also speaks of the way of knowing of the reasonable soul (modus animae rationalis in cognoscendo). This mode or way of knowing is based on the nature of our soul and hence it is more basic than the two ways of going forward in reasoned out knowledge.
We must now consider how the mistake from mixing up what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some imperfect way, can be made in regard to each of these.
When considering how the private way of going forward in each reasoned out knowledge is to be determined, Aristotle had especially spoken of those who wanted to proceed mathematically everywhere. (6) Aristotle had in mind, of course, the Pythagoreans and even, to some extent, his master Plato. We would think of Descartes and Spinoza and Leibniz. In commenting on Aristotle's words, Thomas points out that the mode or way which is simply the best - "ille modus qui est simpliciter optimus" (7) - ought not to be sought in all things or all subjects. He says this in commenting on Aristotle's words that mathematical certitude (or precision) should not be sought everywhere. Even though the way of going forward in mathematics may be the best (it is most certain and most precise and so on), it may not be best for some other reasoned out knowledge whose matter it does not fit. The way of going forward that is best for a given reasoned out knowledge may not be the best way of going forward. Those who want to proceed mathematically everywhere are confusing or mixing up what is best simply with what is best not simply, but in some way (that is, for the matter of some reasoned out knowledge).
The mistake of simply and not simply is also the most fundamental kind of mistake that can be made about the common way of going forward in reasoned out knowledge which is studied in logic.
Thomas' teacher, Albert the Great, had taught that logic is the art which directs us to a knowledge of what is unknown to us through or from what is known to us already. (8) And Thomas in his two proemia to logic (at the beginning of his commentaries on the Peri Hermeneias and the Posterior Analytics ) pointed out how logic is ultimately about the discourse of reason, or reasoning, in which reason "through what is known, comes to a knowledge of the unknown". (9) The classic example of the mistake of simply and not simply in regard to this process of coming to know the unknown through what you know already is found in Plato's dialogue the Meno. Thomas knew this dialogue only indirectly and incompletely through Aristotle. Thomas seems to have thought that Meno was a student of Plato. (10)
The mistake of simply and in some imperfect way can be committed twice when trying to understand how it is possible for man to investigate what he does not know through what he does know. Both of these are exemplified in the Meno. But only one of them is explicitly solved in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics where Thomas comments on its solution. Both, however, can be solved in similar ways.
Meno asks how it is possible to investigate or seek what you do not know. Either you know it or you do not know it. If you know it, there is no need to investigate it. If you do not know it, how can you seek it or direct yourself to it? And how can you know whether you had found it if you did not know what you were looking for? (11) If Meno's objection were good, there could be no art of logic to direct us to a knowledge of the unknown.
But Meno's objection comes from not distinguishing between what is so simply and what is so only in some imperfect way. What is unknown to me can be known to me in some imperfect way. When I ask how many people are in the room, the number of people in the room is unknown to me. Yet in some imperfect way I know this unknown number for it is the number of people in the room and I know that I am looking for the number of people in the room. And knowing in this imperfect way what I want to know is enough to enable me to direct myself to what I do not know. I know that I should count to get the number which is unknown to me. If there were twenty-seven people in the room, I directed myself to knowing twenty-seven without knowing that there was twenty-seven people in the room. I did this by knowing in some imperfect way twenty-seven.
But when Socrates replies to Meno, he does not give this solution. (12) Rather he makes the same kind of mistake when he tries to show that the slave-boy already knew the theorems of geometry because they come out of the answers the slave-boy gives from his own knowledge. This is the mistake that Aristotle takes up in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics and which Thomas comments on. Socrates makes it appear that a theorem of geometry is already known to the slave-boy because in some imperfect way it is. Thomas, in commenting there, says (13):
Before induction or syllogism is brought in to make knowledge of some conclusion, that conclusion is in a way known and in a way not known: for simply (simpliciter ) it is not known, but in some imperfect way (secundum quid ) it is known. Just as if someone ought to prove this conclusion, that the triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, the one who gets knowledge of it through demonstration doe not know it simply before it is demonstrated, but he knows it in some imperfect way. Whence in some way he foreknows, but simply he does not.
