Toward Something — Chapter 7

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Toward Something — Chapter 7

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Toward Something — Chapter 7 Duane H. Berquist The chapter on toward something is divided into three parts. 1. The first part includes a definition of toward something and then the properties of toward something are considered. Up to this point, the division of this chapter would seem to be like that of substance and of quantity. 2. But then an objection is made to the first definition. A second definition is proposed. And another property is brought out. From the objection and second definition, we can see the distinction between what the Latins called relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse. We can also see the surprising order of considering toward something before quality even though the latter is in being or causality before toward something. 3. The third part of the chapter is very brief in which Aristotle notes the difficulty of considering toward something. The first definition of toward something is those things, which in what they are, are said of another or toward another in some way. There is a distinction between the first examples given by Aristotle and then the second ones he gives. The first examples are purely towards something such as greater or lesser and (more distinct ones) such as double and half. But the second examples he gives are mainly of qualities primarily which have some toward something following upon what they are. Aristotle then considers the properties of toward something thus defined. He first considers properties that belong to some of those that are said toward something and then the stricter properties. The first property is to have a contrary. This fits those said toward another which are qualities, such as virtue and vice, but not those which are purely toward something such as double or half. The second property is to admit of more and less. This also fits those said toward another which are qualities, but only some of those purely said toward another. One thing may be more or less like another, but one thing is not more or less double than another. Aristotle then turns to two stricter properties. The first is that what is said toward something will have that something said reversibly towards it. If the master is said to be the master of the slave, then reversibly the slave is the slave of the master. This would not seem to be true in some cases. If the correlative has not been stated correctly, it does not seem to be reversible. If the slave, for example, is said to be the slave of a man, the man is not said to be the man of the slave. But if one takes the correct correlative of master, then reversibly the master is the master of the slave. The reverse may take a different ending or preposition. Knowledge is knowledge of the known and the known is known by knowledge. Sometimes it may be necessary to coin a word to state the proper correlative. The second stricter property is that the correlatives are together by nature. But here Aristotle says that this is true of the purely relatives such as double and half. But it is not true of relatives that are qualities such as knowledge and sense. What knowledge and sense are of, can be before them and without them. At this point, Aristotle raises an objection or difficulty which leads him to reject or modify the first definition of toward something. Each part of a substance can be said to be of another: for example, the

hand of a man or the head of a man. If the first definition of towards something is correct, then substance would a collection of relations. Hence, there is need to look again at the definition of toward something to avoid this absurd consequence of it. Aristotle then modifies the original definition to that whose (whole) being or nature is to be towards something (and not just said to be of another). He then gives another property of toward something which is that if one of the correlatives is known so is the other. They are known together. Aristotle ends the chapter on towards something by noting the difficulty of the matter. Having given an outline of the chapter, we can come back on a number of things. First, we should concentrate on the name of this genus. It is correctly translated toward something (ad aliquid in Latin for the pros ti of the Greek) rather than by the word relation. Thomas Aquinas points out how the more abstract word is not said toward something. In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVII, nn. 1030–1031 Ponit tres modos, quibus aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid non secundum se, sed secundum aliud…. Secundus modus est, quando aliqua abstracta dicuntur ad aliquid, quia concreta habentia illa abstracta ad aliud dicuntur; sicut aequalitas et similitudo dicuntur ad aliquid, quia simile et aequale ad aliquid sunt. Aequalitas autem et similitudo secundum nomen non dicuntur ad aliquid.

He now gives three ways in which some things are said to be relative not directly but indirectly…. The second way is that in which certain abstract terms are said to be relative because the concrete things to which these abstract terms apply are relative to something else. For example, equality and likeness are said to be relative because the like and the equal are relative. But equality and likeness are not considered relative as words.

Moreover, to speak of a relation between two things is to speak as if there is one accident between them. Thomas touches upon this in the following text. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVII, Quaestio I, art. I, ad 2 …quidam dixerunt, ut Avicenna , tract III Met., c. X, dicit, quod eadem numero relatio est in utroque extremorum; quod non potest esse, quia unum accidens non est in duobus subjectis; et ideo dicendum, quod in utroque extremorum est una relatio differens ab alia in quibusdam secundum speciem, sicut in illis quae diversis nominibus utrinque nominantur, ut paternitas et filiatio; sed in quibusdam non differunt specie, sed numero tantum, sicut quando utrumque est unum nomen ut in similitudine et aequalitate; et tunc relatio quae est in uno sicut in subjecto, est in altero sicut termino, et e converso; et ideo relatio secundum esse suum, prout in re fundamentum habet, non est medium, sed extremum, sed secundum respectum est medium; unde patet quod realiter distinguuntur. The question also arises why towards something is considered before how or quality. Aristotle had distinguished the first four genera in the order of nature, but in the order of teaching, he places toward something before quality. Porphyry has a similar change in the Isagoge. He enumerates the five predicables in the order of nature: genus, difference, species, property and accident. But he considers, in the order of teaching, genus and species before difference. The reason there seem to be that genus and species are defined and, hence known, toward each other. But why is there this reversal of order here? This text of Albert shows some of the difficulty of untying this knot.

