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Three Divisions of Fear Into Six Forms of Fear Signified by Six Names
Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will
From his file: DIVISION OF FEAR.doc.
THREE DIVISIONS OF FEAR INTO SIX FORMS OF FEAR SIGNIFIED BY SIX NAMES
The three divisions (in the Sentences, the Summa Theologiae, and the de Veritate) differ not only in their divisions and subdivisions, but also in the six forms of fear they arrive at by these divisions and subdivisions, even though the six names may be in common.
All three divisions though seem to be ex objecto even though fear can sometimes be divided by accidental differences that happen ipsi passioni.
I do not think that as a whole we can say that one of them is better than another because they are not dividing the same things exactly (although there is some overlap). If we wanted to combine them in some way, we would probably have to adopt somewhat different divisions.
Suggested Combination
There is fear of one's own operation and fear of outward things and fear of other persons.
There is fear of one's own operation either because it is shameful or because it is difficult.
If it is shameful, then it can be divided as in the Summa or in Sentences.
If because of the difficulty, then either the labor of outward operation or the difficulty of inward operation.
The difficulty of inward operation is divided most completely in the Sentences (use dubitatio rather than agonia for the third because of other use of agonia)
The fear of outward things is divided in the Summa. Does the third group in the De Veritate fall under this?
The fear of other persons is divided in the De Veritate.
The division of fear into servile and filial is a division of the fear we can have for a person.
How does this division differ from the last above taken from the third group in the De Veritate? The convicium or laesio we fear from another person in the text of the De Veritate may be from just any person - a criminal as well as a master. This is a division of the things we might fear from an enemy as in Psalms 122 and 123, a division of what we might suffer (respectu passionis quae est ab alio) (ibi. de Veritate) or in the Psalms concerned with Christ's sufferings.
Is the fear of an enemy different from servile fear?
FEAR AND KNOWLEDGE
Fear can help us in coming to know or it can impede or prevent us from coming to know. But there are many forms of fear involved here.
Thomas distinguishes sometimes two and sometimes three forms of fear in regard to knowledge. In the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 41, Art. 4, Ad 5, and in the De Veritate, Q. 26, Art. 4, ad 7, Thomas distinguishes two forms of fear in regard to knowing. The distinction is not the same.
As he says in the Sent., Dist. 26, Q. I, Art. 3, such accidental differences of the passions can happen "vel ipsi passioni, ut intentio ejus; vel ex objecto."
In the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 41, Art. 4, Ad 5, he distinguishes admiratio and stupor by accidental differences that happens to the passion itself (ipsi passioni) There one can have either admiratio or stupor in regard to the same object or one man can have admiratio and another stupor in regard to one and the same object. Admiratio is a fear that keeps a man from deciding a difficult matter right away, but later he investigates it slowly. Stupor is a more intense or excessive fear that keeps him from investigating at all.
But in the De Veritate, Q. 26, Art. 4, Ad 7, stupor and admiratio are used to name forms of fear in regard to knowledge that differ by accidental differences of the other kind mentioned in the Sentences: from the object (ex objecto). Admiratio is caused by the magnitude of the object and stupor by its unfamiliarity.
These, then, are two divisions of the passion of fear in regard to knowledge.
How are these two divisions related?
Either member of the division from the object can be divided by the differences that happen to the passion itself. That is to say that a man can have a fear of trying to know something either because it is an object that is very great and above his reason or because it is an object that is altogether unfamiliar to him. And either of these fears can be such that he fears to pronounce any opinion on the subject for the present, but not to investigate in the future, or so great that he fears to investigate and apply his reason to the matter at all.
Sometimes Thomas divides fear in regard to knowing into three as in Sent., Dist. 26, Q. I, Art. 3. There he makes a division ex objecto into three, adding to admiratio and stupor, a third, agonia or dubitatio. The first two are closer for a number of reasons. They come more before the investigation although admiratio may extend into the investigation while dubitatio is more during the investigation and even after. (See Thomas' Proemium to logic at the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics: cum formidine. Moreover, admiratio or wonder and stupor more regard the object and dubitatio more the incertitude of our investigation. Perhaps this third kind of fear may be such as to make us investigate carefully or consider more correctly, or it may be such as to paralyze us in the investigation.
A similar division of fear in regard to exterior objects is made in the body of the article in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 41, Art. 4. As Thomas says there (Ad 1), this division is ex objecto. How is this division related to the threefold one in regard to knowing ex objecto. They seem to be similar divisions in diverse matters: in knowing and in exterior things.