Thomas goes on to give the reason (14):
The reason for this is that...it is necessary to know the principles before the conclusion. But principles are to conclusions in demonstrations, as active causes in natural things are to their effects...Effects however before they are produced in act, pre-exist in their active causes in ability, not however in act, which is to be simply. And likewise, before the conclusion is deduced from the demonstrative principles, the conclusion is foreknown in those foreknown principles in ability (virtute), not however in act - for thus it pre-exists in them. And thus it is clear that it is not foreknown simply, but only in some imperfect way.
Thomas then goes on to show how Aristotle excludes by this the mistake in the Meno. (15)
It is not strange that what Thomas calls the mode of the rational soul in knowing should also be subject to the mistake of simply and not simply, but in some imperfect way. For this mode or way is itself stated universally in terms of what is more known to us and what is more known simply or by nature. Thomas notes in his commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate that natural science especially observes this mode of the reasonable soul:
Natural science observes in its procedures the proper mode of the rational soul...as the rational soul from sensible things which are more known to us gets knowledge of understandable things which are more known by nature, so natural science proceeds from those things which are more known to us and less known by nature as is clear in the first book of the Physics.
But the phrase more known by nature means more known simply or simpliciter, as Thomas explains, in commenting on Aristotle's words in the beginning of the Physics (17)
It should be noted that he calls the same known to nature and known simpliciter.
If then someone confuses what is more known simply with what is more known in some imperfect way, that is, to us, he has made the fundamental mistake about this way of knowing. Such a mistake is involved in the position of those medieval thinkers who thought that God was the first thing understood by us. They thought that because God is the first understandable, he is the first thing understood by us. Hence, Thomas replies to an objection concluding that God is the first thing understood by us that "although God is first simpliciter in the order of understandables, he is not however first in the order of things understandable by us."
We have seen briefly that the fundamental mistakes about the ways of proceeding or knowing belong to the kind of mistake resulting from mixing up what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some way. Is this by chance or is there a reason why this kind of mistake should dominate the fundamental mistakes about the modes of proceeding. The distinction of this kind of mistake or fallacy from other ones outside of speech in a work on the fallacies attributed by some to Thomas (the De Fallaciis Ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas) gives a reason for the dominance of this kind of mistake. And while not wishing to maintain that the work De Fallaciis is by Thomas, we will see that its teaching about the fallacy of simply and in some way is in accord with other parts of Thomas'' teaching. But first, we must look briefly at the teaching of the De Fallaciis about this particular kind of mistake or fallacy and its distinction from the others.
In Chapter 11 of the De Fallaciis, its author distinguishes between the fallacies outside speech:
There are seven fallacies outsides speech: the first of which is according to accident, the second according to in some way and simply, the third according to ignorance of refutation, the fourth according to the begging of the beginning, the fifth according to consequence, the sixth according to non-cause and cause, and the seventh according to many questions as one.
These fallacies are taken according to certain general conditions of beings: for this being is per se and that per accidens, and by this is taken the fallacy of the accident. And by perfect and imperfect is taken the fallacy of in some way and simply. And by opposed and not opposed there is the fallacy according to ignorance of refutation. By same and other, there is the fallacy of begging the question. By before and after there is the fallacy of consequence. By cause and caused, there is the fallacy according to non-cause as cause. And by the one and many, there is the fallacy according to many questions as one.
The proper discussion of this passage as a whole would be a longer labor than we intend here. But there are three things to be noted for the purpose of our paper.