De Praedicamentis, Tractatus IV, De Praedicamento Ad Aliquid, caput II1 Ex hoc iterum ulterius patet ratio ordinis, quod post praedicamentum quantitatis inter genera accidentium praedicamentum hoc est ordinandum, quia scilicet quantitas propinquissima est substantiae, cum substantia ordinanda est. Propter quod etiam quantitatis diffinitiones quamvis concernant materiam, non tamen concernunt hanc vel illam sensibilem, et sunt propter hoc de necessitate mathematicae scientiae. Aliorum autem accidentium diffinitiones et passiones concernunt materiam sensibilem et habent plus de accidentalitate, et minus appropinquant ad substantiam. Et cum inter illa plus habet de accidentalitate ad aliquid, ut dictum est, merito praeponitur inter illa. Et hoc dico salva pace Boetii, qui aliam causam assignat hujus ordinationis: dicit enim quod quia in ordine discretae quantitatis est primum et secundum, quae relationem et comparationem dicunt, et quia tam in praedicamento substantiae quam in praedicamento quantitatis resultant genus et species quae sunt relativa, ideo statim post ista duo ponitur relatio, quamvis qualitas secundum naturam qualitatis sit ante relationem. Quae ratio non est sufficiens, sicut cuilibet bene consideranti facile patere potest. Cajetan’s text also has some difficulties in its solution, I think. De Praedicamentis2 Post praedicamentum quantitatis statim tractat de genere ad aliquid, quum quantitatem maxime sequitur ad aliquid et iam in praedicamento quantitatis sermo de ad aliquid inceptus est, ubi de magno et parvo disputatum est; et iterum in praedicamento qualitatis de ipso habendus est sermo, licet naturae ordine post qualitatem et actionem et passionem sit. I think the chief reason is connected with the two definitions of this chapter. Those are said to be toward something which, as regards what they are, are said to be of another or in some other way toward another.3 ⁂ Those are toward something whose being is toward something in some way.⁴ The first definition is said to be Platonic.⁵ But this definition is so broad as to include the parts of substance and qualities that have a relation following upon them. The nature of quality and the parts of substance is not primarily to be toward something and the second definition limits this genus to that whose very being or nature is to be in some way toward another. Since this book is about names signifying what things are, we must take into account the distinction between something whose whole nature is to be toward something and something whose fundamental nature is not that, even though it may have some relation following upon it. How should esse be understood in the second definition of toward something? It should be understood for the nature, not the existence of relation. Sometimes being means the nature of a thing. The next two texts give the same threefold distinction of esse, but the second also explains the meaning of esse in the second definition of toward something as nature, not being in the sense of existence.

1 Laval ed., p. 115. 133d.

2 Laval ed., p. 65.

3 6a 36–37.

⁴ 8a 31–32.

⁵ See Sophist 255d and Republic 438a 7–b1 and Parmenides

toward something Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio VI, Quaest II, art. II, Responsio …secundum Philosophum, V Meta. (D 7. 1017a31035; L. 9, nn. 895–896) esse duobus modis dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit (text 6) dicit, ens est praedicatum accidentale. Et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae conjungit subjectum cum praedicato, ut dicit Philosophus in VI Meta. Alio modo (1017a, 22–27; L. 9, nn. 889–895) dicitur esse quod pertinet ad naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum decem genera. Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis. Aliquando tamen esse sumitur pro essentia, secundum quam res est; quia per actus consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus. Another important text for understanding the word esse in this definition. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXIII, Q. I, art. 1, 1 & ad 1 1. Videtur quod relationes ipsae non sint essentia divina. Aut enim quae relative in Deo dicuntur, sunt relativa secundum esse aut tantum secundum dici. Sed non tantum secundum dici; quia sic incideret haeresis Sabellii, ut supra in notula Hilarii habitum est. Ergo sunt relativa secundum esse. Sed talium relationum, secundum Philosophum, in Prae., cap. “ad aliquid” esse, est ad aliud se habere. Ergo cum essentiae divinae esse non sit ad aliud se habere, sed sit esse absolutum, videtur quod non sit idem cum relatione quae secundum esse ad aliud est. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod relationes istae non sunt tantum secundum dici ad aliquid, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed sciendum, quod esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse; definitio enim quidditatem rei significat. Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae, sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significabat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod est dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae sicut supra de veritate dictum est. Dico igitur, quod cum dicitur: “Ad aliquid sunt, quorum esse est ad aliud se habere”, intelligitur de esse quod est quidditas rei, quae definitione significatur; quia ipsa natura relationis per quam constituitur in tali genere, est ad aliud referri: et non intelligitur de esse quod est actus essentiae; hoc enim esse habet relatio, ex his quae causant ipsum in subjecto secundum quod esse non referur ad aliud, sed ad subjectum, sicut et quodlibet accidens. Et sic dico, quod non oportet quod esse essentiae divinae sit ad aliud se habere; quia illud esse in quo paternitas et essentia uniuntur, significatur ut esse quod est actus essentiae; non autem uniuntur in esse quod significat definitio rei; quia alia est ratio paternitatis, qua ad aliud refertur, et alia ratio essentiae.

