Thomas Aquinas: Distinction of the Categories
Intro & Logic · Order of Topics for Class 2016
From his file: DistCategories.pdf.
Read from in 2 classes
Thomas Aquinas: Distinction of the Categories In III Physicorum, Lectio V, nn. 321–324 ...ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta. Tripliciter autem fit omnis praedicatio.
Unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico Socrates est homo, vel homo est animal; et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum substantiae. Alius autem modus est, quando praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum quantitatis (nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: unde et Plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum qualitatis (unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis (cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum. Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis:
…being is divided into ten predicaments [said ofs], not univocally, as a genus into species, but by diverse ways of being. But the ways of being are proportional to the ways of being said of. For in saying one thing of another, we say this is that. Whence also the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments [categories or said-ofs]. But all predication [saying of ] comes to be in one of three ways. One way is when that which is said of some subject pertains to its nature, as when I say Socrates is a man or man is an animal. And by this is taken the predicament [category or said of ] substance. Another way is that in which there is said of something what is not of its nature, but nevertheless exists in it. This is had either on the part of the matter of the subject and by this there is the predicament [category or said of ] quantity, for quantity properly follows matter — whence also Plato laid down the large on the side of matter; or it follows form, and this is the predicament [category or saidof ]quality - whence also qualities are founded upon quantity, as color in surface and figure in lines or surfaces; or it is had in regard to another, and thus it is the predicament [category or said-of ] relation — for when I say a man is a father, nothing absolute is said of the man, but a regard which is in him to something extrinsic. The third way of being said of is when something extrinsic is said of something by way of some denomination — for thus also,
sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantia praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus. Denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur quodammodo communiter in omnibus, et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad homines pertinent tantum. Communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominatur enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori. Cum autem quatuor sint genera causarum, duo ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et forma: unde praedicatio quae possit fieri secundum haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis, et homo est corporeus. Causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, inquantum movet agentem. Remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. Si igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est.
Mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca. Intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo uniuscuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: ab his ergo denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrinseco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis. Exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a tempore est praedicamentum quando; secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est praedicamentum ubi et situs, quod addit supra ubi ordinem partium in loco. Hoc
intrinsic accidents are said of substance; for we do not say man is whiteness, but that man is white. But to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in one way commonly in all and in some way specially in those things that pertain only to man. But commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic, either by reason of cause or by reason of measure; for something is denominated caused and measured by something outside of it. There being, however, four kinds of cause, two of these are parts of the nature: namely, matter and form — whence the being said of which could come from these two belongs to the said-of substance, as if we should say that man is rational or man is corporal. And the final cause does not cause anything by itself apart from the agent — for the end has the sense of a cause to the extent that it moves the agent. There remains therefore only the agent cause by which something is able to be denominated as from the exterior. Thus therefore, as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament [category or said-of ] undergoing For undergoing is nothing other than receiving something from an agent. But conversely, as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament acting upon. For acting upon is an act from the agent in another, as has been said. Some measure is extrinsic and some intrinsic. Intrinsic, as each thing’s own length and width and depth. From these, something is denominated as from something existing within; whence it pertains to the predicament quantity. The extrinsic measures, however, are time and place. Hence, as something is denominated from time, there is the predicament [category or said-of ] when. However, as something is denominated from place, there is the predicaments [categories or said-ofs] where
saint thomas aquinas autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte temporis, cum ordo partium in tempore in ratione temporis importetur: est enim tempus numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse quando vel ubi per denominationem a tempore vel a loco.
and position, which adds above where an order of parts in place. This however was not necessary to add on the part of time since the order of parts in time is implied in the definition of time — for time is the number of motion according to its before and after. Thus something is said to be when or where by denomination from time or from place. There is however something special in man. For nature has sufficiently given the other animals those things which pertain to the conservation of life, as horns for defense, a thick and hairy hide for covering, hoofs or something of this sort for walking without injury. And thus when such animals are called armed or clothed or shod, they are not denominated from something extrinsic, but from some of their own parts. Whence this refers in them to the predicament substance, as if it were said that man is with hands or footed. But these sorts of things could not have been given to man by nature, both because they are not suitable to the subtlety of man’s complexion and because of the many forms of operation which belong to man insofar as he has reason for which some determined instruments could not have been adapted by nature, but in place of all these, there is reason within man by which he prepares for himself exterior things in place of those which are intrinsic to the other animals. Whence, when man is called armed or clothed or shod, he is named from something extrinsic which has neither the notion of cause nor of measure. Whence it is a special predicament [category or said-of ] and is called habit. [outfitted ] But it should be noted that this predicament is attributed to other animals, not as they are considered in their own nature, but as they come into the use of man; as if we call a horse decorated or saddled or armed.
Est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel pedatus. Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini inquantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accomodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur habitus. Sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum.
⁂
In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, nn. 889–894 Distinguit modis entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo, ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente...Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum...
Dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. Sciendum enim est quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio huius probavit Philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest.
Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia ”quoties ens dicitur”, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, ”toties esse significatur”, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis.
Here he distinguishes between the types of essential being; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides the kind of being which lies outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments. Second, he gives another type of being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind. Third, he divides being by potentiality and actuality: and being divided in this way is more common than complete being, for potential being is being only imperfectly and in a qualified sense. He says, first, that all those things which signify the figures of predication are said to be essentially. For it must be noted that being cannot be narrowed down to some definite thing in the way in which a genus is narrowed down to a species by means of differences. For since a difference does not participate in a genus, it lies outside the essence of a genus. But there could be nothing outside the essence of being which could constitute a particular species of being by adding to being; for what is outside of being is nothing, and this cannot be a difference. Hence in Book III of this work the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus. 890. Being must then be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of being; for “being is signified,” i.e., something is signified to be, “in just as many ways” (or in as many senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man is an animal, is signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, is signifies
saint thomas aquinas
Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere. Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur. Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid. Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo ut sit omnino extra subiectum: quod quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, Socrates est calceatus vel vestitus. Si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinseca sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato ordine partium in loco, quo considerato erit situs. Alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur ut agere. Nam actionis principium in subiecto est. Si vero secundum terminum, sic praedicabitur ut in pati. Nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur.
Quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum Est,
quality; and so on. For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways. This occurs in one way when the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated. A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either essentially and absolutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation. A predicate is referred to a subject in a third way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. In one way, that from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject; and if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of attire, as when it is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either in reference to time, and so it will be when; or if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts in place is not considered, it will be where; but if this order is considered, it will be position. In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which it is predicated. And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject. But if it is from the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as a passion; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being acted upon. But since there are some predications in which the verb is is clearly not used (for ex-
ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum Est, et participium. Nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis. Unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur.
ample, when it is said that a man walks), lest someone think that these predications do not involve the predication of being, for this reason Aristotle subsequently rejects this, saying that in all predications of this kind something is signified to be. For every verb is reduced to the verb is plus a participle. For there is no difference between the statements “the man is recovering” and “the man recovers”; and it is the same in other cases. It is clear, then, that “being” is used in as many ways as we make predications.