The first of these is the statement that "These fallacies are taken according to certain general conditions of beings." This statement seems reasonable or probable given the likeness of sophistic to wisdom. Both dialectic and sophistic resemble wisdom in their universality. Thomas notes this likeness of sophistic to wisdom in his commentary on the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. (20)
A second thing to be noted in particular is that the fallacy of simply and in some way is here based on what are indeed general conditions of being, namely, the perfect and the imperfect. One place where this can be seen to be clearly is in Thomas' division of the most common names used in the reasoned out knowledge about being as being (and in the axioms and everywhere). In commenting on Book Five of the Metaphysics (where Aristotle considers these names), Thomas divides the text into three parts. (21) First, he says, Aristotle distinguishes the senses of those names that pertain to the causes of the subject, then those names which signify the subject or its parts, and at last those names that signify the passions or properties of being as being. And when he comes to subdivide the third part, he says that Aristotle first distinguishes the senses of the names signifying those things which pertain to the perfection of being, such as the name perfect itself, and then those names which pertain to the defect of being. Moreover, perfect and imperfect are connected with one of the major divisions of being, namely that into act and potency or ability. For perfection is based on act and imperfection, on ability lacking its own act.
The third thing to be noted is the order of the seven fallacies and kinds of mistake which is also that given in the book On Sophistical Refutations. If we can assume that Aristotle gives the more common fallacies first as he gives the fallacy of equivocation (the most common fallacy of all) first among the fallacies inside speech, we would expect the find the fallacies or mistakes of the accident and of simply and in some way more common than the others.
If then the mistakes outside speech are based on the general conditions of beings, and the mistake of simply and in some imperfect way is based on the perfect and imperfect, we are in a position to understand why, as Thomas teaches us, this kind of mistake is involved in the fundamental mistakes about the ways of going forward or knowing. The ways of going forward are nothing other than the ways in which our reason goes from an imperfect condition to a perfect condition. Hence, the kind of mistake that is based on the perfect and imperfect will be the fundamental kind of mistake that we can make about a way of going forward or coming to know. This is confirmed by induction from the fundamental mistakes about the ways of going forward as they were pointed out before by Thomas.
The basis of the mistake of simply and not simply in those general conditions of being which are perfect and imperfect can also be given as a reason for its importance or universality elsewhere, as this is pointed out by Thomas. The mistake of simply and in some way seems to be the kind of mistake made by men about what is good or bad in their acts. Thomas often points this out. Thus when he considers in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae whether the good is the cause of love, he answers the objection from the fact that sometimes bad things are loved by pointing out that the bad is loved because it is good in some respect and is apprehended mistakenly as imply good:
the bad is never loved except under the notion of the good, that is, insofar as it is in some respect good and is apprehended as simply good...(23)
The mistake then of simply and in some way is made then everytime someone chooses something bad. Because it is good in some deficient way, he thinks it is good simply.
The reason why this kind of mistake should be so important here is clear from is basis in the De Fallaciis. For the good is based on the perfect or perfection. Hence, Thomas attaches the consideration of the divine goodness to the consideration of the divine perfection in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars (24) Hence, the explanation of the mistake or fallacy of simply and in some way in the De Fallaciis agrees well with the importance and universality that Thomas attaches to this fallacy in moral matter.
The comparison that Thomas made himself above (25) between the fallacy of simply and in some way in the Meno and in natural philosophy is also in harmony with the De Fallaciis. For before generation or coming to be, a thing exists in some way in its causes, but not simply as it does after generation. (26) And generation is going from potency to act and from the imperfect to the perfect.
Without maintaining then that the De Fallaciis is by Thomas or that the whole of its teaching is in harmony with Thomas', we can hold that its teaching about the fallacy or mistake of simply and in some way is in harmony with and does illuminate the universal role that Thomas sees for this kind of fallacy in our thinking.