And as every student of the seventh book of Wisdom (the seventh book After the Books in Natural Philosophy) knows, Aristotle often contracts his phrase what was to be to to be. We can now examine the distinction between relations made in the two definitions. There is a fundamental distinction of relations made in Latin between the relativa secundum dici and the relativa secundum esse. This distinction tells us nothing about whether the relations are real or of reason and should not be confused with the distinction between real relations and relations of reason. A fundamental text on the distinction between relativa secundum dici and the relativa secundum esse is this text of Thomas.

De Potentia, Q. 7, art. 10, ad 11 …distinctio ista relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis. Quaedam enim sunt relativa secundum esse quae non sunt realia, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna; et quaedam sunt relativa secundum dici, quae tamen important relationes reales, sicut patet de scientia et sensu. Dicuntur enim relativa secundum esse, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas ipsas relationes; relativa vero secundum dici, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates vel aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen consequuntur relationes. Nec quantum ad hoc differt, utrum sint relationes reales vel rationis tantum.

This distinction between predicamental and transcendental relatives does not prove the relations in question to be real. Certain predicamental relative terms do not signify a real relation, for instance, right and left as ascribed to a pillar: and some transcendental relative terms signify real relations, for instance, knowledge and sensation. Because relatives are said to be predicamental when terms are employed to signify the relations themselves, while they are said to be transcendental when thee terms are employed to signify qualities or something of the kind primarily, from which relations arise. Nor as regards the question at issue does it matter whether they be real or logical relations.

The first definition in this chapter would include relativa secundum dici. In another text where Thomas considers the distinction between relativasecundum esse and secundum dici, he states that the relativa secundum dici that signify chiefly a quality belong in another predicament than relation or toward something. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. II, Solutio …aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen “dominus” et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse, et alia dicta de Deo, sunt quidem relativa, quia etiam significant ex primo suo intellectu habitudinem quae secundum rationem est in Deo; sed ex consequenti faciunt intellectum essentiae, secundum quod talis habitudo fundatur in aliquo essentiali. Aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo, sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem quam consequitur respectus quidam ad scibile. Unde ista talia non sunt relativa secundum esse, sed solum secundum dici. Unde ista principaliter dant intelligere rem alterius praedicamenti, et ex consequenti important relationem. In the following text, Thomas explains why power or ability and science should be placed in the category of quality even though they has a relation. De Potentia, Q. 2, art. 2, c. …licet potentiae conveniat ratio principii, quod in genere relationis est, tamen id quod est principium actionis vel passionis, non est relatio, sed aliqua forma absoluta; et id est essentia potentiae; et inde est quod Philosophus ponit potentiam non in genere relationis, sed qualitatis, sicut et scientiam, quamvis utrique aliqua relatio accidat.

…although power is rightly described as a kind of principle which comes under the generic head of relation, nevertheless the thing which is a principle of action or passion is not a relation but an absolute form, namely the essence of the power. Wherefore the Philosopher places science in the genus, not of relation but of quality, although a relation is incidental to both.

This also seems to confirm the necessity of the second definition to exclude the relativa secundum dici that the first definition admits. We do not mean that the distinction between the two definitions is that between the relativa secundum dici and secundum esse. For under the first definition come both relativa. But the second definition excludes the relativa secundum dici from being placed chiefly in this genus. The first definition of toward something is not a definition of relatives secundum dici, but it includes them. But the second definition is of relatives secundum esse and thus excludes relatives secundum dici. There is another universal distinction of relations which should not be confused with the distinction between relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse. This is the distinction between real relations and relations of reason. Thomas points points out this possible confusion in replying to an objection and give examples showing how a relation secundum dici can be real and a relation secundum esse of reason. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, art. III, Obj. 4 & ad 4 4. Praeterea, illa relativa in quibus non est relatio secundum rem, invenimus esse ad aliquid secundum dici tantum, sicut scibile, de quo dicit Philosophus , V Metaphys., text. 20, quod est relatum quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Sed de Deo dicuntur quaedam relativa quae sunt ad aliquid et secundum suum esse, ut dominus, rex et hujusmodi. Ergo saltem illa aliquam relationem realem in Deo significant. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud non facit ad propositum; quia de utrisque relativis inveniuntur aliqua quae important relationem realem, et quae important relationem rationis; sicut idem importat relationem rationis, quamvis sit relativum secundum esse; et scientia importat relationem realem, quamvis sit relativum secundum dici. Relations of reason would not be put in the category of toward something since the categories pertain to a division of real being. This is clear from the distinction of being in the fifth book of Wisdom. But is Aristotle’s second definition of toward something meant to exclude relations of reason as well as relativa secundum dici? Perhaps the use of to be in the second definition for nature indicates that one is thinking of being in things and not just in reason. When Hamlet says to be or not to be: that is the question, he is speaking of being in things, not in reason. Some have thought that all relations are something of reason and not in things, but this is a mistake. But the reason for this mistake is the weakness in being of relations. Thomas speaks of this weakness: In XII Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 2456 …ea quae sunt ad aliquid, remotiora videntur esse a substantia quam alia genera, ex eo quod sunt debilioris esse. Unde et substantiae inhaerent mediantibus aliis generibus, sicut aequale et inaequale, duplum et dimidium, mediante quantitate. Movens autem et motum, pater et filius, dominus et servus, mediante actione et passione. Et hoc ideo, quia substantia est per se existens; quantitas autem et qualitas sunt entia in alio; sed relativa non solum sunt in alio, sed ad aliud.

