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Thomas-beg. of Natural Hearing
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
From his file: THOMAS-BEG. OF NATURAL HEARING.doc.
Aristotle, First Book of Natural Hearing, Reading 1, 184a 16-184b 14:
But the road from the more known and more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature is inborn. For the known to us and the known simply are not the same. Wherefore it is necessary to go forward in this way from the more uncertain by nature but more certain to us to what is more certain and more known by nature.
But what is first clear and certain for us is the more confused. Afterwards, by dividing it, the elements and the beginnings come to be known from it.
Hence, one should go forward from the general to the particular.
For the whole is more known by sense. And the general is a kind of whole since the general takes in many things as parts.
Names compared to definitions also undergo the same in some way. For they signify some kind of whole and indistinctly; as circle. But the definition of it divides into particulars.
And children first call all men "father", and all women "mother", but afterwards separate each of these.
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the First Book of Natural Hearing, Reading I, nn. 6-11:
...he gives the following argument: it is natural for us to proceed in knowing from those things which are more known to us to those which are more known by nature; but those things are more known to us which are confused, as is the general; therefore we should proceed from the general to the particular.
In order to show the first statement, he brings out the fact that the same things are not more known to us and by nature; rather, those things which are more known by nature are less known to us. Because this is the natural way or order of learning, that we go from that which is known to us to that which is unknown to us, we should proceed from things more known to us to things more known by nature.
It must be noted that he says that the known by nature and the known simply are the same. Moreover, those things are more known simply which are more known in themselves. Also those things are more known in themselves which have more being because each thing is knowable insofar as it has being; but those things are greater beings which are more in act; therefore these are most knowable by nature.
But for us the converse is true because our knowledge proceeds from ability to act; and the beginning of our knowledge is from sensible things which are material and which are understandable in ability; therefore these are known to us before we know separated substances, which latter are more known by nature, as is clear in the second book of the Metaphysics.
Therefore, he does not say more known by nature as if nature knew them, but because they are more known in themselves and according to their own nature. Moreover, he says, more known and more certain, because in the sciences we are looking, not for just any knowledge, but for certain knowledge.
In order to understand the second statement, it must be known that he here calls confused those things which contain something in ability and indistinctly. Because to know something indistinctly is a mean between pure ability and perfect act, when our understanding goes from ability to act, that which first comes to it is the confused rather than the distinct; but science is completed in act only when we arrive by resolution at a distinct knowledge of the beginnings and elements. This is the reason why the confused is known to us before the distinct.
Moreover, that the general is confused is evident because the general contains its species in ability and whoever knows something in general knows it indistinctly. But this knowledge is distinct when each of those things which are contained in ability in the general is known actually because he who knows animal knows rational only in ability. Moreover, we first know something in ability before we know it actually. Therefore, according to this order of learning by which we go from ability to act, animal is known to us before man.
But the Philosopher seems to say the contrary of this in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, namely that particulars are more known to us and the general is more known by nature or simply. But it must be known that there he takes as particulars the sensible individuals themselves, which are more known to us because sense knowledge in us, which is of singulars, precedes understanding which is of the general. But because understanding is more perfect and, moreover, the general is understandable in act but particulars or singulars are not (since they are material); the general is more known simply and according to nature. However, here he is not speaking of the particulars which are singulars, but rather the species which are more known according to nature insofar as they more perfectly exist and are known distinctly, but genera are known before by us, insofar as they are known in ability and confusedly...
Then when the Philosopher says "For the whole is more known by sense etc.", he shows the statement by three signs.
The first is taken from the sensible composed whole. He says that the sensible whole is more known to sense; therefore the understandable whole is also more known to the understanding; but the general is an understandable whole because it comprehends many things as parts, namely its inferiors; therefore, the general is more known according to the understanding for us.
But it seems that this proof is inefficacious because it uses whole and part and comprehension equivocally. However, it must be said that the composed whole and the universal whole are alike insofar as each is confused and indistinct because, just as he who grasps the genus does not grasp the species distinctly, but only in ability, so also he who grasps a house does not immediately distinguish its parts. Therefore, since the whole is first known by us because of the confusion, the same holds for every whole. However, to be composed is not common to every whole. Therefore, it is clear that he expressly said above, confused and not composed.
Then when he says, "Names compared to definitions also undergo the same etc.". he gives another sign taken from the understandable composed whole. The thing defined is related to the defining principles as a sort of composed whole, insofar as the defining principles are actually in the thing defined; still he who grasps the name, for example, man or circle, does not immediately distinguish the defining principles; therefore, the name is like a whole and is indistinct, but the definition divides it into parts; i.e., it distinctly gives the principles of the thing defined.
But this seems to be contrary to what he said above because the defining principles seem to be more general, and he said that the general is known before by us. Also if the thing defined were more known to us than the defining principles, the thing defined would not be made known to us by the definition because nothing is made known to us except from that which is more known to us.
However, it must be said that the defining principles in themselves are known to us before the thing defined, but the thing defined is known to us before we now that such are the defining principles of it...Just as animal and rational are known to us before man, but we know man confusedly before we know that animal and rational are the defining principles of man.
Then when he says, "And children first call etc.", he gives a third sign taken from the more general sensible. Just as the more general understandable is more known to us according to the understanding, for example, animal before man, so also the more common sensible is first known to us according to sense, for example this animal before this man.
And I mean first according to sense, both in place and in time; according to place, because when something is seen from afar, we first perceive that it is a body rather than that it is an animal, and we perceive the latter before we perceive that it is a man. Finally we perceive that it is Socrates.
Likewise, according to time, the boy first apprehends this individual as a man rather than as this man who is Plato who is his father. This is what he means when he says, And children first call all men "father", and all women "mother", but later on they distinguish, i.e., know determinately each of them. From which he shows clearly that we first know a thing confusedly rather than distinctly