NOTES
1. Thomas Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas, in Opuscula Philosophica (Marietti, 1954), Proemium, n. 173, p. 63
2. In Opuscula Philosphica, (Marietti, 1954), pp. 225-240
3. Thomas Aquinas, De Fallaciis Ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Caput XI, n. 676, in Opuscula Philosophica (Marietti, 1954)
4. Thomas Aquinas, In II Metaphysicorum (Marietti, 1950), Lectio V, n. 335
5. Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, Q. II (VI), Art. 1, Corpus, in Opuscula Theologica (Marietti, 1954), Vol. II, p. 380
6. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Two, Chapter 5, 995a 6-7, 15
7. In II Metaphysicorum, Lectio V, n. 336
8. Albertus Magnus, Commentaria in De Praedicabilibus, Tract. I, De Natura Logicae (Paris, Vives ed. 1890)
9. In I Post. Analyticorum. Proemium, n. 4 (Marietti, 1955) See also In I Peri Hermeneias, Proemium, n. 1, (Marietti, 1955)
10. In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, n. 23 (Marietti, 1955)
11. Meno, 80 D-E
12. Meno, 81A-86C
13. In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, n. 22 (Marietti, 1955)
14. In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, n. 22 (Marietti, 1955)
15. In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, nn. 23-24 (Marietti, 1955)
16. Same as 5
17. In I Physicorum, Lectio I, n. 7 (Marietti, 1954)
18. In Boetii de Trinitate, Proemium, Q. I, Art. 3, Ad 2 (Marietti, 1954)
19. De Fallaciis Ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas, Opuscula Philosophica (Marietti, 1954), Caput XI, n. 676
20. In IV Metaphysicorum (Marietti, 1950), Lectio IV, nn. 572-577
21. In V Metaphysicorum (Marietti, 1950), Lectio I, n. 749; Lectio XVIII, n. 1033
22. Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, Chapter 4, 166b 21-28
23. Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 1, Ad 1; see also In III De Anima, Lectio XV, n. 829
24. Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, QQ 4-6
25. See page 4, note 14
26. See also In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, n. 24 (Marietti, 1955)
Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Analyticorum, Proemium, n. 4:
Tertius vero actus rationis est secundum id quod est propium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti. Et huic actui deserviunt reliqui libri Logicae.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Hermeneias. Proemium, n. 1:
Sicut dicit Philosophus in III De Anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus componentis et dividentis. Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum.
Harum, autem operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse compositio et divisio, nisi simplicium apprehensorum. Secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam: quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis.
Cum autem Logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, nn. 22-24:
Antequam inducatur inductio vel syllogismus ad faciednam cognitionem de aliqua conclusione, illa conclusio quodammodo scitur et quodammodo non: simpliciter enim nescitur, sed scitur solum secundum quid. Sicut si debeat probari ista conclusio, triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, antequam demonstraretur, ille qui per demonstrationem accipit scientiam eius, nescivit simpliciter, sed scivit secundum quid. Unde quodammodo praescivit, simpliciter autem non.
Cuius quidem ratio est, quia, sicut iam ostensum est, oportet principia conclusioni praecognoscere. Principia autem se habent ad conclusiones in demonstrativis, sicut causae activae in naturalibus ad suos effectus (unde in II Physicorum propositiones syllogismi ponuntur in genere causae efficientis). Effectus autem, antequam producatur in actu, praexistit quidem in causis activis virtute, non autem in actu, quod est simpliciter esse. Et similiter antequam ex principiis demonstrativis deducatur conclusio, in ipsis quidem principiiis praecognitis praecognoscitur conclusio virtute, non autem actu: sic enim in eis praeexistit. Et sic patet quod non praecognoscitur simpliciter, sed secundum quid.