…relations … seem to be farther removed from substance than the rest of the categories are inasmuch as they have a more imperfect mode of being. And for this reason they inhere in substance by means of the other categories; for example, equal and unequal, double and half, inhere in substance by way of quantity; and mover and thing moved, father and son, master and slave, inhere in substance by way of action and passion. The reason is that, while substance is something which exists of itself, and quantity and quality are things which exist in something else, relations are things which

not only exist in something else but also have being in reference to something else. The reality, or existence in things, of some relations is from their being accidents or having a cause in their subject. Relation is something (real) in creatures as having a cause in its subject. The following text of Thomas is useful for understanding what is responsible for a relation being real. De Potentia, Q. 2, Art. 5, c. …relatio secundum rationem sui generis, in quantum est relatio, non habet quod sit aliquid, sed solum quod sit ad aliquid. Quod sit vero aliquid secundum rem, habet ex illa parte qua inest, vel ut idem secundum rem, ut in divinis, vel ut habens causam in subiecto, sicut in creaturis.

…the relation, by reason of its generic nature as such, is a thing (aliquid), but is purely relative (ad aliquid). That it is something real is due to the fact that it is in a subject, which is either identical with it as in God, or is its cause, as in creatures.

Relation, as Thomas explains, is not an accident from its being alone toward something: Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Quodlibetum Septimum, Q. I, Art. 4, c. Illud autem quod ad aliquid dicitur, non habet rationem accidentis ex hoc quod est ad aliquid, sed solum ex hoc quod inest; et inde est quod sola relatio secundum rationem sui generis cum substantia remanet in divinis, nec tamen est ibi accidens. Whence some relations are of reason only because they have no foundation in the thing of which they are said. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio. …in relatione sint duo: scilicet relationis respectus, quo ad alterum refertur, in quo consistit relationis ratio; et iterum ipsum esse relationis, quod habet secundum quod in aliqua re fundatur, vel quantitate, vel essentia, vel aliquo huiusmodi: consideraverat relationes…secundum respectum in quo relationis ratio consistit, ex quo non habet quod aliquam rem inhaerentem imponat [importet]. Unde etiam inveniuntur aliquae relationes nihil realiter in re ponentes…et propter hoc dixit eas assistentes vel exterius affixas. Illae enim proprie relationes dicuntur exterius affixae et assistentes, quae cum proprie non habent fundamentum in re, tantummodo ex habitudine alterius ad rem de qua dicuntur, adveniunt; sicut dextrum in columna, quod dicitur de ipsa per hoc quod homo eam ad sinistram habet…. In the distinction of the ten highest genera, Thomas separated quantity and quality from toward something because the former are said absolutely. What are said absolutely place something in that in which they are by what is private to what they are, but a relation does not have to do this. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio. …ea quae absolute dicuntur, secundum proprias rationes ponunt in eo aliquid in quo dicuntur, ut quantitas et qualitas, et hujusmodi. Unde nihil horum invenitur quod non realiter sit in Deo, de quo vere et proprie dicitur; et propter hoc non possunt de aliquo ex tempore dici, nisi illud mutetur per susceptionem ejus quod prius non habuit. Sed relatio secundum rationem suam non habet quod ponat aliquid in eo de quo dicitur, sed ponit tantum habitudinem ad aliud; unde invenitur aliqua relatio…non realiter existens in eo de quo dicitur; et ideo in talibus habitudines illae de novo dicuntur non per mutationem ejus, sed illius ad quod dicitur….

The following text of Thomas brings out well what relation has in common with the other accidents and what is proper or private to it. Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 28, Art 2, c. …in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto: accidentis enim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum. Et in aliis quodem generibus a relatione, utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum comparationem ad subiectum: nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae. Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra.

…in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of “relation,” as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside.

