To Have — Short Texts
Intro & Logic · Order of Topics for Class 2016
From his file: 12c15_ToHave_ShortTexts.pdf.
Read from in 2 classes
To Have — Short Texts Duane H. Berquist De Rationibus Fidei, Caput 6, n. 987 Contingit autem ab eodem plura haberi secundum diversos modos, in quibus tamen omnibus semper quod est principalius, habere dicitur: quod autem minus principale, haberi. Habet enim totum multas partes, ut homo manus et pedes; non autem dicimus e converso, quod manus vel pedes habeant hominem. Habet etiam unum subiectum multa accidentia, sicut pomum colorem et odorem, et non e converso. Habet etiam homo aliqua exteriora sicut possessiones et vestes, non e converso. In solis autem illis quae sunt partes alicuius unius essentiales, aliquando aliquid dicitur habere et haberi ut anima corpus, et corpus animam. Et similiter inquantum vir et uxor in matrimonio coniunguntur, dicitur vir habere uxorem, et uxor virum. Et similiter in his quae quae per relationem uniuntur, sicut dicimus quod pater habet filium et filius patrem.
Many things can be had by the same person in different ways, but the principal element is always said to “have”, while the less principal elements are “had”. Thus the whole has many parts, as a man has hands and feet; we do not say the inverse: that hands and feet have a man. Likewise one subject has many accidents, as an apple has colour and smell, but not the inverse. Man also has exterior things, like possessions and clothing, but not the inverse. Only in the case of essential parts is something said both to have and to be had, as the soul has the body and the body has the soul. And in marriage a man has a wife and a wife has a husband. The same in the case of things united by relationship: thus we say that a father has a son and a son has a father.
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus …hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur: uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde Philosophus inter postpraedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum
…this word “habitus” [habit] is derived from “habere” [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to “have” something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. Concerning the first, we must observe that “to have,” as said in regard to anything that is “had,” is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts “to have” among the “postpredicaments,” so called because they result from
“to have” — short texts
genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens and id quod habetur: sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio: sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum: unde Philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum Habitus: de quod dicit Philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius.
Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est: de quo Philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic… habitus est qualitas.
the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the “haver” and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that “a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had”; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of “habit”: of which the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that “there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed.” But if “to have” be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says in Metaph. V that “habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit.” And in this sense… habit is a quality.
De Potentia, Q. 2, Art. 1, Ad 2 …cum recipere terminetur ad habere, sicut ad finem; dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse recipiens, sicut dupliciter est habens. Habet enim uno modo materia formam suam, et subiectum accidens, vel qualitercumque habitum est extra essentiam habentis; …habet autem alio modo suppositum naturam, ut hic homo humanitatem; quae quidem non est extra essentiam habentis, immo est eius essentia. Socrates enim est vere id quod homo est. Genitus ergo in humanis etiam non recipit formam generantis sicut materia formam, vel si-
While the term and end of receiving is having, there are two ways of receiving and two ways of having. In one way matter has its form, and a subject an accident, or in fact anything that is possessed besides the essence: …in another way the supposit has a nature, for instance, a man has human nature: for the nature is not beside the essence of the haver, indeed it is his essence: thus Socrates is truly that which is a man. Accordingly the begotten one even in mankind receives the form of his begetter, not as
duane h. berquist cut subiectum accidens, sed sicut suppositum vel hypostasis habet naturam speciei….
matter receives form, or subject accident, but as a supposit or hypostasis has the specific nature….