…excludit ex veritate determinata quandam dubitationem, quam Plato ponit in libro Menonis, sic intitulato ex nomine sui discipuli, Est enim dubitatio talis…
…proponit quod praedicta dubitatio vitari non potest, nisi supposita praedeterminata veritate, scilicet quod conclusio quam quis addiscit per demonstrationem vel inductionem, erat nota non simpliciter, sed secundum quod sit virtute in suis principiis: de quibus aliquis ignarus scientiae, interrogatus veritatem respondere potest. Secundum vero Platonis sententiam, conclusio erat praecognita simpliciter; unde non addiscebatur de novo, sed potius per deductionem aliquam rationis in memoriam reducebatur. Sicut etiam de formis naturalibus Anaxagoras ponit quod ante generationem praeexistebant in materia simpliciter. Aristoteles vero ponit quod praeexistunt in potentia et non simpliciter.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. Analyticorum, Lectio III, n. 27:
…ponit veam solutionem dubitationis praedictae secundum praedeterminatam veritatem, dicens quod illud quod quis addiscit, nihil prohibet primo quodammodo scire et quodammodo ignorare. Non enim est inconveniens si aliquis quodammodo praesciat id quod addiscit; sed esset inconveniens si hoc modo praecognosceret secundum quod addiscit.
Addiscere enim proprie est scientiam in aliquo generari. Quod autem generatur, ante generationem neque fuit omnino non ens neque omnino ens; sed quodammodo ens et quodammodo non ens: ens quidem in potentia, non ens vero in actu: et hoc est generari, reduci de potentia in actum. Unde nec id quod quis addiscit erat omnino prius notum, ut Plato posuit, nec omnino ignotum, ut secundum solutionem supra improbatam ponebatur; sed erat notum potentia sive virtute in principiiis praecognitis universalibus, ignotum autem actu, secundum propiam cognitionem. Et hoc est addiscere, reduci de cognitione potentiali seu virtuali, aut universali, in cognitionem propriam et actualem.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 11, Art. 1, 1 & Ad 1:
1. Illa enim nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed sicut dicit Damascenus in principio libri sui, omnibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo: homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem
Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse, sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens: multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.
Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Proemium, Q. I, Art. 3, 6 & Ad 6:
6. Praeterea, naturaliter cognita, et quae non possunt intelligi non esse, sunt illa quae primo nostrae cognitioni occurrunt. Sed cognitio existendi Deum omnibus est naturaliter inserta, ut Damascenus dicit; nec potest Deus cogitari non esse, ut Anselmus dicit. Ergo Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur.
Ad sextum dicendum quod Deum esse, quantum est in se, est per se notum, quia sua essentia est suum esse; et hoc modo loquitur Anselmus. Non autem nobis, qui eius essentiam non videmus.
Sed tamen eius cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, inquantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse.
Thomas Aquinas, In Boetii de Trinitate, Proemium, Q. I, Art. 3, 2 & Ad 2, 3 & Ad 3:
2. Praeterea, quando sunt plures causae ordinatae, prima causa influit prius in causatam quam causa secunda, et ultimo dimittit ipsum, ut dicitur in lib. De Causis. Sed cum scientia humana sit causata a rebus, scibile vel intelligibile est menti humanae causa intelligendi. Ergo primum intelligibilium prius influit in ipsam. Sed influxus intelligibilis in intellectum inquantum huiusmodi, est ut intelligatur, Ergo Deus, qui est primum intelligibilium, ab intellectu prius intelligitur.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omnium causarum ordinatarum est influentia unius ratrionis in ultimum effectum. Unde non oprtet quod primum intelligibile hocmodo influat in intelectumnostrum quod intelleigatur, sed quod praestet intellgiendi virtutem.
Vel dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit in ordine intelligibilium primum simpliciter, non tamen est primum in ordine intelligibilium nobis.
3. Praeterea, in omni cognitione in qua ea quae sunt priora et simpliciora prius cognoscuntur, id quod est primum et simplicissimum, primo cognoscitur. Sed in cognitione humana ea quae prius occurrunt, sunt priora et simpliciora, ut videtur; quia ens est illud quod primo cadit in conceptione humana, ut Avicenna dicit; esse autem est primum inter creata. Ergo et cognitioni humanae primo occurrit Deus, qui est simpliciter primum et simplicissimum.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis illa quae sunt in genere prima eorum quae intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus, sunt prima cognita a nobis ut ens et unum; non tamen oportet quod illa quae sunt prima simpliciter, quae non continentur in genere proprii obiecti, sicut et ista.