From what does relation have existence in things? Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio II, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio III. Est enim natura relationis ut in aliis rerum generibus causam habeat, quia minimum habet de natura entis, ut Commentator, XII Meta., (text.10), dicit. Unde quamvis relatio per se non terminet motum, quia in “ad aliquid” non est motus, ut probatur in V Phys. (225b, 11), tamen ex hoc quod motus terminatur per se ad aliquod ens, de necessitate consequitur relatio aliqua. Sicut ex hoc quod motus alterationis terminatur ad albedinem, consequitur relatio similitudinis ad omnia alba; similiter etiam ex hoc quod motus generationis terminatur ad formam, consequitur haec relatio secundum quam materia esse sub forma dicitur…. Although how much, how and toward something are said of substance by reason of something in it, there is an important difference in the ratio of toward something and the ratio of quantity and quality, in understanding what they are. De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 8, c. …relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate: quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subiecto remanentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit [in libro de Trinitate], ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud…. Quod autem attribuitur alicui ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente. Et propter hoc etiam probat Philosophus V Phys., quod in ad aliquid non potest esse motus: quia, sine aliqua mutatione

…relation differs from quantity and quality in that quantity and quality are accidents residing in the subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says (De Trin.), signifies something not as adhering to a subject but as passing from it to something else…. Now when a thing is attributed to someone as proceeding from him to another this does not argue composition between them, as neither does action imply composition with the agent. And for this reason the Philosopher proves (Phys. V) that there

eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius, sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie; sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus, quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens.

can be no movement in relation: since without any change in the thing that is related to another, the relation can cease for the sole reason that this other is changed. Thus it is clear with regard to action that there is no movement in respect of action except metaphorically and improperly speaking, just as we say that one who passes from inaction into action is changed: and this, would not be the case if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject. For the goodness of the teaching, we can make more explicit the species of toward something with the help of some texts of Thomas. Here is a text towards the species of relation based on their foundations. Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio V, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio I & Ad 3. Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod unio relatio quaedam est. Omnis autem relatio, secundum Philosophum, V Meta., (1020b 26–32) fundatur vel supra quantitatem, aut quod reducitur ad genus quantitatis, aut supra actionem vel passionem. Unum autem reducitur ad genus quantitatis quasi principium quantitatis discretae. Et supra ipsam fundatur identitas, secundum quod est unum in substantia; aequalitas, secundum quod est unum in quantitate; similitudo, secundum quod est unum in qualitate. Unitio autem est quaedam actio vel passio qua ex multis efficitur aliquo modo unum; et hanc actionem sequitur ista relatio quae est unio. Relationum autem tam harum quam illarum — quaedam innascuntur ex motu utriusque; et tunc oportet quod illae relationes sint realiter in utroque extremorum, sicut paternitas et huiusmodi — quaedam autem innascuntur ex motu unius sine immutatione alterius, quod accidit in his quorum unum dependet ad alterum; et in talibus relatio est secundum rem in eo quod dependet ad alterum, in altero vero est secundum rationem tantum. Cum igitur in incarnatione non sit aliqua mutatio facta in divina natura, sed in humana quae tracta est ad unitatem in persona divina, erit haec relatio, scilicet unio, secundum rem in natura humana, in divina secundum rationem tantum, secundum quod dicit Philosophus in V Meta., (1021a 28–29) quod “aliqua sunt relativa non quia ipsa referuntur, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa”. Unde unio secundum rem creatura quaedam est. Ad tertium dicendum quod unio quae de Deo praedicatur non est neque Creator neque creatura; quia prout in ipso est, non est aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum. Non tamen ratio est falsa, quia fundatur super relationem creaturae ad Creatorem; sicut est etiam de aliis relativis quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur, ut Dominus et hujusmodi. The following text divides the species of toward something in a way proportional to that in which Thomas distinguishes where and when etc. from acting upon and undergoing. De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 9, c. Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu

Consequently there must be order in things themselves, and this order is a kind of relation. Wherefore there must be relations in things themselves, whereby one is ordered to another. Now one thing is ordered to another either as to quantity or as to active or passive power: for on these

passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci. Mensuratur enim aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca. Per virtutem etiam activam unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero; per substantiam autem et qualitatem ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas, — vel forma substantialis aut materia, — habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et numerus, sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum aliquid magis vel minus altero consideratur: sic enim alius aliquid altero dicitur. Et propter hoc Philosophus in V Metaph. species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione.

two counts alone can we find in a thin something whereby we compare it with another. For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity but also in reference to an extrinsic quantity. And again by its active power one thing acts on another, and by its passive power is acted on by another: while by its substance and quality a thing is ordered to itself alone and not to another, except accidentally: namely inasmuch as a quality, substantial form or matter is a kind of active or passive power, and forasmuch as one may ascribe to them a certain kind of quantity: thus one thing produces the same in substance; and one thing produces its like in quality; and number or multitude causes dissimilarity and diversity in the same things; and dissimilarity in that one thing is considered as being more or less so and so than another, thus one thing is said to be whiter than another. Hence the Philosopher (Metaph. v) in giving the species of relations, says that some are based on quantity and some on action and passion.

In this text, Thomas sees one more cause of relation besides quantity and action & passion: In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVII, n. 1004. Ratio autem istorum modorum haec est. Cum enim relatio, quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine quodam unius rei ad aliam, oportet tot modis huiusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit unam rem ad aliam ordinari. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est tertius modus. Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est secundus modus. Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus.

These senses are explained as follows: since a real relation consists in the bearing of one thing upon another, there must be as many relations of this kind as there are ways in which one thing can bear upon another. (3) Now one thing bears upon another either in being, inasmuch as the being of one thing depends on another, and then we have the third sense; or (2) according to active or passive power, inasmuch as one thing receives something from another or confers it upon the other, and then we have the second sense; or (1) according as the quantity of one thing can be measured by another, and then we have the first sense.

Whence relation is a res naturae and has its unity or multiplicity. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Quodlibet Primum, Q. II, Art. 1, c. …relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis generibus, quia ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et qualitates ex ratione qualitatis; sed relationes non ha-

…relations differ from all other categories of things in that those things which belong to other categories are real things from the very natures of their categories, as are quantities from the nature of quantity, and qualities from the nature of qual-

duane h. berquist bent quod sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum. Inveniuntur enim quidam respectus qui non sunt reales, sed rationales tantum: sicut scibile refertur ad scientiam, non aliqua reali relatione in scibile existente, sed potius quia scientia refertur ad ipsum, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphys. Sed relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alterum: qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est ipsis ipsa relatio; unde dextrum et sinistrum in animal sunt relationes reales, quia consequitur quasdam naturales virtutes; in columna autem sunt respectu rationis tantum secundum ordinem animalis ad ipsam. Ex eodem autem habet aliquid quod sit ens et quod sit unum; et ideo contingit quod est una relatio realis tantum propter unitatem causae, sicut patet de aequalitate. Propter unam enim quantitatem est in uno corpore una aequalitas tantum, quamvis sint respectus plures, secundum quos diversis corporibus dicitur esse aequale. Si autem secundum omnes illos respectus multiplicarentur realiter relationes in uno corpore, sequeretur quod in uno essent accidentia infinita vel indeterminata. Et similiter magister est una relatione magister omnium quos idem docet, quamvis sint multi respectus. Sic etiam unus homo secundum unam realem filiationem est filius patris sui et matris suae, quia una nativitate unam naturam ab utroque accepit.

ity. But relations are not real things from the nature of relation. For we find certain relations which are not real but mental only, for example a knowable object is related not by any real relation existing in the knowable object but rather because knowledge is related to the object, according to the Philosopher in V Metaphysica. But the reality of a relation comes from its cause when one thing has a natural order to another. The natural and real order is for them the relation itself. So right and left in an animal are real relations because they follow certain natural powers; however, in a column they are mental relations only according to an animal’s position in relation to the column. But a thing has being and unity from the same cause; and therefore, because of the unity of the cause it happens that there is only one real relation. This is obvious in the case of equality, for there is in one body only one relation of equality because of the one quantity, although this may be in regard to a number of things insofar as it is said to be equal to different bodies. If relations were really multiplied in one body according to all those references to which it is equal, it would follow that there would be an infinite or indeterminate number of accidents in one thing. A teacher is by one relation a teacher of all whom he teaches he same thing, although there may be many of these; so also according to one real sonship one man is the son of his father and of his mother because by one birth he received one nature from both of them.

Again, whence relation has reality and unity or multiplicity. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Quodlibet Nonum, Q. II, Art. 3, c. …in Christo est una tantum filiatio secundum rem, quamvis sint plures respectus relativi secundum rationem…. …in hoc differt ad aliquid ab aliis generibus: quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent quod aliquid sint; sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas, aliquid ponit; et similiter est de aliis; sed ad aliquid ex propria sui generis ratione non habet quod ponat aliquid, sed ad aliquid: unde inveniuntur quaedam ad aliquid quae nihil sunt in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum: quod in aliis generibus non contingit. Et quamvis ad aliquid ex ratione sui generis non habeat quod ponat aliquid, non tamen habet ex ipsa generis ratione quod nihil ponat, quia sic nulla relatio esset aliquid in rerum natura, unde ad aliquid non esset unum de decem generibus. Habet autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale, ex eo quod relationem causat. Cum enim in aliquo invenitur aliquid reale, per quod ad alterum dependeat et comparetur, tunc dicimus

toward something realiter comparari vel dependere vel referri; sicut aequalitas relatio realis ponitur ex virtute quantitatis, quae aequalitatem causat. Quia vero ex eodem res habet esse et unitatem, ideo realis unitas relationis pensanda est ex ipso relationis fundamento vel causa; et quia una est quantitas, per quam pluribus sum aequalis, in me non est nisi una relatio realis aequalitatis habens respectum ad plures; similiter quia una nativitate ex patre et matre genitus fui, una filiatione reali dicor filius utriusque, quamvis multiplicentur respectus. Again, whence relation has reality (whence relatio sit aliquid in rerum natura) and unity or multiplicity. Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist VIII, Art. V, Resp., nn. 57–59. …sicut in I lib. (d. 26, q. 2, a. 2) dictum est, relatio non habet ex hoc quod ad alterum dicitur, quod sit aliquid in rerum natura; sed hoc habet ex eo quod relationem causat, quod est in re quae ad alterum dicitur. Et quia ex eo res habet unitatem et multitudinem ex quo habet esse; ideo secundum id in quo relatio fundatur, de ea judicandum est, utrum sit secundum rem una vel plures. Sunt ergo quaedam relationes quae fundantur super quantitatem, sicut aequalitas quae fundatur super unum in quantitate. Et cum unitas quantitatis non sit nisi una in una re, inde est quod per unam aequalitatem est res aequalis omnibus quibus aequalis dicitur. Aliae vero relationes fundantur super actionem et passionem. Et in istis considerandum est quod una passio respondet duabus actionibus, quando neutrum agens sufficit per se ad actionem complendam; sicut est in eo qui una nativitate nascitur ex patre et matre. Unde in patre et matre sunt duae relationes secundum rem, sicut et duae actiones; sed in nato est una relatio secundum rem, secundum quam refertur ad patrem et matrem, sicut et passio una. Item considerandum est quod quaedam relationes non innascuntur ex actionibus secundum quod sunt in actu, sed magis secundum quod fuerunt; sicut aliquis dicitur pater postquam ex actione est effectus consecutus. Et tales relationes fundantur super id quod in actione ex agente relinquitur, sive sit dispositio sive habitus sive aliquod jus aut potestas vel quidquid aliud est hujusmodi. Sed quia hoc quod relinquitur ex actionibus unius speciei, non potest esse nisi unum; inde est quod tales relationes etiam secundum rem non multiplicantur secundum diversas actiones, sed magis sunt unum secundum id quod ex actione relinquitur. Et propter hoc non sunt diversae relationes secundum rem in patre uno qui generat plures filios, nec in magistro uno qui docet plures discipulos. Si autem sint actiones plures secundum speciem, causant etiam plures relationes specie differentes. Again, whence relation has reality and unity or multiplicity. Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars, Q. 35, Art. 5, c.

Unitas enim relationis vel eius pluralitas non attenditur secundum terminos: sed secundum causam vel subiectum. Si enim secundum terminos attenditur, oporteret quod quilibet homo in se duas filiationes haberet: unum qua refertur ad patrem, et aliam qua refertur ad matrem. Sed recte consideranti apparet eadem relatione referri

Because the unity or plurality of a relation is considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man would of necessity have in himself two filiations—one in reference to his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider the question aright, we shall see

duane h. berquist unumquemque ad suum patrem et matrem, propter unitatem causae. Eadem enim nativitate homo nascitur ex patre et matre: unde eadem relatione ad utrumque refertur. Et eadem ratio est de magistro qui docet multos discipulos eadem doctrina, et de domino qui gubernat diversos subiectos eadem potestate. Si vero sint diversae causae specie differentes, ex consequenti videntur specie differre. Unde nihil prohibet plures tales relationes eidem inesse. Sicut si aliquis est aliquorum magister in grammatica et aliorum in logica, alia est ratio magisterii utriusque: et ideo diversis relationibus unus et idem homo potest esse magister vel diversorum vel eorundem secundum diversas doctrinas.

Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis habet relationem ad plures secundum diversa causas, eiusdem speciei: sicut cum aliquis est pater diversorum filiorum secundum diversos generationis actus. Unde paternitas non potest species differre: cum actus generationum sunt iidem specie. Et quia plures formae eiusdem speciei non posssunt simul inesse eidem subiecto, non est possibile quod sunt plures paternitates in eo qui est pater plurium filiorum generatione naturali. Secus autem esset si esset pater unius generatione naturali, et alterius per adoptionem.

that every man bears but one relation to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence he bears but one relation to both. The same is said of one master who teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of generation. Wherefore the paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one son by natural generation and of another by adoption.

Appendix The distinction between real relations and relations of reason is not made much in the Categories. This is a very difficult distinction to understand fully. Likewise, the distinction among the relations of reason is difficult to understand. We here give some fundamental texts from Thomas which are useful to begin to understand these diffcult matters. Sometimes both relatives are real, sometimes both are not real, sometimes one is and the other is not. Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Ad 3. …relativorum invenitur triplex diversitas. Quaedam sunt quorum utrumque importat relationem non in re existentem, sed in ratione tantum; sicut quando ens refertur ad non ens, vel relatio ad relationem, vel aliquid hujusmodi, ut supra dictum est. Quaedam vero quorum utrumque relationem realem importat, sicut Pater et Filius.

toward something Quaedam vero quorum alterum importat relationem realem, et alterum relationem rationis tantum, sicut scientia et scibile. Et hujusmodi diversitatis ratio est, quia illud supra quod fundatur relatio, quandoque invenitur in altero tantum, et quandoque in utroque; ut patet quod relatio scientiae ad scibile fundatur supra apprehensionem secundum esse spirituale. Hoc autem esse spirituale in quo fundatur relatio scientiae, est tantum in sciente et non in scibili, quia ibi est forma rei secundum esse naturale. E contrario est de amante et amato, quia relatio amoris fundatur super appetitum boni; bonum non est aliquid existens tantum in anima, sed etiam in rebus. Unde dicit Philosophus, VI Metaphys., text. 2, quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus; verum et falsum in anima; et ideo dicit Avicenna, tract. III Metaph., cap. X, quod in amante et amato, in utroque relativorum est invenire dispositionem per quam refertur ad alterum; non in sciente et scibili; et ideo utrobique relatio realis est; sic etiam aequalitas, quae immediate fundatur supra quantitatem, quae in utroque est. The major text dividing relations of reason and what is necessary for a real relation. De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 11, c.

…sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.

…just as a real relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a logical relation is the order of thought to thought; and this may occur in two ways. First, when the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is expressed in a relative term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and species: for the mind discovers these relations by observing the order between that which is in the mind and that which is outside the mind, or again the order between one idea and another. Secondly, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely when the mind understands one thing in its relation to another, although that relation is not discovered by the intellect but follows by a kind of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which has objective reality. This happens forasmuch as certain things not mutually related are understood in relation to one another, although the mind does not understand them to be related, for in that case it would be in error. Now in order that two things be related they must each have existence, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears a relation to itself ), and be referable to the other.

duane h. berquist Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationis creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.

3. Praeterea, hoc nomen Dominus relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est Dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coercendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum. Et eodem modo apparet quod Dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu.

Now the mind sometimes conceives two things as having, existence, whereas one or neither of them is a being: as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and considers one in relation to the other by placing one before the other; wherefore such relations are purely logical since they arise from the mode of understanding. And sometimes the mind considers one thing as though it were two, and considers them in the light of a certain relationship: as when a thing is said to be identical with itself, and such a relation is purely logical. Sometimes the mind considers two things as referable to each other, whereas there is no relation between them, in fact one of them is itself essentially a relation: as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject, wherefore such a logical relation has merely a logical relationship to anything else. Again the mind sometimes considers something in relation to another inasmuch as it is the term of the relationship of another thing to it, and yet itself is not related to the other: as when it considers something knowable as terminating the relationship of knowledge to it; and thus it imputes to the thing knowable a certain relation to knowledge, and such a relation is purely logical. In like manner our mind attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the term of the creature’s relation to him: wherefore such relations are purely logical. This name Lord signifies a relation since it is a predicamental relative. But Lordship is not merely a logical relation in God. Therefore neither are these relations in God only logical. Just as a man is identical with himself really and not only logically (although such a relation is merely logical) inasmuch as the cause of the relation is real, namely substantial identity, which the mind considers in the light of a relation: even so the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our mind considers it in relation to the subjects on account of the subjects’ relation to God: and thus he is called Lord really, although in him the relation is merely logical. For the same reason it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created mind in existence.

In the above text, Thomas would seem to distinguish about five kinds of relation of reason. But he distinguishes them first into two. All relations of reason are either attributable to things only as they are in the understanding or to them as they are outside the reason. Some relations of reason, such as genus and species, are said of things only insofar as they are in reason (where they are universal). The relations of reason that are said of things in themselves are of four kinds whereby they depart in some way from what is required for a real relation: 1. when one or both of the things between whom there is relation does not exist (outside the mind); as today is before tomorrow; 2. when the things are not distinct outside the soul; as Socrates is the same as Socrates; 3. when one is not orderable to the other because it is itself a relation or order; as a relation to its subject; 4. when the foundation of the relation is found only one which is really toward the other, but not viceversa; as the known to the knowledge or knower. Perhaps in the first three, there is a relation of reason in both relatives. But in the last, only in one. There seem to be two most universal divisions or distinctions of relations that we find in Thomas. • Every relation is either a real relation or a relation of reason. • Every relative is either a relative secundum dici or a relative secundum esse There is a danger in understanding dici and esse in the second distinction and confusing them with the first two. One could criss-cross the two divisions, but would this give four kinds or only three kinds.

Relativa sec. dici Relativa sec. esse

Real relations scientia & sensus (important relationes reales) double & half father and son

Relations of reason ??? dextrum et sinistrum in columna Dominus idem genus & species ??

Division of Chapter Seven: Toward Something or Relation I. The first definition and some properties A. The first definition of toward something i. The first definition ii. Definition exemplified (in two kinds of example) B. The properties of toward something i. Weaker properties a. Some of the above have a contrary and some do not b. Some said more or less and some not ii. Stronger properties a. Said in return with another 1. Shown in some 2. Qualification 3. Objection and its solution b. Together by nature 1. Where this is true 2. This is not so in some cases a) Knowledge and the knowable b) Sense and the sensible II. The second definition and another property A. The second definition of toward something i. The difficulty from parts of substance & defect of first definition ii. Solution: the second definition iii. How it is towards first definition: first definition more universal B. Another property of those whose whole nature is towards something i. if one knows determinately one of those toward something, he knows also that to which it is. III. The difficulty of the matter